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INTRODUCTION
The main intent of Marx' writings was to explain social change
throughout the centuries and to discover its laws.

Particularly, Marx

was interested in explaining nineteenth century British capitalist
society.

Based on his findings, Marx made several predictions regarding

the future development of societies.
Marx built his theory of class and social change with the following assumptions:
(1) The modes of production or the ways in which the people produce and distribute the means of sustaining their lives account

for

class formation in a society.
(2) The mode of production is not only an independent variable,
but in the last instance it asserts by itself.
(3) There is a continuous change in the forces of production:
forces of production are constituted by people and their instruments of
work.
The social structure of a society has its source in the way in
which the society produces goods to satisfy the basic human needs of
food, clothing and shelter.

There are two main ways in which economic

production can be carried out: (1) through an economic system in which
the means of production are private, and (2) through the nationalized
means of production.

In a society where the means of production are

private and especially where the production takes the form of commodity
production for profit (this is the case in advanced societies), one can
1
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can distinguish between those who are the owners of the means of production (capitalists) and those who do not own it (proletarians).
Possession of or exclusion from the ownership of the means of production
are the two opposite poles in relation to the means of production.
In order to produce, the O\vners of the means of production buy
human labor from those who do not possess the means of production.

The

process of buying human labor by capitalists brings about a conflict of
interests between these two classes of people.

While the owners of the

means of production are interested in paying as little as possible to
the workers for their jobs, the workers on the contrary are interested
in getting as much as possible.

The irreconciliability of the economic

interests lies in the fact that the value of the final product is

con~

stant, and so the more profit the owner of the means of production
makes, the lower the workers' wages.

Vice versa, if the workers' wages

are higher, the owner's profits are lower.

So, the surplus value which

is created exclusively by the human labor during the production process,
is thus split between the capitalist and the worker.

In other words,

the working day of a worker is divided into two parts: one part goes to
a worker as a necessary means of his subsistence, the other is taken by
a capitalist.

The proportion of the surplus value taken by a capitalist

to the entire surplus created by a worker is a measure of the exploitation of the workers by capitalists or a measure of the exploitation of
human labor by capital.
The owners of the means of production are always a minority in
society but they constitute a ruling class because the control of the

3
means of production brings about political control in society,

The

ruling class of a given society also controls the spiritual life of
that society.
Social change occurs where there is a conflict of the

opposites~

cold and hot, darkness and light, reactionary and revolutionary . . .
In more general terms, an established reality (called by Marx :'thesis")
is opposed by a new reality C'antithesis 1' ) .

Conflict of the opposites

is a consequence of the negation of a thesis by its antithesis and the
result of this conflict is a new reality ("synthesis:').

In terms of

social reality, Marx saw the capitalist class as a reactionary class
(thesis) to which a new revolutionary class, the proletariat (antithesis) was opposed.

There was an inevitable conflict between these two

classes of which the revolution is a climax.

The new postrevolutionary

reality is a new social system in which the proletariat now plays the
role of the ruling class (synthesis).
In Marx' view, the societies pass through several necessary stages
of social development \vhich are nothing but different levels of develop-·
ment of the forces of production (Marx, 1975, I; 612-774; Marx-Engels,

1978: 42-57; Harx-Engels, 1979: 21).

The first stage is Primitive

Communism, characterized by the absence of the private means of production and the lack of the division of labor.

The second is Asiatic

Society, in which the State assumes some important roles and property is
not privately owned.

Marx called the third stage the Antique Community.

Its main characteristic is the rise of private property and the institution of slavery.

The Feudal Society, which is the next step in the

development of the societies gave rise to the system of feudal vassals

4
in a country and of handicraft in the cities.

Modern technology and a

further division of labor accounted for the rise of the capitalist
society.

A fully developed capitalism implies a complete separation of

the direct producers from their instruments of work.

The increasing

conflict between the proletariat and the capitalist class

~vill

end in

the revolution which will bring about the last stage in social development which is an advanced communism.

The main characteristic of commu-

nist society is its classless character, the lack of class conflict, and
the end of the division of labor.
These are essential stages in social change and the societies can
hardly escape them.

The process itself, however, can be accelerated by

using the means which foster a maturation of class consciousness.

This

is especially important during the transition from capitalism to socialism.

It is, therefore, by no means accidental that Marxism inspired the

main stream of the nineteenth century Left in the Western Europe.

But

Marx not only created a theoretical basis for these movements, he was
also personally involved in the great events of the workers' organization in Western Europe during the second half of the last century.
On the basis of his theory, Marx made several predictions regard·ing the future of societies.
economically advanced England.

First, he foresaw a social revolution in
According to him, the revolution can

take place only when the capitalism reaches its climax.

Second, the

nationalization of the means of production would bring about a classless
society because everybody would be in the same relation to the means of
production.

Third, the communist society, as envisioned by Marx. would

be a non-conflictual society because there would be no basis for class

5
conflict.

Finally, the private means of production would disappear

together with the division of labor.

The division of labor is

insepar~

ably linked to private property.
History has contradicted Marx' first prediction regarding the
place of the proletarian revolution which took place not in economically advanced England, but in back1vard Russia.

The purpose of this

paper is to test Marx' theory of class, and connected with that, class
conflict.

There are, however, two reasons why it is extremely difficult

to empirically prove or disprove Marx' theory of class.
its vagueness and generality.

The first is

In fact, Marx used a notion of class

which was widely employed by historians and social theorists at the
middle of the nineteenth century.

~~rx

himself was mostly concerned to

fit this notion into the wider framework of his theory of social change
in the analysis of the social development of societies in general and
the rise of capitalism in particular.

The second reason is the lack of

a systematic account for his theory of class.

Although it may be

reasonably said that everything Marx wrote was in some way connected
with the problem of class, his writings do not elaborate a coherent
exposition of class theory.
During Marx' lifetime no country had abolished the right to
possess large private property or had nationalized private means of pro-duction.

This only happened in Russia thirty-four years after Marx'

death, and six decades after his death in the Eastern European countries.
This new socio-economic reality could constitute a test for Marx' class
theory.

Are these societies classless after having nationalized the

means of production?

If they are, in what sense?

Or maybe a new power
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structure has brought about a new, previously unknown class system?
There have been many sociologists who have tried to answer these
questions.

They range from those who deny the existence of the class

system in state socialist societies to those who maintain that the
Peoples' Democracies are class societies.

The so-called orthodox

Harxists of Russia and of the Eastern European countries, where Narxism
is an official state ideology, follow Marx' class theory of class and
class conflict rather literally.

In consequence they take for granted

the disappearance of classes and class conflict after the nationalization of the means of production.

Even if these sociologists do not deny

the existence of different "strata," they, however, insist that these
differences are rooted in "nongenerating" class factors such as the
difference between the lifestyle in the city and village; between physical and mental work, and in historically rooted differences.
There are also some Western sociologists who came to the same
conclusion that the state-run societies are classless.

Aron (1950;

1969) and Feldmesser (1961) are among the best known.

Even i f they

believe that the state-run society

is classless, they came to that con-

clusion using totally different arguments from those of the orthodox
Harxists,

For Aron the state-run societies are classless because the

powerful elite prevents any organized opposition and therefore the formation of other classes.
society.

Thus this type of society is a one-class

Feldmesser's argument is similar.

But while Aron stresses

the role of the power elite in preventing the formation of classes,
Feldmesser links this role to a police-state which prevents the indi-viduals and groups from forming opposition.

7

Djilas (1957; 1969), with his theory of "new class," represents
the opposite pole of these theories.

According to him, after the

nationalization of the means of production, the "new class," power elite
has been created which controls the nationalized means of production and
the distribution of GNP.

State-run societies are thus two-class soci-

eties with the "new class" as a ruling class constituted by the Party
people, and the vast majority of non-Party people.
Parkin (1969; 1971) and Giddens (1975) take an intermediate position.

In their views, it is the point of view of analyzing class struc-

ture in these societies that is important.

Close to these authors is

Ossowski (1963) who comes with the concept of "nonegalitarian classlessness" in the State-run societies.
Finally, Dahrendorf (1959) elaborates the theory of class in the
"post-industrial" societies which is based on authority relations in the
''imperatively coordinated associations."

Possession of or exclusion

from authority brings about a dichotomous class structure of those who
"command" and those who are "subordinated."

The theory may equally

apply to both capitalist or socialist societies unless they enter the
post-industrial stage of development.
This paper also undertakes the problem of class in the Soviet-type
societies.

The emphasis is posed on the utility of

~~rx'

class theory

for the analysis of class structure and class conflict in the State-run
societies.
The case study of this paper is the Polish postwar social, political, and economic reality with a special attention paid to the structural
conflict in Poland.

The analysis will concentrate mainly on four Polish

8
workers' upheavals, namely in July, 1956, in Poznan; in December, 1970,
in the northern cities of the Baltic Sea coast; in June, 1976, in Radom
and Ursus; and in August, 1980, first in Gdansk and later on, practically in the entire country.

Special attention is given to the factors

which brought about the insurrections.

To do this, Smelser's value-

added method of the analysis of the social movements will be used.

The

data will consist of the State's official data reported by GUS (Poland's
Main Statistical Office), by the Polish sociologists and economists.

To

procure a critical view of these data, they will be compared with more
impartial data reported by foreign books, periodicals, and newspapers.
Additionally, there are included six interviews with several Polish personalities who in some way or other were involved in the opposition to
the State, including an interview with Lech Walesa, the chairman of the
1-lorkers' Strike Committee and the Chairman of the Free Trade Union,
founded after the 1980 strikes.
illustrative.

The purpose of these interviews is

The analysis itself is based mainly on the official

State's statistical data and the data reported by socio-economic empirical studies.

The method employed by this study is imposed by the char-

acter of the research itself which is an historical case study.

There

will be analyzed the circumstances surrounding the insurrections, their
causes, protagonists, and the ways in which the power elite came about
controlling them.

Attention will be given also to the comparative

position of the blue-collar workers and other classes in terms of their
respective roles in the insurrections and their position in terms of
social structure.
The paper is coTiposed of four parts.

Part One presents an

exten~

9
sive discussion of Marx' theory of class and class conflict and a much
briefer exposition of post-Marx' theories of social class and class
conflict regarding mainly the Soviet-type socialist societies, namely
views of Milovan Djilas, Ralph Dahrendorf, Frank Parkin, Raymond Aron,
and Robert Feldmesser.
Part Two discusses the main aspects of social, political and
economic changes in Poland after World War II.

In that context the role

the Communist Party plays in the communist regimes will be discussed.
Part Three will analyze the Polish workers' upheavals which took
place under the communist regime.

The insurrections will be considered

as the manifestations of the structural conflict in Poland.
Finally, out of these, Part Four will propose alternative class
and class conflict theories in the Soviet-type socialist societies.

The

analysis will identify the key variables accounting for class structure
in so-called People's Democracies and the basis for class conflict in
these societies.

P A R T

0 N E

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER I
MARX' VIE\-l OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
As during the First International of the Communist Parties there
were several disagreements among the representatives of different Leftist
schools (reformists, revolutionary anarchists, Proudhonists, Blanquin··
ists,

~rxists

. . . ), similarly there are several schools of Harxism

today: French, German, Russian, and others.

Even though each of these

schools originated from Marx' teaching, they have deviated visibly from
their ancestor.

Uhile the French school never freed itself from the

utopian socialism of Fourier and Proudhon, Russians shifted toward the
voluntarism of Lenin, and Germans started to elaborate Marx' theory to
strengthen it with more explanatory power.

All these schools came from

i-larx' social theory and all constitute, in some way or other, Marxian
heritage; none of them, however, can claim to have preserved its purity.
Marx himself was supposed to say: "One thing is certain; I am not a
!larxist. " 1

To avoid such a misunderstanding, this study of Harx is pri-·

marily based on his writings.

It intends to text Marx' theory of class

in view of the post-World War II Polish socio-economic reality with a
special emphasis on the Polish workers' insurrections during that period.
Historical Materialism
To adequately grasp tne concept of class in the Marxian sense, one

1

Reported by Milovan Djilas, The ~ew Class (New York; Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1957), p. 4
11
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must keep in mind the following essentials of that scheme: (1) the class
system is rooted in the economic system or modes of production in any
given society; (2) control over the instruments of production makes
possible control over the people; (3) economic power brings about political power in a society; (4) the relationship between capitalists and
wage-laborers always have an antagonistic character.

This conceptual

scheme might be diagramed as follows:

Modes of Production

+

Economic System
Relations of Production

Un:L

Classless Society

Owners of the Means
of Production

Differentia t e d - Class Societv /
. ~Hage-laborers
Figure

1

Marx' Model of Social Classes

Basic Concepts
The "modes of production," as Marx uses the term, comprise the
various ways in which people produce and distribute the means needed to
sustain their lives.
adage.

Primum vivere deinde philosophari, says the Roman

To think man has to live; to live he has to eat; but to eat man
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must produce.

The satisfaction of the people's vital needs does not of

itself determine the structure of society, but is merely a presupposition of such a structure.
The mode of production must not be considered simply as being the
reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather
it is a definite form of expressing their lives, a definite form
of life on their part. As individuals express their lives, so
they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce.2
So it is not merely people's appropriation of nature to satisfy their
needs whicn

~eterrnines

social structure and social change; but the eco-

nomic system or the manner of such an appropriation and the manner of production \vhich Harx called the forces of production.
Forces of production are constituted by instruments and people.
"How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most
manifestly by the degree to which the division of labor has been carried.

Each new productive force already known . . ,, causes a further

development of the division of labor." 3

In the productive process man

links all his energies (physical and spiritual) to his tools and natural
energies.

By changing his tools man not only subordinates nature,

develops his society, but also creates history.
History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations,
each of \vhich exploits the materials, the capital funds, t:1e pro--:
ductive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and
thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in corn-

2
Karl Marx, German Ideology (New York: International Publishers,
1978), p. 42.
3

Ibid., p. 43.

14
pletely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old
circumstances with a completely changed activity,4
Any change in man's productive .:?cti'vity nas its repercussions in his
social relations, as well as in himself.

In this way the development of

production constitutes the primary and determining source of the development of the entire society.5
Also people's spiritual life increases and develops through the

4

Karl Marx, GI, p. 57. Contrary to the idealistic philosophers,
for whom "history like truth becomes a person apart, a metaphysical subject of which actual human individuals are merely bearers, 11 for Marx,
"hlstory does nothing; it 'possesses no colossal riches', it 'fights no
battles': Rather it is man, actual and living, who does all this, who
possesses and fights; 'history' does not upe man as a means for its purposes as though it were a person apart; it is nothing but the activity
of man persuing his ends." Karl Marx, "The Holy Family," Writings of
the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society by L. D. Easton and K. H.
Guddat (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 375 and 385
respectively.
5Marx' economic interpretation of history has often been called,
even by Marx himself, the materialistic interpretation. But--as Sebumpeter points out--this is entirely meaningless because any empirical
attempt to account for the historical process is equally "materialistic,"
and is compatible with metaphysical or even religious views. Marx' economic interpretation of history (according to Schumpeter) means two
things: (1) "The forms or conditions of production are the fundamental
determinant of social structures which in turn breed attitudes, actions
and civilization," (2) "The forms of production themselves have a logic
of their own: that is to say, they change according to necessities
inherent in them so as to produce their successors merely by their own
working." Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1975), p. 12.
Harx used the example of a mill to illustrate his position: a
handmill creates a feudal society that is an economic and social rc2lity
in which this method of milling is absolutely necessary; a steam-mill,
vice versa, gives rise to a totally new reality which is called capitalist society. "The windmill gives you a society with the feudal lord;
the steam-mill, society with industrial capitalist." Karl Marx, "The
Poverty of Philosophy," Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 6, p. 166.

15
process of material production in which they alter the objects to
gratify their needs and so learn about the things and the laws governing them.

By changing their material production, people also change

their mentality which, in consequence, accounts for change in the

pro~

duct of their thinking.
Finally, through their material and spiritual production men create
new conditions and new possibilities for the world of nature.

They

humanize nature, create a new world which would be impossible without
their activities in nature.

"He (man) opposes himself to nature as one

of her own forces setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the
natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate nature's productions
in a form adapted to his own wants." 6

In the process of man's material

activity, material and spiritual appropriation of nature takes place
7
. h puts nature 1n
. serv1ce
.
wh 1c
o f man.

6Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1979),
Vol. 1, p. 177. Marx' orientation is highly anthropocentric. His
humanism in comparison with the old humanisms overcomes the philosophical
concept of "good life'' of Aristotle and dichotomy of reason and sensibility of classical humanism. Instead, he put man with his productive
activity in the center of interest. Cf. Donald C. Hodges, "Marx's
Contribution to Humanism," Science and Society 29 (1965), pp. 173-191.
See also George Markus, "Marxist Humanism,' Science and Society 30
(1965), pp. 275-287; Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: F.
Ungar, 1961). According to Chamberlain, even "atheism for Marx is
theoretical humanism." Gary L. Chamberlain, "The Man Marx Hade,"
Science and Society 27 (1963), p. 310.
7Ljubomir Zivkovic, "The Structure of Marxist Sociology," Marxism
and Sociology by P. Berger (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1965),
p. 110.
The relation of priority of the sphere of material production over
the mental production is expressed by the categories of the base and
superstructure. The forms of production, and consequently appropriation
of the fruits of human labor, determine the political, religious and
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Forces of production are constituted by the means of production
and by the people who take part in the productive process.

The means of

spiritual life. In other words, politics, religious morality, ideology,
customs, every-day life--even if they are objective and real--they. like
other social activities, are determined by the economic structure of
society. This is because a social being does not exist in an abstract,
philosophical form, but in concrete social form.
The direction of influence between base and superstructure hardly
can escape to be characterized as materialistic determinism. Marx subordinated the whole mental, religious, moral, and spiritual life to the
sphere of material production. "The mode of production in material life
determines the social, political and intellectual life process in
general. It is not the consciousness of men that d€termines their being,
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." Karl Marx, "A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, :r
The .:rarx-Engles Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York; W. W. Norton and
Company, Inc., 1972), p. 4 (Introduction). This il.'l uuch l"".Or~ than to say
that material production has a ttlogic of its own" to use Schumpeter's
expression. The form of production accounts not only for the changes in
the superstructure, but even for th~ rise or death of some aspects of
the superstructure, e.g., religion. This deterministic position Bober
calls "substitution of plausible simplicity for complex totalities."
~1. H. Bober, Karl :Marx's Interpretation of History (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1950), p. 319. Feuer criticizes Marx for the tendency
'to underestimate the psychological complexities of human beings."
Lewis Feuer, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy; Karl Marx an~
Fredrich Engels (New York. Garden City, 1959), p. XIV (Introduction).
Hook talks about inadequacy of historical materialism because of :: . . .
disregard of the enormous influence which political, national and moral
forces have exerted on the development of capitalism as an economic
system.'' Sidney Hook, Marx and the Marxists: The Ambiguous Lega_cy (New
York. Charles Scribner and Sons, 1958). Kolakowski admits that relative
independence of the superstructure, reciprocal influence between base
and superstructure, the role of tradition can be fitted in the historical
materialism, but only because "the doctrine is so imprecise that no historical investigation and no imaginable facts can refute it." Leszek
Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1978),
Vol. 1, p. 367.
H. Needleman and C. Needleman advocate Marx's mul ticausal solu·tions. According to these authors, Marx was misinterpreted mainly
because of his style. Martin Needleman and Carolyn Needleman. "Marx
and the Problem of Causation," Science and Society 33 (1969), pp. 322339. This, however, can hardly be maintained because Marx was more than
clever in writing to express himself in an understandable way. Additionally, the authors base their arguments on the sources of secondary
importance.
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production are not merely the instruments used in the production but
also the work plant, raw materials, land . . . that is, all elements
which enter into the manufacture of the final product.
Man, however, does not produce separately from other men.
collaborates with them.
tions of production.

He

Doing so, he enters into two-dimensional rela-

First, he is related to the instruments or tools

he uses in the productive process.

Second. he is related to others who

participate in the same productive process.

The relations of production

constitute then, the organization of the division of labor through which
people participate in the material production in a particular historical time.
The relations of production depend upon the way it is controlled,
i.e., by ownership of production.

Collective ownership of the means of

production brings about a classless society in which each person's relations to the means of production are similar.

Private control (owner-

ship) of the means of production gives rise to a class society in which
a small minority of owners appropriate the fruits of production and
doing so, they exploit the large majority deprived of such a control.

For Kelle historical materialism is not only acceptable, but the
author sees in it the solution of all social problems and a panacea for
virtually any theoretical difficulty. Historical materialism enables a
scientist to detect all stages of the historical development of societies, to perceive casual and chronological interconnections of the
elements, to perform a scientific analysis of social processes, social
change and culture. Cf. Wladyslaw Kelle
"Marks i wspolczesne problemy teorii procesu historycznego," Czlowiek i Swiatopoglad 10 (1976),
p. 38. This nothing but a summary of the official position-on Marx'
teaching in Russia and her satellites.
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In this way "society is divided into rich and poor." 8

It cannot be

otherwise, because this is a necessary consequence of the private control of the means of production.
The worker's propertylessness, and the ownership of living labor by
objectified labor, or the appropriation of alien labor by capital-both merely expressions of the same relation from opposite poles-are fundamental conditions of the bourgeois mode of production, in
no way accidents irrelevant to it. These modes of distribution are
the relations of production themselves, but sub-specie distributionis.9
Increased private ownership of the means of production has always
been accompanies by the division of labor. 10

Especially in "complex

societies the relations of production take the form of a division of
labor which places people into categories or groups according to their

8Maurice Cornforth, Historical Materialism (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 59.
9Karl Marx, Grundrisse (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 832.
1 °For Durkheim, division of labor along with increase of population density, are the causes of the transition from the mechanical to
the organic solidarity. It is dynamic density which increases the
struggle for existence to produce a complex division of labor. In Durkheim's sociology, division of labor is rather a natural process with no
moral connotation. Cf. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
(New York: The Free Press, 1964).
In Marx' view, division of labor has always been connected with
private property (private ownership of the means of production) and
exploitation process. It brings about "the unequal distribution, both
quantitative and qualitative, of labor products, hence property." Karl
Marx, GI, p. 52. The reason is that "as soon as the distribution of
labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of
activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He
is a hunter, a fisherman, a shephard, or a critical critic, and must
remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood." Karl
Marx, GI, p. 53.
Finally, division of labor brings about the contradiction between
individual and community and between city and village. Only communist
society, that is, a society where there is only a public control of the
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role in the productive enterprise." 11
social classes.

These categories are called

Structured society tends to have a dichotomous char-

acter: a class which possesses the means of production and a class
excluded from the ownership of the means of production.

Freemen and

slaves, patricians and plebeians, lords and serfs, guild-masters and
journeymen are the examples of the contending classes in different
historical epochs. 12
Stages in the Development of
the Forces of Production
Every society passes through the same historical process of
development which consists of many different levels of the division of
labor, and corresponding to these levels, many different forms of ownership.

In Marx' view, these stages are necessary, that is, inescapable

steps in the process of the development.
Xen make their own history, but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves,
but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from

means of production, is a classless society which obliterates division
of labor, wipes away social classes and overcomes all contradictions.
"In a communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of
activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes,
society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for
me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning,
fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after
dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman,
shepherd or critic. !r Karl Harx, GI, p. 53.
11

Calvin J. Larson, Major Themes in Sociological Theory (New York:
David McKay Company, Inc., 1954), p. 44.
12

Karl Xarx, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International
Publishers, 1979), p. 9.
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the past. The tradition of all the dr~d generations weighs like a
nightmare on the brain of the living.
Primitive Community
The first stage of society's historical development is the primitive community.

In this type of society there is no private property,

no division of labor and, consequently, no classes.

People live in

extended families where the division of labor does not exceed natural
biological differences.
means of subsistance.

Nature itself provides for man the necessary
People of a primitive society live in an idyllic

relation to earth; they consider themselves as its common owners.
Asiatic Society
This type of society is characterized by rising of the sedentary
agriculture and by common ownership of land.

At that level of develop-

ment, the villagers are not yet the proprietors of the land; its ultimate owner is the State.

The State provides for public works, especi-

ally irrigation and road construction.

The communities are self

sufficient with a high level of integration of agriculture and manufacture.

There is no division into towns and villages, nor class

conflict.

According to Marx, "India offers us a sample chart of the

most diverse forms of such economic communities, more or less dissolved,
but still completely recognizable."

13

14

Asiatic societies are "stagnant,

Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Rrumaire of Louis Bonaparte," Tht::
Marx-Engels Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1972), p. 437.
14

Karl Marx, G.P. 882.
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unchanging, nondialectical, particularistic, and devoid of societal
mechanism for change."

15

Since the Asiatic society lacks private property, therefore it is
deprived of change. 1 6
. '1 SOCl.e
. t Y•
a Cl.Vl.

17

We find there is no pressure for the emergency of

A stagnant asiatic society needs an external force

to overcome the impasse.

That force came through European colonialist

expansion which brought about the dialectical conditions necessary for
any social change.

18
Ancient Community

Two important characteristics of this period should be stressed:
the emergence of individual ownership of private property and the institution of slavery.

The first characteristic resulted from historical

and environmental factors.

The more a natural tribal grouping is

15 sholmo Avineri, "Marx and Modernization," The Review of Politics
31 (1969), p. 181.
16social change in Marx' view, is always connected with conflict
and private property.
17 For Marx "only under the reign of Christianity, which makes all
national, natural, moral, and theoretical relationships external to man,
was civil society able to separate itself completely from political
life, sever all man's species, substitute egoism and selfish need for
those ties, and dissolve the human world into a world of atomistic,
mutually hostile individuals." Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question, 11
Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society by L.C. Easton and
K. H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 247.
18

Even thougli colonialism was viewed by Marx as a precondition of
modernization in the asiatic societies, he found no moral justification
for it. Both capitalism and colonialism are necessities which, however,
must be overcome. It will be accomplished through creation of the communist society.

22

affected by geographic migration, the more that tribe is exposed to new
conditions which usually enhance an individual's power and creativity
and reduce the collective character of the tribe,

Thus conditions

become more favorable for an individual to create private land ownership, that is, to acquire exclusive control of land to be cultivated
only by him and his family.

"With the development of private property,

we find here for the first time the same conditions which we shall find
again, only on a more extensive scale, with modern private property." 19
Another new element of the ancient period was the emergence of
slavery which disrupted the egalitarian system of the aaiatic community.
The use of slaves as labor power procured enormous wealth to a small
minority of the ancient society.

In consequence, the small land owners

were forced to augment the number of the proletarians because they were
not able to compete with wealthy patricians exploiting their slaves.
Finally, the invention of money as a means of exchange was very
essential to that period.

It sharply accelerated the exchange rate.

The impasse and stagnation of the preceding period was overcome.

The

foundation of the class society has been laid.
Feudal Society
An important circumstance which made possible the transition from

the ancient to the feudal society was the downfall of the Roman Empire.
Exploited slaves expecting to become land

o~vners

welcomed the barbarians

19Karl Marx, GI, p. 44. The former asiatic social structure based
on the communal ownership with the high degree of people's power ''decays
in the same measure as. in particular, immovable private property
evolves." Ibid., p. 44.
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as their liberators.

But the growth of the new era required some other

factors which did not exist in the previous stages in general and the
ancient society in particular.
While

new stage.

The first was a starting point of the

the ancient society started out from a small terri-

tory (a town), the feudal system of the
large territory (a country).

Ages started out from a

The population once living in small towns

was scattered over the large area.
ownership.

~iddle

The second factor was the change of

During the feudal epoch there were established two chief

forms of property ownership; the ownership of land with serfs as the
direct producers chained to it and craft labor organized into guilds in
towns.

Each of these forms of ownership brought about different hier-

archical structures.

One structure established the feudal hierarchy of

vassals with the king at the top; the urban structure contained a three-step hierarchy; master, journeyman and apprentice.
tion in both villages and towns was restricted.

The amount of produc-

Feudals were not inter-

ested in investing any surplus produce, but spent it in making wars and
in building castles and cathedrals.

Similarly, in the cities, the slight

division of labor could hardly give rise to a large-scale production.
"Apart from the differentiation of princes, nobility, clergy and peasants
in the country and masters, journeymen, apprentices and soon also rabble
of casual laborers in the towns, no division of importance took place.n2Q
So, in Marx's

view, "from these conditions} and the mode of organization

20Karl Marx,
.
GI, p. 4 6
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of the conquest determined by them

feudal property developed."

21

Capitalist Society
The emergence of capitalist society was possible under two conditions: the first was the dissolution of the feudal structures, that is,
the manorial system with its core of serfs and corresponding to it the
craft labor of artisans in towns;22 the second was the loosening of
energy caused by an increase of demand for conunodities.23

A new and

more efficient form of production was necessary to meet this demand.
Only the capitalist production of commodities has become an epochmaking mode of exploitation, which, in the course of its historical
development, revolutionizes, through the organization of the labor
process and the enormous improvement of technique, the entire
economic structure of society in a manner eclipsing all former
epochs.24
Referring to that, Shaw observes:
This type of production encourages the advance of the productive
forces and provides a basis for simple commodity production and
change. Although it is by no means geared primarily for exchange,
the division of labor between town and city, and within both,
requires it to a certain extent.25
These changes, according to Marx, brought about what he calls

21

Karl Marx, GI, p. 45.

22 Both of them were based on small-scale work relations.
23 "Meantime the market kept ever growing, the demand ever n.s1ng.
Even manufacture no longer sufficed, Thereupon, steam and machinery
revolutionzed industrial prolluction." Karl Marx, CM, p. 10.
24

Karl Marx, C, Vol. 2, p. 35.

25w. H. Shaw, Marx's Theory of History (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 143.

25
. . .

"pr~m~t~ve

accumu 1 a t"~on. n26

The word "primitive" does not mean less

important but indicates only "the prehistoric stage of capital and of
the mode of production corresponding to it."27

The process itself is

not simple or unilinear; it looks like a vicious circle.

11

The accumu-

lation of capital presupposes surplus value; surplus value presupposes
capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the preexistence of considerable masses of capital and of labor-power in the
hands of producers of commodities."

28

This is why the primitive accumu-

lation is "nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the
producer from the means of production." 29

The process started with the

expropriation of the direct agricultural producers from their soil, and
took different forms and intensity in different countries. 30
Capitalist Accumulation
Once the expropriation of rural population has been accomplished,
the newly created proletarians were forced to look for new means of
subsistance, but no longer in the rural areas.

Peasants who had been

26

"The primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the
same part as original sin in theology." Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 713.
27 rbid., p. 715.
28
29

IbicL , p. 113.
Ibid., p. 714.

30Marx limited himself to the studies of the expropriation process
in England. He distinguished three phases of that process: the first
took place in the fifteenth century when new nobility was expropriating
the peasants from their lands to have more lands to convert them into
pastures to produce more wool for the growing manufacture; in the sixth-

26
set free migrated to towns where the growth of manufacturing offered
numerous job opportunities.

With that, a new process of transforming

the rural proletariat into an urban one was put into motion.

Willingly

or unwillingly people began to participate in the new productive system.
"They

~v-ere

tal."31

now transformed into material elements of variable capi·-

The peasants were previously producing the means of their own

subsistance which they consumed by themselves, now everything became
commodity: raw material, capital, labor power .
built: some of them grew rapidly.

New shops were

Commerce and usury served as a means

to enlarge the capital.
Another factor which accelerated capitalist development was the
discovery of new lands, especially America.
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of
Africa into a warren for commercial hunting of black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.32
Similarly, the new banking system helped capitalist entrepreneurs
in obtaining money and created a new class of finance aristocracy.
Additionally, the employment of children in factories lowered the
cost of production and therefore augmented the profit of the capitalist.

teenth century Reformation expropriated the Catholic Church and converted its inmates into the proletariat, and finally, in the nineteenth
century, the expropriation took the form of the so-called "clearing of
cottages," that is, the expropriation of the peasants from their small
lots. Cf. Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, pp. 717-745.
3

~arl Harx, C. Vol. 1, p. 745.

32

Ibid., p. 751.
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"Many, many thousands of these little creatures were sent down into the
north, being from the age of 7 to the age of 13 or 14 years old."33
Also, by this time work in shifts has become a normal practice.34
Finally, exploitation of weaker countries through the colonial
system enormously fostered capitalistic accumulation.

"Colonial system,

public debts, heavy taxes, protection from commercial wars, these
children of the true manufacturing period, increased gigantically during
the infancy of Xodern Industry.

The birth of the latter is heralded by

a great slaughter of the innocents."

35

Fully developed capitalism implies complete separation of the
direct producers from their means of production.

"Capitalist production

reproduces . . . the class of wage laborers, into whom it transforms the vast majority of the direct producers."36
high level of concentration of capital.
the second.

33

It also requires a

The first is a consequence of

"(The) expropriation is accomplished by the action of the

Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 758.

34

Marx refers to that fact in Capital: "It is a common tradition
in Lancashire. that the beds never get cold." Ibid.
35

Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 757. Even the state has that purpose.
The state for Marx is simply "the form of organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for
the mutual guarantee of their property and interests," Karl Marx, GI,
p. 80. Cf, A. F. McGovern, "The Young Marx on the State," Science and
Society 34 (1970), pp. 430-466.
36 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 32.
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immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the concentration of
capital. tt 3 7
Toward Proletarian Dictatorship
Capitalism, according to Marx, is not a last stage in the development of the societies .. A growing conflict of interests which brings
about class struggle and the concentration of capital will destroy the
capitalist system.
Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of
capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of
transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery. degradation, exploitation: but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined,
united, organized ~g the very mechanism of the process of capitalist
production itself.
This means that the seeds of communism are always present in the
capitalist society.

39

In order to make possible a revolution it is

necessary to wait a period of time for the maturation of the revolutionary consciousness.
In times when the class
of dissolution going on
whole range of society,
that a small section of

struggle nears the decisive hour the process
within the ruling class, in fact within the
assumes such a violent, glaring character,
the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and

37

Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 763. Fully developed capitalistic pro-duction implies "concentration of the means of production in few hands,
whereby they cease to appear as the property of the immediate laborers
and turn into social production capacities . . . ; organization of labor
itself into social labor: through cooperation, division of labor, and
the uniting of labor with the natural sciences . . . , and creation of
the world market .
" Karl Marx, C, Vol. 3, p. 266.
38Karl Harx, C, Vol. 1, p. 763.
3 9conflict of interests and class struggle are not accidental to
the capitalist society, rather, they lie at the very heart of the capi-
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joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its
40
hands.
Even though revolutions are not going to take place at the same time in
different countries, this depends upon the level of the development of
the forces of production and consequently, upon the level of class consciousness of the proletariat, communism is still an international
affair.

Abolition of capitalism will give rise to a classless society

din which the free development of each is the condition for the free
development of all. "

41

Figure 2 represents the historical process of the development of
societies according to Harx. further elaborated by Helotti.42
Forces of Production, Social Classes
If the concept of class is an essential component of every sociological theory, it is especially central in Marx' social theory, since
everything Marx wrote was in some way related to the question of class.
Curiously, however, Harx never elaborated a systematic theory of class.
He never provided a formal definition of class.

Moreover, Marx' termi-

talist system. Capitalism will not vanish because of its success, as
Schumpeter says. It will do so because of its innermost defects.
4 °Karl
41
42

u
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narx,
1 ,
p. 19 .

Ibid., p. 31.

V. Melotti, "Marx e il terzo mondo,"
(1971), p. 27.
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Historical Stages in the Development of the Societies
According to Marx
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nology is ambiguous.

He used such terms as "class," "stratum," "estate 11

as if they were interchangeable.

Additionally, he applied the general

conrept of class to subclasses like "lumpenproletariat," "ideological
class," i.e., to the groups of people which meet only some of the
teria of a class.

cri~

However, Marx' writings contain many scattered frag-

ments which may help readers to grasp what he meant by class.

43

Impli-

citly, Marx analyzed the problem of class in connection with his
analysis of production, creation of surplus value, social change,
division of labor, social conflict, exploitation, and alienation.
Basic Components of the
Marxian Class Concept
Any social grouping must meet at least four criteria to constitute
a social class in the Marxian sense: (1) individuals must be in the same
relation to the means of production; (2) they must share the same life
conditions; (3) they must have and define consciously their interests,
11y organ1ze
. d . 44
. .
an d (4) t h ey h ave to b e po 1 1t1ca

Relation to the Means of Production
To Marx, the most important factor of social life is human work.
To live, man must work.

But to work he collaborates with others in

43

~ve find in Marx' ~vritings, as Calvez points out, aspects of
reacial class theory (especially in his analysis of colonialism), its
psychological aspect (when Marx makes analysis of class consciousness),
the cultural aspect (when he was connecting ruling ideas with the ruling
class, and finally, the most important--the economic aspect of social
class. Cf. Jean-Yves Calves, La pensee de Karl Marx (Paris: Editions
du Seuil, 1956), pp. 197-203.
44

Cf. Michel Peillon, "Une strategie sociologique pour l'etude de
la structure declasse," Theory and Society 10 (1980), p. 7.
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making his living.

"The mode of production, once it is assumed to be

general, carries in its wake an ever increasing division of social
labor · · ·

"45

This collaboration assigns people to different positions

in the productive process.

Class, then, is constituted by "the function

its members perform in the process of production. ':46

It is composed of

the individuals who perform the same function in the organization of
production or their respective functions in the economy.

Class in the

l'Iarxian sense is not a cluster of occupations: "class and occupation
occupy basically different theoretical spaces. •· 4 7

Nor is it the source

of income in the division of labor that accounts for class, but the
relationship of grouping of individuals to the means of production.
Other indices of class such as consumption. educational level, lifestyle, etc., are but consequences of the main criterion.
t~,;o

Marx outlines

different types of relationship to the means of production: owner-

ship of the means of production, and exclusion from the property ownership.

Patricians, lords, bourgeois were characterized by the first type

of the relationship; slaves, plebeians, journeymen and proletarians by
the second.
In every type of class society, and especially in capitalism,

45

Karl Marx, C. Vol. 2, p. 33.

46

Reinhart Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, "Karl Marx's Theory of
Social Classes," Class, Status, and Power by Reinhart Bendix and Seymour
M. Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 7.

47

Erik 0. Wright, "Classes and Occupation," Theory and
(1980), p. 178.

~_9_c;iety
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there are two fundamental classes: a minority of the owners of the means
of production and the others who do not own the means of production. 48
Control over the means of production brings about the control of distribution over the good produced: "The worker becomes all the poorer the
more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and
range."49

It also brings about the control of the mental production of

the society: "The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationship

rrSO

The Sharing a Similar Lifestyle
Even though the amount of one's income is important, it does not
automatically assign individuals to a given class.

It is possible, at

least theoretically, for two individuals to have similar incomes, even
the same profession, and yet not belong to the same class.

But again,

this is only a negative requirement in the sense that all individuals of
the same class share a similar lifestyle which does not yet account for
a full class formation. 51

If a group of people meets the requirement of

48

Marx talks about the tendency of the "concentration of capital
and land in a few hands." Karl Marx, CM. p. 34. The proletarians with
no property constitute the misery pole. ''The proletarian is without
property." Ibid., p. 20.
Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,n The Marx~
Engels Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1972),
p. 57.
49

SOKarl Marx, GI. p. 64.

51

This is stressed by Marx on different occasions but especially
when he talks about Lumpenproletariat and French peasants.
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similar lifestyle it forms "a class in itself,'' but its members are
still not aware of the antagonism towards the ruling class.
Large scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people
unknown to one another . . . (but) the dominian of capital has
created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This
mass is thus already a class as against capital but not yet for
itself. In the struggle .
52 . this mass becomes united, constitutes
itself a class for itself.
Common Interests, Class Consciousness
Class becomes a class "for itself" only when its members become
aware of their objectives, that is, their interests and their common
enemies.

This assertion answers two basic questions: who is the enemy,

and why are they the enemy?
Class interests are not merely a sum of an individual's or even
many people's interests.
And as in private life one distinguishes between what a man thinks
and says of itself and what he really is and does, still more in
historical struggles must one distinguish the phrases and fancies of
the parties from their real organism and their real interests, their
conception of themselves with their reality.~ 3
The object of class interests for two different classes is opposite.

In capitalism, the immediate interest of the proletariat is the

wage, that of the bourgeoisie, profit.

While each class "needs" another

to produce commodities, they are at the same time exclusive because of
their conflictual interests.

The opposite character of class interests

stems from the capitalist production itself.
products assume the form of commodities,

52

"In a society where all

these commodities must be

Karl Marx, "Poverty of Philosophy," Collected Works (New York:
International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 6, pp. 210-211.
53

Karl Marx, EBLB, p. 460.
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sold after they have been produced, it is only after their sale that
they can serve in satisfying the requirements of their producer .~·5 4
higher the wage paid to the worker, the lower the profit of the

The

capi~

talist, i.e., the difference between the sale price of a commodity and
the cost of its production.

55

Using Marx' terms then, we can say: pro-

duction of a commodity is a process of increasing the surplus value in
that

cow~odity.

This increase might be accomplished in two ways: by

the prolongation of the working day or by decreasing the labor time
necessary for the reproduction and maintaining of the labor power.
Surplus value produced by prolonging the working day Marx calls "an
absolute surplus value" while the second type of surplus value is called
"a relative surplus value." 5 6
The working day of a direct producer is always divided into two
parts: one part goes for the reproduction (physical and mental) of the
labor power;

57

.

.

the second takes the cap1tal1st.
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The proportion of

54
Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 169.
55

The minimum of wages is determined by the value of those means
of subsistance that are physically indispensable for maintaining of a
laborer. Ibid., p. 173.

56 .
Ib1d. , p. 315.
57

Marx calls it "a necessary labor time."

Ibid., p. 217.

58

labor."

This portion of the working day is called by Marx "A surplus
Ib'd
"17 •
1 . ' p. 4.
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surplus labor to necessary labor is a measure of exploitation of labor
power by capital.

59

When capital dominates labor power (when the direct producer is
separated from his tools), his work becomes aa.forced activity" which
instead of fulfilling him induces him to exhaustion, despair, misery .
.

Ho~o

faber externalizing himself in nature through his work finds

the object of his activity as alien and oppressive power.

It is this

process of objectification that appears " . . . as a process of alienation from the standpoint of labor, and as appropriation of alien labor
the standpoint of capital."

60

Thus, the conflictual interests (economic) of capitalists and the
working class are the main source of all other opposite interests,
especially political power.

It has already been pointed out how the

economic relations (control of the means of production) bring about
unequal distribution of wealth in a society.

Unequal distribution of

political power is another important consequence of the authority relations in the sphere of production.
Opposite class interests cause class conflict.

"The history of

59

Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 218.
60
·Karl Marx, G, p. 831. Contrary to Hegel, who conceived alienation in terms of spirit, Marx "by linking alienation with economic and
social structure," as Swingewood stresses, "grasped its historical
character and argued that abolition of its cause, private property,
within capitalism, will finally, liberate man in communism," Alan
Swingewood, Marx and Modern Social Theory (Essex: The Anchor Press,
Ltd., 1975), p. 91.
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all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."

61

The protagonists of class conflict have varied through centuries, but
the contending parts have always been oppressors and oppressed.

"The

contending classes are locked in a situation of domination and subjection from which there is no escape except through the total transformation of the mode of production."

62

This is because "no social order

ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room
in it to have been developed and new higher relations of production never
appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in
the womb of the old society?" 63
Class conflict is not simply accidental to the capitalist system.
It expresses the very innermost character of the system itself.

Because

of its contradictory character capitalism allows only a limited realization of the potential creativity which industrialization procured and
capitalism made possible.
Class conflict is possible only if each of the opposing classes is
aware of the interests and goals which conflict with those of the other
class, i.e., when its individuals possess a sufficient degree of class
consciousness.

For that reason, Marx argued, the French peasants of

the nineteenth century were not established as a class "for itself,"
nonetheless they shared similar life conditions:

()1

·Karl Marx, CM, p. 9.

62
Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 1977), p. 18.
b3Karl Marx, "A contribution to the Critique of the Political
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In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of
existence that divide their mode of life, their interests and their
culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile
contrast to the latter, they form class. In so far as there is
merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the
identity of their interests begets no unity, no national and
political organization, they do not form a class. They are completely incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own
name, whether through a parliament or through a convention.64
Class consciousness is not given but it develops, and grows.

Con-

sciousness as a social product also grows as proletariat increases in
number and organizes itself as a political class.

Among other important

variables which would foster the maturation of class consciousness are
the growing discrepancy between the wealthy and the poor, improvement in
intercommunication between the individuals of the same class so that the
new ideas can easily be disseminated, better understanding of the historic role of the class, and finally, an adequate leadership.

The work-

ing class will emerge victorious because only the proletarian movement
is really self-conscious.
Class Political Organization
Dividing the society into two struggling camps cannot be

accom~

plished unless the contending parts have been politically organized,
"The struggle of class against class is a political struggle." 65

If

class struggle is a political struggle, the contending classes must be
organized as the political parties.

Marx taught in the same vein during

Economy," The Marx-Engels Reader by R.C. Tucker (New York: IV.W. Norton
and company, 1972), p. 51.
64Karl Marx, EBLB, pp. 515-516.
65

Karl Marx, PPH, p. 211.

On the next page Marx wrote; "Do not say
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developing into a atruggle for political power, was an inseparable part
of the fight against economic exploitation." 66

Political organization

of the proletariat is, therefore, not a matter of option, but the necessity to acquire desired discipline, unity and effectiveness, all the more
that "the organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently
into a political party, is continually being upset . . . by the competition bet>;.;een the workers themselves. " 67

Despite all these difficulties,

the proletariat will emerge as a victorious class.
Finally, in times when class struggle nears the decisive hour, the
process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact
within the whole range of society, assumes such a violent, glaring
character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself
adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the
future in its hands.68
It is not simply a matter of chance that neither

~~rx

nor his fol-

lowers have elaborated a formal definition of class in the Marxian
sense.

The difficulty arises from the Marxian theory itself; more

specifically, from the generality and and the ambiguity of its basic
criterion of class formation (the ownership of the means of production
or exclusion from it).

Perhaps the best known definition of class in

the Marxian sense is Lenin's.

In Lenin's words,

that social movement excludes political movements."

Ibid., p. 212.

66

Julius Braunthal, History of the International (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 130.
67Karl Marx, D1, p. 18; cf. Karl Harx. C, Col. I, p. 763.
68
Karl Marx,

~1,

p. 19.
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. . . social classes are large groups of people which differ from
each other by the place they occupy in a historically definite
system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed
and formulated in laws) to the means of production, by their role in
the social organization of labor, and consequently, by the dimensions of the wealth that they obtain and their method of acquiring
their share of it.69
This definition has two crucial components: the first stresses the
fact that relations of production do not end in the relations to
things, but also represent an exterior expression of relations among
men in an economic productive process.

The second component asserts

that the difference in relation to the means of production causes the
difference in the division of wealth and the national product.
Lenin's definition of class, however, does not include some other
fundamental aspects of class in the Marxian sense; for example, the
common lifestyle of the individuals who form a given class, their minimum necessary political organization, and most importantly, the class
consciousness.

For these reasons, Lenin's definition, even though

somewhat useful cannot be fully valid.

Instead of this, I propose

another definition of class in the Marxian sense: class is a large
group of individuals who are in the same historically established relation to the means of production, who share a similar lifestyle, possess
common interests, spell them out consciously in opposition to the
interests of the other contending class, and work for their realization
through political organization.

69
Vladimir I. Lenin, "Hielka inicj atywa," Dziela Wspolne (Warszawa:
PHN, 1956), Vol. 19, p. 415.
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classes in the Nineteenth
century British Society
Only at the end of the third volume of Capital does Marx treat the
problem of class more systematically.
completed.

But the analysis has never been

The manuscripts were ended without being finished.

The few

passages we find there are surely the most important for this topic.
From the third volume of Capital we learn that there were three classes
in the nineteenth-century British society: landowners, wage laborers,
and capitalists.

A discovery of these three classes was in line with

the first Marx criterion of class: the relation to the means of production--property and propertyless.

Property has two different forms:

land, which gives rise to the class of aristocracy; and capital, which
creates the class of capitalists.

Exclusion from property accounts for

the rising of the proletariat.
Aristocracy was, in Marx' view, the most easily identifiable
class.

Its history reached back to the Medieval feudal period or even

to the time of the Roman Empire.

This class has been changing during

the centuries but not to the point of losing its identity.
The proletarian class was as old as the ancient ruling classes.

No

other class has changed so often and so profoundly; initially ancient
slaves, later plebeians, serfs, journeymen, and finally, the working
class of the modern capitalism in hope of becoming a ruling class in the
classless society of communism.
In trying to do more specific analysis of social classes. Marx
faced insurmountable difficulties due to his theoretical model of class.
Property after all, can assume different forms.

We saw above, that this
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was a reason for distinguishing between the capitalists and the aristocracy.

But capital can also assume different forms: e.g., ownership of

the factories or money.

Marx refers to the first stratum as "millioc-

racy;" the second he calls "moneyocracy" or ''finance aristocracy. " 70
Even with this distinction the problem has not been solved.

Marx

had to assign a place in the structure to a rather large stratum of
the British society--the intellectuals or intelligentsia.

The dilemma

was this: were the intellectuals capitalists (and if so, in what sense?h
or did they belong to the proletarian class?
need to look at other writings of Marx.

To solve this problem we

Intelligentsia: writers.

journalists, professors, doctors, lawyers and priests are all "the

· 1 represen t a t 1ves
·
· · "
1· d eo 1 og1ca
an d spo k esmen o f th e b ourgeo1s1e.

71

As "the

centralized State power, with its ubiquitous organs of a standing army,
police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature-organs wrought after the
plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labor, originates :rom
the days of absolute monarchy, serving nascent middle-class society as
a mighty weapon in its struggles against feudalism,"

72

so the intellect-

uals., whole intelligentsia and bourgeoisie stand forth as brothers,
united by the same interests but specializing themselves on the field

70

1

Karl Marx, "Class Struggle in France, ' Collected Works (~ew York:
International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 10, p. 48. Talking about capitalist class Marx is often rough-spoken; he calls them "class of barbarians," Karl Marx, C, Vol. 3, p. 813
"class of parasites," ibid.,
p. 545; murders: "One capitalist ahvays kills many," ibid., Vol. .1,
p. 763.
71

Karl Marx, CSF, p. 49.

"7')

,._Karl Marx, "Civil War in France," The Marx-Engels Reader by
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work.

The intelligentsia is an ideological class which is at capitalists

.

serv~ce.

73

~1arx

also faced difficulties in analyzing the proletarian class.

As the intelligentsia, this class was not homogeneous either.

It was a

part of "lumpenproletariat" that Marx called "a dangerous class," "a
social scum," "passively rotting mass" composed of the lowest layers of
old

.

soc~ety.

74

Lumpenproletariat was a dangerous class because "its

conditions of life prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of
reactionary intrigue."

75

Lumpenproletariat did not hesitate to sell

their services to the capitalists, who made use of them as strikebreakers
and antirevolutionists.

Elsewhere lumpenproletariat is considered " a

recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the
crumbs of society, people without a definite trade, gens sans feu et sans
aveu." 76
Finally, Marx had somehow to deal with a large part of the nineteenth century society which hardly could fit into his scheme--the

R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 552.

73
Such a solution is unjustified. It is historically incorrect to
link intellectuals and intelligentsia with capitalist class as its
supporters. French philosophers of the eighteenth century had inspired
French revolutionists; Russian intelligentsia whole-heartedly opposed to
the Tsarat and developed revolutionary attitudes of Mensheviks or even
Bolsheviks; Polish intelligentsia protected and preserved Polish culture
during 125 years last partition of Poland.
74

75
76

Karl Marx, CM, p. 20.
I.bid., p. 20.
Karl Marx, CSF, p. 62.
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middle and lower middle class, such as small manufacturers, shopkeepers,
artisans.
tionary.

77

78

In Marx' view, they were neither reactionary nor revoluEven though they were oriented towards the future, this

class has no future.

It was predestined to disappear.

Like "the feudal

lords were replaced by urban usurers . . . , and aristocratic landed
property was replaced by bourgeois capital,"

79

so the middle class will

be converted into proletariat to create a perfectly dichotomous society
of capitalists and proletarians.
stop there.

But the social evolution does not

After that polarizations, the turn will come for the capi-

talist class to be overcome by means of the proletarian revolution; when
the classless society will be built, the proletariat itself will undergo
a radical transformation into a community.
The vagueness of Marx's use of the concept of class constitutes the
"crux" of Marxian class theory.
Marxian class analysis.

Olleman calls it the "disorder" or

Marx, he observes, "cannot escape . . . the

accusation of having a litter of standards for class membership and of
"
.
. h out prlor
.
.
c hanglng
t h em wlt
warnlng.

77
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Marx calls them "petty bourgeoisie."
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Karl Marx, CSF, p. 49.
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"Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the
wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only
in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus
defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their
own standpoint to adopt that of the proletariat . . . " Karl Marx, CM,
p. 19.

79

Karl Marx, EBLB, p. 518.

80

Bertell Olleman, "Marx Use of 'Class'," American Journal of
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eight criteria used by Harx on different occasions in his analysis of
class. 81

To avoid such difficulties, Blalyszewski suggests stressing

the following characteristics of the Marxian model of class: direct
connection between production--distribution and class, class as real
groups and not only analytical categories, ideological and political
differences as the consequence of the property relations differences,
class conflict as a source of social change, and finally, the historical
aspect of social classes. 82

Wiatr wants to stress first the ideological

inspirations which played an important role in Marx' analysis of class.83
Whatever might be the differences among

~farxists,

it seems that on

the basis of Marx' whole writings, we can depict the image of the capitalist society

as it is diagramed on page 46.

Marx claimed that his theory of social change, with the theory of
social class as its integral part, was universally valid in space and
time.

Explaining social change, and particuarly changes in class struc-

ture during the centuries, as we have seen, he came to the conclusion
that the private ownership of the means of production accounts for social
class formation.

The type of the private means of production is itself a

81 stanislaw Kozyr-Kowalski, "Harksistowska teoria Klas i Warstw spolecznych w swietle 'Kapitalu' - Proba rekonstrukcji," Studia Socjologiczne 2 (1969), pp. 5-42.
82

Henryk Blalyszewski, "Funkcjonalny model struktury spolecznej i
jego krytyka," Problemy wspolczesnej socjologii by S. Widerszpil
(i.Jarsza>;.ra: P~.JN, 1970), p. 55.
83 Jerzy Wiatr, "U1:-mrstwienie spoleczne a tendencje egalitarne,"
Kultura i Spoleczenstwo 2 (1962), p. 34.
This position can hardly be maintained because it pushes analysis of
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a. Owners of the means
of production
1. Capitalists
b. Owners of the working
{
capital
c. Ideological class

I. Owners

2. Landowners

Capitalist
Society

II. Middle class (It will disappear)

1.

III. Horking
Class

Proletariat

2. Lumpenproletariat
(

2.

Peasants

a source of different dichotomous class structures in different historical periods.
On the basis of this theory, Marx envisioned communist society arising after the nationalization of the means of production.

The main

characteristic of that society would be its classless character.

Marx,

however, did not have a chance to see his theory of class disappearance
verified in his lifetime.
"socialized" prior to 1917.

No country had the means of production
That happened for the first time in Russia

in 1917, and in Eastern European countries, now called "the Peoples'
Democracies" thirty years later.

All these countries have their means

of production nationalized, and even if there exists a small amount of

class to the point where everything and nothing can be a social class.
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private property, socialist countries differ significantly from capitalist countries where the private initiative and the possibility of
inheriting property

play an important role in class structure.

Thus

the nationalization of the means of production in these countries brings
about a reality i'iarx invisioned: the abolition of private means of production.

In the framework of the Marxian theory of class, one can

logically assume the disappearance of a class system in the People's
Democracies and with that the rise of societies free of structural conflict.
But a sociologist cannot take for granted that social stratification
will automatically disappear following the abolition of the private means
of production.

This has to be proved.

Similarly, it is not enough to

say that in the socialist societies there "are no classes" in the Marxian
sense because private ownership of the means of production has been
abolished.

One must see if there is any other patterned inequality per-

petuating itself.

If this is the case, one must identify the factors

which account for such an inequality.
Several sociologists tried to answer these questions.

There are

among them so-called "orthodox" Marxist sociologists, who follow Marx'
view rather literally.
European countries where

These are mainly the sociologists of the Eastern
~1arxism

is an official State ideology.

There

are also several I.Jestern sociologists who addressed the matter of classes
in State-run socialist societies.
following chapter.

Their views will be presented in the

CHAPTER II
PEOPLES' DEMOCRACIES CLASS OR CLASSLESS
SOCIETIES?

DIFFERENT VIE\.JS

Orthodox View of Class Structure in The
State-run Socialist Societies

The abolition of the private means of production was for Marx a
necessary condition for the solution of all economic and social problems and for the creation of a new, classless society.

The proletarian

revolution was intended as a turning point in the history of humanity,
the laying of a foundation for a completely new social system.

This,

however, could happen only where the forces of production reached a
necessary level of development.
. .

sue h con d 1t1ons.

1

A highly developed capitalism creates

Once this turning point has taken place, a new pro-

cess is put into motion.

Its end is a highly developed communist

society, where there is no more "division of labor," where ''labor is no
longer merely a means of life but becomes life's principal need," when
reigns the rule: "from each according to his ability, to each according
to his needs."

2

1

It was the Russian revolution itself that contradicted this theory.
In Harx' view, proletarian revolution was possible only in the stage of
an advanced capitalism. For that reason Marx predicted revolution in
economically developed England. But the revolution took place in backward Russia ~vhere capitalism was in its infancy.
2
Karl Harx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (New York: International
Publishers, 1938), p. 10.
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Marx predicted the advent of the future classless society on the
basis of his theory.

Private ownership of the means of production or

being denied such ownership account for the dichotomous structure in a
class society.
ture.

Advanced capitalism is the best example of such struc-

Abolition of the private means of production would bring about a

society without social classes.

But Marx died before any society had

nationalized private means of production.

Russian and other orthodox

Harxist sociologists of the Eastern European countries have to face very
different problems.

While Marx was predicting the main features of the

society without private means of production, the contemporary Russian
and orthodox Marxist sociologists have to deal with a reality.

On the

one hand, Marxism has been an official ideology in Russia and Eastern
European countries and so constitute an inviolable framework of analysis; on the other hand, the so-called Peoples' Democracies can hardly
be considered classless societies because in them are very evident
inequality of opportunity, income, education, prestige, and power.
orthodox Marxists must find an answer to this problem,

The

The solution

they bring is this: while the abolition of private means of production
rids society of its classes, it does not eliminate all inequalities.
This will take place only with the advent of the final stage of commu...,.
nism.
Russian orthodox sociologist, Kosolapov, distinguishes three ryeriods
on the way to the full development of communism: the first is a transitional

period during which socioeconomic relations are transformed,

the cultural revolution takes place, and individuals become accustomed

so
to the socialist form of economy and the corresponding political power
of the proletariat (proletarian dictatorship),

The last factor is of

special importance, and a conditio sine qua non of understanding of
social changes during the socialist transformation of a country.

Any

abstration from that role of the State power on that level of social
change could totally distort the perception of the socialist reality.
The state of proletarian dictatorship persists because class contradiction continues to exist as it does opposition and it become necessary
to protect the interests of the working class by sheer force of the
3tate.

The second period is characterized by the consolidation of the

new system, the development of the force of production, and actual
socialization of the economic life.

At that stage, the dictatorial

functions of the State are superfluous because of the disappearance of
the exploiting classes and their political organizations.

The third

period implies elimination of all relics of the preceding system, and a
reign of social democracy.

The development of the socialist democracy

will bring about the death of the State itself and transform the society
into a self-governing community.

This community, however, is not

possible as long as there exists a division of the world into different
economic and political systems and while there is a real possibility of
and international conflict. 3

3R K
.
. . roz\vlnletego
. .
. oso 1 apov, "Meto d o 1 og1.czne
pro bl emy teor1.1
socJ. a-,.

lizmu," 0 rozwinietym spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym by H. Cholaj and
F. Ociepka (Warszawa: 1979), Vol. 1, pp. 47-48. Cf. J. Czecharin,
"S ystem polityczny w warunkach rozwinietego socjalizmu," ibid., pp. 268284; A. P. Butenko, "Istota i problemy rozwinietego spoleczenstwa socjalistycznego," ibid., pp. 52-84; Aleksander Owieczko, "Demokracje socjal-
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To put it another way, there are several criteria which indicate to
what extent the socialist system has advanced on the road to communism.
They are: the degree of a real socialization of the means of production
and the universality of the new relations of production; the level of
the social efficiency of human work; the degree of equalization of life
and work conditions of the different social classes (strata); the level
of the development of socialist democracy and the efficiency of the
state's organs in serving people; the degree of establishment of the
socialist ideology in the consciousness of the individuals, and finally,
the character and degree of the satisfaction of all human needs.

As

soon as the advanced socialist society becomes a reality, the prevailing
motivation of the people is a conviction that what is socially right and
useful, coincides with the personal interests of the individuals. 4
The advanced socialist country is ruled by the principle of socialist democracy, where there has been established not only a legal but
real equality through the abolition of the private.means of production.
Several channels have been opened through which people can and do participate in social organizations and institutions of power.

istyczne i udzial mas w zarzadzaniu gos.podarka narodowa, '! _Ideologia i
Polityka 10 (1975),
4

Jerzy Wiatr, Spoleczenstwo (Warszawa: PWN, 1973), pp. 368-376.
Cf. Adam Pieniazek, Panstwo na etapie budowy rozwinietego spoleczenstwa
socjalistycznego (Warszawa: KiW, 1980), Jan Bluszkowski, "Przemiany
struktury klasowo-warstwowej w okresie budowy socjalizmu," Ideologia i
Polityka 12 (1976); Stanislaw Widerszpil, "Przeslanki budowy rozwinietego spoleczenstwa socjalistycznego," Ideologia i Polityka 2 (1976);
Stanislaw Zawadzki, "Kryteria rozwoju demokracji socjalistycznej," ~owe
Q_rogi 4 (1974).
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In the advanced socialist societies there are no classes nor privi!edged social strata.

The most numerous class (stratum), the working

class, is a subject of political power, but the other strata also participate in that power through their representatives in the political
bodies.

This is possible because, contrary to the capitalist societies

where the interest of different classes are opposed to each other, the
class interests in the socialist societies are not conflictual.

They

are the same interests.
The individuals of the advanced socialist societies universally
accept scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology, that is, a materialistic
theory of the world, man, and social life.

As socialism matures, there

also grows the social solidarity manifesting itself in the growing conviction that whatever is socially good is at the same time individually
desirable. 5
Orthodox Marxist sociologists and Party propaganda deny the existence of social classes in the socialist societies.

The reason for the

non-esitence of social classes is that in these societies the private
means of production have been abolished.

By that fact, the very basis

for class formation has been eliminated and with it there has been
eliminated any possibility for a class society,
Harxist sociologists do not deny the existence of some differences

5

"Ksztaltowanie sie i rola postaw moralnych w spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym," Biblioteka lektora i wykladowcy 1 (1979), p. 3. Cf. Jerzy
Wiatr, "Uwarstwienie spoleczne a tendencje egalitarne," Kultura i
Spoleczenstwo 2 (1962); Jaroslaw Ladosz, "Geneza i istota wielopartyjnosci w spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym, '' Ideologia i Polityka 11
(1976).
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between different social strata, but they do not consider them class
generating.

Social strata are allowed to originate on the basis of

difference between lifestyle in the cities and villages, on differences
between physical and mental work.

The persistence of these differences

indicates that the Peoples' Democracies have not yet reached the stage
of communism where everyone will be rewarded according to his needs but
that the rule is still valid, at the present stage,
ing to his work."

11

to everyone accord-

Because this rule is still in force, there can be

some differences in rewarding.

By the same token such differences might

be even desirable to serve as incentives for stronger social commitment.6

Refering to that problem, Chlopecki wrote; "In the present

socioeconomic situation one cannot push egalitarian aspirations to
point of contradicting the principle:

1

the

to everyone according to his

work', . . . because this would have negative effects on the rate of
7

socioeconomic development."'·
Depicted in such a way, society is a smoothly functioning one,
where there is no room for conflict, where the interests of the individuals are subordinated to or even coincide with those of whole society,
\vhere one's justified needs are completely satisfied, and where everyone, inspired by high moral imperatives, collaborates spontaneously for
the common good.

6

Polish socialist society is free of conflict because

Jerzy Hiatr, "Uwarstwienie spoleczne . . . " op. cit., p. 37.

7
Jerzy Chlopecki, "Nadazanie za apetytem," Kierunki 24 (1969),
p. 3. Cf. Adam Lopatka, "Rozwoj podstawowych praw i obowiazkow
obywateli Polski Ludowej," Ideologia i Polityka 7-8 (1976).
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it is bound by the common tradition (a result of national and socialist
integration of the Polish society); common organization (around the
Party's program); common moral identity (as the people develop their
socialist personalities), and common materialistic ideology.8
efforts are led and coordinated by the

:~respectable"

';freely elected and supported by the whole society."

All these

Communist Party,
The Party itself

constantly applies the principles of democratic centralism "strengthening its links with the working class and other working people and
directing economic pressure in accordance with the social objectives of
sor:ialism." 9
In view of the orthodox Polish Marxists and Party's rulers, the
peoples' democracy in Poland in the 1970s was in the stage of building
an advanced socialist society.
The Polish People's Republic is entering a period in which the state
of the dictatorship of the proletariat ~vill gradually develop into a
state of the whole people led by the working class. The state and
its every function will be strengthened and perfected on the principle of unity of civil rights and duties, of subordinating the
activity of the state apparatus to the people's interests an~
encouraging socialist democracy and public self-government-~u
The Party newspaper, Trybunal Ludu, referred to that state of social
reality

when

it said.

"On this level of the development the Party's

primary ;oal and its main line of policy is a creacion of the material

8 "Jednosc spoleczenstawa budujacego socjalizm," Biblioteka Lektora
i Wykladowcy 7 (1979).
9Jan Szydlak, "Strategy of Accelerated Progress," World Harxist
Review 19 (1976), p. 11
10
Ibid.,p.l2.
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and spiritual conditions for personal development and gratification of
all needs of the individuals. 1 ' 11

The social classes of People's Poland

"create a social structure free of antagonistic contradictions, based on
collaboration and solidarity of all strata under the leadership of the
working class and its Party. 11
If one accepts literally Marx' theory of class, he must, in consequence, come to a conclusion that the socialist societies are classless.
Through the abolition of the private means of production in those societies there has been wiped out the very basis for class formation: private m.rnership of the means of production.

Similarly, the abolition of

the private means of production is supposed to create nonantagonistic
"class" relations. Since conflict originates in this kind of ownership,
it seems logical to assume its disappearance, once this condition ceases
to be present.
turbed.

At this point, however, a scientific logic might be dis-

Is the theory to modulate the facts, or rather is a theory's

usefulness measured by its explanatory power in a strict relation to the
facts?

"A basic weakness of the Eastern European Marxism," write Tell-

enback, "is that it takes the non-existence of exploitation and antagon-istic classes for granted and does not sincerely discuss the possibility
of alternative class criteria, such ~s collective ownership of the means
of production or control over them." 1 3
11

Trybuna Ludu, January 3, 1976.

12 Marian Spychalski, "Rola Partii w uksztaltowaniu i rozwoju Ludowego Panstwa Polskiego," Nowe Drogi 7 (1969), p. 12. Cf. Antoni
Szczypiorowski, "Fundamenty Integracj i, ,; Argumenty 38 (1968).
13

sten Tellenback, "Patterns of Stratification in Socialist Poland,:;
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One might agree with the thesis that in the socialist societies
classes in the Marxian sense do not exist because the relations to the
means of production are uniform.

This, however, does not imply that

these societies are ipso facto, characterized by the similar other
attributes also of great social importance, such as historically
inherited differences, social roles, and differences in income, etc.
Marxists argue that these differences account for the rise of the different strata in the socialist classless society.

In other words, in a

developed socialist society, classes disappear, but social stratification still remains.

But at this point one is arguing about the words.

Are values such as income, education. the social prestige of an occupation, and lifestyle important to an individual or not?

Do these

variables account for an inequality of opportunity in a given society?
If they are not important, why are they highly valued?

If they are

important, they must account for the rise of different social groups

Acta Sociologica 17 (1974), p. 28.
The author criticizes three underlying principles regarded as valid
by the Polish orthodox sociologists, namely: (1) historically inherited
differences, (2) division of labor (physical and mental work), and (3)
economic incentives. In Tellenback's view, "it is not the matter of
some historical remnants that are fading away together with the evolution of socialist society, but of the constant reproduction of the
'classical' social attributes of different classes or strata . . . It
is undeniable that a complex industrial society necessitates a farreaching division of labor, but according to which law of principle does
this division of labor have to create patterned social inequality?.
It is (also) self-evident and pure common sense that the use of economic
incentives leads to a hierarchical income structure; but why are economic incentives necessary? It is not sufficient to refer to economic
efficiency, as is usually the case. Economic efficiency is, of course,
the reason why economic incentives are applied, but it does not explain
why similar incentives are used as in capitalist societies and not
alternative ones." Sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 29.
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(classes), and the phenomenon should be theoretically explained.

Tell-

enback says:
\fuereas patterned social inequality is observed, as it is a case in
the socialist Poland, this matter of fact has to be explained by some
continually working mechanism or determinant. which, in turn. is used
in such theory as a criterion for sorting out relevant social enti·ties characterized by the different social attributes.l4
rlarxist theory of class has lost its epistemological usefulness
'1 y regar d'~ng t h e

especia~

. 1"~st

sJc~a

.

.

soc~et~es.

l5

Ossowski write with

reference to this:
In stitutions where changes of social structure are to a greater or
lesser extent governed by the decision of the political authorities,
we are a long way from social classes as interpreted by Marx, Veblen
and Weber, from classes conceived of as groups determined by their
relations to the means of production or, as others would say, by
their relations to the market. We are a long way from classes conceived of as groups arising out of the spontaneously created class
organizations. In situations where the political authorities ~an
overtly and effectively change the class structure; where the privileges that are most essential for social status, including that of
higher share in the national income, are conferred by a decision of
the political authorities; where a large part or even the majority
of the population is included in a stratification of the type to be
found in a bureaucratic hierarchy--the nineteenth century concept
of class becomes more or less an anachronism, gnd class conflicts
give way to other forms of social antagonism. 1
Considering one socially important criterion of class formation, it
preserves only a function of affirmation or negation of class existence
once this criterion is present or absent,

14
Sten Tellenback, op. cit.

In consequence, Marxian

p. 29.

15 As an example of such sturl.ies may be used
by W. Wesolowski (t~arszawa: Ossolineum, 1974).

Zroznicow~El:_~___sp_oleczne,

l6stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Incorporated, 1963), p. 184.
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theory of class regarding socialist societies loses theoretical attributes.

It becomes sociography with very limited aspirations.

The

dilemma is this: "Social classes in socialist society continue to exist
empirically with all their class attributes in spite of the fact that
the classical Marxist class criteria, the ownership of the means of
.

product~on,

h as cease d to

.

ex~st.

1117

It cannot be otherwise until there

exist the differences in income, prestige, lifestyle, and inequality of
opportunity.

"What one's job is, how handsomely one dresses, how much

one knows, how well one plays games •

., how one practices religion,

. " 18 all these may become the basis of evaluation of the members in
a society; in other words, they may determine the relative position in
the class system. 1 9

17

"Social stratification,'' Parsons says, "is . .

Sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 28.

18

Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (Harcourt, Brace and World,
Incorporated, 1957), p. 19.
19

One must distinguish between "status" and "class." Different
authors approach this problem from different perspectives. According
to Weber, "Social honor (status) can adhere directly to a class situation and it is also, indeed most of the time, determined by the average
class situation of the status group members. This, however, is not
necessarily the case. Status membership, in turn, influences the class
situation in that the style of life required by status groups makes
them prefer special kinds of property or gainful pursuits and reject
others." Max Weber, Religion of India (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958),
p. 39.
Close to Marxists, Dahrendorf, distinguishes between "class" and
" stratum," but for a different reason. lfuile "stratum" represents for
him the descriptive aspect of the social reality, the "class" has its
analytical purpose. Dahrendorf writes: "Class is always a category for
purpose of the analysis of the dynamics of social conflict and its
structural roots, and as such it has to be sepearated strictly from
stratum as a category for purpose of describing hierarchical systems at
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the differential ranking of the human individuals who compose a given
social system and their treatment as superior or inferior relative to
one another in certain socially important respects,"20

And these

"socially important respects" have to be determined empirically.

Fail-

ing to do that, sociology ceases to be a science and becomes mere faith.
This is what happened to the Polish Marxist sociology.

On the one

hand, it recognizes the differences of social groupings in socially
important respects, but on the other hand it denies the existence of
classes in Poland, because the private means of production has been
socialized and so everybody is in the same relation to the means of
production.

So, according to the Polish Marxist sociologists, in the

socialist Poland, there are no social classes because there is no private otroership of the means of production, whereas there

are important

a given point of time," Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 76.
That surely is a relic of the Marxian distinction between class "in
itself" and class "for itself" which Dahrendorf considers superfluous.
especially in the framework of the conflict theory, where conflict is
considered to be ubiquitous. Following this distinction, Krauss defines
stratus as "any aggregate of persons who are similar in the possessions
of, or access to, social goods." Irving Krauss, Stratification, Class
and Cliflict (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 13. "Classes,"
instead, "are formed when an aggregate of persons defines their interests
as similar to those of the others in their aggregate, and as different
from and opposed to the interests of another aggregate of persons
ibid., p. 15. The author concludes: "The key difference between social
stratification and social class is communalization: therefore class
formation requires some kind of structuring which may lead to informal
groups of formal organization. Otherwise the aggregates of persons continue to be strata, and discontent does not lead to organized attempts
to change conditions," ibid., p. 15.
20

Talcott Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social
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differences in opportunity, income, prestige, lifestyle.

These differ-

ences account for different strata which are the relics of the capitalist class structure.
This theory is taken for granted, but not proved.

"To refer to

inherited historical differences," says Tellenback, "is not sufficient,
because social inequality is constantly reproduced ii socialist
Poland.

"21

One may agree to some extent with Szczepanski, who writes

that in the \.Jestern societies "the property accumulated by the family
can be inherited, and there are not institutionally fixed limits of
" 22 an d t h at 1n
. t h e p o 1"1sh soc1ety
.
.
property accumu 1 at~on,
t h e f am~"1 y h as

lost such an attribute, but this does not eliminate other socially
important respects such as income, education, and prestige which account
for differences in opportunity.
groupings.

It does not matter how one calls these

They constitute a social reality which should be labelled as

social classes. 23

These differences correspond to the psychological

Stratification," Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press,
1954), p. 69.

21 sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 29.
22 Jan J. Szczepanski, Polish Society, op. cit., p. 145.
23weber refers to a class as "when (1) a number of people have in
common a specific casual component of their life chances, in so far as
(2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in
the possession of good and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets .
The term 'class' refers to any group of people that is found in the same
situation." From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology by H. H. Gerth and C.
H. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 181.
Parsons defines class "as a plurality of kinship units which, in
those respects where status is a hierarchical context is shared by their
members, have approximately equal stat us." Talcott Parsons, ·'social
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aspect of the classes.
a 'class' society

Ossowski points it out as follows: "A society is

. . . if

there exists within it distinct barriers to

social intercourse and i f class boundaries can be drawn by means of an
analysis of interpersonal relations

n24

Repeated statements by the

Marxist Polish sociologists that in Poland there are not classes in the
Marxian sense say nothing about the differences in other important
respects of the different social groups in the Polish society.

Such

formulations serve more the ideological purposes of the ruling class
than constitute the findings of a genuine science.

The source of this

tremendous confusion is Marx' theory of class itself and as applied to
serve the ruling class ideology.

Therefore, Barber is correct when he

says: "As a theory of stratification Marxism requires essential qualification as well as refinement."25
Class Structure in the State-run Socialist
Societies: Different Views
According to the orthodox Marxist view of class structure, class
division rooted in the different sources of income cease to exist once
the means of production have been socialized.

The social differentia-

Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory,"
Essays in Sociological Theorz (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 328.
Giddens conceives class as "a large-scale aggregate of individuals, comprised of impersonally defined relationships, and nominally
open in form." Anthony Giddens, the Class Structure • . . op. cit.,
p. 100.
?I

-~Stanislaw

Ossowski, op. cit., p. 136.

25 Bernard Barber, Social Stratification, op. cit., p. 54.
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tion of individuals or groups persists, as does the system of reward, but
they are not "class generating" factors.

By the same token, Xarxists

argue, the existing strata, relics of a capitalist society or generated
by the differences between physical and mental work or between city and
village, are not in the antagonistic relationship with one another,
because from the Marxian perspective as a means of production are socialized, the class system disappears.

These are the pivotal theses of the

Marxian view of social classes and class conflict.

They have never been

proved, yet they are maintained in spite of powerful arguments and evidence which discredit such theory.
Aron and Feldmesser are among the best known Western sociologists
who come to the same conclusion that State socialist societies are
classless by using, however, different arguments.

According to Aron,

soviet-type societies are "classless" nonetheless, there exis,t within
these societies differences in lifestyle, power, and the incomes of
different groups.

The author writes:

We are agreed that all societies, Soviet as well as western, are
heterogeneous--a heterogeneity of individuals and of groups. There
exists a hierarchy of authority, a hierarchy of incomes. There is a
difference bet~veen the way of life of those at the foot and those at
the top of the social scale.26
The reason why in the socialist societies there are not social classes
is that in these societies a minority (elite), has control of a powerless majority.

Political and economic power, concentrated in the rulers

of a State-run society, gives them totalitarian control over the rest of

26

Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. 8.
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the society.

Therefore, the totalitarian (monistic) socio-political

system excludes the formation of social classes:
Politicians, Trade Union leaders, generals and managers all belong to
one party and are part of an authoritarian organization. All intermediate bodies, all individual groups, and particularly professional
groups are in fact controlled by delegates of the elite . . . The
Trade Unions are not more expressing the claims of the workers, they
are an instrument of the state intended to bring the workers into
line. A classless society leaves the mass of thz population without
any possible means of defense against the elite. 7
For Aron, the dilemma is this; nHow can we understand that in one
type of society classes assert themselves as they are and in the other
appear not to exist."28

The author hurris to give the answer: "It is

the political regime, that is the constitution of power and the idea
that those who govern have of their authority which decides the existence or nonexistence of classes and above all their self-awareness." 29

27

.,

.,

Raymond Aron, ·Social Structure and the Ruling Class,' British
Journal of Sociology 1 (1950), Part II, p. 131.
Also Giddens comes to a contradictory conclusion: on the one hand
he says: "The state Socialist societies, .
have genuinely succeeded
in moving towards a classless order . . . only at the cost of creating
a system of political domination which altered the character of social
exploitation rather than necessarily diminishing it .. , Anthony Giddens,
The Class Structure in the Advanced Societies (New York; Harper and Row,
1973)' p. 294.
One can hardly accept such a contradiction between, on the one
hand, "genuinely succeeded in creating a classless society,'· and on the
other, "still intensified the exploitation.,. 'ifuat seems acceptable i3
that in socialist societies there has been laid a new foundation of
class structure. Cf. David Lane, "Marxist Class, Conflict Analysis of
State Socialist Societies," Industrial Society. Class, Cleavage and
Control by R. Sease (London; George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1977),
p. 180.
28
29

Raymond Aron, Democracy . . . , op. cit., p. 9.
Ibid.

64

People studying socialist societies would, in general, agree with
this description of the Soviet-type society.
ever, cannot be sustained.

Aron's conclusions, how-

If it is true that the State-run society is

clearly divided into the powerful elite and the powerless rest, there
must then be at least two classes.
when he says:

And in this case Djilas is right

"The capitalist and other classes of ancient origin had

in fact been destroyed, but a new class, previously unknown to history,
had been formed."30

The new class has its counter-part in the exploited

majority.
Secondly, Aron seems to include political organization of a class
as a condition for class formation.

In

~1arx'

view, such a political

organization was required by any class "in itself" to become a class
for "itself."

Today, the conflict-theory supporters suppose some kind

of organization of class to defend their interests.

Additionally, no

one >vould deny that "the problem of class cannot be treated in the
abstract reality of the political regime." 31

But classes are not polit-

ical parties and if they were, one would have to conclude that in the
U.S.A. there are as many political parties as there are social classes
in contemporary American society.

This does not mean that members of a

particular class may not have certain political preferences, but this is
not

the point at issue.3 2
30:-.Ulovan Dj ilas, The New Class, op. cit., pp. 37-48.
31 Raymond Aron, Democracy

. . .,

op. cit., p . 9.

32Cf. Richard F. Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States
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Thirdly, Aron's apocalyptic view of the powerless majority is not
acceptable either.

This is not to deny that in the Soviet-type socialist

systems "a single party, emjoying the monopoly of political activity,
dominates the state and imposes its own ideology on all the other organizations."33

These "powerless" majorities, however, destroyed the

Tsarist system in Russia in 1917, and in 1980, Polish workers forged a
free Trade Union out of the State-controlled Union.
Support for the thesis of the classlessness of socialist societies
comes also from Feldmesser. 34

As in Aron's view the elite, the Party

apparatus together with the secret police, for Feldmesser, prevent the
class formation.
Yet in the totalitarian scheme of things, it is essential to the
preservation of party supremacy that no group become so entrenched in
positions of strength as to become insulated against further demands
from the party, . • • Hence the party must insist--in the long run-that every man be individually and continuously on trial . • ,35
The gulf between the political minority and the large majority of nonParty people inhibits class rising.
~..rho

Especially monitored are the people

exercise managerial responsibilities, who might from that position,

pose a threat to the authority of the Party.

36

Consequently, fear of

(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972).
33 Raymond Aron, Democracy . . • , op. cit., p. 185.
34

Robert A. Feldmesser, "Toward the Classless Society?," Class,
Status, and Power by R. Bendix and S. H. Lipset (New York: The Free
Press, 1966).
35
36

Ibid., p. 533.
Also Pareto occupies himself with the problem of elite, but his

66
being arrested or loss of property and uncertain future among the con-trolled managers, paralyze any attempt to challenge the status quo.
Police-state oppression is an every-day reality for all nonsupporters of
the existing system.
If this then is the case, there would be at least two classes:
powerful elite and a powerless majority.

Secondly, one may agree that

during the period of the revolution called by Brinton the ''reign of
terror and virtue,'' a society might acquire a classless character; as
time goes on, the rigid class structure is changing to bring about at
least a dichotomous division of a society. 37
makes.

This is a point Parkin

In his opinion one has to distinguish between two different

stages of the development of these societies; the first, a relative
early stage, rather egalitarian, in which the society might be considered classless, and the more advanced stage in which the need for
stratification grows out of economic rationality and technological efficiency.

Parkin writes:

The system of rewards in the socialist society during this formative
relatively classless phase stems largely from the need of the ruling
elite to consolidate its power and to resist opposition from the
potential 'class'. That is to say, because the immediate goal of the
order is one of political stabilization and control, the rewards
structure is especially responsive to ideological demands . . • (but)
once the new regimes have succeeded in establishing a measure of
political legitimacy and stability, and when industrial efficiency
becomes a major preoccupation, the socialist stratification order

approach is much different. He elaborates the theory of elite circulation mainly referring to governing elite. Cf. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind
and Society :~ew York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935).
37

Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage
Boosk, 1965), p. 176.
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appears to come under increasing strains. This occurs largely
because of the tnesion between the system of rewards prescribed by
the formal ideology and association with economic rationality and
technological efficiency. • • The emergent emphasis upon economic
rationality and the allocation of men to elite positions on the basis
of meritocratic criteria leads to the erosion of traditional socialist ideology and paves the way to a form of class stratification
that has much more in common with that of Western capitalism.38
Elsewhere, however, Parkin contradicts himself.39

He sees social-

ist societies "class" to the point that there exists in them the "system
of rewards" in the hands of the political elite, which is simply opposite to what he said above, and "classless" as if one stresses the
highly permeable boundaries between classes:
If we take a synchronic view of the present socialist reward system
we can detect a distinct social boundary between the 'new class' and
the rest of society. We should thus be justified in regarding it as
a class system in this restricted sense • • • If we take a diachronic view of the same system (with highly permeable boundary
between a 'new class' and others,
The 'classlessness' thesis
has greater plausibility.40
If the first of these views is acceptable to some extent (technocracy can never substitute the role of ideology in the socialist system
because the ideological principles have always a priority in the case of
conflict between economy and politics otherwise the system would not be
able to survive)--the other Parkin's solution is not a solution.

The

author takes for granted the permeable boundary between the elite and

38 Frank Parkin, "Class Stratification in Socialist Societies,"
~ritish Journal of Sociology 20 (1969), pp. 360-361.
39Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971).
40

Ibid., p. 158.
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others.

One must be aware that elite's ideology of the Soviet-type

society, Marxist ideology, is different from the ideology of the ruling
class in the Western-type society.

The former includes not only a

politico-social view, but also a perspective on the world and on man's
destiny.

Besides many other possible factors, the meterialistic ideol-

ogy alone is sufficient to make such a class highly exclusive.
The most prominent protagonists of the view that the Soviet-type
society is a class society are Djilas and Dahrendorf.

While the first

deals directly with this type of society, the second talks about
advanced or post-industrial societies, whether they be capitalist or
socialist.

Both of them distinguish between property ownership in a

broad and narrow sense.

Property in a narrow sense is a legal right of

ownership; property in the broad sense is conceived as real control of
the means of production with no further specification as to the manner
in which this control is exercised.

Djilas and Dahrendorf agree that

property-ownership in the second and broad sense gives rise to a new
class.

"Ownership," Djilas says, "is nothing other than the right of

profit and contro1."41

He concludes: "if one defines class benefits by

this right, the communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the
origin of a new form of ownership or a new ruling exploiting class."4 2
But at this point these two authors disagree.

Djilas sees this

new class as based on political power, Dahrendorf sees it formed on
authority relations.

41

M·l
r ~ ovan

42

·

D]~·1

Djilas says: '' . • • the bureaucracy, or more

as, Th e New Cl ass, op.

Ioid. , p. 35.

.

c~t.,

p. 35 •
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exactly the political bureaucracy, has all the characteristics of
earlier ones as well as some ne'tv characteristics of its own. " 4 3

As such

exercises its control over the collective ownership of means of production it "is reflected in a larger income in material goods and privileges."44

Political power that the new class exercises gives it a

privileged position in the socioeconomic life and in the collective
ownership.

"Power is both the means and the goal of communists, in

order that they may maintain their privileges and ownership, • . •

it

is only through power itself that ownership can be exercised."45
Djilas' theory differs from the Marxian in that he shifts the
emphasis from the ownership relations or property to power.

"While

:1arx," writes Darhendorf, ". • . subordinates relations of authority to
those of property, Djilas seems inclined to subordinate ownership to
power."46
Djilas' theory is a partial theory, but it is correct in its partiality.

If one takes into consideration the division of the Soviet-

type society into political elite, "new class," and the "powerless
majority," the theory is useful and accord with the reality.
theory, however, is incomplete.

The

The division into "new class" and

"others" does not reflect the Party and non-Party cleavage.
Party members belong to the political elite.

Not all the

Additionally, both Party

4 3Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 38.
44 rbid., p. 44.
45 Ibid., p. 169.
46Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict . • . , op. cit., p. 83.
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and non-Party individuals are stratified in similar ways in some other
important respects.
Even if Dahrendorf distinguishes between property in the broad and
narrow senses, he defines classes in terms of authority relations within
"imperatively coordinated associations."47

It is possession of or

exclusion from authority which accounts for class formation.
Dahrendorf starts his analysis with Mills and Parsons' concept of
authority as a "zero-sum."48

In his view, it is always possible to

draw a clear distinction between those who possess and exercise authority and those who are subjected to the commands of others.

The first

possess authority to the extent that the others are deprived of it.

In

consequence, authority relations constitute a basis for a social struc»

ture characterized by its dichotomous division into super and subordination.

The superordinates legitimately control by orders, warnings,

and prohibitions the behavior of the clearly specified subordinates

47

Dahrendorf uses the Weberian definition of power and authority.
"Power is the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own
will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are
participating in the action." Max Weber, Essay in Sociology by H. H.
Gerth and C. W. ~ills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 180.
Authority in Weber 1 s view is a rule over men 11 1vhether predominantly
external or predominantly internal, to which the governed submit because
of their belief in the extraordinary quality of a specific person,"
ibid., p. 295. An important difference between power and authority is
that the power is associated with the personality of the individuals,
the authority is connected with the social position.
48 c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1965), p. 268. Cf. C. Wright Mills, "The Social Role of the
Intellectual," Power, Politics and People by r.R. Horovitz (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1963); Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of
Political Power," Class, Status and Power by R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset
(New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 255.
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using, if necessary, legitimate sanctions. 49

In other words, authority

relations are social roles which become the objective interests within
the imperatively coordinated associations.

Role interests, when taken

independently of the conscious orientations of their players, are
"latent interests," when they become conscious goals, they become the
"manifest interests."

Latent interests give rise to the conflictual

"quasi-groups" and the manifest interests to the "conflictual groups.SO
the graph on the next page diagrams Dahrendorf's scheme.
Viewed in this way class structure may equally apply to the socialist and capitalist societies unless they enter into what Dahrendorf
calls the "post-industrial" stage of the development, characterized by
decomposition of capital, decomposition of labor (diversification of the
working class), growth of the middle clas.s (connected with the increase
of the bureaucracy and the sector of services), growth of social
mobility, and finally, institutionalization of class conflict.
Dahrendorf's class theory is criticized for the following reasons.
First, one can hardly accept that authority relations make possible a
dichotomy of division: dominant and superordinate.

49
50

Different levels of

Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict • . • , op. cit., 0. 83.

rb 1· d ., p. 176 • Da h ren d or f rema1ns
·
f a1t
· hf u 1 tote
h con fl'1ctua1
social theories according to which every society is based on the coercion of some groups by others. Social conflict and its consequent
social change, are ubiquitous and finally, every element of the society
contributes to this disintegration and consequently to its change. Cf.
Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," Sociological
Theory: An Introduction by W. L. llallace (Chicago: Aldine Publishin:;
Compnay, 1969), pp. 213-226; Pierre L. Van Dan Berghe, "Dialectic and
Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." American Sociological
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authoritY imply several intermediate classes.

Second, and Dahrendorf

recognizes this, the theory is limited to the "imperatively coordinated
organizations" or more specifically, to the state and industrial enterprises.51

Third, if authority constitutes the basis for class struc-

ture, a classless society is inconceivable.
society without authority relations.

One cannot even envision a

Some kind of patterned authority

relations are conditio sine qua non of every society.52
Also Ossowski maintains that there has been a tendency to conceive
hierarchical divisions of society in dichotomous terms throughout cultural history.

He identifies three basic aspects of these dichotomies:

(1) ''the rulers and the ruled," (2) "the rich and the poor," and (3)
"those for whom others work and those who work."

53

These principles

were often linked by sociologists vTith the exploitation. The third
principle might refer to what Stalin calls "nonantagonistic classes." 54
In Ossowski's view,nthe abolition of class system can be understood as
wiping-out only of those inequalities which result from class divisions."55

He elaborates a concept of "nonegalitarian classlessness"

Review, October (1963}, pp. 695-705.
51

Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conf lie t . · · ' op. c l.· t. , p. _?48 •

52 Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure • . . , op. cit., pp. 72-73.
53

Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure . . . , op, cit., p. 23.

54
Joseph Stalin Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1947), p. 621.
55

Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure • • . , op. cit., p. 97.
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which means that the "abolition of social classes does not necessarily
involve the destruction of the social ladder."56
Every one of the just discussed opinions of the different authors
stresses some aspects of the structual reality in the Society-type socialist system. But the authors, except Dahrendorf, do not sufficiently
point out very simple features of these societies.

It they are not yet

in the "post-industrial" stage of the development, they are approaching
it quite fast.

This seems to be a converging point of both advanced

capitalist and socialist societies, regardless of how
this point.

t~ey

arrived at

In such advanced societies, the basic stratifying factor

is the occupational system with its prestige and income. Parkin writes:
The backbone of the class structure, and indeed of the entire reward
system of modern Western Society, is the occupational order. Other
sources of economic and symbolic advantage do not coexist alongside
the occupational order, but for the vast majority of the population
these tend, at best, to be secondary to those deriving from the
division of labor.57
Bell speaks in the same vein: "The second way of defining a post-industrial society is through the change in occupational distribution, i.e.,
not only where people work, but the kind of work they do.

In large

measure, occupation is the most important determinant of class and

56 stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure • . • , op. cit., p. 97. He
elicits four characteristics of social classes: (1) "The existence of
superior and inferior categories of social statuses, which are superior
and inferior in respect of some system of privileges and discrimination," (2) "The distinctness of permanent class interests," (3) "Class
consciousness," (4) "Social isolation,' which provides a basis for
belief that a given society is a "class" society. Ibid., pp. 135-136.
57

Frank Parkin, Class Inequality • . . , op. cit., p. 18
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stratification in the society." 58

Blau Duncan go even further:

The hierarchy of prestige strata and the hierarchy of economic class
have their roots in the occupational system; so does the hierarchy
of political power and authority, . . • The occupatio~al structure
also is the link between the economy and family, .
J9
Soviet-type societies in general, and the polish society in particular, are not exceptions.

What is different in them is the general

framework of the socio-political and economic situation of these countries. Thus any detailed analysis of class structure in these societies
must take into consideration the peculiarities of the socialist system.
The following overall working hypotheses will guide the present
study to bring the issue of class in poland into sharper focus:
1. Once the Communist Party assumed power in Poland it tended to
limit activities of other parties and to control them totally.
The Party did not eliminate other parties completely since it
wanted to have ready proof of the "democratic coexistence" of
different political views. The Communist Party, however,
considered itself an exclusive subject of power and the representative of the whole nation.
2. Through nationalization of whole industries and large farms,
the enormous discrepancies of wealth between the richest and
the poorest in Polish society are eliminated.
3. "Equality of opportunity" is distorted by the fact that Party
membership ensures privileges in Polish society.
4. In Poland, where the means of production are nationalized, pOUXical power becomes the most important factor of stratification
because of its control over the distribution of roles and
re~vards.

58 Daniel Bell, The Corning of Post-industrial Society (New York:
Basic Books. Ind., o976), p. 15 (Introduction).

so

'Peter M. Blau and Otis D. Duncan, The American Occupational
Structure (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 7.
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5. The main cleavage in Polish society, between those who are
members of the Communist Party and those who are not, is
visible at all levels of the social stratification. The top
social positions are totally reserved for the members of the
Commwnist Party.
6. Nationalization of the means of production in Poland has not
eliminated social classes, but has merely shifted importance
from real ownership of the means of production to control of
the distribution of the national product.
7. The occupational system is, after political power, the second
most influential factor accounting for the class system in
Poland, and in State-run socialist societies.
8. Four variables, namely, political power, income, education and
social prestige, give rise to a six-fold class structure in
Poland: power elite, intelligentsia, skilled manual workers,
white-collar workers, farmers, and unskilled manual workers.
9. There is in Poland a high degree of status inconsistency as
well as a positive correlation between high social positions
and Party membership.
10. In the socialist system in general, and in Poland in particula~
the power elite is a necessary part of the structural conflict.
11. Structural conflict in Poland is intensified by the ideological
conflict oet~..reen State and Church, and by an historically
rooted antagonism toward Russia.
12. In the socialist systems and in Poland particularly, propaganda
is a necessary means of social control, and its use is the
exclusive privilege of the Communist Party.
Class structure in Poland was visibly changed after World War II.
That was the consequence of the other changes; political, economic, and
social in the country.

So, it is logical that this detailed analysis

of class structure, with the analysis of conflict in Poland, has to be
preceded by a consideration of the most important trends and changes
in the Polish postwar socio-political reality. This will be the subject
of the following part.

PART

Tl.JO

POLAND IN ITS POSTWAR PERIOD

CHAPTER
MAIN FEATURES OF

C~~GES

III
IN POSTWAR POLAND

Postwar Poland has emerged from the German occupation with a
totally new political system.

The initial and decisive change circum-

scribed Poland to a determined sphere of the international influence of
Russia and her Eastern European satelites.

In the area of domestic

policy the Communist Party conquered an absolute power.

A similar

change in the political system in Russia twenty-seven years earlier
brought about other changes: economic, social, and structural.

Poland

followed the same pattern: nationalization of industry, agrarian reform,
and changes in the educational system.

These reforms influenced deci-

sively the change in class structure from the prewar Polish society.
T••o classes, the bourgeoisie and the land aristocracy, disappeared
completely.

The industrialization of the country rapidly expanded the

working class and the "new" intelligentsia.

The free school system

opened new channels (knowledge and skills) for upward social mobility.
Political Change in Poland after World

Wa£_~~

The future of postwar Poland was practically decided many months
before the Yalta Conference took place in February, 1945.

In December,

1943, during a clandestine meeting in Warsaw, a new Polish, pro-Soviet
political authority was established.

It was called the National Council

of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa - KRN).
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The KRN was intended as
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a provisional parliament.

Nonetheless, this new political body claimed

.
. 1y
to have mu 1 t1-party
c h aracter, ".1t was, " as Grot h says, " overw h e 1m1ng
dominated by the Communists, although it included a few others, like the
subsequent Premier and left-wing socialist Edward Osobka-Morawski."l

1

Aleksander J. Groth, People's Poland: Government and Politics
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), p. 15. At that time
the official name of the Communist Party was the Polish Workers' Party
(Polska Partia Robotnicza- PPR). The history of the Communist Party in
Poland goes back to the end of the nineteenth century, when it existed
as the Left-Wing of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna - Lewica - PPS-Lewica) against the Right-Wing of that party. The
PPS-Lweica has always been Russian-oriented. Its most prominent leader
was R. Luxemburg. In 1905 that party opposed the idea of the independent Poland as shameful to the international social revolution. For the
same reason that party boycotted the January, 1919, elections to the
Polish Parliament (Sejm). At that time the party existed under the name
of the Polish Communist Workers' Party (Komunistyczna Polska Partia
Robotnicza- KPPR). In 1920, the KPPR "supported the Soviet offensive
against their country by every possible means." Nicholas Bethell,
Gomulka: His Poland, His Communism (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1969), p. 19. Its leaders, J. Marchlewski, F. Dzierzynski, F. Kon, J.
Unschicht, and J. Leszczynski set the Revolutionary Committee (REVKOM)
in Bialystok to be ready to take power in the Polish Russian Republic.
Their dreams vanished because of the unexpected, total Polish victory,
over the Red Army. To the KPPR referred M. Niedzialkowski saying:
''With you, gentlemen, one never knows if you are genuine political
workers, or agents of the Russian government. In the past, as the
Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, you bitterly
denounced the aspirations for independence, After Poland regained
independence you opposed it ruthlessly. You led Cossack regiments
against your own country." Cited by Jan K. Kwiatkowski, Komunisci w
Polsce: Rodowod-Taktyka-Ludzie (Brussels: Polski Instytut-Wyda~iczy,
1964), p. 14. Consequently, in the 1930s, Pilsudski undertook several
measures to limit the Communist Party's activities. Also Stalin distrusted them and abruptly dissolved the party in 1938, during so-called
Great Purge. Many of the communists leaders who had sought refuse in
Russia, or who had already been there, were executed, or sent to various
concentration camps. Even some of those who were out of Russia were
insidiously lured to be liquidated. Among the most prominent who lost
their lives were: Adolf Warski-Warszawski, Maria Koszucka (pseudonym:
Vera Kostrzewa), Bruno J~sienski, Julian Lenski-Leszczynski, and others.
Cf. Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Wanowski, The Communist Party of
Poland: An Outline of History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
l976), p. 149. After the outbreak of the German-Russian conflict, the
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At the end of July, 1944, the Eastern part of the Polish territory was already free of Germans, and under Russian occupation.

On the

21st of July, 1944, the executive body of the KRN was brought into being
--the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia
Narodowego-PKWN) which issues th.e next day its Manifesto to the Polish
nation claiming to be an execlusive legal and political authority. 2

A

few months later the PDJN proclaimed itself the Provisional Government
of Poland.
Every step of advancing power of the Russian sponsored Polish Communist Government was carefully watched by the Polish Government in
exile.

Any collaboration with the

was very problematic.

P~iN,

even if officially proposed,

The government in exile learned about several

cases of the disarmament of the Home Army by Russian tropps.

Many

Polish communists who had fled to Russia reorganized the Communist Party
under the name: Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza--PPR).
Its Russian affiliation and dependence from Soviets quickly brou~ht
about the reinterpretation of its initials: Placeni Przez Rosje--Paid by
Russia. The Communist Party figured under that name in Poland until
1948, when the PPR imposed fusion upon the Polish Socialist Party. "The
ground for merger." as Dziewanowski says, "was prepared by skillful use
of slogan -'unity of action, f which was to be a step toward 'organic
unity' of the entire working class of Poland." M. K. Dziewanowski. The
Communist Party of Poland, op. cit., p. 215. The new body has been
named the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia
Robotnicza--PZPR), and it still exists under this name.
2At that time there existed in London a Polish government in exile
headed by Stanislaw Mikoljczyk. The London Polish Government was
regocnized by the West European countries and the U.S.A. as a legal
Polish government. To counterbalance it, Russia hurried to recognize
the Provisional Government (January 5, 1956). Referring to the Polish
Government in London, the Lublin Manifesto said: "The emigre Government
in London is illegal and self-styled authority, based on the illegal
Fascist Constitution of April, 1935. That government has hampered the
struggle against Hitleric invaders by its policy of political opportun
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soldiers of that unit disappeared.

3

This only deepened the distrust of

Stalin, still vivid because of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of the fourth
partition of Poland in August, 1939, its execution sixteen days later
after the German invasion of Poland, deportation of 1.5 million Poles to
Siberia, and the extermination of more than ten thousand Polish officers
in the forest of Katyn. 4

ism and is driving Poland to a new disaster."

Appendix C, p, 408.

3The Home Army was affiliated to the government in London.
4 cf. Zbrodnia Katynska (Dokumenty) (London: Gryft, 1962); see also
Jan K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Katyn Forest Massacre (South
Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1962.
After the fall of 2oland, Molotov boasted in October, 1939:
"Nothing is left of Poland, this ugly offspring of the Verseilles
Treaty." Cf. M. K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party of Poland, op.
cit. , p. 158.
As soon as the Red Army had occupied the Eastern part of Poland in
1939, there took place a massive forced deportation of Poles into deep
Siberia. Russian policy regarding deported Poles was very simple: we
are not going to shoot you, you will die all the same of famine, miser~
and cold.
German-Russian conflict created better perspective for an eventual
collaboration between the Polish Government in London and Stalin. The
Commander in Chief of the Polish forces in the West, and at the same
time Prime Minister of the government in exile, General Wladyslaw
Sikorski, undertook strong diplomatic action to persuade Stalin to
release Poles from Russian concentration camps. The action was partly
successful. On July 13, 1941, there was signed the so-called July Pact
between the Polish Government in London and Stalin regarding an eventual
future collaboration. Consequently, on August 14 of the same year, an
agreement was signed and diplomatic relations between these two sides
was established. Two days before (on August 12), the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviets proclaimed an amnesty for all Polish citizens remaining
on the territory of Soviet Russia. Cf. Franciszek Tyczkowski,
Wspomnienia z Pierwszej i Drugiej Wojny Swiatowej (New York: Czas Publishing Company, 1972), p. 99. Practially, only a small number of the
Poles could leave Russia (about 90 thousand). It was General Wladyslaw
Anders who led them out of Russia. Through Persia they came to the
Middle East, then they joined the American and British armed forces to
fight against Germans in Africa and Italy. The majority of the Polish
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In August, 1944, the Red Army and with it the First Kosciuszko
Army, formed in Russia, were approaching

~\arsa\•'..

r:t'he Home Army (Ara1ia

Krajmva--AK) affiliated with the government in exile, initiated an
insurrection against Germans in Warsaw.

The Home Army and the govern-

ment in London aimed at gaining by the insurrection a better position
for possible future negotiations with Stalin.
miscalculation of forces.
driven back.

There was, however, a

After initial success, the ill-armed AK was

Germans were able to bring rapidly two divisions from the

West front to crush the

insurrection~

The dramatic appeals for help from

the passively stationed Red Army on the East banks of Vistula River vanished.

The city was razed to the ground.

Some 250,000 people lost their

lives in a terrible gehenna. 5
Besides the regular army (Kosciuszko Army), there was a small
section of the guerillas inside Poland controlled by the communists: the
People's Guard (Gwardia Ludowa--GL), subsequently renamed People's Army
(Armia Ludowa--AL). 6

Since the beginning, communist propaganda

attempted to discredit the Home Army, accusing it of hostility towards

soldiers were not allowed to leave the Soviet territory. They formed
the First Kosciuszko Army which fought at the Red Army's side in the
Eastern fronts.
5

stalin not only refused to help the Warsaw insurrection, but he
even helped to crush it. When the British and Polish pilots tried to
drop supplies for Warsaw, they were not allowed to land on the territory
occupied by Russia, and they had to fly back to Italy to refuel. Cf.
Bernard Newman, Portrait of Poland (London: Robert H. Limited, 1959),
p. 85.

6

In 1943, the Union of the Polish Patriots (Zwiazek Patriotow
Polskich--ZPP) was also founded in Russia. Its founder was Wanda
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the soviet Union

and of passiveness in fighting Nazi enemy. 7

The first days of 1945, brought about new events in Poland.

The

PKWN proclaimed itself a Provisional Government of the Polish Republic
with Boleslaw Bierut self-nominated as President, Edward Osobka-Morawski as Prime Minister, and Wladyslaw Gomulka as Deputy Premier.

8

wasilewska, Polish journalist. Later on she married A. Korneychuk, the
Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.
7
. tact1cs.
.
Groth puts it in this way:
There was a d"ff
1 erence 1n
"Where the Home Army was anxious to minimize German executions and
repressions against Pole~ civilians for guerilla acts of sabotage the
Communists did not have such scruples. They attempted to capitalize on
the population's hatred of the Nazi rulers without worrying about consequences . . . " Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 14.
8B. Bierut's real name was. Boleslaw Krasnodebski. As the communist
activist in the underground before World War II and during the German
occupation of Poland, he had to use several aliases. There were among
them t1vo names: Bienkowski and Rutkowski. The name Bierut came from the
combination of the first three letters of both just mentioned names.
Bierut spent at least two indoctrination periods in Moscow: one in the
early 1920, shortly after the defeat of the Red Army by Marshal Pilsudski in August, 1920, and second, in the period from 1933 to 1936. For
that reason, Bierut, more than anybody else, was trusted by Stalin and
so he was appointed for the task of the reorganization of the Polish
Communist Party.
E. Osobka-Morawski was a socialist. He had no strong political
personality. His participation in the government served the purpose of
creating the fiction of a genuine governmental coalition. Once he had
served this purpose, he was promptly fired.
W. Gomulka was born in 1905. As a seventeen year-old locksmith, he
founded a Trade Union. He joined the KPPR and in the 1920s was
arrested three times. By the time of the German invasion of Poland in
1939, he was in prison. After escaping from prison, he went to Warsaw
to participate in the defense of the capitol. Since the capitulation of
Warsa1v on September 27, 1939, he actively participated in organizing
anti-Nazi guerillas.
Gomulka belonged to the Polish school of the left-wing. His deter~inism and nationalism were largely known.
Gollancz wrote of him: ;'He
18 a ferverent Communist without fear or favor--a man of ruthless
energy and drive . .
He showed his courage in underground activity
during the war . . . For all his Communism, Gomulka is careful to
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There was still a lot of confusion in Poland when Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Stalin met in Yalta in February, 1945, to discuss the
future of Europe.

The problem of Poland was a key-issue.

The question

of Poland's borders was discus.sed during six of seven meetings,

All

three politicians agreed in principles: (1) Poland must be an independent ccuntry; (2) there should be held free elections in Poland as soon
as possible;9 (3) Roosevelt and Churchill succumbed to Stalin's claim
regarding some Eastern Polish territories with a partial recompense in
the

~-Jest. 10 Some reconciliatory signs between the Government of Lublin

and that in exile (like a nomination of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk a VicePremier and Minister of Agriculture) brought about the official recognition of the new Polish regime by Great Britain and the U.S.A. and
simultaneous withdrawing of their recognition to the exile government in

emphasize that he is a Pole and not a Russian puppet.'' Reported by
Bernard Newman, op. cit., p. 95. During the controversy between Tito
and Stalin, Gomulka refused to condemn Tito. In a struggle for power
with Bierut he \vas defeated. In 1949, he was expelled from the Party
as a deviant and, two years later, he was imprisoned. He spent three
years in prison. In October, 1956, he regained power as the First
Secretary of the Communist Party. Gomulka was in power until December,
1970. After the riot in Gdansk, he was force to leave that office to
Gierek.
9

Churchill and Roosevelt were pleased with Stalin when he declared
himself in favor of free election in Poland. But it was a matter of
ingenuity to take it seriously when they were well informed about the
Ribbentrop-Holotov pact of partition of Poland, compulsory deportation
of Poles in Siberia. their extermination in Russian concentration camps,
and most importantly, the personal responsibility of Stalin for murdering more than 10.000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. Roosevelt
especiappy was confident in his personal success in negotiating with
Stalin, but by the end of the War, Roosevelt was no longer alive.
10

Poland lost such traditional centers like: Vilno, Lvov.

In

85
London.

In fact, the political situation in Poland, even if it already

had been predetermined, was very tense.

The Communist regime, backed by

the soviets, began merciless purges whose main target became the Home
.
.
11
. .
Army an d ot h er Po 1 lSn antl-communlsts.
chance, even if it existed until 1948.

The opposition had not much
Time worked for the regime.

Sporadic bloody conflicts between opposition and the new regime were
completely useless. 12

There was no way to divert the events.

The Com

munist regime, by fair means or foul, was consolidating its power very
fast.
There was, however, one more thing that the new regime desperately
needed: a "placet" of the people.

That was totally in vein with the

Yalta agreement and the Potsdam conference in 1945. which intended free
election as a basis for a permenent Polish government.
were held on January 19, 1947.

The elections

The result surprised no one, not only

return it received Gdansk (Danzig), ~roclaw (Breslau), and Szczecin
(Stettin). Russia has retained 47 per cent of the prewar Polish
territory. In total, Poland has been reduced from 388.6 to 311.7
thousand square kilometers.
11 Even a simple affiliation to the Home Army was sufficient to be
imprisoned, to be sent to Siberia, or to get a death sentence. Great
numbers of people have disappeard. See William J. Rose, op. cit.,
P· 276, cf. Aleksander Groth, op. cit., p. 19.
Gomulka openly recognized the importance of the presence of the
Red Army for the political change in Poland after lvorld War II. See
Wladyslaw Gomulka, W walce o demokracje ludowe (Warszawa: P~.JN, 1947),
Vol. 1, p. 303.
Syzdek calls the presence of the Red Army "the favorable conditions for the creation of the revolutionary authority :1 in Poland.
Bronislaw Szyzdek, "Strategia PPR w walce o zdobycie i utrwalenie
wladzy ludowej," Ideologia i Polityka 1 (1970), p. 78.
12 rn 1947, pro-Soviet General Karol Swierczewski was executed by
Ukrainian Nationalist guerillas.
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because of different kinds of intimidations and repressions carried out
by the Ministry of Public Security and the secret police, but simply
because the counting of votes was an exclusive privilege of the
munist Party. 13

Com~

So, the election resulted in an overwhelming "victory"

of the Communist Party; 382 seats for so-called "Democratic

Bloc~'

totally controlled by the Communists, 17 seats for the Labor Party, 14
for Dissident Peasants> 27 for Peasant Party of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk,
1 for Independent Socialist, and 3 for Catholics. 14
A few months later, it was already clear, that the so-called
'Governmental Coalition 11 was simply a fiction.
trolled the government completely.

The Communist Party con-

The only party which had some influ-

ence was the Peasant Party headed by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk.l5

It was,

13Already in 1946, the PPR forced the PPS to campaign together for
the election. The Party propaganda referred to that as to "an agreement"
of common electorial campaign. See Bronislaw Syzdek, op. cit., p. 83.
z. Zulawski, the only independent socialist elected, made a comment; "It
was not a free election, it was not an election at all, but organized
violence over the electorate and his conscience . . . It was not
allowed to publish even one single electorial appeal . . .. , Cited by
Clifford R. Barnett and others, Poland (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1958),
p. 96. ~1ikolajczyk's party faced similar difficulties. "The Communists
made determined efforts to break up all our meetings. In Katowice they
ordered the workers . . . to gather in their own meetings at the time of
our scheduled meetings and to demostrate against us . . . At Radom • . .
the band of thugs . . . (was) sent against us . . . At Opole the Com•
munists crowded into our meeting hall and interrupted our speakers . . .
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk The Rape of Poland; Pattern of Soviet Aggression
(1-Jesport Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 158 159. After the election, the
the Peasant Party's newspaper, Gazeta Ludowa, was forced to publish the
electoral result, ibid., p. 200.
14

Clifford R. Barnett, et al., op. cit., p. 96.

l5At that time the PPS was extremely weak because it lacked an
adequate leadership. The Socialist Party lost its prominent leaders;
Germans executed Niedzialkowski and Dubois Puziak died in Soviet
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however, quickly accused of being ';a party of capitalists and reactionaries, composed of landlords and factory owners . . . ·•16

At the meet-

ing of PPR in Bydgoszcz, Tadeusz Krzysniak, attacked personally Mikolajczyk, calling him ;'a thief and bandit . . . i:fikolajczyk will be
arrested," he said, "and executed." 17
:1ikolaj czyk' s day were numbered.
abroad.

At that point it was clear that

He saved his life by taking refuge

The secret police (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa--UB) commended by

Russian trained Stanislaw Radkiewicz and so-called Voluntary Citizens
:1ilitia, undertook an uninterrupted series of acts of violence directed
against all potential opposing forces.

Also the Polish Army, with its

high number of Russian officers. was aimed in backing the Communist
Party.
Communist propaganda doubled its efforts to enlarge the Party
membership, and it succeeded.

The party membership increased from

135,728 in 1945 to 1,200,000 by 1949, to 1,297,000 by 1954. 18
Until 1947, perhaps because of its own problems, Russia did not
interfere much in the Eastern European countries policy, with one
exception--Czechoslovakia.

In all other countries there was a visible

consolidation of power of the

c~mmunist

parties.

leaders \vere sufficiently trusted by Stalin.

Russian-trained

But since 194 7, Stalin

prison, Erlich and Alter were exterminated by the NKVD.

16

stanislaw Mikolajczyk, op. cit., p. 153.

17 Ibid.
18 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jednosc czy konflikty (London: Odnow~,
1964)' p. 72.

88
decided to form a new international communist movement called COMINFOR}L
The inaugurating meeting serving this purpose took place on September 21,
1947, in Szklarska Poreba in Poland.

It was that issue, however, that

brought about dissension in the Communist bloc.

The first person to

oppose that idea was Gomulka, claiming the right of the Polish road to
socialism.

For the same reason Gomulka defended slow collectivization

of the private farms in Poland. This little bit of diversity requested
by Gomulka was called ''Gomulkaism," later described as heresy.
meeting in Szklarska Poreba did not solve the problem.
tion to Gomulka was growing from month to month.

The

But the opposi-

During the Party Ple-

num in August, 1948, he was openly attacked by Bierut, Berman and the
Russian ambassador to Warsaw, Lebediev.l9

Gomulka admitted some mis-

takes, but he had enough courage to counter-attack.
him much.
jail. 20

In 1951, Gomulka was arrested and spent three years in
Arrested with Gomulka were his associates: Zenon Kliszko and

Harian Spychalski.21

19

This did not help

Stalinism experienced its hey-day in Poland.

Nowe Drogi, January, 1947, p. 40.

20

Gomulka was never brought to trial. There are several possible
explanations of that fact. The most probable is that Bierut knew very
well that Gomulka was a genuine communist, even if not highly educated,
and that Gomulka was incredibly stobborn. No persuasions or tortures
would bring him to confess crimes he has never commited. Gomulka's
trial might very easily turn into Bierut's trial. Cf. Nicholas Bethell,
op. cit., p. 190; Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Pounds, op. cit.,
Pp. 282-824; Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 61; Jan B. de Weydenthal,
£ommunists of Poland (Stanford; Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 6465.
.
21 First Spychalski, later on Gomulka, were arrested by an UB
colonel, J. Swiatlo, who, a few months later, defected to the Hest and
broadcast his memories through Radio Free Europe.
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Postwar Economic Change in Poland
Political change in Poland after World War II brought about change
in the economic system.

Poland, between the wars, was a backr.;ard

country with a highly stagnant economy.
agricultural.

The country was overwhelmingly

This situation was due partially to the 125 years of

lasting partition, the exploitation of Poland by foreign capital, and
partly to poor between-war economic policies.

The index of the indus-

trial production per capita in 1939, in Poland, e.g., did not reach the
quota of 200 zlotys.

1-Jhen t:1e same world's index was 300 zlotys; Italy 1 s

industridl index was close to 600 zlotys, that of France, 1250; of
Great Britain_ 1400, and of the United States, 2300. 22
The pre-World War II Polish economy was stagnant.

For example,

although the population increased by five million during the period of
ten years (1921-1930), the industrial employment rate rose only by
100,000 people. 23

The villages were poor and overpopulated.

World War II could only aggravate the already difficult economic
situation.

During the War Poland lost 22 per cent of its population and

38 per cent of its total resources.

The losses in different sectors

varied: they reached 33 per cent in industry, 35 per cent in agriculture, 28 per cent in forests, 83 per cent in transportation, 62 per cent
in communication, and 60 per cent in schools and scientific institu-

22

Guilio Gelibter, Polonia oggi e domani (Bologna; Capelli, 1975),

p. 57.

23

Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 99.
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tions.24 Some big cities like Warsaw, Szczecin, Gdansk, Wroclaw, and
many more towns and villages were turned into heaps of ruins.
Every Marxist handbook of political economy points out the necessity of the material basis for the development of socialism.

This

material bases consists of socialized production, that is, the creation
of a society without private ownership of the means of production, and
in consequence, the creation of a society without exploitation.

'~Aboli-

tion of the private property," writes Gilejko, ''creates an economic
basis for the development of democracy, i.e., the fundamental condition
to overcome the narrowness of bourgeois laws." 25
By shaping human needs, aspirations and satisfactions, the economic system shapes also the system of beliefs, values and career
patterns.

The economic system, therefore, has social repercussions.

Creation of such material basis for socialism in Poland, required
several changes in the prewar economic system.

The most important were

agrarian reform, nationalization of banks and reform of the whole industrial and educational systems.
Agrarian Reform
It was on January 6, 1944, eight months before the end of World
War II, that the PKWN issued the decree on the agrarian reform.26

The

24

Andrzej Bodnar, ''Economie" in Pologne; realit~s et problems, by
J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966), p. 123.
25

Leszek Gilejko, "Ekonomiczne podstawy demokracji socjalistycznej," Ideologia i Polityka 2 (1976), p. 33.
2 6Dziennik Ustaw, No. 4, 1944.

91
agrarian reform consisted of three different, at least juridically,
acts: confiscation, nationalization,and ''reglament.''

The first consited

of seizure of private property which belonged to the individuals or to
the groups because of some criminal activities of these individuals or
groups.

Confiscation gives no right to appeal in court.

The confiscation of 1944, in Poland, included the private property
of the following physical or corporate bodies: property of German
citizens and of the Polish citizens of German background; property of
all individuals convicted of a collaboration with clazis duriGg the period
of German occnpation of Poland; private property of land in which the
whole area exceeded 100 hectares or SO hectares of arable land.

27

The State control over the forests took the form of nationalization.28

Juridically, nationalization consists on conversion from pri-·

vate to State ownership and control.

Nationalized property was normally

intended to be compensated (not always).

By the force of the decree of

the PKWN of 1944, all forests whose areas exceeded 25 hectares have been
nationalized along with all other facilities which make possible forest
management such as meadows, waters, and so forth. 29
The third legal act of economic reform, "reglament,' aimed at a

27

1 ha = 2.371 acres. The clause of SO ha of arable land did not
apply equally to the whole country.
28 A similar decree was issued in 194S, which specified the purpose
the confiscated land was destined. The decree mentioned: creation of
Private farms, creation of specific farms, reservations, industrial or
residential urban centers. The decree did not mention the State farms.
29 Dziennik Ustaw, No. lS, 1944.
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complete control by the State over the resources, products and the process of production in purpose to limit, and later on, eliminate the
private sector of the economy and consequently eliminate any competi·tion.

This type of juridical act regarding agriculture was enforced

only in the 1940s and early 1950s, during Stalinism as an intensive
campaign against kulaks.

The policy followed the Russian method of

struggle against rich farmers, but it has never reached, in Poland, the
point of physical destruction of individuals.

The State tried to

destroy them by heavy taxes (in money and nature), by refusing to sell
them fertilizers or machines.

The State propaganda machine used its

power to portray them as an exploiting class.
attempted collectivization Polish agriculture

During this time of
experien~ed

its lowest

. .
30
pro d uct~v~ty.
Nationalization of
Banks and Industry
Nationalization of the banks and the fundamental branches of the
national economy came fifteen months after the agrarian reform had taken
place.

.c\ decree

of January. 3, 1946, introduced these changes. 31

In

accordance with that decree the following branches of the national economy became confiscated: factories, banks, mining, communication, insurance, and commerce if they belonged to Germany or to the free city of
Gdansk, to German citizens or citizens of Gdansk, to the corporate body

30

There is no data available on the real earnings in the State
farms until 1955; this is probably because the dAta -;vnuld be discrediting
to the system. Cf. Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. XL.
31

Dziennik Ustaw, No. 3, 1946.
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of Gdansk, or Germany, and finall;r, to political refugees in Germany.
All other industries such as steelworks, coking plants, the textile
industry, printing firms, etc. (the decree specified 17 of them), were
nationalized.

Nationalization of these branches_ of industry was to be

accompanied by compensation which, however, never occurred. Additionally, all establishments not mentioned elsewhere but capable of employing more than 50 employees per shift were nationalized.

The confication

and nationalization of industry practically eliminated foreign capital
from Poland and gave the government complete control over the economy of
the country. 32
The radical changes in the Polish economy, just described, did not
determine, by themselves, the international market for Poland.
policy accomplished that.

Russian

As early at the late 1940s, it became clear

that Russia intended to link the Polish economy with the Soviet economy
and consequently to completely subordinate it.

Poland. under Russian

pressure, could not participate in the Marshall Plan even if initially
it intended to do so. 33
the Russian sponsored

Instead, Poland was forced to participate in

C1EA

(Council for Hutual Economic Assistance).

In

the words of the official propaganda, the CMEA served the purpose of consolidation of the economies of its members by the means of technical
assistance.

"Mutual aid in the form of raw materials, food, machinery,

32

This was true nevertheless the factthat the decree of 1949
mentioned three sectors of the Polish economy: public, private, A.nd
cooperative.
33 Cf. James F. Morrison, The Polish People's Republic (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 5.
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and equipment was supposed to be made available to all six initial CMEA
members.

n34

Meantime, Poland received in UNRRA aid nearly half a billion
dollars. 35

This evidently helped Poland shorten the period of recon-

struction of the country according to the Three Year Plan (1946-149).36
Following the Soviet model, with most investments poured into heavy
industry, Poland sacrificed the investment in consumer goods and agriculture.

The curves on page 95 indicate clearly the discrepancy between

the growth of industry and agriculture in Poland.

Agriculture has

always been a neglected sector of the Communist economy as is light
industry.

These are the main reasons why the standard of living in the

Communist countries is very low, and virtually all of them import grain
from the capitalist countries.

This policy brought about considerable

growth and a variety of industrial production in Poland.37

Poland

34 Richard Staar, Poland 1944-1962 (Westport; Greenwood Press,
1975), p. 123.
35 UNRRA, Report of the Director General to the Council for the
Period July 1, 1947 to December 31, 1947 (Washington, D.C., 1948),
p. 204.
36

cf. Thad P. Alton, Polish Postwar Economy (New York; Columbia
University Press, 1955); Nicolas Spulber, The Economics of Communist
Eastern Europe (New York: Technology Press and Wiley, 1957); Alfred
Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East
Germany, 1937-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
37

There were three periods in the postwar policy of the economic
development of the country; (1) reconstruction period up to 1949; (2)
basic industrialization with emphasis on heavy industry from 1950-1960,
and (3) complementary industrialization of the country with more stress
on the consumer goods 1961-1970.
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started to produce new machines, ships and even jet fighters, radar (and
other sophisticated) equipment.38
The Reform of the Education
and Socialization System
The introduction of free schooling (including college) has been
essential for social, economic, ~nd structural change in Poland. 39

The

system itself could not be cured instantly because of losses during the
years of German occupation in personnel, school building, school
supplies, etc.

During the War, Poland lost 700 college professors and

assistant professors, 1,000 high school teachers and 4,000 grammar and
elementary school teachers.40
During the reconstruction period, private schools (especially high
schools), were tolerated because of the limited resources of the government.

However, once the regime stood on its feet, the policy was radi-

cally changed.

In consequence private school were eliminated, religion

classes were banished, and Marxist ideology was taught in every
school. 41

38cf. James F. Morrison, op. cit., p. 76.
39 During the prewar period about 10 per cent of school age children, mainly in villages, did not attend school at all. Given the fact
that a few scholarships were available, the majority of youth could not
afford to continue their studies in high school and college. College
and even high school education was practically reserved to higher
classes.
40western Press Agency, Bul. No. 3, 1957: Cf. Jan T. Gross, Polis~
Society Under German Occupation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1979), pp. 74, 235.
41 There have been brought into being two organizations which were
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The changes in the educational system had three objectives: eradication of illiteracy, democratization of the composition of schools, and
Marxist-Leninist indoctrination of pupils.

The programs in schools were

modeled on the Russian style and school curriculums were mande uniform.
Compulsory primary education and several programs for adult education served to eradicate illiteracy.

This was virtually achieved by the

end of the 1960s.
As a means to balance school pupil composition, a democratization
policy was initiated.
classes.

It favored pupils from working and peasant

This was accomplished by giving such students additional entry

points because of their social background and by fixing a quota on the
proportion of students from different social classes.
Teaching of the Marxist ideology had been introduced in 1948.
Intensification. however, of the indoctrination varied in different
periods: strong during Stalinism, liberal after October, 1956, and
moderate with a tendency to strong in 1960s and 1970s. 42
The scheme on page98 represents the Polish school system which was
introduced in 1967/68.

The main novelty of this system was that the

supposed to serve this purpose directly; Society for Secular Schools
(Towarzystwo Szkoly Swieckiej--TSS) and the Society of Atheists and
Freethinkers (Stowarzyszenie Ateistow i Wolnomyslicieli--SAiW).
42

A new ref~rm of teaching and learning was proposed in the late
1960s and early 1970s. It consisted mainly in doing homework in schools
under the supervision of teachers. With the ban on religious instruction in schools, this would practically eliminate any possibility of
teaching religion after classes. For this reason, the Polish bishops
openly questioned such a proposal.
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Adapted from Area Handbook for Poland (Washington, D.C.: U. S.
Government Printing Ofb.ce, 1972), p. 92.
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was that the seven-year, mandatory elementary school was extended by
one year.

This additional year was supposed to be spent for broadening

pure science and socio-political education.
Preschool education includes nurseries
and kindergartens (4-7 years old).

(1~3

year old children)

In 1970/71, there were about 1,000

nurseries which were able to serve 4.7 per cent of the children. 43

The

situation was not much better in 1978, since the capacity of nurseries
increased only by 0.5 per cent. 44
In comparison with the nurseries, the kindergarten system was sig'f.~cant 1 y ~mprove
.
d . 45

n~

In 1970/71, there existed about 8,900 kinder-

gartens which served 49, 825 4-7 year old children.

By 1978/79, the

number of kindergartens rose to 14,669 and their pupils to 904,353. 46
In 1970/71, in Poland there were 26.126 elementary schools of
which 5,000 were huge school complexes located in the urban areas.

The

total enrollment amount to 5,257,000 stuqents almost equally divided
between cities and villages.47

The elementary school curriculum is

standardized and includes Polish, basic mathematics, music, physical

43 Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 424.
44 Ibid.
45Kindergartens are subjected to the Ministry of Education and
Socialization, while the nurseries are under authority of the t1inistry
of Health and Social Welfare, which is visibly neglected and inefficient.
46Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 378.
47

Ibid., p. 379.

100
education, and pratical work

The fifth, sixth, seventh, and

eighth grades include other subjects such as history, biology, chemistry, physics, and Russian.
Approximately 90 per cent of the elementary school graduates con-·
tinue their education.

The majority of them, however, enter basic

vocational schools which do not have the same prestige as high vocational schools.

Only the diplomas of the schools of general education

and the vocational high schools qualify graduates to enter college after
having passed

~n

entrance examination.

In 1971/72, there were 909 700

students studying in the basic vocational schools, 401,900 in the high
schools of general education, and 474,800 in the vocational high
schools.48
Finally, in 1970/71, there were 85 colleges and universities with
330,000 students of whom two thirds were degree candidates. 49

The

others were evening, nondegree, and correspondence students.50

In the

same year there were more than 300 student hotels providing lodging and
board.

The majority of students are on full scholarships.

Yet the

number of college candidates considerably exceeds the number of places
available.

48
49

In 1971/72, the demand exceeded the supply by 42,000 places

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 379.
Ibid., pp. 548-59.

50 rn 1979/80, the number of students rose to 469,368.
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. 408.

See
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and constituted 181 per cent of the supply. 51
In spite of these restrictions, twenty years after the communist
regime took power, some 73 per cent of the youth between the ages of
fourteen and seventeen were attending schools in 1963/64 in comparison
with 14 per cent in 1937/38. 52
Every totalitarian regime, more than any other type of system,
has a genuine interest in controlling the socialization and education
of youth.

This held true for prewar Fascist regimes and it is still

more evident in the case of communist parties policies.

::It is upon

the young that the hopes of the dictatorship are focused, and the totaltarian regime never tires of asserting that the future belongs to the
you th . "53

51 Area Handbook for Poland, op. cit., p, 99,
52Bogdan Suchodolski and Feliks Bielecki, "Instruction et ~duca
tion," Pologne: realt~s et problems by J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966,
p. 230).
53 carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian
Dictatorship and Authority (Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 60.
Young people have not yet committed themselves definitely to one
thing or another. This is why it is much easier to influence their
choices than the choices of the adults. On the other hand, the exuberent demand for freedom of youth might work very well in opposite direction and bring about riots and protests. "Youth exuberance and ideal-ism, •: as Cornell stresses, "are to be harnessed to regime-defined goals,
and are not to be manifested in individual self--expression. :o Richard
Cornell, Youth and Communism (New York: Walker and Company, 1965), p. 3
(Introduction).
"What is striking . • . ,"observe some sociologists," is a high
number of indifferent attitudes regarding all so-called mass organizations' popularity. But if we compare them (members) with the opinions
we obtained directly from the members of these organizations, it becomes
clear, that only to a very small degree their large memberships were an
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In Poland, as in Russia, a considerable effort had been devoted
to organizing, controlling, and indoctrinating youth.

The immediate

postwar Polish policy regarding youth followed

the Soviet

cl~sely

patterns characterized by their negative and positive aspects.

The

first aimed at elimination of the private school system and ban on
opposite ideologies (especially religious views).

The others were

stressing the necessity of youth organization in the framework of the
socialist system.

The negative aspects have already been discussed.

We need now to further explore the last ones.
By the end of World War II, there were in Poland four youth movements affiliated with the major political parties; The Young Peasants
(I.JICI) was controlled by the Peasant Party; the Union of Youth for
Struggle (Zwiazek Walki Mlodych···-ZI.JM) was affiliated with the Polish
Workers' Party; the Socialist Party had an auxiliary in the Socialist
youth organization and finally, there was a middle class youth organized as "liberal democrats."
In 1948, a "unity congress" took place during which all these
movements were ordered to merge into one--the Union of Polish Youth
(Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej--ZMP).
youth to join the

Z~~.

With the pressure of the regime on

the membership of this new body grew very fast.

outcome of the positive attitudes toward them," Halina Bialkmvna
Irena Majchrzakowa and Renata Tulli, "Postawy robotnikow fabryki
samochodow osobowych wobec organizacji spolecznych roznego typu,"
Z badan klasy robotniczej i inteligencji by J. S. Szczepanski,
(Lodz: PWN, 1958), p. 115.

1U3
In 1955, the

Z~1P

numbered 2,019,000 members.

listie youth organization.

54

The ZHP became a monopo-

Almost the whole career of a young person

such as an entrance to college, getting an apartment or better job,
faster promotion, etc., depended on that organizational membership.

"In

the period 1948-56, a youth had only one alternative: to join the ZMP or
stay out of the youth organization."55
Artificially created and ideologically divided, the ZHP broke down
once the external pressure had been weakened.
October, 1956.

This happened after

The ZHP had split into the Union of the Socialist Yough

(Zwiazek Mlodziezy Socjalistycznej--ZMS) backed by the Communist Party
and the Union of Peasants Youth (Zwiazek Mlodziezy Wiejskiej--ZMW).
The separate student organizations survived until August, 1950, when
they were ordered to merge into one organization: the Polish Academic
Youth Union (Zwiazek Akademickiej Mlodziezy Polskiej--ZAMP).

Later on,

this organization changed its name to the Polish Students' Union
(Zrzeszenie Studentow Polskich--ZSP).

Although the ZSP had incorporated

more than 80 per cent of all students, it had little political significance because of lack of spontaneity and political involvement of its
members.

Many students considered their membership as a necessary condi-

tion to be admitted to college or to get a grant of scholarship.

54

"In

Richard Cornell, op. cit., p. 161.

55
.
Maria Jarosinska and Halina Najduchowska, "Mlodziez robotnicza
wobec Zwiazku Hlodziezy Polskiej w okresie kryzysu," Z badan klasy robotniczej i inteligencji by J. J. Szczepanski (Lodz: PWN, 1958), p. 140.
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consequence," as Benes and Pound stress, "many young people lost interest in public affairs and fell back on that internal emigration which
can be found in all modern democratic societies." 56

Since 1970, the

zsP figured under the name of the Polish Students' Socialist Union
(Socjalistyczny Zwiazek Studentow Polskich--SZSP).
the SZSP reached 228, 200.

The membership of

57

The Scouts organization had always been considered the most
important youth organization.

Until 1948, however, the regime made no

special efforts to infiltrate this organization.

This "neglect" was

probably connected with the uncertainty and instability in the country,
and the urgency of solving other problems.

But in 1948, the Scouts

(Zwiazek Harcerstwa Polskiego--ZHP) came under communist influence
which has persisted to the present.

Only for a short period of time,

practically one year after October 1956, the ZHP was not under the
regime's control.
enormously.

During that short period the organization grew

Already in 1957, a controversy arose regarding the ZHP.

One side wanted it apolitical, and the other (the regime) intended to
use the ZHP for its purposes.
vailed.

As one might expect, the last group pre-

The ZHP, as other youth organizations, has been totally con-

trolled by the regime.

In 1960, the ZHP had 728,600 members; in 19.75,

56
Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Pound, op. cit., p. 53. The party
newspaper, Trvbuna Ludu, observed in connection with that: "Only conformity of personal effort with national objectives" creates conditions
in which talents and abilities can be developed. Trybuna Ludu,
December 18, 1962.
57

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. 23.
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2,680,300, and by 1979, it grew to 3,442,300.5 8
Whatever one might say about the changes in the educational system
in Poland after World War II, one thing cannot be denied: a new channel
of upward mobility on the basis of skill and knowledge has been opened
for many people.

This decisively fostered the growth in size and

diversity of the intelligentsia class.

The classical intelligentsia has

become a minority among the highly educated people.
nical intelligentsia has grown.

Instead, the tech-

This has resulted from the ever increas-

ing demand for technical skills arising from the growth in size and
sophistication of modern industry.
Ironically or not, but the three reforms just discussed (agrarian
reform, nationalization of industry, and school system reform) brought
about the growth of three main social classes which later on, in some
way or other, were challenging the power elite (Communist Party) which
had created favorable conditions for the rise of the new challengers.
The agrarian reform of 1944 distributed millions
prewar rural proletariat.

of acres of land to the

Created in this way a new class of small peas-

ants was the first to oppose the nationalization of peasants' pieces of
land already in the early 1950s.

A new generation of intelligentsia

moved up in the social hierarchy, thanks to school reform which permitted
young people to enter college with free tuition, started to challenge the
rule of the political elite in the late 195Qs.
"revisionists."
class, which
58

They have been called

Finally, there was the most numerous class, the working

were brought in large numbers from over-populated villages,

RoczPik Statystyczny, 1980, p. 23.
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to become the most powerful challenger to the power elite which claims
to represeni the working class interests.
Although this research will analyze, to some extent, all three
aspects of the conflict in Poland, the main attention will be paid to
the workers' insurrections in the postwar period.
The take over by the Communist Party has brought about a new sociopolitical situation.

The reforms mentioned above were one of the

aspects of this new socio-political reality.

But the reforms themselves

could be achieved only because the Communist Party had an absolute control over social, economic, and political life.

This aspect of the

socialist societies in general, and the Polish society in particular,
has to be pointed out very strongly because the totalitarian power of
the communist parties accounts for the formation of the political elite,
which is the key factor for understanding class structure and class conflict in the state socialist societies.
following chapter.

That will be a subject of the

CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE SOCIALIST SYSTEH
It is impossible to analyze the class system in the socialist
societies without taking into consideration the role the Communist
Party plays in those regimes.l

The Party, in the socialist systems, "is

the backbone of the entire political, economic, and ideological activity.
The entire public life is at a standstill or moves ahead, falls behind
or turns around according to what happens in the Party forums." 2

High

ranking military officers, public officials, politicians and even union
leaders all belong to the same Party which has no counterpart.
Party elite controls all intermediate bodies.

The

This is so true, that one

can say that "the Communist government • • • is a party government, the

lusing the term "socialist regime" I refer to the so-called
People's Democracies, and not to the socialist regimes in the sense of
the Western understanding of socialism.
Also the "party" in socialist regimes has a different meaning from
what the Western people mean by the political party. Communist parties
adapt the form of the political party, but they do not function as the
Western political parties do. "They do not freely recruit their membership, as democratic parties do, but institute the sort of tests that are
characteristic of clubs, orders • . • They correspondingly practice the
technique of expulsion • • • ; within the totalitarian party there is
also no 'democracy'." Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, op.
cit., p. 45; cf. Fred Schwarz, You Can Trust the Communist to be Communist (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), Chapters 2; 3; Rudolf
Heberle, Social Movements (New York: Meridith Corp., 1951), Chapter 15;
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc.,
1965).
2Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 70.
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Conmun~st

army

.

~sa

.,3
party army; and the state is a party state.·

For Harxists, as it was for Marx, the Party is necessary to the proletariat in order to transform it into a revolutionary class.

:'The party

is conceived as the organization, incarnation, or institionalization of
class consciousness.:r 4

The Party is the "vanguard of the proletariae'

in the achievement of its final goals.
far-reaching aims and course the

As such, it is able to grasp

so~iety's

development.

"If 'the masses'

happen to disagree with the course chosen by their rules, this bears
evidence only to the 'immaturity' of the masses themselves, to their
inability to grasp the far-sighted wisdom of the leadership
Therefore the party, as the repository and the guardian of the ideal
society to come, needs no endorsement from its contemporaries; much less
can it allow itself to be diverted from its path by sluggish pace of the
unenlightened

and thereby retarded, majority."5

Party authority is. estahlished on every level of social, economic,
and political organization.

This is not only because all high social,

economic, and political positions are held by the Party members, but
additionally, because every level of such positions corresponds to the
Party hierarchy.

This creates two interlocking hierarchies; govern-

mental hierarchy and, corresponding to it, a Party hierarchy (see the

3
Milovan Djilas, The New Cass, op. cit., p. 72.

4Alfred Meyer, Leninism (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
1962), pp. 32-33.
5

Zygmunt Bauman, :rofficialdom and Class. Bases of Inequality in
the Socialist Society," The Social Analysis of Class Structure by F.
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scheme on page 117).

The first coordinates social and economic life,

while the Party hierarchy's role is to watch over the governmental
activities of the corresponding level and endeavor to promote the execution of orders through the regular administrative channels.

Party

functionaries should not interfere with the work of governmental hier·archies, but their role is to help if any aid is necessary.

But. as

Bendix points out, ;'in every case the Party reserves for itself the
right to judge and to distinguish 'aid' from 'interference' ."6
The Party itself is organized in accordance with so-called
';democratic centralism. "7

The main feature of the democratic centralism

is not only a personal loyalty of all members to the Party line, but
also a total identification (mental and emotional) with the Party principles.

This is a form of a growing process.

11

After long acquaintance

with his role, a man grows into it so closely that he can no longer
differentiate his true self from the self he simulates, so that even the
most intimate of individuals speak to each other in the party slogans."8
Party hierarchy is shaped as a pyramid.

The lowest level of the

pyramid is organized in local groups whose representatives participate
in the provincial meetings.

Parkin

Any decision on that level absolutely binds

(London; Tavistock Publications Limited

1974) 1 p. 137.

6

.
ReLnhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York, Harper
and Row, 1963), p. 399.

7Gordon H. Skilling, Th.e Governments of Communist East Europe (New
York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), pp. 62-64.
8

p. 52.

Czeslaw Hilosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Vintage Books. 1955),
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the local organizations.

The provincial authorities are controlled) in

turn, by the central committee which has its executive body in the
Politburo.

Additionally, in every establishment there is the so-called

factory Party organization whose decisions exceed ideological issues.
They are also binding in regard to purely economic matters.
The effectiveness of the Party requires unanimity of minds, will,
and programs.

No deviation can be tolerated because the central com-

mittee of the Party enjoys the privilege of issuing absolute truths.

On

the base of that assumption, for example, the spokesman for Gomulka, J.
Morawski, said in 1958; "There is only one Marxism: tne one that guides
the Party

n9

This totalitarian character of the Party leads often

to dilemmas and purges. 10

In the case of necessity, the Party find

enough victims to be sacrificed to save its reputation.
never wrong; only individuals can make mistakes.

The Party is

This was strongly

pointed out during Trotsky's trial and his confession.
of us wishes to be or can be right against his party.

"Comrades, none
In the final

reckoning the party is always rights, because the party is the only
historic instrument that the proletariat possesses for the solution of
its fundamental problems

I know that to be right against the

party is impossible. One can be right only with the party and through
the party, since history has not created any other paths for the reali-

9

Polityka, December 13, 1958.

10
The purges apply to those who have already accepted the Party
ideology or who were associated with the Party.
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zation of one's rightness."

11

Similarly in 1948, Gomulka confessed his

mistakes, but he had an incredible amount of courage to counterattack.
He succeeded although he was later imprisoned.

The same Gomulka had no

chance to defend himself in 1970, when he was forced to leave the office
to Gierek.

Jaroszewicz, Gierek's Prime Minister 1 suffered Gomulka's lot

in April, 1980. 12

A few months later, Gierek himself (at that time the

First Secretary of the Communist Party) did not appear before the decisive Politburo meeting during whjch he was removed from the office,
claiming to have serious heart problems.l3
gress in July, 1981,

'};he extraordinary Party Con-

stripped Gierek from the party membership and all

medals and honors. 14
The purges among the members of the PUWP were incomparably less
severe than those among the Russian deviants, especially during

Stalin~

11
Trinadtsatyi Sezd RKP (B), Stenograficheski Otchet, Moscow, 1924,
pp. 166-67, cited by Thornton Anders.on, Masters of Russian Marxism (New
York; Appleton-Century--Crofts, 1963), p. 134.

12

nziennik Zwiazkowy,·April 3, 1980. Referring to this, Gierek
said; "As it is known to you, comrades, Comrade P. Jaroszewicz, asked to
postpone his candidacy for high party offices and to be exempted from
the duty of Prime Minister. He intends--as he says--to retire." VIII
Zjazd PZPR (Warszawa; KiW 1980), p. 235.
13Polish radio reported on September 5> 1980; "Polish United
Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierek developed serious disturbances in the heart this morning . . . The patient is in a hospital
" Reported by Sun-Times (Chicago), September 6> 1980.
14

Aron calls this practice "the logic of confessions." Its idea
is based on the following presupposition. "whoever is not for the
central committee of the communist garty is an enemy of the sacred mission of the proletariat,
" Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 189.
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ism.

For example,

Trotsky was expelled from the party, exiled to Alma

Ata, forced to leave the country, and finally, executed in Mexico in
1940.15

In 1934, Kirov; in 1937, Marshall Tukhachewsky, and in 1938,

Yezhow were all liquidated.
Every system generally, and the totalitarian system in particular,
makes use of ideology as a powerful weapon of the rulers.

16

"A comrade

is a comrade by virtue of his beliefs, which are perceived as his most
significant qualities." 17

Ideology constitutes a body of principles

regarding vital aspects of human existence.

Ideology arises from the

fact that order, once created intellectually and put in practice, needs
adequate explanation.

This is a positive aspect of the ideological

15 Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth-Century Russia
XcNally and Company, 1959), p. 283.

(Chicago; Rand

16

Brzezinski defines totalitarianism as aa system in which tech~
nologically advanced instruments of political power wielded without
restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning
of man on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the
entire population. 11 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in
Soviet Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 47-48.
The ideology must be accepted, at least passively, by all members of a
given society. For Baradat the totalitarian state is "a state in which
government controls the economic, social, and cultural as well as
political aspects of a society." Leon P. Baradat, Political Ideologies,
Their Origins and Impacts (New York; Prentice-Hall. Inc., 1979),
P· 306. Cf. Aryeh L. Unger, The Totalitarian Party (London; Cambridge
University, 1974).
17

Edward Shils, :.Ideology, •: The Intellectuals and the Powers and
Other Essays (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 29.
Cf. Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York: Random House,
1962), Chapter 8; Carl J. Friedrich, M. Curtis and B. R. Barber,
Totalitarianism in Perspective, Three Views (New York: Praeger Pub~
lishers _ 1969).
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views. 18

Besides that, every ideology indicates the ideas which are

exceptionally dangerous for its existence.

Ideological unity is a

necessary condition for the existence of the totalitarian system. This
holds true for the Communist system as well.
justifies Party policy in absolute

terms~

It is ideology which

a common ideological view

prevents the formation of other ideologies or movements.

Ideology

provides ' 1 universal rationale for each decision and activity so that
members have a ready-made vocabulary of private motives and public
reasons which differ radically from every common universe of discourse." 1 9

Finally, the unity of ideology constitutes a fundamental

condition of the personal dictatorship.

Vice versa, the continuity of

the ideology is an unmistakable sign of a dictatorship. 20

18 Ideology, for Marx, had a derogative meaning. He linked ideol-ogy with the ''false consciousness" of the bourgeoisie in the process
of exploitation of the proletariat.
Mannheim refers to ideology as to "all those utterances the
'falsity' of which is due to an intentional or unintentional conscious,
semi-conscious, or unconscious; deluding of one's self or others,
taking place on a psychological level and structurally resembling
lies." Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, Inc., 1950), pp. 265-66.
As Arendt points out "ideologies always assume that one idea is
sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise,
and that no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction .
Three
elements are peculiar to all ideological thinking: . . . their claim to
total explanation . . . , (they are) emancipated from the reality . . . ,
(and) they achieve this emancipation of thought from experience through
certain methods of demonstration . . . " Hannah Arendt, The Origin of
Totalitarianism (New York; Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Ind., 1973),
PP. 470-4 71.
l9Reinhard Bendix, op. cit., p. 347.
2017 Totalitarian ruler," as Arendt says,

11

is confronted with a dual
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According to the well known principles of orthodox Marxism, the
community Party in general and PUWP in particular express the doctrinal
basis of the whole socialist system and enjoy all the attributes and
privileges of an absolute monarch.

The PUWP establishes the aims and

goals of political, economic, and social life.
neous direction to all socialist programs.
and guidelines of State policy.

It tends to give homage·

It establishes principles

It inspires, directs, and controlls all

aspects of society through the presence of its members on every level of
social classes, Party.

Finally, it exclusively prepares personnel for

the most important social positions. 21

The monopoly of political power

is necessary if the entirely new society is to be created.

"A

homage~-

neous society cannot be forged and social classes suppressed if the
rights of the opposition are respected. 11 22
The Party considers itself not only the unique party of the working
class, but also the party of the whole nation.

It is the working class

party because it traces its origins back to the radical wing of the
Polish workers' movements; it follows Marxism-Leninism which is an

task which at first appears contradictory to the point of absurdity; he
must establish the ficticious world of the movement as a tangible work-ing reality of every day life, and he must, on the other hand, prevent
this new world from developing a new stability; for a stabilization of
its laws and institutions would surely liquidate the movement itself
and ~v:ith it the hope for eventual world conquest. a Hannah Arendt, op.
cit., p. 391. The totalitarianism creates a state of permanent instability in which it operates and through which it survives.
21

Ludwik Krasucki, avie politique, 11 Pologne: realites et
problemes by J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966), p. 106.
22

Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 44.

115
ideology of a matured proletariat, and it is a unique representative of
the working class. 23

It is a whole nation party because its policy aims

at the interests of all classes; workers, peasants, and intelligentsia,
as their representative body; the PUWP tends towards harmonious solution
of all problems. 24

;'Today," says Wojna, " . . . the Party expresses the

right of the whole nation, the party and non-party people, the believers
and non-believers, to decide about our common fate. 1125
Lenin's words

1
' •••

In Martov and

the Party is the conscious spokesman of an uncon-

scious process. 1126
An absolute control by the Communist Party over the government,
economy, and social and political life is possible through the establishment of the Party hierarchy on every level of the government.

Even

the Sejm (Parliament), which is intended as the nation's legislative
body, is totally controlled by the Party, whose membes form a vast
majority of the Se jm.

Giere!<, former First Secretary or t•1e PU"wP, said

in reference to that;
Wherever proceeds life, wherever people work, wherever important or
secondary issues are to be solved--there is our Party. The Party
thinks about the people and we, the leaders of that Party . . . have
but one goal: to serve the Party, to serve socialism and Poland,

23

Jerzy Wiatr, "Ksztaltowanie sie i rola systemu partyjnego w
Polsce," Struktura i dynamika spoleczenstwa polskiego by W. 1Vesolowski
nvarszawa; P\,m, 1970), p. 60.
24
25

Ibid. , p. 61.
zycie Warszawy, September 11, 1971.

(Article of Jan Wojna.)

26
Vladimir I. Lenin,

11

0ne Step Forward, Two Steps Back," Selected

1
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because Poland and socialism are the same thing.27
The diagram on page 117 represents the power structure in Poland
and the establishment of the Party line on every level of social organization.
Unity with masses, in the Partyts view, is not a static, but a
dynamic unity.

Once it has taken place it is growing, broadening,

strengthened by the unity of ideology, the quality of socio-political
solutions of the important issues and by the socialization and education
of the youth.28

The noble goal (creation of the classless society) is

the best and unfailing guarantee of a total success.
Class structure, in Marx' view-, is inseparably linked with class
conflict in a society.

Vice versa, the presence of structural conflict

is an unmistakable sign that a given society is stratified.

"The

history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."29
From the Marxian point of view it is not only possible, but even
more plausible, to start the structural analysis of a given society
with an analysis of conflict in that society.

That will make possible

Works (International Publishers, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 319.
27

vn

Zjazd PZPR (Warszawa: KH-1, 1980), p. 91.

28 cf. Adam Lopatka, "Na czym polega kierownicza rola PZPR w
Polsce," Partia-panstwo-spoleczenstwo by R. Dudek and z. Siembrowicz
(Warszawa; KiW, 1978), p. 75; A. Jegorov, "Partia komunistyczna w
warunkach rozwinietego socjalizmu," 0 rozwinietym spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym by H. Cholaj and F. Ociepka (Warszawa; Khr, 1979), Vol. 1.
29

Karl Xarx, CM, op. cit., p. 9.
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1

Party Hierarchy and the Governmental Power Structure
1

Adapted from Jan. J. Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York:
Random House, 1970), p. 61.
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the identification of the parties in conflict and their conflictual
interests.
From many different approaches this research chooses the latter:
Marxian logic.

It starts with an extensive discussion on the existing

conflicts in Poland giving special attention to two main protagonists
in those conflicts: power elite, and working class (mainly blue-collar
workers).

It further stresses the circumstances which visibly fostered

such conflicts.

The impossibility of explaining these conflicts on the

basis of Marx' theory of class and class conflict, will bring from this
analysis a redefinition of classes in State-run socialist societies.

P ART THREE

POSTWAR POLISH WORKERS' UPHEAVALS

CHAPTER

V

MAIN SOURCES OF STRAIN IN THE POSTWAR POLISH SOCIETY
The central thesis of Marx' theory of class is that the classes
cannot coexist without entering into class conflict or class struggle.
In order to eliminate class conflict, it is necessary to abolish social
classes.

Hence, social classes arise on the basis of different rela-

tions to the means of production, therefore, with the abolition of the
private means of production, the class conflict will also disappear.

On

the contrary, by proving the existence of a structural conflict in a
given society, one ipso facto proves the existence of at least two
classes which participate in the conflict.
With the proletarian revolution the social structure of the capitalist society undergoes radical changes.

The class of the bourgeoisie

and the class of the land-owners are expropriated and the socialist
reconstruction of the society takes place.

While in Marx' view the

process of total separation of the direct producers from their means of
production was relatively long, the proletarian revolution brings about
rather rapidly the far reaching changes in class system and class
struggle.

Capitalist exploiters once deprived of their weapons, are not

able to divert the events.

Bureaucracy as well as

1

tate are eliminated. 1

See Franco Ferraresi and Alberto Spreafico, "Il dibattito sulla
burocrazia nella tradizione weberiana ed in quella marxista," Quaderni
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Lenin, however, observed that the reality is more complex.

He wrote:

"During the transition form capitalism to communism • • • (a) special
machinery for suppression, the 'state' is still necessary."2

Only with

the development of communism, the .State as a suppressing mechanism will
disappear.

"Communism renders the state absolutely unnecessary, for

there is no one to be suppressed, 'no one' in the sense of class • • • " 3
Problem of class disappearance after the nationalization of the
means of production appeared to be complicated as well.

To explain the

differences in social strata (classes) Stalin invented the concept of
"nonantagonistic classes."

Facing the same difficulty, the contemporary

orthodox Marxist sociologists maintain that with the abolition of the
"parasitic classes," there also should disappear the antagonistic class
relationship, which is rooted in the private ownership of the means of
production.

Some differences among classes, which originate from the

social division of work, differences in wages and power remain, but they
do not contribute to conflict; they have no antagonistic character, so

di Sociologia 13 (1975), p. 217; Giuseppe Bucaro, "L'uomo libero in
Carlo ~1arx," Orientamenti Sociali 33 (1977), pp. 73-93.
The reality of the Peoples,. Democracies, however, appears to prove
the contrary to be true. It is commonly known that the Russian bureaucracy exceeds even that of the capitalist states with an immense build
of law enforcement. The situation is similar in other socialist
countries. For example, the para-police organization in Poland, ORMO
(Voluntary Reserve of the Civic Militia) numbered 99,600 people in 1960,
and grew to 379,400 in 1970, and to 428,200 in 1978. Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 22.
2vladimir I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International
Publishers, 1969), p. 74.
3 rbid., p. 75.

122
they do not endanger the socialist system.

The new system itself

creates the basis for class integration within a given nation, but the
class integration again is not an automatic result of the objective la\vS
of socialism.

It can be fostered and accelerated by special means like

propaganda. 4
Even if the socialist system is free of class conflict, it is not
yet free of all other possible conflicts, e.g., long-range social interests which require sacrifices from the people, and ad hoc interests-individual's or groups' need to be satisfied.

Szczepanski, who is close

to being a Marxist sociologist, goes even further.
bility of worker strikes in the socialist system.
their structural character.

He admits the possiHe, however, denies

These types of strikes are not the "class

conflicts;" their source is to be located in "economic mismanagement." 5
Writing in this vein, Polist Marxist sociologists Dobieszewski and
Owieczko say: "Contemporary social relations in Poland are characterized
by an advanced degree of integration of the basic nation's classes and
strata's common interests." 6

Trybuna Ludu in reporting the agenda of

4
Adolf Dobieszewski and A.leks.ander Owieczko, ''Zadania Partii w
integracji spoleczenstwa," Partia, Panstwo, Spoleczenstwo by T. Dudek
and Z. Siembrowicz (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 87.
5

Jan J. Szczepanski, "Zjawiska i procesy dezorganizacji spolecznego
przedsiebiorstwa," Przemysl i spoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J.
Szczepanski (Warszawa: Osoolineum, 1969), p. 310.
6
Adolf Dobieszewski and Aleksander Owieczko, op. cit., pp. 84-101.
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the VII Congress of the Polish_ United W0rkers Barty saia: "It is certain
that we constitute a society with a fully developed socialist character • . •

Contemporary Poland belongs to those countries in which

socialism has rooted very deeply." 7

Gierek, the first secretary of the

PffivP, spoke similarly:
People's Poland, fulfilling the last will of the Polish democrats and
revolutionaries has finished with class exploitation and social degradation. For the first time in the history of our nation, there
have been created social and material conditions for genuine realization of human right, for real democracy.8
This statement was made five years after the Gdansk riot and only a
few months before the strike in Radom and Ursus took place in 1976.
This is

~vhy

such a statement has to be brought in question by any

serious student of the Polish postwar society.

The 1980 strikes may dis-

qualify it completely, and reject it as a simple propaganda slogan.
People of the postwar Poland live under a permanent strain which, with
some precipitating factors, turns into an open conflict.
In the early 1950s, there were peasants who became the main target
of attacks of the new regime which intended to collectivize the private
farms.

The conflict lost much of its acuteness after 1956, when the

regime, under the new leadership of Gomulka, gave a green light to the
small private farms.

Not all the peasants' problems were solved, but

that year marked the end of an open conflict between peasants and the
power elite.

7Trybuna Ludu , January 8, 1976.
8przemowienie Pierwszego Sekretarza KC PZPR E. Gierka (Warszawa:
KiW, 1977), p. 6.
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Decimated during the German and Russian occupation and terrorized
by the anti-humanitarian methods of the new regime, the Polish intelli-

gentsia was unable to enter into an open conflict with the Party, at
least in the early 1950s.
1950s.

It strengthened itself visibly in the late

Since that time its role in conflict with

th~

regime has become

more important.
The most important protagonists of the conflict in Poland after
World War II, however, were the working class and power elite.

The

Polish workers' upheavals are but the most visible signs of the structural conflict never recognized by the regime and not institutionalized
through some adequate channels.
As has already been pointed out, there were at least four major
strikes and upheavals of Polish workers during the past 36 years of the
Communist regime in Poland.

The first happened in June 1956 in Poznan.

It originated in the Cegielski plant and it soon spread over the whole
city.9

The second took place in December 1970, and was mainly confined

to the northern cities on the Baltic coast: Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot and
Szczecin.

The theater of the events of June 1976, was the cities of

Radom and Ursus.

Finally, the 1980 strike originated in Gdansk and then

spread to the other cities of the Baltic and, later on, over the whole
country.
These four Polish workers' ins.urrections can be analyzed as cases

9

The workers strike in June 1956 must not be confused with the political events in Poland in October of the same year. There was no direct
connection between those two events.
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of collective behavior. 1

Collective behavior is viewed as the outcome

of the people's will to change the situation which is considered unjust
or oppressive.

As in any other attempt to solve the problem, collective

behavior has to be considered as a process which arises in some conditions, grows, reaches its climax, and is solved.

Every stage of that

process is necessary in order that the next stage might occur.

All

classes of factors are combined in a so-called value-added process which
is simply the process of limiting and narrowing the end-product range.ll
I will adopt this logic in the analysis of the four Polish workers'
upheavals in the postwar period.

The main reason for adopting this

method is its usefulness in dealing with the specificity of the conflict
in the totalitarian communist systems.

Class conflict in these socie-

ties is not recognized and therefore not institutionalized through some
adequate channels.

The power elite denies its existence and conse-

quently prevents its manifestation, because that would prove that the
power elite does not represent the workers and peasants interests, but
rather its own.

In these circumstances the conflict of interests

10

Smelser defines collective behavior as "mobilization on the basis
of a belief which redefines social action." Neil Smelser, Theory of
Collective Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 8.
The collective behavior is non-conventional because the participants in
it are behaving contrary to the norms generally accepted; it is direct
because the actors attack directly the source of evil. Cf. George C.
Homans, "Collective Behavior," American Political Science Review 57
(1963).
11

"Value-added" logic is commonly used in the study of economics.
The value of the final product is composed of the added values of every
stage in the process aimed at the production of the final product.
Similarly, in logic one can infer one proposition from another by limit-
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creates a permanent strain in these societies.

This strain turns into

open and violent conflict under some precipitating factors.

The politi-

cal elite solves the conflict by means of physical coercion.
In the framework of Smelser's theory of collective behavior one can
summarize the stages in the Polish workers riots as follows:
1. The Structural Conduciveness
The existing structures drive
people to behave in a determined \vay

Noninstitutionalized social conflict
in Polish society manifests itself
in periodical outbursts

2. The Emergency of Structural Strain
a. poverty of the large majority
of population
Departure from equilibrium
b. State - Church conflict
c. Russian rule in Poland
3. The Growth of Generalized Belief
It indicates the nature of the
problem and the inability of
the institutional operations
to solve the problem

Lack of institionalized means to
to solve the problem

4. The Role of the Precipitationg Factors
Immediate causes of the collective outbursts

Large increase in prices of food
and others consumer goods

5. The Mobilization of the Collectivity
Agitation for action

Creation of the strike committees
and of a net of communication; role
of the messengers

ing the predicate which is a case of value-added process.
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6.

The Collective Action and Official Control
a. attack of the rioters on the
Party facilities
b. isolation of the place of riot
by the authorities
c. disinformation by the official
mass media

It depends upon the stage at
which control is instituted

d. use of force to control the riots
e. recognition by the authorities
that the riots were caused by
objective difficulties
f. personnel changes of some Party
officials
g. partial or total withdrawal of
the proposed food prices

Given the character of the socialist societies where the power elite
denies the existence of social classes and structural conflict and consequently does not intend to institutionalize conflict through adequate
channels, this research will stress the following stages in the process
of the Polish workers insurrections: the situation of strain in the postwar Polish society, the rise of some precipitating factors as the immediate causes of the riots, collective action taken, the solution of the
conflict, and the conquests of the upheavals.
There have been at least three basic sources of the permanent
strain in the Polish society after World War II.

The first, and the

most important, was the poverty of the large part of the population
occurring simultaneously with the visible·wealth of the minority who
might be identified as Party people.

The second source of the strain

was an open conflict between State and Church.

This was mainly, but not
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exclusively, an ideological conflict.

Finally, the third source of the

strain in Poland was its dependence on Russia (economic and political).
Economy of Scarcities as a Source
of Strain in Poland
The alarming situation of the Polish economy and connected with
that, the poverty of the majority of the population including the working class, was not disclosed publicly before 1956.

It became publicly

discussed only after the October renewal, which lasted only two years.
The political elite was interested not only in keeping it undisclosed,
but even in falsifying the real statistical data on the Polish economic
reality.

Until 1956 no Statistical Year Book (Rocznik Statystyczny)

reported data on the minimum wage, cost of living, or the real wages in
Poland.

Gomulka said in 1956: "The government was creating a fiction

about the country's economic prosperity in the past period." 12

In fact,

the country's economy was in bad shape, and the working class lived in
misery.

Warner Klatt outlines the data on the standard of living during

the first postwar

decade (see Table 1).

It was this. situation to which Wazyk was referring in his "Poem for

Adults" saying:

12

Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (London), October 20, 1956.
The same fiction was created, however, during Gomulka's and Gierek's
leaderships. "Statistics (in the communist countries," Kuczynski says,
"have not only an informative function but also serves as a means for
propaganda. Through 'correction' of the indices, the economic units
present themselves in a better light before their superordinating units,
and those before the people. When this practice becomes normal, there
increases. a probability of serious mistakes in the economic statistics
of the country . • • There is. a strong and motivated conviction that
the data on the Polish economy is distorted by such mistakes." Waldemar
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TABLE

1

STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
COi:1MUNIST REGIME IN POLAND

Year

Nominal Value
of Wages

Cost of Living

Real Value
of Wages

1939

100

100

100

1951

428

658

65

1953

693

1025

64

1955

764

1150

67

a

aindustrial Labor Policy and Living Standards in the Soviet Orbit,
London, 1957, Vol. 1.

Kuczynski, Po wie1kim skoku (Warszawa: Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza,
1979), p. 7.
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. . • There are people from Nowa Huta
who have never been to a theater,
13
there are Polish apples which Polish children cannot reach.
Gomulka, in his speech in 1957, compared the purchasing power of
the 1953 average working class salary with that of 1949.

He found the

following results: the 1953 working class wage bought 3.8 per cent more
wheat, 5 per cent more flour, 13.8 per cent more milk, but 38 per cent
less pork fat, 19.4 per cent less pork, 23 per cent less sausage, 26.6
per cent less ham, 37 per cent less veal, 40.3 per cent less beef, 26.6
per cent less butter, 26 per cent less sugar and 35.4 per cent less
14
potatoes.
Civilta Cattolica made a comment on the Polish reality:
"Before the War, Poland was exporting agricultural products.
after ten years in a communist regime, Poles are hungry.

Today,

Their standard

of living is very low, due mostly to the disproportionate effort of
15
industrialization."
No one can deny that the effort of reconstruction and industrialization had a strong impact on the standard of living of the people.

"We

contracted important investment credits for the expansion of industry,"

13
Adam Wazyk, "Poem for Adults," National
Revolt in Eastern Europe by P. E. Zinn~e~r~~r~e~w~~~~~~~~~~~~=
Press, 1956), p. 47.

14

"Gomulka's Keynote Speech," World Communism: Key Documentary
Material by S. Hook (New York: Van Nos·trand Reinhold Co., 1962}_, p. 233.
Cf. La situation dans le Parti et le pays. Rapport de W. Gomulka present~ a la Xme session pleniere du Comit~ central du Parti ouvrier
unifi~ polonais, 24-26 octobre 1957, Bureau d'Indormations Polonaises,
Paris. Reported by Paul Barton, Misere et revolte de l'ouvrier Polo~ (Paris: Conf~deration Force Ouvrier, 19'71). p. 12.
15

civilta Cattolica, Vol. 4 (1957), p. 222.
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Gomulka said, "and when the time came for the payment on the first
installments, we found ourselves in the situation of insolvent bankruptcy."16

This is an indirect admission of the mistakes made in the

central planning.

This time one might even accept that explanation.

The same situation, however, will be repeated and the same explanation
will be offered again: wrong central planning in the past period.
Golmuka blamed Bierut's regime, to be then blamed for the same mistakes
by Gierek in 1970, and this to be condemned by Kania's leadership. But
as Kurowski observes, the patterned economic crises in Poland have their
source in primacy of politics over economy and the priority of political
over economic criteria.
When a dictator openly proclaims his preference for farm c~llectivi
zation in.spite of the fact that this causes hunger and malnutrition
for generations of people . • • when the head of the local administration of a commune council nags the private farmer • . • when
another official imposes an extremely centralized system of management on a company and on a business--all of them • • • act according
to the principle of priority of politics over economy.l7
Gomulka's speech of October 21, 1956, offers convincing data on
that issue.

The data refers to the agricultural output of three dif-

ferent types of agriculture existing at that time in Poland.

Table 2

summarizes the statistics (on page 132}.
Gomulka concluded his speech: ''This is • • . the economic picture

16 Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-234. Also the Episcopate expressed its critics, e.g., during the 171 Meeting of the Polish
Bishops. Cf. Dokumenty (Instytut Literacki, Paryz), 313, (1980),
p. 220.
1 7stefan Kurowski's speech during the meeting of the Polish Sociological Association, Harsaw, May 12, 1979.
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TABLE 2a
FA&~S

1955

Individual
Private
Farms
Kolkhozes
State
Farms
a

IN POLAND: THEIR AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

Per Cent of
The Total Area

Per Cent of
Agricultural
Output

Value of the Output
per Hectar at
Constant Prices

78.8

83.9

621.1 zlotys

8.6

7.7

517.3 zlotys

12.6

8.4

393.7 zlotys

Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-243.
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picture of the collective farms.

It is a sad picture." 18

In spite of this evident data indicating the higher output of the
private farms, the policy toward private farms has never changed, with
the exception of a two-year period after October 1956. During the war,
levies were imposed on agricultural products (milk, grain, potatoes and
meat) produced by private farmers and they were in force until 1946.

In

1952, they were reimposed under a new form of so-called "obligatory sale
of these products to the State."

The burden of that sale consisted in

the fact that the price of the sale was established by the government
and it was 50 per cent lower than that on the market.
farmers found themselves in an absurd situation.

Hany small

Because they were

unable to produce for themselves and for the obligatory sale, they had
to buy these products at the market and then resell them to the State at
a much lower price.

In his interview Professor Czuma said:

In the socialized farms, the State invests about 20,000 zloties for
one hectar of arable land annually. An average farmer invests ten
times less, i.e., 2,000 zloties. And what are the results? In the
socialized farms, the production from one hectar is lower than in
private holdings.l9
Another problem not solved in the first decade of the communist
regime in Poland, was that of hous.ing.
built.

In 1950, 150,000 rooms were

During the Six Years Plan (1950-1956), only 370,000 of the

900,000 rooms outlined by the plan were ever built.

In Gomulka's report

it was. said that "the situation was not much better in the field of

18 Gomu1ka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-243.
19

Appendix A, Interview 1, p. 374·
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public services, health and sanatoria

u20

The Party's long term policy was not changed after the 1956 insurrection in Pozan.

Besides some increase in wages, two other government

concessions, workers' councils and the Trade Union reform, appeared to
be very limited in time.

Workers' councils, which were intended as the

bodies through which the workers could participate in the companies
decisions, and which were supposed to mediate between staff and workers
in a situation of conflict, were virtually unable to influence the
central planners decisions.
Trade Union reform never came: through because the Union would not
free itself from the tutelage of the Party.

The Party did not intend to

leave much room for Union activists, lest they lose control over it.

In

1958, Gomulka said:
Every non-authorized strike is contrary to the idea of order and
Socialist law-abidingness. The strikes which we observe in different places are the signs of anarchy and are not in keeping with
socialist liberties. There are, in Poland, symptoms of activities of
the people's enemies. We see no room for the protagonists of this
type of strike in our factories, Neither state Iuthorities nor the
Union can tolerate their subversive activities. 2
The 1959 Congress of the Communist Party expressed its opinion on
the role of the Union and its possible actions of protest, limiting them
to "justified" interests and "just" grievances, terms which allowed the
Party much. space for divergent interpretations, according to the
specific circumstances,

"Giving in to unjustified vindictive actions

actions and promising impossible things, has nothing to do with efforts

20 Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., p. 234.
21 Glos Pracy, April 15, 1958.
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to reinforce liaisons with the people," said Trybuna Ludu. 22

Accord-

ing to the doctrinal guidelines of the same congress, the Union's
efforts should be directed toward the following areas of action:
increase of job discipline, improvement of the workers professional
qualifications, limitations of job changing by the workers, and commitment to the heightening of class consciousness. 23
In 1960, there had been formulated a doctrine of "the unity of the
roles" of the Party authorities and of the Trade Union. 24

Seven years

later Union boss Loga-Sovinski spoke irl the same vein: "We (Union) agree
with the ideological direction of the PUWP, because this Party's program
and its sphere of activities express the legitimate aspirations and
25
interests of the working class and the whole nation."
In Wesolowski's
view, the Union's role consists of bringing to crystalization among the
factories' crews "the motivated attitudes toward work, toward proper
combining of common interests with those of individuals." 2 6
Among the four tasks of the Union were concern about the increase

?2
- Trybuna Ludu, March 11, 1959.
23rbid., Congress said nothing about the protection of the workers'
interests by the Union.
Class consciousness must be understood here as a conformity with
the Party.
24

Glos Pracy, July 2, 1960.

25rbid., July 21. 1967.
26wlodzimierz \.Jesolowski, Klasa robotnicza w Polsce Ludowej
(Warszawa: KiW, 1969), p. 37.
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of the GNP, guarantee of socialist law-abidingness, care about hygienic
work conditions, and greater access of the workers to cultural goods,
a direct defense of the interests of the workers was not mentioned.
Similar opinions were reported by the newspapers and periodicals: "The
Union," wrote Przeglad Zwiazkowy,

"has many opportunities to influence

the increase of production, and to influence the establishment of prices
in accordance with the economic plans of the country." 2 7

A few months

before the worker's upheaval in 1976, Trybuna Ludu said, "The Union • • •
is a school of civic activities and commitment to the building of the
socialist society." 28

During the 1980 strike the State Union started to

advocate workers' interests, but the workers did not expect any support
from the Union which neglected their cause for so many years
was controlled completely by the State. 29

a~d

which

It was the Union's newspaper

which, in 1970, bitterly condemned the workers' insurrection: "Adventurism took over the necessary operations during the situation of strain
and covered under the name of working class trouble-makers, committed
excesses, common crimes and violated rules of social order."30

27

Przeglad Zwiazkowy 6 (1969), p. 19.

28Trybuna Ludu, January 26, 1976.
29 According to Trybuna Ludu, forty different presidia of State
Trade Unions were exclusively occupied by the members of the Communist
Party. Cf. Trybuna Ludu, April 23, 1981. Therefore, "the Union was
losing face and authority among non-party people
" Ibid.
30

Glos Pracy, December 19, 1970. The State Trade Union (Centralna
Rada Zwiazkow Zawodowych) wrote Solidarnosc "was like a bureaucratized
ministry for the Trade Union. Its chief had a status and salary of
vice-premier, and its secretaries wages of the under-secretary of
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In September 1976, at the initiative of fourteen Polish intellectuals there was founded the Committee for Defense of the Workers
(Komitet Obrony Robotnikow--KOR) which influced
Trade Union foundation.

significantly the Free

In its appeal to the President of the Polish

Sejm it described the role of the State Union as "deplorable.31
Nonetheless, in spite of some increase in the wages of the Polish
workers after the 1956 riot in Poznan, and also of some temporarily
limited reforms, the standard of living of the working class remained
almost at the same level as before or even deteriorated.

This was

mainly due to the governmental policy of subordinating wages to the
economic plans.

In terms of practicality the wage increase was limited

to symbolic supplements and rewarding efficiency.

As we have already

seen it was the Union which in its partnership with the Party, took
upon itself the role of assuring that wages would not surpass the ceiling that was imposed by the economic plans.
From that policy of incentives for efficiency and limitation of the
state bureaucracy there resulted a necessary reduction in the number of
the employees.

But nothing is is.olated in the economic system.

The

reduction of the employee personnel was often necessary to increase
wages requested by the workers.

Consequently, the unemployment process

State." See Solidarnosc (Gdansk), Harch 6, 19.81.
represent the Polish Union abroad. Ibid.

Its real task was to

31 cf. ANEKS, 13-14 (1976), p. 78. During the First Congres.s of
"Solidarity" in Gdansk, 1981, i t was announced that the KOR "had completed its job and was disbanding to all the 9 million member Solidarity
to carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy in Poland." Chicago
Tribune, September 29, 1981.
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began to affect seriously the less protected: women, unskilled older
workers and the newly graduated. 32

In 1964, the unemployed surpassed

550,000 and was expected to reach 1.5 million in 1970. 33

Not until the

end of 1968, did the Health Department and Social Security Program begin
to care for the unemployed.

On December 6, conditions were established

under which an officially recognized unemployed person would be entitled
to receive lodging for two weeks.

But as Barton points out, "the condi-

tions imposed were so restrictive that the majority of the unemployed
could not take advantage of that privilege." 34
The policy guidelines to have factories limit employment and so
have a margin for eventual wage increase, while maintaining the same
level of production were incompatible.

Implementations of these direct-

ives resulted in a failure to reach the volume of production established
by the economic plans.35

In spite of growing unemployment, the law

regulating overtime hours was seldom observed. 36

Arbitrarily imposed

quotas of production for the factories by the central planners had their
repercussions in the quality of the produced goods.

Determined hy the

32 Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 79.
33 Basler Nachrichten, April 13, 1965.
34
35

Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 80
Dziennik Lodzki, January 25-26, 1970.

36The law forbade more than 120 overtime hours per year, but many
workers. were taking as many as 100 overtime hours per month in some
factories of Lodz; similarly in shipyard
in Szczecin, where the working day was normally not eight hours but ten, twelve or even fourteen.
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central plan and not by market demand resulted in production of good not
required by the domestic market while there was a shortage of goods in
demand.

"Thus," writes Bryant, "there are (in Poland) shortages, wait-

ing lists, black markets, dual and triple prices for goods changing
hands privately at more than their purchase price."37

Besides that, the

law regarding job security was rarely observed because that would have
raised the cost of production and so delay the execution of the plans.
In consequence, the number of civil disabled rose in five years (196538
1970) to 1,000,000.
The attempt to limit the demand for consumer
goods took two somewhat different forms.

The first was an undisclosed

rising of prices by changing the name of the goods, diminishing the
quantity of the goods or simply by bringing them to the market in new

Cf. Zycie Warszawy, April 25-26, 1962.
37 christopher G. A. Bryant, "Worker Advancement and Political Order
in a State Socialist Society," Sociological Review 28 (1980), p. 115.
At the same time the Party's propaganda was saying: "Through the socialization of the means of production there has disappeared the duality of
goals of producer and consumer which creates a real possibility of
adopting production to the satisfying of the needs of the great majority
and not only of the more or less limited elite." Wladyslaw Gabryl,
"Rynek konsumenta: suwerennosc modelu konsumpcji," Miesiecznik Literacki
20 (1968), p. 86. The situation was not better ten years later when one
German newspaper entitled its article "Endless Lines for Every Day's
Bread," Brettner Nachrichten, July 15, 1980.
38 As an example of the seriousness of the situation, can be given
the plants in Skawina which used obs.olete Russian technology and which
caused immeasurable harm to the environment and to the people. These
Plants were closed in 1980 under the pressure of Solidarity environmentalists. Cracow itself was not in much better situation. "In Krakow," writes Novak, "the most medieval and most beautiful of Poland's
cities, its Oxford, its Cambridge, socialism has created the worst air
Polution I have ever encountered • • • particles are visible in the air,
gather quickly on one's shirt, congest one's nose." Chicago Tribune,
December 20, 1979 (article of Michael Novak).
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boxes, different from those formerly used.
ical raising of prices.

The other way was a period-

Its average mark-up was 50 to 60 per cent.

It

was this type of rising prices that in 1970, 1976 and in 1980 served as
a spark to cause the workers'upheavals.
After 1970, the food prices were frozen for five years.

Even if

the supply was never brought to the level of demand there was a fair
availability of goods.

There was a privileged minority which was never

touched by any kind of goods shortage.

They were entitled to buy pro-

vision in the special shops called "behind the golden drapes." 39

This

was already a normal practice in the 1950s and has become a part of the
normal life in the 1970s because the range of the privileged extended
to police and professional soldiers.

Gomulka's statement of 1956, "A

great deal of evil, injustice, and many painful disappointments have
accumulated in the life of Poland during the past years . • • " 40 applied
very well to every regime's leadership in post-war Poland with perhaps
one difference: the injustice and disappointments were even increasing
as time went on.

Referring to the period of Gomulka's regime, an

American periodical said: "It isn't hard to understand why the average
Polish

~vorker

is unhappy.

He makes less than 3, 000 zlotys a month-

about $125-and he needs approximately 5,000 zlotys to support a

39
40

News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October, 1956, p. 42.
Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., p. 271.
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The whole policy was called by the author a "stultifying

f amJ."ly • rr41

atmosp h ere. n42
Besides the food shortages, housing was another acute problem of
the postwar Poland.

World War II left one-third of all shelters des-

troyed; another one-third was damaged.
economy.

Such losses affected the Polish

But while other countries, like West Germany, made up for

this by constructing apartments, the housing problem in Poland continued
to be problem number two after the \Jar.

We saw how the Six Year Plan

failed to keep the building industry at the level of 1950.

Neither were

the goals of the other plans ever reached. That was due partly to poor
synchronization of work in different collaborating companies, partly to
the building up of material shortages.

The building of private homes

was especially affected by the second cause.

Consequentl¥, delars. in

the housing industry prolonged the time of waiting for an apartment by
people who paid the amount of money entitling them to live in it.

While

in the 1960s that condition lasted for five years; in 1980, it rose to
eight to ten years.

Meanwhile, the owners had to put up with cramped,

overcrowded, and substandard shelters.

There have been families of four

or five people constrained to live in one room, in poor hygienic conditions.

According to Wesolowski and Slomczynski, in mid-1960s, only 34

per cent of unskilled and semiskilled workers and 40 per cent of skilled
workers. in Lodz, Koszalin and Szczecin lived in apartments with plumbing

41
42

u.

S. News and World Report, December 18, 1970, p. 23.

Ibid.
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and flush toilet facilities. 4 3

The situation was worsening because many

apartment constructed in the postwar period did not survive the thirty
years and were falling into disrepair.

In 1970, more than 640,000

apartments did not fit the basic requirements for shelters due to the
.
44
. . con d.~t~ons.
lac k o f sa f ety an d h yg~en~c
In addition to the shortages of accommodations, there was a poor
quality in the new apartments.

They were small and uncomfortable.

In

1974, in Poland, 39 per cent of the apartments in the cities had only
one to two rooms, 54 per cent had three to four rooms and only 6.9 per
cent had five or more rooms. 45

At the same time, in the U.S.A., the

numbers were respectively: 5.6 , 32.1, and 62.3 per cent.

46

The area

of the room per thousand peoole in Poland was 485 square meters, 758

.

square meters in Prance, and 1329 in Belgium.47
Shortage of food and shelters affected most bitterly the poorest
ranks of the Polish society, and relatively its vast range.
goods, they are necessary for survival.

As basic

And while one cannot say that

in the postwar Polish society the shortage of food came to the point of
hunger, surely there was no abundance of goods.

This was not the same

43 Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Zroznicowanie
spoleczne: podstawowe warunki," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. '\.{esolowski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), p. 109, Table 8.
44

ch~cago Tribune, March 6, 1978.

4 5Rocznik Statystyczny. 1979, p. 548.
46 Ibid.
47rbid., p. 549
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with the shortage of the apartments.

One can hardly say that at this

point the situation was tragic, but it was certainly very serious.
Housing and food shortages are the most important, but not unique
indices of the standard of living in a country.

If we take into con-

sideration the other indices, they will only support what we observed
about the shortages of food supply and housing.

In 1977, e.g., there

were in Poland forty-four passenger cars per thousand people (in 1960,
only four per thousand) which was less than in Greece--fifty six, Spain
--162, and 507 in the U.S.A.

48

A tiny "126 Fiat" (two cylinder car)

was sold for 110,000 zloties, which was twenty-five times more than an
average monthly wage.
communication.

Similar situations are found in the field of

While in Italy, for example, in 1976, there were 271

telephone receivers per thousand people, in Spain, 239, and 721 in the
U.S.A., in Poland, there were only eighty. 49

There was also a visible

deterioration in health services and hospitalization.

In 1975, there

were seventy-five hospital beds in Poland for 10,000 people; in 1977,
there were two less.SO

48 Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 537.
49

Ibid., p. 539.

50 Ibid., p. 554. In spite of the visible deterioration of health
care (rate of mortality of newly born is 24.5 per thousand in Poland).
Gierek said in 1977: "~rational funds for ~1ealth protection effectivelv
influence the health care and foster its improvement." Edward Gierek';
speech in Sejm, June 30, 1977. Jan Szydlak, Politburo member wrote
similarly: "We have laid the nateria1 bsis for solving a numb~r of prob~ems by assuring dynamic progress in the next five years." Jan Szydlak,
Strategy of Accelerated Progress," World Marxist Review 19 (1976),

p. 11.
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As we can see in Figure 3 (p. 145), the real income in Poland was
growing at very slow rates during the period between 1959-1970.
even decreased in 1959-1960.

It

It grew at higher rates in the years

between 1971 and 1975 to decline in 1976 and to score negatively in
1978 (-3 per cent) as compared with that of 1977. 51
Similar patterns are observable on the curve indicating the dynamic of the GNP with only one exception: the year 1967-1968, when the GNP
grew faster than during the other years of the preceding period.

The

plan for 1969-1970 foresaw an increase of 5.8 per cent in GNP, 2.9 per
cent in agricultural output, 1 per cent in animal production.52
quota appeared to be too high.

The

Increased production was respectively:

5.2 per cent, 2.2 per cent, and the animal production not only failed to
increase, but was 3.3 per cent lower than intended.53

Only the period

between 1970 and 1975, marked a relatively dynamic growth of the G:lP and
the real personal income.

But the 1976-1980 plan which was intended to

keep a continuous increase in real wages, improvement of the market supply, increase in housing output, higher subsidies for medicare, remained
on paper. 54

The total agricultural production in 1976, was 2.1

51A relatively high rate of growth of the real income from 1970 to
1975 was not due to a dynamic growth of the Polish economy in that
period, but to borrow·ing money from abroad. In 1980, Poland's debt to
the West had reached $26 billion.
52stanislaw }larkowski, "Podstawowe Zagadnienia ~PG na 1970,"
Przeglad Zwiazkowy 12 (1969), p. 4.
53Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, pp. XLI-XLIII.
54 Lech Zacher, "Kierunki rozwoju spoleczno-gospodarczego Polski
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Figure 7
The Growth of GNP and Income (Real) in Poland 1955-1978
aAdapted from Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, pp. XXXVI-X~~VII and
XXXIV-XXXV respectively.
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55
per cent less than that in 1975.
GNP grew only 2.7 per cent in
1978. 56

The situation in 1979-1980 was still worse.

During the first

quarter of 1980, only 73.7 per cent of the apartments were built as was
the case in the same period of 1979.

There was 5.3 per cent less sugar

on the market and 2.7 per cent less meat.
trous for Polish agriculture.

57

The year 1980 was disas-

Meat production declined by 25 per cent

from 1979, the potato crop was one of the worst in the postwar Polish
history and sugar beet output was 60 per cent below the target.58

In

1978, Poland bought (on credit) four times more grain than in 1971.
Figure

8 on page 147 compares the economic situation of West

Germany with that of Poland.

While the GNPs of both these countries

were increasing at similar rates from 1962 to 1965, the year 1966
appeared to be exceptionally good for German economy.
15 per cent.

Its GNP grew by

It declined in 1967, to return to its normal growth.

But

again, the year 1969-1970 brought about new, even more dynamic growth.
Meanwhile, the GNP in Poland was growing moderately and declined sharply
in 1969-1970. 59

1976-1980," Czlowiek i Swiatopoglad 3 (1976}, p. 16.
55Rocznik Statys.tyczny, 1979, p. XLI.
5 6 Ibid., p. XXXV.
57Trybuna Ludu, August 7, 1980.
58Time, December 29, 1980, p. 23.
59Given the difference in the economic development bet'lveen West
Germany and Poland, it is necessary to keep in mind that the meaning of
the percentage of increase of GNP in these two countries is quite different. One must realize that the percentage of growth of GNP in an
advanced country has a much different meaning from that in less advanced
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The cost of living in West Germany was rising at about 5 per cent
annually with a decline in 1966-1968.
back to its patterned arise.
differed significantly.

The perio

of 1968-1970 brought

The curve of the cost of living in Poland

It declined in 1962-1963 to rise about 10 per

cent in the period of the next two years.

The year 1966 showed some

decline in the cost of living, but the next two years brought about
almost 10 per cent increase: it rose by 15 per cent in 1968-1969, and
about 25 per cent in 1969-1970.
The year 1980 brought about a worsening of the already difficult
situation of the Polish economy.
records.

Productivity was reaching negative

Poland's debt to the West reached $26 billion. 60

regime could not find any remedy.

Gierek's

Ten years of mismanagement in the

economy had caused an unprecedented crisis.

"Poland," wrote Kisielew-

ski, "is a country of an immense centrally caused thriftlessness and
disorganization."6l
State-Church Conflict During the
Postwar Period in Poland
The second course of strain in the postwar Poland has been conflict

country. An increase in car production, e.g., in the U.S.A. of 1 per
cent cannot be compared with 1 per cent increase in the same area in
Indonesia. 1-lhile an increase of the GNP of 15 per cent in the developing country is not unusual. such an increase in the developed country
would be considered an economic boom.
60 European Economic Community rescheduled 12 billion dollars debt
for 1980 by extending its repayment over eight years with four years of
healing period, free of repayment.
61 stefam Kisielewski, Czy geopolityka . . . op. cit., p. 62.
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between State and Church.
of Marx is atheist.

It is by no means accidental that the Marxism

~larx

found two main reasons to reject religion:

philosophical and socio-political.

As far as the first is concerned,

religion contradicts the essence of man.

"Since man has become for man

as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man--the
question about an alien being above nature and man--a question which
implies the admission of the inessentiality of nature and of man--has
become impossible in practice."62
This simply means that atheism constitutes an integral part of
Marxian anthropology.

"Atheism, as the denial of this inessentiality,

has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through his negation." 63

Admitting the God-

creator is admitting man's dependence on God and this is alienation
from self.

No one who lives by the grace of another being can regard

himself fully human.

This independent status is essential to both

human being and nature.

Thus "an alien essence, an essence byond man

and nature, is practially impossible..
independence of man and nature • • •

This would be a negation of the
Atheism for Marx is theoretical

humanism."64

62 K.arl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy
of Right,'' Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975),
Vol. 3, p. 174. (Introduction).
63Karl Marx, EPhM, p. 78.
64Gary 1. Chamberlain, "The Man Marx Hade," Science and Society 27
(1963), p. 310; cf. Donald C. Hodges, "}farx's Contribution to Humanism,"
Science and Society 29 (1965), pp. 173-191.
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Another reason why Marx rejects religion is the character and role
it plays in a society.

To grasp that, one must realize the

stances and the reasons religion originates.

circum~

Religion, like state,law,

morality, etc., comes to life in specific circumstances, i.e., through
the alienation process whose immediate source is estranged human life
during man's economic activity and especially his alienating work.
Religious estrangement does not limit itself to man's consciousness
because human activity expresses itself in the people's economic activity which is their real life.
both aspects." 65
peo Ple • .. 66

Consequently, "its transcendence embraces

Elsewhere Marx called religion "the opium of the

Its role in the hands of the exploiting class is to prevent

the revolution of the exploited people against their exploiters.

Reli-

gion remains "man's self-consciousness so long as he has not found himself nor lost himself again."67
The handbook for Military Academy students in Poland points out the
problem of religion in the following way: "the Party attempts to eliminate religion from the social life because of its negative influence on

65Karl Marx, EPru~, op. cit., p. 71.
66Karl Harx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy
of Right, op. cit., p. 174.
67 Ibid., p. 174. Marx was aware of the religious influence on the
social life. He wrote: ·"Religion is the general theory of this world,
its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual
Point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its general basis of consolation and justification." Karl Marx,
CCHPHR, p. 174.
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1168
soclal
consclousness.

The action of the most conscious sphere of the

society has to acquire concrete forms and determination because religion
will disappear in proportion to the transformation of the social relations and the replacement of the religious outlook on life with the
scientific one.

In that context the Party has the full right "to propa-

gate offensively the Marxian outlook on life." 69

The progressive forces

of the society must be aware that political clericalism intends "to substitute the division of society based on class criteria by division
based on the relation to religion • , , and to seize political power."70
In postwar Poland the ideological conflict between the way religion
looks at the world as opposed to Marx' view has not remained at the
level of believer and nonbeliever, but has shifted to the level of the
institutions: State versus Church (Catholic Church). 71

The intensity of

the conflict has changed significantly from time to time: moderate
between 1944-1947 and 1956-1958, very tense in early 1950s and moderate
with a tendency to be acute during all other periods of postwar Polish
history.

68"Religia jako forma swiadomos.ci spolecznej," Podstawy sw.iatopogladu marksistowskiego (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 50.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 49.
71

One has to be aware of the specificity of conflict in the totalitarian Communist systems. In those systems the State has totalitarian
power. It controls not only politics but economy and all aspects of
social life. Also the judiciary system, even if in theory independent,
in practice it becomes one more means of serving the power elite. Any
group or class in conflict with the power elite is primarily struggling
for survival, always being on the defensive, unless some precipitating
factors cause an explosion of violent conflict.
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The State had two objectives in entering into conflict with the
Church.

First, it intended to control the Church economically and

make it dependent on the State.

The confiscation of the Church's

property and the interference into pure Church matters aimed at this.
second, it deprived the Church the possibility of influencing youth
through the ban on private schools and the ban on religious instruction
in the public schools.
To reach these goals, the power elite could choose between the two
tactics: to openly attack the institutional Church (Catholic), or to
discredit it in the opinion of the believers.

Practically, both those

tactics have been used.
The attempts to control the Church started in the middle of the
1940s.

On September 12, 1945, the Cabinet broke the Concotldat of 1925

between the Polish State and the Catholic Church.

72

The official state-

ment of the Polish government said: "The Concordat between the Polish
Republic and the Holy See ceases to be in force.

The rupture was

caused exclusively by the Holy See which during the German occupation of
Poland signed documents contrary to the clauses of the Concordat." 73

72 The 1925 Concordat between the Polish Republic and the Catholic
Church conferred some privileges on the Church in return for support
against communism. That was in accord with the antibolshevic attitudes
of Pilsuds:ki.
73 Reported by E. Santarelli, "Stato e Chiesa," Quaderni di
Conoscersi, December 5, 1959.
The pretext to which the government's statement was referring, was
the nomination of the German bishop Buitinger, the archbishop of Gniezno
and Poznan with jurisdiction over the German people living in that
diocese. Cf. Civilta Cattolica, Vol. 3, 1946, p. 223.
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With the law of March 20, 1950 in force, the property of the Church
and of religious orders, including many buildings was confiscated. 74
Some of the orders' buildings were restored after October 1956; but
others have been held until now.

The regime used force to turn the

priests and the religious adrift in actions which were massive and often
violent.
Another step aimed at further control of the Catholic Church by the
State, was the decree of February 9, 1953, which required consent of the
governmental authorities for the appointment of bishops and pastors.
Additionally, the candidates for such positions were obliged "to swear
allegiance to People's Poland" and in the event of their "supporting of
anti-state activity" they could be removed from their posts. 75

This

move was, in the opinion of the Church, a visible attempt to annihilate
.t

~

.76
Additionally, the regime requested that the bishops change the tern-

porary status of the hierarchy in the regained Western Polish territories into a permanent status. 77
Besides that, the regime initiated show-trials of the priests and

74

Dziennik Ustaw, No. 9, 1950, par. 87.

75nziennik Ustaw, No. 10, 1953.

Cf. New York Times, February 12,

1953.
76

That was a point Cardinal Wyszynski made during his sermon on the
feast of Corpus Christi the same year. He called it: "an intolerable
attempt" to suppress religion.
77

It is up to the Holy See to nominate the ordinary bishops as well
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bishops.

Many of them were arrested.

In 1951, Msgr. Kaczmarek from

Kielce was arrested and subsequently accused of collaboration with antisoviet Ukrainian insurgents during the War, and of having contacts with
British-American agents afterwards.

Later on Cardinal Wyszynski was

arrested because he publicly refused to condemn ~1sgr. Kaczmarek. 78

The

French magazine, Le Mende, was referring to that situation of an open
struggle when it said: "The Polish Church has never been persecuted as
much as it is now, not even during the German occupation of Poland." 79
It was during that period of manifest persecution of the Church and
of incredible tension in the country, that an agreement was reached
between the regime and the Church on April 14, 1950.
composed of nineteen paragraphs. 80

The agreement was

The Episcopate agreed to support the

government's efforts in the reconstruction of the country and the integration of the recaptured Western territories to Poland.

Morever, the

Polish bishops committed themselves to use their authority to restrict
priests' activities to pastroal ones (par. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 18).

The

government, for its part, promised to guarantee freedom to pastoral

as their auxiliaries.
78 The official note of the government (September 28, 1953) declared
that the Primate was arrested because he abused pastoral activities to
violate the April 1950 agreement between the State and Church. This
referred to the above mentioned Cardinal's Corpus Christi sermon.
79 Le Monde, December 15, 1953. Cf. Frank Dinka, "Sources of Conflict Between Church and State in Poland," Review of Politics 28 (1966),
pp. 332-349.
8 0slowo Powszeche, April 14, 1950.
ber 23, 1953.

Cf. New York Times, Septem-
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activities (par. 1) and freedom of religious education in schools of
religious practices, and to guarantee equal rights for private schools
as ,,rell as public ones (par. 10), to tolerate the Catholic University
in Lublin (par. 14).

The government committed itself also to guarantee

the possibility of religious assistance to people in military service,
in prisons (par. 16, 17), and hospitals (par. 18).

Finally, the regime

exempted seminarians from military service.
October 1956 brought about a temporary relief for the Polish Church.
Some property sequestered during Stalinism was restored to the owners.
The Cardinal was released from imprisonment, and religious instruction
was permitted in the public schools.

Gomulka's regime seemed to have

turned radically from the previous policy of the Party regarding the
Church. 81
But the new regime's liberal policy lasted less than two years.
Already at the beginning of the 1960s, the Polish Church found itself
in the same situation it experienced in the early 1950s.

Gomulka's

regime accused the hierarchy which endeavors demagogically "to abuse
religion and the Church for the struggle against socialism."82

The

government imposed taxes on the Church, restored the draft of seminarians, and imposed a limit on students attending the Catholic University
.
~n

83
L u bl"
. ~n.

In the field of social policy there was visible discrimi-

81 It was that policy and the attempt to modify Polish-Russian relations as well as that won for Gomulka an enthusiastic support of the
whole society.
82 Radio Warsaw, February 5, 1960.
83The Catholic University in Lublin is not supported by the State,
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nation against Catholics in social promotion.
The new regime, under the leadership of Gierek, proclaimed itself
to be for a full normalization of the relations between the government
and the Church.

In his first speech, as the first secretary of the Corn-

munist Party, Gierek appealed equally to all, the Communists and Catholies.

Jaroszewicz, Premier, declared a few days later: "the government

will now try to bring about a full normalization of relations with the
Catholic Church."84

As a sign of "good will," the new regime intended

to restore ownership of about 7,000 sequestered religious buildings:
churches, chapels, monasteries in the returned Western Polish territories.

Some (about 130) new churches were allowed to be built.

Everyday life, however, did not agree with what the State Propaganda -.;.,ras proclaiming.

The Church during Gierek' s stay in power not

only did not enjoy full freedom, but it was openly persecuted.

Jan

Szydlak wrote in 1974: "The experience of the recent years has clearly
showed that the main, organized anti-socialist force in this country
. . . is the reactionary part of the episcopate . • . "85

The regime

appointed B. Piasecki (the head of PAX) a member of the Council of
State.

This act was considered as a slap in the EPiscopate's face

because of Piasecki's subversive role regarding the Church.

Practically

not much of anything was changed in State-Church relations in the 1970s.

but the Catholic people. The Sunday collection of every first Sunday
of the month goes for that purpose.
84
85

Trybuna Ludu, December 24, 1970.
Nowe Drogi, May, 1974.
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Since 1973, as part of its Ostpolitik, the Vatican has begun a
dialog with the Polish government.

In November 1973, Stefan Olszowski,

Polish foreign Hinister, was received at the Vatican.

A few months

later (February 1974), Archbishop Cassaroli paid a formal visit to the
Polish government.

The direct contact of the Vatican with the govern-

ment was understood by some as a proof that it was the Polish Episcopate
that was an obstacle to Church-State rapport. 86

This certainly served

to give credence to the official propaganda in Poland.

Also Polish

Church hierarchy felt hurt by that policy of the Vatican.

The Episco-

pate's position regarding that issue was steadfast: there can be no
Polish-Vatican normalization without Church-State normalization.

Mon-

signor Poggi's mission in 1975, was much more careful and besides the
contacts with the government's officials, he was also in touch with the
hierarchy of the Polish Church.

The Vatican diplomat pointed out

clearly that it was the Polish hierarchy which was a party to StateChurch normalization of relations,87
Gierek's regime did very little in the field of social justice.
Social discrimination against Catholics was visible in every day life.
This was why, in 1973, the vicechairman of "Znak" (the Catholic deputies
in Parliament), Janus.z Zablocki, protested in his parliamentary speech

86

When Pope Paul VI appointed Archbishop Wojtyla cardinal in 1967,
some speculated that the Vatican was preparing new, more acceptable
channels of corrnnunication with the regime. The state controlled mass
media picture Wojtyla as progressive, open-minded in contrast with the
reactionary Cardinal Wyszynski.
87

Cf, La Croix, March 26, 1975.
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against the regime's discrimination against Catholics.

One of the

interviewed put it this way: "Every nigher post (in the society) is
aiven to Party members; even a foreman has to be a Party member since

0

the working team is a social group, and such a group should be directed
only by a Party member."

88

The second aim (preventing Church's influence on youth) was even
more important to the regime.

Even if the Temporary Government of the

National Unity declared that as "it has never limited the activities of
the Catholic Church, so it would retain its full freedom of action withing the limits of the law in f~rce,"89 the events of the foreseeable
future would prove that the guarantees expressed in that declaration
would be contradicted by the policy of the regime toward the Catholic
Church.

Already in 1948, the schools started to teach Harxian ethics

as opposed to Catholic morality and the religious outlook of the world.
To that anti-church policy the pastoral letter of the Polish bishops
referred stating: "New problems impos.ed by the reconstruction of the
country and necessary reforms which have to be undertaken by the party
in the field of economy, converge, unfortunately, with an intense propaganda of the materialistic ideology." 90

Already in 1951, religious

instruction was banished from the public schools.

In Warsaw the Insti-

tute for Education of Scientific Personnel was founded for the purpose

88

Appendix A, Interview 5, p. 397.

8 9E. Santarelli, Stato,
90

op. cit.

Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops, April 15, 1948.
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of training the high Party officials which later on was knmvn as the
Institute of Social Science.91
Gomulka' s post-October "ideological truce"
Church already ended in the late 1950s.
in the schools was reimposed.92

bet~.reen

State and

A ban on religious instruction

The law of July, 1961, openly pro-

claimed that "the schools and other institutions of education and
socialization are secular," and that"the whole education and socialization process has a secular character."

The decree said even more:

"Schools and other institutions of education and socialization educate
according to the spirit of
social coexistence." 93

ocialist morality and tne principles of

This negative policy toward the Church charac-

terized Gomulka's regime until his final days in power.

The Bishops'

pastoral letter of 1969, made an enumeration of the problems to be
solved; government refusal to permit building of new churches, different obstacles in the religious education of children, difficulties
Catholics meet in their places of work, State ban on Church access
to the mass media and religious as.sociations, prohibition against
creating new parochial communities, limitations in publications, excessive censorship, and several restrictions on pastoral activities. 94

91 This is the main Party school which almost every higher Party
official attended. The institute has nothing whatever to do with social
sciences in the Western sense. It is simply a school of Marxism and
Leninism.
92 ustawa o Swieckosci Szkoly, July 15, 1961.
No. 32, par. 160.

Dziennik Ustaw,

9 3Dziennik Ustaw, No. 32, 1961, par. 160, art. 2 and 1 respectively.
94

Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops, June 8, 1969.

All this
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Gomulka's regime refused an entrance visa to Pope Paul VI who intended
to participate in the Polish

~illenium

of Christianity in 1966.

months before that, an antiepiscopate action was initiated.

A few

The letter

of the Polish bishops to the German Catholic hierarchy seeking a reconciliation among the two nations on the occasion of the celebration of
the Xillenium of Christianity in Poland was taken as a pretext. 95
Premier Cyrankiewicz accused the hierarchy of betraying Poland and being
involved in politics.

"He do not demand anything more from the Church

hierarchy than loyalty towards People's Poland, respect for the Constitution and for the laws of the Polish People's Republic."

96

The Front of the National Unity in its electoral campaign declared
in 1976:

"~ve

guarantees

base our program on the constitutional principle which
freedom of conscience, religious beliefs, tolerance of the

divergent outlooks on life, and separation of the State from the

was happening in spite of the fact that the Polish Constitution of 1952,
guaranteed religious freedom to every citizen and proclaimed the separation of the State from the Church. Official propaganda was proclaiming
"a coexistence" of believers and non-believers. See Poland's Constitution of 1952, Appendix B, p. 406, art. 70. Cf. A. Krasinski, "Coexistence des croyants et non croyants," Polosne: realites et problems by
J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1968), p. 116. In fact, the opposite was true.
95

Cf. "Letter of the Polish Bishops Inviting the German Prelates
to the Millenium Festivities in Poland," Poland Since 1956 by T.
Cieplak (New York: T~.;ayne Publisher, Inc., 1972), pp. 150-158.
96

"Letter of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
People's Republic of Poland to t~e Bishops of the Roman Catholic
Church," Poland Since 1956 by T. Cieplak (New York: Twayne Publisher,
Inc., 1972), p. 181.
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Churc h .

n97

Gierek in his speech to Parliament in 1977 said: "The State

scrupulously observes constitutional principle of freedom of conscience."98

An educational reform of 1963, however, intended to employ a

large number of well-qualified personnel with a socialist outlook on
life.

In practice, that was nothing but doubled efforts of Marxist

propaganda.

The Episcopate reacted immediately and strongly.

"Parents," the bishops said, "have the right and the duty to educate
their children in accordance with their own religious beliefs." 99
Cardinal

\~yszynski

repeated that protest in his sermon to the youth of

the country on April 9, 1974: "The time has come for you to tell your
educators and professors: teach us the truth and do not destroy us." 100
In 1976, the editors in-chief received a secret instruction which
was intended as a guideline for the censorship.

The twelve-point

instruction obliged censors to cut out all information about Church
activities, its role in Poland and in the other parts of the world,
except that in the Polish Press Agency version, and any philosophical
distinction between ideology and the outlook in life. 101

97

How far the

Deklaracja Wyborcza Frontu Jednosci Narodu (Warszawa: KiW, 1980),

p. 13.

98

Edward Gierek, Socjalistyczna Polska stworzyla warunki
rzeczywistej realizacji czlowieka (Warszawa: KiW, 1977), p. 5.
99

George Schophlin, "Poland: Troubled Relations Between Church and
State," Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 2, July-Oct.ober, 1974, p. 5.
lOO"The False and the True Church," Mirror, July, 1974.
101Gazeta Niedzielna (London), July 11, 1976.

162
situation was from "normal" is shown by the Pope's appeal to Gierek when
he visited the Vatican one year later.

In his final speech the Pope

said that the Church in Poland "does not ask for privileges, but only
the right to be herself and the possibility to carry out her special

~vork without obstacles. "l02
A very sensitive issue of State-Church ideological conflict was

the Catholic press. Poland has surely been an exception among the
socialist countries.

In 1972, there were in Poland, 52 religious

periodicals and ne~vspapers ~vith a circulation of 549,000 copies. 103
Among the most important were: Przewodnik Katolicki, Gosc Niedzielny,
Tygodnik Powszechny, Apostolstwo Chorych; monthly: Znak, Wiez, Homo Dei,
Ruch Biblijny i Liturgiczny.
l~eekly

cultural Tygodnik Powszechny was watched particularly by the

State authorities.

Every significant deterioration of relation between

the Government and the Episcopate was reflected in the censorship of
that periodical and for new restrictions on the amount of copies
allowed.

In 1961, for example, Tygodnik Powszechny was cut by 10,000

copies for its criticism of the law on the State's educational policy
and of the government's refusal to return confiscated churches in the

102

The Catholic Post, December 18, 1977.

103 This included periodicals and newspapers which, for some reason
or other, could not be considered fully Catholic, such as: Slowo Powszechne, Zorza, Za i Przeciw. Some of them were even conceived as a
means to infiltrate Catholic doctrine with atheist propaganda. That
figure included also the scientific publications of the Catholic University in Lublin and the Academy of Theology in Warsaw.
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western Polish territories. 104

Again, in 1964, it was cut by 10,000 to

revenge the "Letter of Thirty Four"lOS to Premier Cyrankie~..ricz which
protested the restrictions in cultural activities.l06

The letter was

signed by Kisielwski and Turowicz, both associated with Tygodnik Powszechny.
Besides that tactic of open confrontation with the Polish Catholic
Church, the government was using from the beginning another tactic-infiltration of the Church to discredit it in the eyes of the believers
and to raise within the Church itself internal dissensions.

The PAX

(the pro Communist Catholic Society) was founded primarily for that
purpose.

PAX' redefinition of Catholicism stressed the duty of support-

ing the advance of the Soviet-type communism throughout the world.

To

understand the real character of PAX one must go back to its origin and
to its founder. 107

The association was founded in 1945 by Boleslaw

Piasecki, a prewar Polish fascist and leader of a paramilitary organization

FAL&~GA.

It was intended also as a Nazi party in Poland.

"Syste-

matic violence against Jews," says Groth, "physical and verbal, and the
aspiration to an iron-clad nationalist dictatorship

. were its most

104

Stefania Szlek Miller, "The 'Znak'Group: 'Priests' or 'Jesters'?
0956-1970," The Polish Review 21 (1976), p. 71.
105

5 ee, Poland Since 1956, op. cit., pp. 130-133.

106 Tne official note of the government said that the reason for
such restriction was a shortage of paper. Meantime, hundreds of publications on rfarxist ideology were printed which filled up the shelves in
the bookstores. Cf. Stefania Szlek Miller, op. cit., p. 71.
104 see, Adam Bromke, "From 'Falanga' to 'Pax," Poland Since 1956
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distinctive feature." 108

During the German occupation of Poland,

Piasecki collaborated with the Nazis.
FALili~GA

At the end of the War his

fought both Germans and Russians.

Captured by Russians in

1945, he was convicted and condemned to death.
life and stayed only a short time in prison.
FAL&~GA's

He, however, save his
Such a happy end for the

leader could have only one explanation.

Piasecki had con-

vinced the Russians and the Polish regime that he would be much more
useful for them alive than dead.

In any case, Piasecki had become a

significant personality in the postwar Polish history.

For many, he

\vas simply a Russian agent.
In his "Our Guiding Principles" in 1950, Piasecki, presented PAX'
objectives: liberation of the Catholic community "from the bonds by
which it had been linked with the perished world," "safeguard the
Polish nation from subversion," and "the creation of the theoretical and
practical form of participation by faithful Catholics . . • " 109 in the
ne~.,r

system.
PAX virtually supported the entire foreign and domestic policy of

the Party.

Its critics spared no one: Vatican, Polish Episcopate,

intellectuals, Catholic deputies

The latter became a target for

attach by PAX in 1968, when they made an inerpellation in the Sejm concerning the police brutality during the students' riots.

Piasecki

by T. Cieplak (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 183-197.
lOSAdam G. Grot h , op. c1.t.,
.
p. 90 .
109

Dzis i Jutro, November 26, 1950.
op. cit., pp. 264-265.

Reported by Richard F. Staar,
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declared: "Znak (Catholic deputies) have consciously chose popularity
among the people who inspired riots."llO
Even if the State-Church conflict does not coincide with that of
class in Poland, it has visibly fostered the class struggle in postwar
Polish society.

Professor Stanowski put it in these words:

During the December events the workers marched along the streets
. . . and sang by turns the 'International' and religious Polish
anthem 'Boze cos Polske'.
By singing the 'International' they
pointed to the structural conflict, because it meant that the present Polish situation has little to do with the promises of the text
of the 'International'; (but) they expressed also the ideological
. . . conflict because of the meaning of this religious anthem.lll
Russian Rule in Poland
The third source of strain in Poland after World War II, was
Poland's political and economic dependence upon Russia.
something more to that than mere dependence.

But there is

Polish-Russian relations

during ten centuries of history have been rather conflictual than
peaceful.

Certainly, in the distant past, the 125 years of the parti-

tion of Poland must be laid at the door of Tsarist imperialism. However,
the responsibility for the events of recent history must be given to
the Soviet Communist regime.
After the 1920 Polish-Russian conflict was ended by the Treaty of
Riga, the relations between Poland and Russia were visibly antagonistic.

110

•
k 1,
• 11 0 tworczeJ• •KontynuacJ~
• • ustrOJU
• 1• w1 a d zy, II
Bo 1 es 1 aw P ~asec
Zycie i Hys~ 4 (1968), p. 9.
PAX 11as a publishing company which is tax exempted. Together \vith
its subsidiary, 'Veritas', producing more than 40 per cent of all religious articles in Poland, makes enormous profit. It also owns a newspaper Slowo Powszechne.

lllAppendix A, Interview 2, p. 379.
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Russia was aware of Pilsudski's anti-communism and, vice versa,
was looking at the Red Neighbor with preoccupation.

Poland

In spite of the

treaty of nonagression between Poland and Russia, the invasion of
Poland in 1939, came from both sides West and East.
Ribbentrop-~olotov

112
.
fourt1
1 tJ.me.

pact of August 1939, Poland was partitioned for the

The Red Army invaded Poland 16 days after the German

invasion of September 1, 1939.
Siberia and Kazakh province.
additional

By reason of the

anti~Russian

in Katyn forest, idle

Russia deported 1.5 million Poles to
Then came other events which fostered

feeling among the Polish people: the massacre

~-miting

of the Red Army at the right banks of the

Vistula River while the people of Warsaw were dying in a terrible
gehenna after the failure of the 1944 insurrection against the Germans,
annexation of 160,000 square kilometers of the Polish territory, imposition of the Communist regime . • •
Even the Communists themselves had enough reason to be suspicious

112 Khrushchev mentions that treaty in connection with his visit to
Poland in 1945. ''The treaty of 1939 had deeply wounded the Poles, and
the wound was still fresh." Khrushchev Remembers (New York: Little,
Brown and Company, 1970, p. 361. German "Dienst aus Deutschland,"
September 23, 1939, called the pact between Ribbentrop and ~olotov
"Treaty of Hutual Friendship and Agreement on Frontiers." 1-lolfe makes
a comment: "The precision with which the Red Army and Werhmacht moved
to their appointed demarcation line showed how carefully this joint
operation had been ~vorked out in advance." Bertman D. Wolfe, Communist
Totalitarianism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 191-192.
Khrushchev does not mention the massacre at Katyn. There is no
evidence as to what degree he himself was involved in it. Until now,
in spite of the report of the international Red Cross investigation
which clearly stated Russian responsibility for that crime, Russia
denies its role in the Katvn massacre. On a poor monument in honor of
the Polish officers murder~d in Katyn, one can read: "In Honor of the
Polish Officers Shot by Nazis in 1941."
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of the Russian rule in Poland.
Communist Party.

In 1938, Stalin dissolved the Polish

tlany of its leaders were exterminated.

"The only

reason," Khrushchev said, "that Bierut and Gomulka stayed alive, was
that they were relatively unknown in party circles.ll3
He have already seen in Chapter III to what extent Stalin's policy
intended to tie the Eastern European countries to Russia.

Similarly,

and even more visibly, was the political dependence of these satellites
on Russia.

Poland was no exception.

The most visible sign, almost a

symbol, of Poland's dependence on Russia during the period 1949-1956,
was the presence of Marshal Rokossovsky together with the all-powerful
Russian ambassador to Warsaw, Berman.

Rokossovsky, hero of Stalingrad,

was sent to Poland in 1949, to become Poland's Defense Minister.

With

some 400 high ranking Russian officers, he was able to control completely the Polish Army.ll4
That status persisted until October 1956, when the seizure of power
by Gomulka gave rise to a destalinization and derussification process.
The first leader who had to leave Poland was Marshal Rokossovsky whose

113

cf. Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit., p. 107. That might be true
regarding Gomulka because he had never been to Russia before 1938, but
certainly it was not true regarding Bierut, who was well known in Party
circles in Poland and in Russia. His two previous indoctrination
periods in Russia could hardly escape Stalin's attention. Bierut's
death in Russia, during his visit to Moscow (March 12, 1956), aroused
suspicions about the cause of his death (apparently he died of a heart
attack). If he was murdered, who did it? Surely, it was not Stalin
because he had been dead for three years. Khrushchev mentioned that fact
saying: "There was great turmoil after his (Bierut's) death." Khrushchev
Remembers, op. cit., p. 351.

114

~ewsweek,

October 29, 1956, p. 42.
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idleness in attacking

~Jarsaw

in 1944, to support the Warsaw insurrection

\VaS never forgotten nor forgiven.

Gomulka also requested the removal of

other Russian officers from the Polish Army.

An unexpected visit by the

Russian leaders and by the top military commanders in Warsaw, headed by
Khrushchev himself, intended to stop the derussification process.

Dur-

ing the historical meeting in the Belvedere Palace, the Russian leader
delivered an ultimatum that the former Politburo be restored intact.
Rokossovsky's troops surrounded Warsaw, and two other divisions were
ordered to march from Silesia to the capital.
not give in.

115

Gomulka, however, did

Radio Warsaw delivered his speech: "Each people has a

right to . • • independence .

This is how it always should have

been--and now it is beginning to become that way." 116
"Start," an appendix to bi-weekly Srzydla Wolnosci wrote in 1956:
It is about time to openly acknowledge a generally known fact: there
are anti-Russian feelings in our society . • . Deportations of
Poles into deep Russia, activities of Beria's KGB . . . One can
hardly expect much enthusiasm from thousands of the Polish families
returning after several years of slavish labor in the Russian mines
or from forced labor camps in the Soviet Union, from thousands of
families whose relatives were never freed from Beria's prisons.ll7
I t was still in the 1950s that Rus.sian history handbooks for high

school students were presenting Poland's partition as a positive fact
because through that action Rus.sia freed the Hhite-Russi3.ns and Ukrainians from the discrimination of the Polish majority.

"Thirty years

ll5East Europe, January 1957, pp. 4-15.

116

Newsweek, October 29, 1956, p. 44.

ll7skrzydla Wolnosci (Appendix), November 4-5, 1956.
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after Lenin had nullified the partition treaty of Poland," says
Krzemienski, "the Russian youth were still taught in schools that
Poland's partition was not bad at all • • • " 118
When Khrushchev and other Russian dignitaries had learned that only
a ,var '"ith Gomulka' s Poland could stop the reforms, they suddenly

changed their tactics.

They called Gomulka to Moscow, to persuade him

of the necessity of keeping strong ties with them.

Two visits by

Gomulka to Moscow were sufficient to avert what by many was considered
irrevocable. 119

The near future demonstrated that Russia was able to

reconcile Gomulka with itself.

He not only accepted the Brezhnev

doctrine of Russia's right to intervene even militarily if communism was
endangered in any of the friendly neighbors, but he was also considered
a strong supporter of Czechoslovakia's invasion by Warsaw Pact troops in
1968.
Gomulka's servility to Russia went so far that, after the intervention of the Russian ambassador to Warsaw in 1968, he banished the play
"Dziady" (Ancestors), authored by Nickiewicz, nineteenth-century

Polish

poet, because the audience was enthusiastically applauding anti-Russian
lines, e.g, "The only things Moscow sent to Poland were Jackasses,
idiots, and spies;" Russian policy was marked by "cold-blooded cruelty

118

uczen Polski (Niezalezne Pismo Mlodziezy Szkolnej), 4 (1979),
art. of L. Krzemienski}, p. 10.

119

We consider the changes which have recently been accomplished as
irrevocable" said the resolution of the Party members of the Jagiellonian University. Cf. Radio Warsaw, October 21, 1956. (Reported by
East Europe, January 1957, p. 4.)
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and cunning, by denunciations and deportations of Polish patriots to
Siberia" which referred to Tsarist Russia.
Since 1956, there was no open conflict between Poland and Russia.
Gierek's regime was faithfully following the directives coming from
Xoscow.

His submission to Russia went far beyond any necessary limits

to the clear detriment to the Polish cause. 120

"Formally we have our

own country," says Kisielewski, "then were are practically Russian
province." 121

Censors received detailed guidelines to be followed in

cutting out any criticism of Polish-Russian relationships. 122

At the

same time a ban was imposed on data which might reveal Russian exploi-

lZOAf ter h 1s
· b1tter
·
. . .
' 1 ews k'1 suggeste d
cr1t1c1sm
o f t h at po 1.1cy, K.1s1e
so-called "geopolitics" or double thinking. In his opinion Russia
should be Poland's number one partner but not its master. "Finlandization" 1:-Jould be possible for Poland, if the politicians made an appropriate policy. But, if anyone was not able to do that, surely Gierek's
regime was not. Gierek's hunger for personal riches, his megalomania,
corruption, paternalism . . . , prevented him from any positive service
to the national cause. At the beginning of the 1980 strike in Gdansk,
he declared: "We will not tolerate a strike. We will not tolerate work
stoppages! '\.Je will not tolerate attempts at political changes." Sun
Times (Chicago), August 19, 1980. Still, a few days before his deposition from office he said: "Socialist system is inseparably tied to the
Polish national interest • . . We (Polish People) have always been
united by the bonds of understanding, of common concern and the future
of our country. I appeal to your patriotism, to your awareness of responsibility." Trybuna Ludu, August 19, 1980. Anna Walentynowicz, a
member of the strike committee, criticized Gierek's paternalism: "He
acts as i f we were children • . . " Sun Times (Chicago), August 19,
1980.
121 stefan Kisielewski, "Czy geopolityka stracila znaczenie?," Res
Publica 1 (1979).
l2 2one of the detailed guidelines specified that any criticism of
tbe Russian drilling instruments used in Poland for searching the
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tation of Poland. 123
.:Vlichnik in his "Nowy e\volucj onism" touched the problem.

He remem-

bered that in 1956, Gomulka won his great popularity, thanks to his
appropriate formulation of "the Russian question."

The author suggested

that "Polish-Russian relationships should be as a good tea: strong, hot,
but not too sweet." 124
In 197 0, two amendments \vere ?reposed to the 1952 Polish Consti tution.

One concerned a constitutional recognition of the leading role of

the Communist Party, and the other intended to include in the Constitution Polish-Russian friendship.
public opinion.

Especially the second amendment aroused

There were hundreds of letters sent by different groups

of the the Polish intelligentsia and signed by well-known personalities
expressing protest and indignation.

Young scientists of the Catholic

University in Lublin wrote: "Introduction into the Polish Constitution
otherwise unquestioned friendship with the people of the Soviet Union
. we consider as

. a further limitation of our own sovereignty

and resignation from its further extension."l 2 5

Lipinski wrote an open

natural gas. must be censored. Nor could any suggestion for buying
drilling instruments. in Wes.tern countries be publicized. Cf. Solidarnosc Gorzowska 21 (1981}, p. 8.
12 3This was why, for example, any information was cut out about the
quantity of import and consumption of the natural coffee to prevent any
calculation of its re-export; similarly any publication of the Polish
export of meat to Russia must be censored. Solidarnosc Gorzowska 21
(1981)' p. 8.
124Adam Michnik, "Nowy ewolucjonism,"
125

Kultura (Paris) 13 (1976), p. 32.

ANEKS 13-14 (1977), p. 43.
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letter to Gierek criticising such an amendment and his whole Party as
well:
We are forced to support unconditionally Russian foreign policy . .
This is incompatible with Poland's own interests. We have actively
participated in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia . • . We
have violated (their) sovereignty in the name of the imperalistic
interests of the Soviet Union and by that we have consolidated our
dependency.l26
All this happened when "in the whole world, even among the communists,
there were growing negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union."

127

This foreign policy of Gierek, his russophilism, his disastrous
mismanagement of the economy, the building of the police-state, besides
his personal corruption, merit a highly negative mark.l28

During the

parliamentary debate he was so evaluated by one of the deputies, Edward
Osmanc~yk:

"He buried so many hopes," the deputy said, "he understood

nothing, he became an obstacle to change of any kind."l29
In 1980, the Polish workers upheaval and the foundation of the Free
Trade Union brought about a new crisis in Polish-Russian "friendship."
That was related to the losing of credibility by the Communist Party.
The following factors contributed to a manifest crisis of authority in
the country: Party's dependence on the directive from Moscow, incompetency of many Party people occupying high social positions, their corruption, lack of law--abidingness, and social injustice.

126 Edward Lipinski, "List otwarty do Tmv-.
(Paris), 6 (1976}, p. 7.

The Party was

E. Gierka," Kultura

127rbid., p. 7.
128About Gierek's corruption, see Slowo Powsz~chne, ~·lay 13, 1981.
129 Gazeta Krakowska, April 13, 1981.
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losing the little bit of credibility it still had.
people turned in their party IDs.

Some 240,000

Another 181,000 were expelled because

their orthodoxy was questioned or because they were accused of opportunism.130

The Times, referring to that situation said: "In Poland

. there is nothing the party can boast of at present."
Loss

131

of pm..rer by the PUWP backed by Soviets, endangered Russian

rule in Poland.

Soviet reaction went in two directions, both known from

the recent past history.

The first was an accusation that the new Trade

Union was an instrument of Western Imperialism; the second was an intimidation of all adversaries by threatening Poland with military intervention.

As far as the first tactic was concerned, this was an old

method used by Russian leaders to find its formal expression in the socalled Brezhnev's doctrine.

132

According to that doctrine, Russia, as

the most experienced and the most advanced country in the realm of Communism, has a right and even a duty, to defend communist forces in
. 1"lSt countrles
.
.
.
. h.ln an d externa 1 lmper~a
.
. 1"~sm. 133
agalnst
reactlon
Wlt

soc~a

130Dziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda"(Chicago), December 4-5, 1981.
131The Times, July 13, 1981. The Party's Emergency Congress of
1981 \vas intended as a means of regaining the people's confidence.
Rakowski said: "We have to elect a leadership which will be courageous
and able to regain the trust of the people.'' The Washington Post,
July 16, 1981.
132

Cf. Judson R. Xitchell, "The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist
Ideology," Review of Politics 34 (1972), pp. 190-209.
132

In the name of that doctrine Russia intervened militarily in
Hungary in 1956, and the Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia in
1968.
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Russian control of the Eastern European countries takes place
through the directives coming from Moscow to the communist parties of
those countries.

Consequently, any challenge to the communist parties

in the satelite countries, is conceived as an indirect challenge to the
Russian rule in those states.

For that reason, Russia is exceptionally

sensitive to any possible counter-revolution in its satelites, and is
eager to accuse "Western imperialism" of the infiltration of the communis t \vor ld.
During the strike in Gdansk in 1980, TASS accused Polish workers of
being an instrument of "anti-socialist elements."
has already become routine.

134

Such an accusation

In June 1981, the accusation took the form

of a warning of the Polish Communist leaders.

The supreme Soviet sent

a warning letter to the leaders of the Western neighbor to take appropriate measure to restore order in the country and to prevent the
hostile forces from "striking a decisive blow against Marxist-Leninist
forces." 135
But as last year's events showed, Russia did not limit itself to the
mere verbal warnings addressed to Polish workers and later on to the
Polish leadership.

Russia put its military forces on alert and gathered

Kania, the first secretary of the PUWP, spoke in the same vein during the Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1981: "The situation
in Poland is intimately linked to the security of all socialist states.
Its defense is the task not only of those other states, but also of
every Socialist party." Cf. Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1981.
134

135

Newsweek, September 8, 1980.
Newsweek, June 22, 1981.
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them around the Polish borders.

In December 1980, more than one mil-

lion Russian troops were ready to invade Poland.

The White House

spokesman said that the Soviets appear to have completed preparations
for possible intervention in Poland. 136
"How :'1oscmv Would Invade (Pc,landl ?" 137
Russia to stay out of Poland.

Newsweek published an article:
Carter's, administration warned

"The attitudes and future policies of

the United States toward the Soviet Union," the note said, "would be
directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in
Poland." 138
Another form of intimidation of Poland was the prolonged maneuvers
"Sojus 1981."

Even if the maneuvers were scheduled, they were purposely

prolonged and had one definite end in view: intimidation of the Polish
Le Soir made the following comment: "C'est une ing~rence poli-

people.

tique inadmissible mais pas surprenante.

Elle a ete preced~e et accom-

pagnee d'une preparation psychologigue minutieuese." 1 39
larger scale maneuvers took place in September 1981.

Still on a

They included

large numbers of warships which played their war games around the Gdansk
gulf less than 100 miles from the city where the Solidarity Congress was
held.

It was during that Congress that Solidarity called for independ-

ent unions in all Eastern European countries.

136

"We support those of you

CBS, December 6, 1980.

137Newsweek, December 15, 1980.
1 38President Carter's Speech.
139Le So1r,
.
!1arc h ""~ 5 , 1981.

Newsweek, December 15, 1980.
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who have decided to enter the difficult road of struggle for free and
140
independent unions~
The Russian military alert had mainly a psychological purpose.

In

this way the Soviets wanted to impress the Polish Communist Party that
i t should crack down on the new Trade Union, and also to limit the birth

of Polish expectations regarding their status among Eastern European
countries.

Actually Russia could hardly afford a war with Poland.

Soviets are aware of the moods toward them in Polish society.

The

There was

too much antagonism in the recent" his.tory of these two countries to be
easily forgotten.

The old slogan that "As long as the world exists, the

German will never be a brother to the pole," may now be paraphrased: "As
long as Soviet Russia exists, Russians cannot be brothers to the Poles."
But even if the Societs decide to invade Poland, "they may find that
.
. easler
.
.
. 141
ta k lng
t h e country lS
t h an k eeplng
lt.

Immediate Causes of the Polish Workers Upheavals
According to the value-added theory of collective behavior, the
strain situation does not end by itself in an outburst.

There must be

one or more factors which cause the explosion--the precipitating
factors.

140

Those factors give to "the generalized beliefs concrete,

The New York Times, September 9, 1981.

141 Newsweek, December 15, 1980. According to Solovyov, Russia \vill
not invade Poland because of the limited number of troops which could be
sent to Poland (every second Russian soldier is kept on the Chinese
border); secondly, the war with Poland would be to the disadvantage of
the Russians on Polish territory; thirdly, Russians have a traditional
fear of Poles. It already has a war with the Afghans. It has the
Chinese on a hostile border, and internal strains--discord between the

177
.
immed1ate
su b stance. .. 142

They serve as a spark to cause an outburst.

In three of four analyzed cases, the role of the precipitating
incidents .;.zas played by a sharp, one-day increase in cons.umer goods.
mainly in food.

This cannot be considered as overreaction in a country

\vhere the average family spends· half of its income on food.

An increas.e

of 70 per cent on meat and 30 per cent on other food burdens the family
budget significantly,
The only ins.urrection which was not an immediate consequence of a
drastic hike in the price of food was that of Poznan in 1956, but it
still had an economic basis.

The riot originated in "Cegielski" plants,

where 30,000 people were working in the production of different kinds. of
engines and other machines.

Until the time preceding the event, they

were receiving approximately 30 per cent more in wages than other
workers because of the special destination of their products.

Suddenly,

the benefits were cut off and at the same time there was a revision of
norms in the factory causing additional .tension.

The negotiations with

the Minister of Industry did not bring about any positive solutions.
\men the \vorkers' delegates were imprisoned, the outburst started.

civil and the military sectors, industrial inadequacy, the failure even
now of Soviet agriculture to feed the nation.'' Chicago Tribune,
June 21, 1981 (article by William Pfaff). The new Russian tactic toward
Poland consists on pressing the Polish Communist Party to crack down on
the workers.

142

Neil Smelser, op. cit., p. 17. Generalized beliefs refer to the
strain, its sources. They explain the problem, identify the responsible
for the strain, and indicate some possible solution under new conditions.
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The 1970, 1976, and 1980 Polish workers' upheavals had as their
immediate cause the sharp increase in prices in food.
I t ~,ras

on December 12, 1970 that the Cabinet decided to modify

retail prices of a large number of products beginning the next day.

The

Cabinet reduced prices in some industrial, and rather luxurious goods,
while it drastically increased the prices of food and other goods.

As

an average, the retail prices increase: 20 per cent for meat, 24 per
cent for bread, 23 per cent for sugar products and the same for shoes.
Additionally, there was an increase of about 50 per cent for building
materials. 143
Two circumstances have to be stressed at this point.

The first is

that the average Polish family was spending, at that time, 58.3 per cent
of its budget for food, beverages, and cigarettes.

The December hike in

prices brought this portion of the family budget to 65-70 per cent. 144
Second, the price hike of 1970 had its special psychological effect,
because it came only 12 days before Christmas, when every Polish family
intended to buy some better food, which they could not afford during the
other times of the year.

Incrase in prices of food at that particular

moment was understood as a challenge to the poorest and a disregard of
of the elite for the people.
m,rski, "when the price

'"It gives us nothing," says Professor Stan-

of a color T'J set is lowered, Hhile the prices

or butter and meat go up by 80 per cent." l 4 5

143

L'express (Paris} December 21-27, 1970.

14 4Paris Hatch, January, 1971, p. 16.
145

Appendix A, Interview 2, p. 382.
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In consequence of the riot following the decision to raise prices
in 1970, the new regime under Gierek's leadership froze the food prices
initially for two years, and later on the period was extended to
-6 146

19I

At the same time (1971-1975) real wages were increasing on

•

the average at the rate of 7.18 per cent annually.

This was possible

thanks to the influx of money borrowed from the West which did not correspond with the internal dynamics of the economy.

Gierek's regime

learned the lesson from Gomulka's fall and it was very careful about the
increase in food prices.

Additionally, two poor agricultural outputs

(1974, 1975) of the Polish farms only aggravated the food situation in
Poland. 147
normal.

The apparent stability of the Polish economy was far from

Domestic consumption of meat increased considerably, i.e., by

6.6 kg per capita in five years. 148

Polish agriculture could not meet

that demand.
Sooner or later, the regime had to face the problem of the new food
prices to regain control over the visible chaos in the economy.

Even if

the official propaganda continued to proclaim economic success: "Poland
is growing in strength and the people are prosperous," 149 the Party was

146

There was a latent increase in prices through the diminishing
of the quantity of goods, or simply changing the name of the same goods
and selling them at new, higher prices.
l47Poland imported grain from abroad in the amount of $2.5 billion
in three years (1973-1976). Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1976.
148
149

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p.
Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1976.
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forming public opinion for new drastic measures, which were under consideration to heal the economy.

During the VII Peasant Party Congress

(ZSL) Gierek said: "We have to produce more and better • • . (this)
refers to the entire economy, but especially to agriculture."l50
Polityka talked about the discrepancy between the supply and demand on
the Polish market.

"We cannot hide the discrepancy between

~vhat

expect from the market . . • and its real possibility • • • " 151

we
To

reduce the demand for some goods, especially meat, there was suggested
a restriction of consumer goods regulated not only by the market, but
.
152
also by social mot1ves.
Gierek's regime was aware of the possible reaction to a hike in
food prices.

For that reason the period for the increase in food prices

was carefully studied and predetermined by the end of June.

By that

time university students are busy with their finals, high school students are already out of school, and many people have made their plans
for summer vacations.

To secure full success to the plan, the regime

went so far as to make an extraordinary

draft.

Even those who, for

some reason or other, were excluded from military service, were drafted,
if they fell into one of the following categories: NPR--Negatywny
prowodyr robotniczy (Illegal ring-leader), NAP--Negatywny aktywista
polityczny (Subversive political activist), and K--Kryminalista

150

Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1976.

lSlPolityka, June 19, 1976 (article by

z.

Szeliga),

152zdzislaw Fedorowicz. "Akt~vna polityka cen i place realne,"
leologia i Polityka, 5-6 (1976), p. 42.
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(Criminalist). 15 3

The same day the regime chose to raise food prices,

i t granted a considerable raise in wages for professional military per-

sonnel and especially for police.l54
On June 25, Prime Minister Jaroszewicz disclosed the price increase
in basic food items which had been predicted and expected.

But what

took the people and especially workers by surprise was the magnitude of
the price hike: 50 per cent for butter and cheese, 30 per cent for vegetables and poultry, 100 per cent for sugar, and an average increase of
69 per cent in meat, with 90 per cent hike for better cuts. 155

As a

compension for the price increase in food, there were foreseen supplements in wages and pensions of 240 to 600 zloties.

The higher subsidies

'\vould go to those who were making more money or had higher pensions.

In

spite of government precautions, the next day workers' riots began in

/
Ursus and Radom.
The increase in food prices came after the 1976 riot, but it was
gradual and much more moderate than that proposed by Jaroszewicz.
food supply was not increasing but rather deteriorating.
the already growing discontent among the working class. 156

The

That fostered
Corrupted

153KOR Bulletin No. 2, fu~EKS, 13-14 (1977), p. 89. Jacek Kuron,
e.g., was drafted and spent about three month (July 19-0ctober 9, 1976)
in military training. In 1976, Kuron was already 42 years old.
154\fuile the average increase in wages to compensate for the
increase in food prices was 200 zlotys for workers, for military professional personnel 600 zlotys, for the police it amounted to 1,600 zlotys.
Cf. ANEKS 12 (1976), p. 31.
155Dziennik Polski, June 25, 1976.
156Gierek's regime was able to find only one remedy: borrowing the

182
and incapable of any serious action Gierek's regime instead came out
with an indoctrination program which was undertaken in the entire
country.

In one Voivodship, Nowy Sacz, 1248 instructors were employed

to handle the indoctrination of 40,000 people in 1,123 groups.

157

School teachers at all levels of education were obliged to disseminate the Party's Marxist ideology.

The task of the teachers was

clearly stated in a 1973 decree: "A teacher embodies the socialist
ideals pursued by the leading force of the nation--the PUWP in the
domain of the ideological formation of the consciousness of the young
generation, its patriotic and international attitudes." 1 5 8
Many people involved in opposition were fired from their jobs,
stopped by the police, beaten by "unknown bandits," called "hooligans"
. , and their apartments

~.,rere

periodically search.

i.Jalesa himself

was fired from three jobs for his activities, and in 12 years he was
stopped 150 times by the police.l59

Another member of the 1980 strike

committee in Gdansk, Walentynowicz, was also fired from her job.
others could not work in places determined by the regime.
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Some

On Decem-

money abroad. So, Poland's debt of hard currency rose from $741 million
in 1970 to $10.6 billion in 1976, to 20 billion in 1979. Cf. Fortune,
September 27, 1980, p. 126.
157Jan Pilarczyk, "Doskonalenie pracy wykladowczej - z doswiadczen
i.Zoj ewodzkiego Osrodka Ksztalcenia Ideologicznego," Ideologia i Polityka,
7-8, 1977, p. 142.
l58Dziennik Ustaw, No. 12, 1973.
l59Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384; cf. Interview 4, p. 386;
Interview 5, p. 395.
l6°Appendix A, Interview 6, p. 400.
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ber 23, 1976, the "unknown" hooligans beat attorney Sila-Nowicki and
Drawicz.

Seven days later, another member of KOR was beaten.

On

January 10, 1977, attorney Sila-Nowicki and eight other members of KOR
.;.;ere as saul ted in the hall of the Court.
able to evade again.l6l

The "unknown" hooligans were

Still in 1980, on the 24th anniversary of the

riot in Poznan, the police searched the apartments of many of the opposition, such as J. Bazydlo, A. Borel, W. Samolinski,
P. Tomczak's apartment was searched for eight hours.

z.

Koniecki • . •

The underground

newspapers were confiscated and he himself was arrested.
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In 1980, the strain in Poland was reaching its climax.
before the strike in 1980 began,

~~alesa

situation cannot last much longer."l63
needed only a spark to explode.
posal.

said in the interview: "That
As before, also this time it

It came again from the new prices pro-

The strike started in the huge Lenin Shipyards to spread over

the whole country.
demands.

Two months

Strikers' demand exceeded simple bread and butter

When asked why the workers went on strike, Walentynowicz

161nziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (London), January 9, 1977.
162nziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierca (London), July 3, 1980. By
1980, there were several underground papers in Poland. Among them the
most important were: Krytyka (Critique), Res Publica (connected with
KOR), Glos (Voice), Opinia (Opinion), Droga (Road), Gospodarz (Ste.;.;ard),
Robotnik (Worker), Bratniak (Brother). Cf. Aleksander Smolar, "Pologne:
la lutte contre l'oubli," Culture et Pouvoir Communists by N. Dionjeva
and T. Wolton (Parid: Recherches, 1979), p. 88.
163

Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 385.
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ans\vered: "The regime lies and cheats: the people want to know the
truth." 164

164

Gwiazda Polarna

(~ilwaukee), September 20, 1980.

CHAPTER VI

POLISH

~·lORKERS'

INSURRECTIONS

Polish Workers' Riots and Their Control

In Smelser's value-added theory of collective behavior, the mobilization for action includes three factors: the leadership (formal or
informal), organization of the hostile outburst, and the rise of the
hostility curve.
In two (1956, 1970) of four Polish workers' riots, the role of the
leaders was rather limited and was totally informal.

This was simply

because in the totalitarian system the power elite prevents any organized opposition.
rule.

Such an opposition could challenge the dictator's

There were, however, several unidentified leaders who formulated

the grievances and sent messengers to other plants to bring people to
the streets.
formed.

In 1970, a three-man committee headed by L. Walesa, was

Its task was to negotiate with the officials.

The strike com-

mittee could not control the events because of lack of the intermediary
organizational levels.

Before the strike committee and Party officials

could come to any agreement, the events escaped their control. The
August 1980 strike was completely different from all preceding upheavals.
It was prepared, organized, and controlled by the strike committee composed of L. Walesa, A. Kolodziej, B. Lis, and fifteen other members.
Such an organization was possible thanks to the organized oppositionist
groups in the circles of the workers, students, and intelligentsia.
185
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~fhen,

in collective behavior, tension reaches its climax, action

takes place.

The crowd directs its attacks toward previously identi-

fied persons or institutions considered as evil or as a source of
evil.

In any totalitarian system, and in the socialist regime in par-

ticular, it is relatively easy to identity responsible individuals or
groups for the present situation.

The power elite, which exclusively

controls every aspect of social, political, and economic life, is considered by the vast majority of people to be responsible for the evils
of society.

Its personnel, its buildings became the targets of the

workers' attacks.

That was true in three of four Polish workers' insur-

rections (1956, 1970, and 1976).

The 1980 strike was an exception.

Its

specificity, however, was not a matter of a split responsibility, but a
matter of diversity of the protest itself.

It did not take a violent

form.
The insurrection in Poznan began on June 28, 1956.

There were

three main targets of the worker's attack: City Hall with its officials,
the prison in which the workers' delegation was. imprisoned and the
jamming station which jammed Radio Free Europe's broadcasting in the
Polish language.

An eye-witness recalls the action.

Workers were coming from the direction of the 'Stalin' plants. 1 They
were in work clothes • . • At nine o'clock they started (to go) to
the City Hall. They wanted to see Sroka and ask him where the second
delegation (of the workers) was . . . People began shouting and
and chanting 1 \-J.e want bread', 1 \.J:e >..rant better pay', 'Get the Russian

1

cegielski's Plant was renamed "Stalin."
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Someone shouted [pull

occupiers out', 'Give Poland freedom',
down the enemy's flag•.2

The second target of the workers' attack was the city prison where
the

~.;rorkers'

prison . . .

delegation was imprisoned.

"The guards did not defend the

They gave up their guns and people found other guns in

the office, perhaps fifty or more, including some machine guns.

The

prisoners came into the main office and everybody started throwing
papers and files out the windows .
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Finally, the rioters attacked the jamming station.
to operate in

1954.

It had started

The station was successful in making it difficult

to listen to Radio Free Europe broadcasting.

That station was located

on the top of a four-floor insurance building in the center of the city.
The

~.;hole

assault was accomplished in a few minutes: "The social insur-

ance building was open, but the radio station was locked.
broke the door in.

Someone

There was on man there but he could do nothing.

pulled tubes and machinery from the roof and cut the antenna.

We

Every

time a piece fell in the street the crowd cheered1• 4
When the workers were storming the Public Security (UB) headquarters, the Polish army tanks came up.
ever, other tanks came up.

They did not fire.

Soon, how-

As the same eye-witness states, they were

Russians in Polish uniforms:

?

-News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 37.
3 rbid., p. 38. At that time there was an International Fair in
Poznan, and therefore there were flags of all the countries which participated in the exhibition.
4

News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 38.
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They started firing machine guns and cannons. Many were killed and
wounded . • • I know that they were Soviet soldiers. I saw someone
thrmving a gasoline bottle at a tank and it caught fire. The
officer climbed out. People asked: 'why do you shoot at Poles?' I
heard him say "I do not understand Polish!' They were in Polish
uniforms but they spoke Russian and we all knew they were Russians
. . . Th5n the Polish troops came and surrounded the dmvn-town
district.
According to the General Prosecutor, aarian Rybicki, by the middle
of July 1956, there were 323 persons in custody. 6

By the end of Sep-

tember 1956, there were only 154 still in prison.

Three people: J.

Foltynowicz, K. Zurek, and J. Sroka were accused of murdering corporal

z.

Izdebny.

The others were accused of looting and vandalism.

But by

October 23 of the same year, only the group of Foltynowicz was still in
prison. 7
The 1970 events in Gdansk began Monday, December 14, '\vith the
strike of the first shift in the Lenin Shipyards.
committee was formed.

A three-person strike

Five hours later the workers (3,000) came to the

Party building with slogans: "We >vant bread!," "The press lies."

The

crowd hurled stones through the windows of the press house, and when
they arrived at the Party headquarters, they tried to set fire to the
palace. Police. however, w.ere ahle to dispers_e the crowd using bombs.

5News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 39.
6

Trybuna Ludu, September 22, 1956. According to the Polish Press
Agency, 48 people were killed and 270 more were injured during the
riots_ See Herder Korespondence. 1955/56, p. 502.
7

.
Ibld., October 23, 1956. There were 71 casualties during the
Poznan riot, 900 were injured. 1976 were seriously injured, Five of the
dead were police and soldiers. Slowo Powszechne, March 6, 1981.
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with tear-gas.

Next day the strike was proclaimed.

toward the central station and the Party building.

The workers marched
The crowd shouted:

"Hang Gomulka!, Gomulka out! , Cyrankie\-licz out!, Kliszko, Kociolek,
Moczar out!

Out!

Out!"

8

The c rm-1d threw rocks and set fires to des-

troy the Party's buildings.
fire.

Inside the police were

There was shooting at first.

was in flames.
place.

~.Jhen

extinguishing the

At ten o'clock the Party building

First battles between security police and workers took

a new column of \-lorkers had formed to march to the Party

building they were fired upon by militia from hiding places.

A few

hours later a large group of the workers returned to the shipyards.
atmosphere of combat

gre~-1

The

when in the afternoon the army units were

ordered to enter into action.

One person was crushed by a vehicle.

By

6:00p.m., the troops were controlling the streets and the shipyards to
protect them from any sabotage.

But as a French newspaper pointed out,

the shipyard was not a target of any attack.9

At the meeting of the

provincial authorities, Kliszko was infuriated that the workers were
boasting of taking part in burning down the Party building.

Kociolek,

the deputy Prime 1-linister, said, on Gdansk television: "The demonstrations and riots have been exploited by hooligans and social scum .
The authorities are determined to do everything within their power to
restore order."lO

8

George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland (New York: Pergamon Press,
Inc., 1979), p. 10.
91 F.
e 1.garo, J anuary 1 6 -1 7 , 1971.

10

BBC Monitoring, December 15, 1970.
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The next day, about 5,000 workers were gathered in the shipyards
to formulate their grievances.

The staff of the shipyard did not make

any promises but warned the crm..z:d not to go to the streets.
did not obey.
There

~:vere

The workers

When they tried to get out, the troops fired on them.

many dead and injured.

The strike committee proclaimed a

24 hour strike, asked for punishment of those responsible for the catastrophic situation of the Polish economy, the raising of wages, abolishing of systems of reward and removing troops from the city.
Almost at the same time disorders took place in Gdynia.

The crowd

gathered at the Paris Commune Shipyard to ask for the liberation of
three imprisoned workers.

When the Party secretary, Pol<rzycki, refus.ed

to do that. the strike was proclaimed.

The first secretary of Gdansk

Voivodship, Kociolek, made an appeal to the workers to go back to their
normal work.ll

Meantime the troops occupied the shipyards.

strikers asked for a broadcast of their grievances.
refused.

The

The authorities

The next day the troops blocked the entrance to the shipyards.

The loudspeakers announced to the people coming to work not to approach
the tanks.
spot.

When the crowd grew, the workers were ordered to leave the

They refused.

cheted and hurt many.
killed several people.

The troops fired on the ground.

The helicopters sprayed tear-gas.

Random shots

One eye-witness, Steven Ricks, said that he saw

policemen who purposely aimed at the crowd and shoot.12

11

The bullets rico-

Zycie Literackie, February 21, 1971.

l2The Guardian, December 22, 1970..

The crowd moved
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to the Czen.;ronych Kosynierm.;r street with slogans: "Murderers!"

"Ges-

tapa.I II
Then people attacked the buildings in which there were prosecutors
offices and tried to set fire to the Party building protected by police
and army units.
crowd.

Only in the afternoon, police and troops dispersed the

Xany were killed on the spot and many injured.

coordinated by the helicopters.

The action was

According to Bajalski, a Yugoslav

journalist, it was Kliszko who ordered the attack to fire on the
workers. 13

As soon as the riot began, he went to Gdansk and established

his operational headquarters in the provincial Trade Union building. In
his memorandum, Gomulka says that he never gave the order to fire on
the people, but only to react efficiently to ensure order.

Admittedly

he said: "My basic error was that I, myself, did not go to the coast." 1 4
The Szczecin riot began on December 17.
Shipyard was proclaimed.

At about 12:00, several thousands of workers

began a march toward the Party building.
They could not.

A strike in the Warski

Police tried to stop them.

Even though reinforcements were brought, the Party

building was burned down.

The official report said that there 'tvas 16

casualties and 117 people \vere seriously injured. 15
curfew was ordered.

In the evening a

The strike committee presented 22 grievances.

There were among others dismissal of the president of the State Trade

13Polityka (Gelgrad), February 23, 1971 (article by Risto Bajalski).
14 George Blazynski, op. cit., p. 9.
15 rb1"d.,

op.

CJ."t • ,

p. 19 .
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Union, 30 per cent raise in wages, postponement of any repression of the
strikers, publication of the real data on the economic situation of the
country · ·

16

The next day, after the increase in prices in 1976, there were
widespread s.trikes announced across tha whole country.

This happened in

spite of all the precautionary measures the regime undertook.

The most

serious events, however, took place in Ursus, ten miles from Warsaw,
and in Radom, 80 miles south of Warsaw.

In Ursus the tvorkers of the

large tractor factory ripped up rails and derailed the Paris-Moscow
express.

A 10-mile long line of trains was formed.

There was not a

direct confrontation of the workers with the police, but many workers
were arrested.
The events in Radom were much more dramatic.

17

On June 25, the

workers of the "Walter" factory marched toward the Party building.
asked for the first secretary.
the second secretary.
building.

They

He did not appear, but instead sent

The crowd insulted him and burned the Party

On the walls of the houses there were slogans: "Down tvith the

Party of the traitors. " 18 Street fights began in tvhich two policemen
were killed and 75 were injured; eight of them were seriously injured.
The causalties on the side of the workers were much higher especially
when police reinforcements were brought in the so-called "Goledziniaki"

16AFL-CIO, N0uvelles du mouvement syndical libre, April, 1971.
17 cf. "Bunt robotnikow Radomia" (Eye-witness report), ANEKS, 12
(1976)' pp. 28-30.
18

Ibid., p. 29.
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(boys from Goledzinow). 1 9
any more of the injured. 20

By evening the hospitals were not accepting
Meamvhile the excited crowd broke the

windows of the shops and looted several of them.

As that was taking

place, the police were taking pictures from the helicopters to make it
easy to identify and convict the rioters who would be brought to trial.
After 11:00 p.m. the streets were calm, the workers went home, but many
were arrested later that same night.

The sentences in Ursus were much

lighter than those in Radom where several workers were sentenced up to
ten years in prison or slightly less.

Several thousand people

~vere

fined 3000-5000 zlotys. 2 1

The 1980 strike in Gdansk and later on in the whole of Poland did
not follow the previous patterns.

That time, the workers did not go to

the streets, there was no breaking of windows nor burning of the Party's
buildings.

The workers were organized and controlled

strike committee.

completely by the

They were determined more than ever before to strug-

gle for their cause, but they wished negotiations rather than violence.
We will see later on how that strike brought about an unprecedented
change in the socialist system.

19rn the people's op1n1on they are recruited from criminals of
every kind and they received special training for that kind of action.
20Many suspected that this was purposely ordered by the State
authorities.
21 "Bunt Robotnikow Radomia," Al.\JEKS, 12 (1976), p. 30. The trial
was held contrary to the existing laws in Poland. Accused workers could
not have their own attorneys, but were entitled only to ?ublic defenders.
Only the closest family members could be present in court during the
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Besides the use of force to control the riots following the four
Polish workers' upheavals, the regime adopted similar tactics in all
four insurrections but added something different in 1980.
The first thing the regime tried to do was to isolate the place
of riot to prevent its spread to other cities.

It was done by cutting

communication and transportation to those places. The newspapers, radio,
and television did not report the events.

Only

~.,rhen

the regime was

forced to publish the workers' grievances did the mass media report the
incidents.

In December 1970, e.g., Trybuna Ludu reported the events in

Gdansk after a three day delay.
delays in reporting the riots.

Also in 1976 and in 1980, there were
\men in June 1976, the riot in Radom

forced the regime to postpone the price hike, the Prime Minister, Piotr
Jarosze\..ricz said: "Many propositions came up which were worth consideration (and therefore) the Cabinet ordered that the food prices remain
unchanged." 22
Secondly. the regime tried to present the events as the excesses of
hooligans or the activities of the enemies of the working class.

In

1956, the accusations were mainly directed toward foreign agents.
The Poznan provocation was organized by the enemies of our fatherland
at a time when the Party and Government are greatly concerned with
eliminating the shortcomings in the life of the workers and making
our country more democratic. Every patriot and every honest pers_on
in Poland must realize this • . • The people's enemies, foreign
agents, chose that moment (International Fair) to discredit the working class and the Partv whose main effort is the improvement of the

trials.

22

"Apel do swiatowej opinii publicznej,
Trybuna Ludu, June 27, 1976.

ANEKS 12 (1976), p. 41.
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standard of living of each of us.23
The Prime

~inister,

J. Cyrankiewicz, spoke in the same vein:

Imperialistic centers and the reactionary underground hostile to
Poland are directly responsible for the incidents • . • The working class . . . will consciously live up to its responsibilities.
(Therefore) every provocateur or maniac t.rho t.;ill dare raise his hand
against the people's rule may be sure that in the interest of the
working class, in the interest of the working peasanty and of the
intelligentsia • • . the authorities will chop off his hand. 24
In 1970, the propaganda hurried to provide foreign journalists with
the pictures of vandalism and looting to prove that the people who
caused riots were hooligans and not the workers.

The imposed curfew was

aimed at protecting private and public property from vandalism. 25

After

the 1976 riots in Ursus and Radom, the workers were accused of looting
and vandalism and were convicted and sentenced to prison terms.

There-

fore, the appeal of the Polish intellectuals to the world's public
opinion in behalf of the tvorkers stated: "We consider it our duty to
express our disagreement with labeling the workers' protest, which contested unjust social policy and authoritarian power, as 'hooligansm' ." 26
The use of propaganda in 1980., was much more res.tricted.

On

August 28, 1980, the spokesman for the government accused the strikers

23
24

Trybuna Ludu, June 29, 1956,
Ibid.

2 5As Dziennik Polsk·i i Dziennik Zolnierza (London, December 24,
1970) reported the authorities purposely freed from the correctional
centers young criminals who actively participated in looting and vandal
actions.
26cf. &~EKS, 12 (1976), p. 41.
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of being inspired by "anti-socialist" ideas and
situation as it is now, cannot last any longer.

~-larned

them that "the

It is becoming serious

and it is endangering the very substance of the country." 2 7

The intimi-

dation, however, did not work.
At that point, two different tactics were used in riot control.
During the upheavals when there was an immediate change in the leadership (1956, 1970, and 1980) the new leaders promptly admitted the mistakes and mismanagement of the preceding administration and acknowledged
that the riots were not caused by foreign agents or hooligans but by the
workers, whose serious grievances forced them to protest.

In 1956,

Gomulka said:
The Poznan workers did not protest against the People's Poland,
against socialism when they went out into the streets of the city.
They protested against the evil which ~-Ias widespread in our social
system and which was painfully felt by them • . . The working class
recently gave a painful lesson to the Party, the leadership and the
government •
they shouted in a power voice: 'Enough'. This
cannot go on any longer! 'Turn back from the false road' .28
In 1970, Gierek in his radio speech (December 20) withdrew the
Party's condemnation of the riot and openly admitted that it was. caused
by the legitimate grievances of the working class.
condemnation of Gomulka's policy.

That was an indirect

A few days later he and his Prime

Hinister, P. Jaroszewicz, pledged to improve housing, payments, food
supplies, and others . . .

27Time, September 8, 1980, p. 31.

?8

Trybuna Ludu, October 21, 1956. See also Andrzej Werblan,
.
rzyczynek
do genezy konfliktu," ~iiessiecznik Literacki 26 (1968),
pp. 61-67.

"p

~
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In 1980, Gierek's regime on the verge of falling, recognized the
mismanagement and inefficiency of his government.

The State Union

declared: "The present crisis has. its source in economic mismanagement
and in regression in the development of a Socialist democracy."29
no argument worked.
failed.

But

His tactic of appealing to people's emotions

The workers derided his speech.

At that point he brought the

last and the strongest argument: the sovereignty of the nation is endangered because the Soviet Union is preoccupied with the idea that the
socialist rule in Poland is in danger.

This argument did not work,

nonetheless, Russia did show its concerns about the fact that its political influence in Poland might be lessened.
After Gierek's fall, there came an open condemnation of his policy:
mismanagement, setbacks in socialist democracy, inefficiency, corruption
Finally, he himself was stripped of all medals and Party membership. 30
In 1976, another tactic was used.

Because no immediate change was

foreseen, State authorities organized an immense propaganda in support
of the regimes's

policy.

The workers were forced to participate in

rallies which were presented as the spontaneous reaction of the working
class against the hooligans from Radom and Ursus.

29

The Party newspaper

PAP (Polish Press. A,gency}, Bulletin No. 1017, August 27. 1980.

30rn 1970. Gierek bitterly condemned Gomulka for his policy even i f
he himself was a member of Gomulka's politburo. Similarly did Kania in
1980, in spite of his membership in Gierek's politburo. This surely,
reflects the struggle for power in different politburo factions and
indicates the way the system works to survive.
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reported new resolutions every day: "We protest against the disturbances of the dialogue of the Party with the nation." 31
of the Party policy by the

~vorking

class."

"Full acceptance

"Working people are with

you, comrade Gierek~"

"We condemn those who despise work."3Z

comrade Gierek, we are

~vith

you.

"Dear

We will help you, we \vill enforce law-

abiding and working class efforts." 33

It was the chief of the Polish

Radio and Television, tlaciej Szczepanski, who in violent words condemned
workers as "the subverters of the public order." 34
In 1980, Gierek's regime used all available alternatives to survive.

While the workers of Gdansk were still on strike, the police

struck the KOR.

Jacek Kuron and the other people, especially those from

the Confederation for the Independent Poland (KPN) with its founder,
Leszek Moczulski, were arrested.

That not only did not stop the strike

in Gdansk, but served to spread it to Lodz, to Silesia region, and
Warsaw.

Now Gierek made a conciliatory gesture.

He fired Tadeusz Pyka,

a chief negotiator with the strike committee, because the workers
refused to meet with him, accusing him of corruption.
Edward Babiuch, cast in Pyka's lot.

31

Puppet Premier,

Jan Szydlak, the President of the

Trybuna Ludu, June 27, 1976.

32Ibid., June 28, 1976.
33rbid., June 29, 1976.
34 nziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (LondOn, June 30, 1976. In
the fall, after the 1980 strike. Szczepanski was accused of amassing a
personal fortune in embezzled state funds to build a luxurious country
house and of having 900 pornographic video films. Cf. Sun Times
(Chicago), September 6, 1980.
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Trade Union, was replaced by R. Jankowski.
reform of the State Union was refused.

Even the proposal of the

The joint strike committee

representing some 300,000 workers declared: "He will go back to work
the 0ay after tomorrow if the government will agree on point one: Free
Trade Union."35

E. Honecker, the East German Party's first secretary,

warned the anti-socialist forces in Poland: "Poland is and will remain
a socialist country . . . we, and our friends will make sure of
that."

36

Husak's regime condemned "Solidarity" since the beginning

but the condemnation took the most solemn form during the Czechoslovakian Communist Party Congress in April 1981.
All who are attemtping to misuse the events in Poland for instigating anti-socialist campaigns must be reminded of our clear standpoint that the protection of the socialist system is not only the
concern of each socialist state, but also the joint concern of the
states of the socialist community, which are determined to defend
their interests and the socialist achievements of our people.37
Even N. Ceausescu came out in agreement with his critics.
speech he asked the rhetorical question:
independent of]
injustice?"

In his

What was it (Ne": Trade Union)

"Of the struggle against oppression and social

Liberal as he was considered, he went to the point no one

else did: "Independent Unions," he said, "have always served the

35
36

37

Rocky Mountain News, August 29, 1980.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), October 6, 1980.

The Times, April 7, 1981. In protest at Hussak's speech, the
Dutch Communist Party recalled its delegates.
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interests of the bourgeoisie and imperialism."38
The reactions of Russia and its Eastern European allies to the
Polish "anti-socialist" revolution were not limited to verbal disapproval.

East Germany sealed its borders with Poland.

Czechoslovakia restricted travels to and from Poland.

Russia and
The Warsaw Pact

had gathered about one million troops around the Polish borders.
Several unusual maneuvers took place on Polish territory.
ber 8, 1980, the invasion plan of Poland was set.

By Decem-

The American maga-

zine, Newsweek, reported "the invasion scenario." 39

A Swiss newspaper

disclosed that only a bot-line call from President Carter to Moscow
prevented the invasion.
In April 1980, the situation was aggravated again because of the
beating of the Unionists by the police and UB agents.

In consequence,

"Solidarity" proclaimed a nation-wide strike to protest this action. 40
Russia prolonged its maneuvers in Poland.

When the emergency Party

Contress was about to take place in July 1981, the Russian Politburo
hurried to send a

minatory letter to the Polish comrades, who in the

opinion of the Soviets, were giving up too easily to the Union's

38 R

·

oman~an

39

Press Agency (Agerpress ) , 0 eta b er 16 , 1980 .

Newsweek, December 15, 1980, p. 40.

40 The action took place during the provincial assembly in Bydgoszcz, March 19~ 1981. The government expressed its regrets (see Le
~. April 1~ 1981) and promised the investigation.
The investigation conducted by the state attorney was postponed from week to week
so that by the end of May, no progress had been made. (Cf. The Times,
June 5, 1981.) On August 31, 1981, the government decided to drop the
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requests.

A few days before the emergency Congress took place, Gromyko

arrived in

\~arsaw

munist Party.

with the necessary instructions for the Polish Com-

In the middle of August 1981, Kania and Premier Jaruzel-

ski were summoned to Moscow for new directives.

At the same time

several new maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact troops were ammounced for the
fall.

They coincided with the Solidarity Congress in Gdansk and had an

explicit aim: an intimidation of the "Solidarity."
Conquests of the Polish Workers' Upheavals
As I have already pointed out, the postwar Polish workers' riots
took place in a situation of continual strain which was sharply aggravated by some precipitating factors.

Similar but not exactly the same

grievances caused the explosions in the four cases analyzed above.

In

all four riots the main cause of the explosion was lowering of the real
income through significant price increases, especially in food.
was a kay issue.

This

The second were the complaints against some Party

officials considered as corrupted.

In two of the strikes (1956 and

1980), the problem of free workers' organization played an important
role.

As for the specific grievances, the 1970 and 1976 strikes did

not formulate any significant importance, contrary to the 1980 strike
which did make many of them.

They will be discussed in connection with

the final agreement between "Solidarity" and the Party officials.

case.
(See The New York Times, September 8, 1981.) This was nothing
but an official institutionalization of crime committed by police.
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In 1956, the main grievances were: (1) abolition of the recently
introduced norms and regulations for job and job discipline; (2) renunciation of the authoritarian conditions of employment; (3) an authentic
workers' representative body within the factories; (4) an independent
from the tutelage of the Party Trade Union; and (5) a parliamentary
.
. d epen d ent
representat1on
o f t h e work ers t h rough an 1n

un1on.
. 41

Any positive answer to these problems would require a substantial
change in the existing structure of management and of the State-run
Union.

The Union, as it existed, was not considered by the workers as

their representative, but an instrument of State control.

Glos Pracy

wrote: "In one year the gap bet\veen the working class and the Union
\videned significantly. n42
The Poznan riot influenced the atmosphere of the VII Plenum of the
Central Committee which took place on July 18-28, 1956.

Plenum came to

a decision to repair the injustice caused by infringement of democratic
law-abidingness and undertook several reforms aimed at healing the
crippled Polish economy.43
The Central Committee bulletin of August 5, 1956, cleared W.
Gomulka, M. Spychalski, and

41

z.

Kliszko of charges formulated against

Cf. Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 14.

42

Glos Pracy, November 26, 1956.
43 cf. 100 lat ruchu robotniczego: kronika wydarzen (Warszawa: KiW,
1978), p. 311.
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them in November 1949. 44

One day before that, the levy of milk imposed

on private farmers was abolished.

But the most important concessions

to the workers were to come two months later.

They were: Workers'

Council, Union Reform, and an increase in wages.
Workers' Councils
The foundation of the Workers' Councils was considered by the
workers as an important structural change in the system and as a sign
of a long-range democratization process.

They were thought of as a

part of the so-called self-management or autonomy of the factories'
policy embodied in the Yugoslavian model which implied the right to
establish the direction of the factory's specialization, direct control
over the staff and administration in the plants, improve the factory's
efficiency, and the right to decisions regarding funds, organizations,
plans • . . 45
Workers' Councils had, generally speaking, two functions: a
greater participation of the workers in the decisions of the companies.
and the role of mediation between staff and workers in case of conflict.

That was, as Morawski pointed out, some kind of two-fold system

of management: the administrative coming down from the central planners

44

Gomulka's heresy was called "Gomulkaism" which claimed the right
to the Polish road to socialism.
45

Leszek Gilejko, "Formulowanie sie i rola samorzadu robotniczego," Struktura i dynamika spoleczenstwa polskiego by W. Wesolowski
(Warszawa: PWN, 1970), p. 183.
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and that of workers based mainly on their initiative. 46
The idea of the autonomy of the factory was propagated mainly by
the younger generation and seemed to be easily accepted by the new
leadership of the Party.

Besides that, the political circumstances of

the post-October policy stressing the right to the Polish road to communism, promised a rather lasting character of change in factory administration.

Similarly, the young intelligentsia had actively participa-

ted in the process of renewal supporting the elimination of incompetent
managers, but Party men. 4 7

Striking was the fact of the unprecedented

small number of Party members in the first Workers' Councils to the
point that the following slogan circulated among workers:

''Workers'

Councils without Communists."
The new body, however, did not have enough time to become naturalized in its primitive form by the time it began to be an object of
manipulation under pressure coming from the top.

The Workers' Councils

were gradually transformed from the representative bodies into institutions whose main goal was to increase the efficiency of the factories.
By 1958, when a new law concerning the Workers' Councils was enacted,
legally restricting their role, it had already been in practice for

46

Cf. \.Ji told Horawski, "Funkcj e samorzadu robotniczego w przemyslowym systemie zarzadzania," Przemysl i spoleczenstwo w Polsce
Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1969), p. 246.

47

The new ideas were mainly propagated by "Po prostu" and
"Przeglad Kulturalny."
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some time.48

The new law clearly

stated that all organizations within

the factory form a system of organization whos.e leading role was
to the Party organization at the factory level.

~'iven

That was not only

a

step back, but a total annihilation of what was intended by the Workers'
Councils. 49
Union Reform
An effort to reform the discredited Union had begun immediately

after the insurrection in Poznan, as requested by the workers.

At the

end of October 1956, the militants of the new Union movement met in
Warsaw to study the objectives of the Trade Union in the new circumstances of the country.

Challenged by that initiative, the State Trade

Union immediately ordered an extraordinary meeting (October 25) and
invited the new Unionists to participate in it.

During that meeting,

the State Union's chief, Klosiewicz, admitted that the workers had
reason for their distrust toward the Union's officials. 5

°

Conciliated

by that, militants did not insist on a convocation of an extraordinary
Congress of the Union, but conceded that the reform should be left to
the State Union's General Council.

Gomulka's regime availed itself of

the opportunity and removed Klosiewicz from the office of president of

48

Dziennik Ustaw, No. 77, 1958.

49

Witold Morawski, op. cit., p. 258. Cf. George Kolankiewicz,
"The Polish Industrial Manual Class," in Social Groups in Polish
Societz by D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (eds.) (London: The MacMillan
Company, 1973), p. 18.
50

Glos Pracy, October 26, 1956.
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the Union and replaced him by Loga-Sowinski, a new politburo member.
One could hardly expect a more absurd situation, at least in the
western understanding of the Union's role.

So, before any positive

reform took place, the Party had reassured itself of full control of
the reform.

When, for example, the Unionists asked for dismissal of

vice president J. Kulesza, criticized for his role in the preceding
Union's administration, it was postponed for an indefinite future.
Workers' delegates to the Union's General Council bitterly criticized
the situation.
what we think •

"No one asks us what are our grievances, what we want,
Union's General Council is but a group of the

anonymous people who never were able to . • • express interests of the
masses . • .

1151

In s.pite of these evident limitations, some positive acts of the
Union's reform took place.

The first was a decentralization of the

Union's power in making decisions.

On this basis, the right to make

decisions on the level of different types of industry was conferred on
the federations.

The second positive step concerned the necessity of

limiting red tape and lessening the over-bureaucratic nature of the
Union.

Finally, it was stressed that it was the role of the Union to

defend working class interests.52
As counter-reform of the Union was taking over, the Union's General Council started to talk about "justified interests," "just griev-

51

Glos Pracv, November 17, 1956.

52 Paul Barton, op. cit .• pp. 33-35.

~
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ances," and "balancing" of the nation's interests with those of the
working class, terms which allowed much space for substantial differences in interpretations., according to specific circumstances.
Union had found itself in a deadlock.
independence as a conditio

The

At one side, it insisted upon

s.ine qua non of its activity; on the other,

it could not stay in opposition to the Party, because the Party itself
,.;as the "working class Party, which protects the working class interests."

When in 1959, the first secretary of the Party, H. Gomulka,

listed the fields of the Union's activities, there was not among them
the protection of the workers' interests. 53
Increase in Wages
As •..re can see in Table 1, the real income in Poland in the early
1950s was declining.

The deterioration of the economic situation of

the workers caused the 1956 riot in Poznan.
another grievance of Poznan's protesters.

The increase in wages was
Table 3 (p. 208) shows the

.
. wages a f ter t h e rlot
.
. p oznan. 54
lncrease
ln
ln

While the regime boasted that in 1949, the GNP surpassed the level
of 1938,55 the real wages in 1956 were only at 74 per cent of those

53

Trybuna Ludu, March 11, 1959. In Gomulka's view, the role of
the Union consisted in: struggle for job discipline, improving workers'
qualifications, stabilization of the factory personnel and commitment
to the heightening of the workers' socialist consciousness.
54BIT, Annuare de Statistique du travail. Reported by Paul Barton,
op. cit. , p. 50.
55Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 40.
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TABLE 3
INCREASE IN WAGES AFTER 1956
RIOT IN POZNAJ.'l

Year

Quarter

Per Cent of
Increase

I

-1.7

II

5.2

III

9.4

IV

4.0

I

3.9

II

1.9

III

4.5

IV

-0.7

I

-0.7

1956

1957

1958
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before the World War II leve1.S6
The 1970 workers insurrection in the Northern cities of Poland
(Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin) did not bring any institutional changes in
the Polish society.

That happened because of the weak organization of

the workers, and lack of experience.

We will see, later on, that the

same happened in the 1976 upheaval.
First of all, the workers had no formal organization.

The State-

run Union was not considered a workers' body, but as one more State
institution to control them.

In the socialist system, the regime

reserves for itself the right of controlling every aspect of social
life and therefore it prohibits any organization beyond its control.
Even if the ability of the workers to organize themselves surprised
some of the officials, it was not sufficient to challenge the power of
the Party. 57
emotions.

Secondly, the Party officials appealed to the workers'

During the very tense meeting of Gierek and his associates

with the workers' strike committee in Gdansk, Szlachcic cried, counting
on the workers' patriotism, and in addition promising that from now on
"a Pole will not shoot at a Pole."S8

1-Ialesa himself said: "Frankly

speaking, I believed in this at that time . . .

Today I understand

56 rndustrial Labor Policy and Living Standards in the Soviet
~. London, 1957. Table 1.

57 A top Party official, Szlachcic said: "We were surprised at the

ability of the working class for rapid activities improvised in the
course of events." Cf. Appendix A, Interview 2, p. 377.
58 Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384.
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that it was a trap.

It happened because our people, although devoted

to the \vorkers' caus.e,. had s.oft hearts:. "59.
The December 1970 riot brought about several changes including the
position of the first secretary of the Community Party.

In conse-

quence, W. Gomulka was replaced by Edward Gierek and four other Politburo members, B. Jaszczuk,

z.

Kliszko, R. Strzelecki and X. Spychalski,

left their positions and were replaced by P. Jaroszewicz, M. Moczar, J.
60
Szydlak, S. Olszowski and E. Babiuch.
In addition, J. Cyrankiewicz
gave his position as Premier toP. Jaroszewicz; he took M. Spychalski's
position as chairman of the Council of State.

Besides that, some

changes took place in regional (Voivodship) top positions.

One not too

familiar with practices in the communist states, might be surprised by
ti1eir number.

In reality, they were only the scapegoats to save the

Party's reputation.

Most of the promotions and demotions were done at

a close circle "family forum."
bonum.

Some were sacrificed pro Party publicum

A new edition of the same regime tried once more to manage the

country, to bring it, after ten years, to the edge of complete bankruptcy.
If considered from the point of view of personnel changes and
scapegoats, the 1976 riots in Ursus and Radom might be categorized as
less important.6l

The riot forced the regime to postpone price hikes,

59Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 348.
60The number of the Politburo members remained the same; the fifth
ne•..r member replaced Gierek, who because the first secretary.
6lPiotr Jaroszewicz survived the riot, but he was fired four years
later.
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but no one ''as immediately s.acrificed.

Prime :V1inister Jaros,zewicz said

the next day: "We proposed the change of prices. • . . (but} we received
several concrete propositions (concerning the matterl

..

·- (so}

the Cabinet decided to stay with the preceding retail prices of
t- 00 d • 1162

That was a victory for the workers, even if limited in time,

because prices were raised later on only moderately.
A much more important consequence of the June riot was the foundation by fourteen prominent Polish intellectuals of the Committee to
defend persecuted workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow -- KOR), which
later on was transformed into the Self Defense Committee KOR.

The

fourteen intellectuals in their declaration of June 1976, expressed
solidarity with the workers and initiated the collecting of funds to
.
.
d or f ~re
. d wor k ers. 63
support f am~. 1.~es o f ~mpr~sone

Another group of

intellectuals protested against the illegal practices during the
\vorkers' trials and appealed to 'N'orld opinion to intervene in favor of
of the Polish workers. 64

Jacek Kuron wrote a letter to Enrico Ber-

lingTter, the first secretary of the Italian Communist Party, asking for

62

Dziennik Polski, June 26, 1976.

63 Even Lech Walesa '.vas support by that organization. Cf. Appendix
A, Interview 3, p. 382· By December 21, 1976, KOR supported 109 families, spending 474,510 zlotys in Ursus and about the same number of
families in Radom with 494,650 zlotys. KOR, Bulletin No. 5, ANEKS,
13-14 (1976), pp. 417-418.
64 "Apel do swiatowej opinii publicznej, " Al'ifEKS, 12 (1976), pp. 4142.
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intervention in favor of the Polish workers.6S
Professor Edward

Lipi~ski

asked publicly

for

the possibility of

creating an opposition group according to the guarantee of the constitutional principle of freedom to form associations and hold meetings. 66
A protest carne also from the Polish hierarchy with the appeal for clemency for the irnprisoned. 67

Under that pressure from within and from

abroad the government proclaimed an arnnes.ty for the rioters. on February 5' 1977.

68

The August 1980 strike in Poland brought about far-reaching personnel changes of Party officials but also a significant institutional
change.

It was a long standing practice in the policy of the Communist

parties in the Soviet orbit to use changes in Party position members as
scapegoats.

The same happened in Poland in 1980.

The first to be

sacrificed was Gierek, whose incompetence, aristocratic lifestyle,
paternalism, and corruption were manifested more and more.

His appar-

ent initial liberalism changed into an oppressive, overwhelming control.
Gierek's right hand, Piotr Jaroszewicz, was fired a few months before
65

see ANEKS, 12 (1976), pp. 37-40. The Italian Community Party's
newspaper "L'Unita" published the letter on July 20, 1976. The Central
Committee of the Italian Communist Party sent a letter to the Polish
comrades protesting against the imprisonment of the workers in Poland.
A similar protest carne from the biggest Italian Trade Unions.
66

Edward Lipinski, op. cit., p. 10.

67 Reuter and DPA from Warsaw, November 20, 1976.
68

George Blazynski, op. cit., p. 290. Clemency did not include
those who did not admit their guilt or who were beaten up and degraded.
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the strike began, and was replaced by a puppet, Edward Babiuch, a close
Gierek associate.

E. Babiuch, J. Szydlak, propaganda chief, J. Luka-

siewicz, economic planning chief, T. Wrzaszczyk, politburo members T.
Pyka and

z.

Zandrowski were fired with Gierek.69

The newly established

Politburo was composed of the following persons: S. Kania, K. Barcikowski, T. Grabski, H. Jablonski, M. Jagielski, W. Jaruzelski, M. Moczar,

s.

Olszewski, J. Pinkowski, and A. Zabinski.
Some changes were forced by Solidarity, e.g., in Bielsko Biala,

where the governor was forced to leave his office because of his corruption.70

In spite of evident cases, Warsaw refused to remove the

governor and his associates.

Only after 11 days of regional strikes

\vhich cost $100,000,000 did the regime give up.

By the end of 1980,

more than 20 of the 49 Voivodship Party officials were substituted.
Institutional change, i.e., the foundation of the Free Trade Union,
first its industrial and later on its rural branch, was the most important result of the workers' strike in 1980, guaranteed by the agreement
between the Government and the Strikers' Committee reached on August 31,
1980.

Since the beginning of the strike, the Free Trade Union was the

69

cf. Rockv Mountain News, October 7, 1980. In December 1980,
four other politburo members were fired: W. Kruczek, A. Karkoszka, S.
Kowalczyk and A. \~erblan, the hard-line Party ideologist. See Sun
Jimes (Chicago), December 3, 1980. In April 1981. T. Wrzaszczyk was
stripped of Party membership for "mismanagement of central planning
administration, and for reaping personal profit from his social
position." Gazeta Krakowska, April 27, 1981. For the same reason the
former minister of Industry and Mining, F. Kaim, was expelled from the
Party. Ibid.
70

See Sun Times (Chicago), February 7, 1981.
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most important demand of the

~..rorkers.

"We

short of a Free Trade Union . . . and we
declared.

~..rill

not settle for anything

~..rill get it," 71 Walesa

One month later, November 10, 1980, the Polish Supreme Court

ruled in favor of the new Union and registered its charter.

The Union

recognized the leading role of the Communist Party in the Government,
but not in the Union itself.

Together with the right to form a Free

Trade Union, almost all of the 21 demands of the workers were satis. d • 72
f ~e

Once the agreement had been reached, Kania said:

A new situation arose in the country. There is a need for a new
approach to the Party's task, to socio-economic policy, the the
development of a Socialist democracy, to the role of the Trade Union
movement, and to work among youth. It is no longer possible to use
old methods, and the need for renovation arises from a critical
analysis of (past) mistakes, from a confrontation with the ideas of
socialism . . • In the Party, in its units, there ~s a need to
search persistently for a new and better approach." 3
The final approval of Rural Solidarity faced some legal problems.
The most difficult was that the farmers were not employees, but worked
for themsel vt:!ti.

·inerefore, the Supreme Court, even if it technically

recognized Rural Solidarity during its session on February 10, 1980, it
denied Rural Solidarity the juridical status of the Union.

71

That came

Newsweek, September 8, 1980, p. 30.

72

The regime guaranteed the right to strike and the security of
the strikers and anyone aiding them; it promised to limit censorship,
to give more information about the country's economic situation, to
increase wages, to ration meat, to lower the retirement age, to improve
health services, and prolong maternity leaves; the regime promised also
more five-day ;ieeks. Cf. Dokumenty: Protokoly porozumien Gdansk,
Szczecin, Jas trzebj e; Statut NSZZ "Sol ida rnosc" (1-Jarsza~..ra: Kraj owa
Agencja Wydawnicza, 1980), pp. 2-9.
73Trybuna Ludu, October 5, 1980.
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two months later, after having prepared a legal basis for such recognition.7 4
Another indirect consequence of the 1980

~vorkers'

foundation on February 17, 1981 of the Student Union.

strikes was the
This new Union

helped the students to win several concessions, such as dropping of the
mandatory Russian language and also obligatory courses in Marxism.
addition, permission to travel abroad was eased. 75

In

Under the pressure

of the Student Union, the Higher Education Minister, Janusz Gorski, was
fired because of his incompetency.
The Free Trade Union in the Socialist system is an oddity to the
::-Iarxian theory of class.

According to that theory and Harx' theory of

conflict, the Communist Party itself is the embodiment of the workers'
interests.

The Party is a unique and genuine representative of the

\vorking class.

The Communist system is a workers' (proletarian) dicta-

torship, the Communist Party is the "vanguard" of the working class.
It is the proletariat which delegates its authority to the Party, and
this delegation is permanent and final.

Thus any attempt to challenge

the rule of the Party is a challenge to all social classes (strata) but
especially to the working class.

This challenge cannot have genuine

74 The Times, April 18, 1981. On April 17, 1981, the government
and the farmers signed an agreement. The farmers recognized the leading role of the Communist Party in return for legal recognition of
Rural Solidarity. Even if Rural Solidarity is intended to be open to
all farmers, regardless of their political beliefs, its statutes
openly recognized the role of the Church in farmers' life.
75

Sun Times (Chicago), February 18, 1981.
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proletarian inspiration but it has to come from peoples enemies, domestic or foreign, as well.
At this point, the Party is contradicting itself.

If this is the

case, what is the role of the State-run Trade Union in the Socialist
system?

The working class has already its representative, namely the

Party itself.

Similar theoretical difficulties arise when one talks

about the "Free Trade Union."

One must logically ask the next question:

what should the Trade Union be free from?
Such a theoretical difficulty can have only one reasonable solution: the Party (new class) does not represent the real proletarian
class, but constitutes, in itself, a political elite.

Accepting that,

however, one is shifting away from the Marxian theory of class and
class conflict.

The next part of this paper will try to present

another, more feasible theory of class and class conflict in the
socialist societies in general and in the Polish society in particular.

P A R T

CLASSES

ru~D

F 0 U R

CLASS CONFLICT IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETIES

CHAPTER VII
CLASS STRUCTURE IN THE POLISH POSTWAR SOCIETY

Introductory Considerations
Any theory of class structure in a given society must include the
solution of the fundamental problem namely, formulation of class definition or identification of the basis on which class structure in that
society arises.

This is practically a task of identifying hie et nunc

(here and now) class generating factors which are of special consequences.

By meeting this requirement one avoid the possibility of

shifting analysis from a real problem to a false one.

The hie implies

an empirical identification of what is highly appreciated in a given
society.

The~

has its temporal dimension.

This is why it makes no

sense to formulate class theory in the Polish society based on the
color of the eyes of the people.

Nor does it make sense today to cate-

gorize Polish people according to their nobility at birth even if it
would make sense to do that 200 or even 100 years ago.

One cannot

build an abstract definition of class and then say that such and such a
society has classes or is classless, but one must empirically identify
the important indices which account for the hierarchy which is present
in a particular society at a particular time.
Additionally, class analysis has to identify the size of the groups
and different minorities which possess specific characteristics and
values.
218
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Finally, a sociologist studying class structure must look at how
these different parts of a society interact.
conflictual interaction?

Is that a harmonious or

If the groups are conflictual, he must iden-

tify what constitutes the basis on which the conflict arises.

In other

words, any theory of class structure in a particular society has to
take into consideration three dimensions of human life: social, economic, and political. 1

Differences among individuals regarding those

aspects will account for the rise of social groups which might be considered higher or lower in that society.

Chapter I noted the diffi-

culties Marxian theory met in explaining class structure in capitalist
society and its uselessness in explaining class structure in the Soviettype socialist societies.

Marxian theory of class is limited because it

tries to explain class arising on a one dimensional basis (i.e., economic), the relation to the means of production.
class structure is visibly unilinear.

The Marxian model of

The independent economic variable

accounts for political power, which in turn, gives the right to control
the spiritual life of a particular society.

Control over the means of

production gives political power which makes possible control of the
spiritual life (superstructure) as well.
Such a sequence is even contrary to the notion of revolution as
Harx envisioned it which intended to abolish private ow-nership of the
means of production.

\._r.

The old capitalist order was protected by the

G. Runciman, "Towards a Theory of Social Stratification," The
Social Analysis of Classes by F. Parkin (London: Tavistock Publica~
tions Limited~ 1974), p. 56.
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State which, in Marx' view, was nothing but the guardian of the system
itself, constituting its integral part . . So, it is inconceivable that
one could change the economic system (socialize the means of production)
before one seized political power.

Therefore, in 1917, in Russia, the

Bolsheviks first seize an absolute political power, \vhereupon the
nationalization of the means of production followed.
of events occurred in Eastern European countries.
countries to install communists in power.

A similar sequence

Russia occupied these

Such a change in the sphere

of political power was followed by the change in economy.
Logically, one might envision the future system as totalitarian,
where the powerful elite acquires absolute control over politics,
economy, and social life, which de facto, has occurred in Russia and
her sattelites.

But this was not Marx' vision.

In his view, the evil

of capitalism is rooted in its heart namely, i.e., private property.
Abolishment of that type of property would be a unique and sufficient
remedy.

Reality, however, is much more complex.

The so-called "van-

suard of the proletariat," instead of serving the "new classless
society," has formed a new political elite (power elite) thereby creating a gulf between themselves and the vast majority of the population.
The new proletariat not only did not lose its "chains" but has lost
even the little bit of control it exercised through a free electorate.

2

2 rn the Soviet style of socialist society as Simirenko points out:
"The Party exercises the right to select its worthy persons and bring
them to attention of the people, because the clients are not regarded
as sufficiently competent to judge them . . . Elections are a form of
plebiscite, in which the clients are asked to deliver a vote of confidence in their professionals . . . " Alex Simirenko, "Professionaliza-

221
"If we substitute," writes Djilas, "'Party' for 'capital', then we can
see before our eyes a vision of Communism's destiny, the one Marx had
assigned to capitalism;

monopoly capital (Party monopoly) become fer-

ters on the mode of production which flourished with it and under

i~." 3

An analysis of the Soviet-type of society has therefore to take
into consideration the Party membership which constitutes the basis for
the power elite recruitment.

Party membership is a necessary, but not

a sufficient condition for reaching the top of the socialist society
pyramid

(See diagram on page 222). Party membership procures priv-

leges which grow as one moves up in the class pyramid.

Advancement

into the power elite is conditioned by one's active involvement in the
Party's affairs and a positive acceptance of the Marxist ideology. 4
Discrimination against non-Party people in Poland was indirectly
but officially recognized by the regime in the Party's theses for an
emergency Congress in July 1981.

Speaking about managerial positions

it was said: "The access of non-Party people to managerial posts in the
country and in the economy should be a basic principale of policy." 5
tion of Politics and Tension Management: The Case of the Soviet Union,"
Sociological Quarterly 15 (1974), p. 24.
3Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, Inc., 1969), p. 187.
4In Poland, probably more than in other socialist countries, people
enter the Party files only to be ahle to hold better positions in the
society. However, they are not trusted enough to advance eventually to
power elite. One must positively prove his support for Party ideology.
5Gazeta Krakowska, May 8-10, 1981. The postulate does. not say "an
equal access" but an "access." That simply meant two things: (1) that
until now, no other people had access to those positions, and (2) that
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While in 1949. non-Party people occupied 17 per cent of the

mana~eri2l

positions, in 1951, only 4.2 per cent and in 1953, 2.2 per cent and
they were completely removed from those positions by 1956. 6

All this

happened nevertheless that in 1957, only 16 per cent of 84,000 managerial posts were held by the people with a college education, 49 per cent
had high school diplomas, and 32 per cent had not reached even this
.
7
level o f f orma 1 e d ucat~on.

At the same time more educated people were

not allowed to occupy those posts because they were not Party members.
Tnis social and political discriminatory policy against non-Party
people has been the normal rule in postwar Poland.
History knows four ideal types of social stratification systems.
Each one of these systems stresses in a special way one of four aspects
of one's qualities: power, wealth, work and knowledge.

The first may

be called "cratism," the second f{plutoism," the third "ergoism," and
finally, the last one "epistemism."8
These ideal types do not exist in their pure forms.

What is real

some changes in this policy were necessary (for propaganda purposes),
but an equal access has never been an issue.
6Halina Najduchowska, "Dyrektorzy przedsiebiorstw przemyslowych,"
Przymysl i spoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Wroclaw:
Ossolineum, 1969), p. 86.
7Polityka, September 24, 1957.
8

The terms are neologisms taken from Greek: "kratein," "ploutos,"
"ergon," and "episteme" which mean respectively: to rule, wealth, work,
and knowledge. Cf. Stefan Kurowski, Struktura spoleczna, a rewolucja
~aukowotechniczna (~.Jrocla1:v: Instytut Nauk Spolecznych Politechniki
Wroclawskiej, 1971), p. 18.
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is that while in one society power may be considered the main stratifying factor, in others, the same role may play wealth or knowledge.
One indicator does not exclude the other, but is only considered more
important than the others in a particular society.

And so, every

totalitarian system is labeled as "crateism" because it give priority
to power.

The secret knowledge of the priestly cast in Ancient Egypt

gave rise to "epistemism."
Four variables account for class formation in contemporary Poland:
Party membership, education, occupation, and income.

The first repre-

sents the political dimension of the social classes in Poland, the next
two (highly correlated) represent the social aspect, and the last one
accounts for the economic aspect of class.

9

The model on page 222

presents a graphic representation of the variables and their sequence
in the class generating process.

Party membership variable has a

positive correlation with the levels of income and education influencing
both of them directly or indirectly.

The political power variable

influences prestige but only indirectly via income and education or only
education.
come.

It also influences "life chances" directly or through in-

The level of income influences one's life chances, status and

level of education being itself influenced by the education variable.
Education depends on one's political membership (Party membership) but,

9

Italian sociologist, Pagani, suggests the same variables as valid
for class analysis in Italy. He does not include Party membership
cleavage. This is understandable because the Italian regime is democratic like other Western systems. Cf. Angelo Pagani, "L'immagine
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independently influences the level of income and social prestige. 10
Individuals with a similar social status have a similar lifestyle.
Slomczynski's research of 1966 shows the following degree of correlation between the just mentioned variables: 0.35 between education and
prestige of the occupations; 0.36 between income and prestige, and 0.40
bet\veen education and income.ll
Party Membership
Every society has a system of differentiated political roles to
make possible its functioning and the legitimate use of necessary
devices.

Such a structure, built on the political power, creates a

foundation for evaluation of the individuals.

The higher one's respon-

sibility in the governmental structure, the higher is his position in
that society.
In the Soviet-type Specialist societies, the Communist Party has
absolute power and through its ideology and members controls every
aspect of economic, social and political life. 12

"Politics," writes

della struttura di classi nella popolazione Italiana," Quaderni di
Sociologia 19 (1970), p. 161.
10

Politically committed receive some additional entry points to
enter the colleges.
llKazimierz Slomczynski, Socio-occupational Differentiation and
Education, Authority, Income and Prestige, presented to 1-Jorld Congress
of Sociology in Varna, 1970, p. 18.
12This absolute power consists of the control of "the means of production, distribution and exchange," of "the control over the means of
physical coercion," and over "the means of the status attribution."
See Karl Hoering, "Pmver and Social Stratification," Sociological
Quarterly 12 (1971), pp. 10-11.
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Tellenback, "is a central social force in it (socialist society) and
political power is concentrated to the Party.•• 13

A sufficient legiti-

mation of that absolute Party power is the building of a future Socialist society "which excuses the rulers from submitting their policy to
the judgment of the 'masses' ."14

The Party recruits its members on the

basis of ideological loyalty and it is through that ideology that it
controls them.

In Haering's view,

. . • the exertion of power can . . . be understood as a structurally dependent selection process among given alternative resources,
and acceptance of this selection by others in view of more unpleasant or expensive possibilities--physical force, withdrawal from
cooperation, loss of membership, excessive complexity, undertainty,
or responsibility.lS
The five characteristics of an ideal bureaucracy are absent here
as they are in a patrimonial system.

Bauman puts it this way:

'In place of a well-defined impersonal sphere of competence, there
is a shifting series of tasks and powers commissioned and granted'
by the party through more or less arbitrary decions.
'In contrast
to rational hierarchy of authority in the bureaucratic system, the
question who shall decide a matter' can be subject to arbitrary
decision of the party.
'Whenever (the Party) intervenes, all others
give way' to its will. Any checks 'from below' aimed at effectively
reducing the arbitrariness of these decisions would be emphatically
dismissed as an attempt by the ideologically retarded to shape the
imperatives of the future of which the party is the sole interpreter.16
Power is strictly related to privilege: of getting better jobs, or

13 sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 41.

14Zygmunt

Bauman, Officialdom . . . , op. cit., p. 137.

15 Karl Haering, op. cit., p. 10.

16 Zygmunt Bauman, Officialdom . . . , op. cit., p. 138.
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having access to any scarce goods, and finally, the privilege of having
power.

Any privilege presupposes power.

Subsequently, we will see the

ways in which the political elite in Poland take advantage of their
positions of power.
Income--Wealth
Wealth is a stratifying factor in relatively bigger and to some
point developed societies.

If deprived of prestige and education,

wealth is a secondary criterion of class division.

Weber writes:

"Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification,
but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity."

17

This

is because the lack of wealth makes it difficult to reach a high
position in a society and obligates one "to work, and to work hard, in
"
•
Order to 1 -l've.

18

Add·~ t ~ona
·
11y, as Parsons s t resses, " money

is a

particularly convenient criterion to designate various steps in . . •
a gradual pyramidal structure, particularly where other common measures
such as direct technical criteria or hierarchy of office in directly
comparable organizations are not readily available."

19

In the People's Democracies of the Soviet-type, the means of production have been nationalized.

This undoubtedly has its strong

17Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party," The Impact of Social Class by
P. Blumberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1972), p. 27.
18T. H.
Social Class
Inc., 1972),
op . cit. , p .

Marshall, ~'Citizenship and Social Classes," The Impact of
by P. Blumberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
p. 40. Cf. Talcott Parsons, An Analytical Approach • . • ,
83.

19 Talcott Parsons, An Analytical Approach • . . , op. cit., p. 85.
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impact on the class structure.

At least two main classes of the former

capitalist system disappeared completely: the bourgeoisie and landowners.

That reform has homogenized the source of income of almost the

entire population.

Contrary to the capitalist societies where there

are several different sources of income in Poland, practically all
people are State employees who live on their salaries. 20

This uniform

source of income is the most visible consequence of the totalitarian
control of economy, politics and social life by a monopolistic Party.
The next chapter will stress the system of wages which does not follow
the meritorious lines.

The power elite decides arbitrarily the remuner-

ation levels of different occupational categories.

Official State

statistics admit that the range of wages in Poland, in the late 1970s,
was 1500-1600 zlotys.

21

Education
Education and occupation are two variables closely related one to
another especially in modern society.
highly qualified personnel.

Technological change requires

The progress in the sciences brings about

technological change to provide society with necessary food, clothing,
shelter, and recreation.

These are "technological skill(s) in the

manipulation of the ideas and physical instrument necessary to produc-

20

Only a moderate number of richer farmers are self-employees.
The others who do not have enough land to support their families are
also State employees.
21Rote Fabne, September 13, 1979 (interview with B. Borusewicz).
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tl.·on • "22

Knowledge is a basic variable for class theory of a modern

society.
The very process of technological change to which many of our
'materialists' assign so fundamental a role are in part a function
of knowledge, i.e., of ideas, in exactly the same sense in which
economic processes are. And there, far more than in the narrowly
economic realm, knowledge has .become a variable which we think of as
a high degree of autonomy.23
Another necessary skill for the functioning of a modern society is
the skill in human relations, that is, "the ability to set goals for
and effectively exercise authority over those who are jointly engaged
in productive organization."24

This obviously places people in a privi-

leged position, and the system (especially capitalism) rewards them by
means of income and prestige.25
Modern technology employs a large number of highly trained
specialists because of .the growing division of labor.
this issue that escaped the attention of Marx.

It was exactly

The author of Capital

did not pay enough attention to possible complexity of industrial
development and, arising with that, the new stratifying factor of an
occupational system based on the complex division of labor, i.e., work

22 Bernard Barber, Social Stratification, op. cit., p. 37.
23 Talcott Parsons, "Role of Ideas in Social Action," Essays in
Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 23.
While Marx placed technology in the sphere of "basis," Parsons
located it in the "superstructure," to use Marxian terms. This is
logical. It is not a tool which creates man, but man creates and uses
his tools.
24Bernard Barber, Social Strification, op. cit., p. 37.
25 George Ross, "Marxism and the New Middle Class: French
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roles and proliferation of the authority relations. 26
The school reform in Poland with a democratization of high school
and college education has opened new channels of upward mobility for
intelligent youth.

Despite the limited possibilities the State can

offer to young people and despite the State's favouring activist youth
who are seen as the future Party people, the most intelligent students
are able to enter college.
Occupational Prestige
By prestige we mean "a hierarchical ordering in terms of esteem."27
In the industrial societies such an ordering in prestige has its essential basis in occupational roles or in one's performances.

In non-

Critique," Theory and Society 5 (1978), p. 187.
26rn Giddens' view that was due to Marx' theory of value, distinction between productive and unproductive labor and insufficient explanation of the exploitation. For Marx, only productive labor creates
value: the "unproductive minority" lives by appropriation of the surplus created by the "productive majority." But as we know, efficiency
of the modern industrial production is based on bureaucracy where the
unproductive minority is necessary for efficient production. Giddens
says: "Any form of society • • • which depends upon the large scale of
production and exchange of goods, must necessarily involve, according
to the terms of Marx's economic theory, the extraction of surplus
value from the producing majority." Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure • • • , op. cit., pp. 96-97. Marxian theory of class is suspected
because it links exploitation with the appropriation of surplus value
created by another class, and because they who do not "produce" are
automatically considered exploiters.
27 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press,
1964), p. 132. Cf. PaulK. Hatt and Cecil G. North, Occupations and
Social Status (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); Robert W. Hodge,
Paul M. Siegel, and Peter .H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the
United States, 1925-63," The Impact of Social Classes by P. Blumberg
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Company, 1972), pp. 233-254.
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modernized

societies a differential esteem is mainly ascribed by

nobility at birth and kinship.

What is, however, common to both of

these societies, is that ordering of esteem has a relatively stable
character and may be influenced by some cultural values of a society.
For that reason, a hierarchy of prestige of occupations in two different countries with a similar degree of development might differ significantly.

(See diagram on page222, where prestige variable is influ-

enced by cultural values.)

Prestige, as Thomas and Znaniecki say, is

"the complex product of a half-intellectual, half-emotional attitude of
each member of the group toward the leader as seen by other members;
the subject of prestige is not the individual as an active personality
but the picture of this individual drawn by·public opinion."28

So, an

occupational prestige forces those who possess it "to keep the traditions and to uphold the 'esprit de corps' by which this profession
(occupation) of class tries to maintain its prestige

rt29

Even if prestige is related to power, these are two different variables.

"Prestige," write Bierstedt, "is frequently accompanied by

power and when the two occur together power is usually the basis and
ground of prestige rather than the reverse.

Prestige would seem to be

a consequence of power rather than a determinant of it or a necessary

28

William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in
Europe and America (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958), Vol. II,
p. 1333.
29
Ibid. , p. 1332.
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component o f i t.

.,30

There are mainly the totalitarian systems which

bring about a situation where prestige and power diverge significantly.
This is also true in Poland.

For example, a Government Minister, who

is supposed to have much power, occupies only the fifth position on the
scale of prestige. 31

So, one can say that the hierarchy of esteem is

assumed and ascribed. 32

Professional prestige, however, always confers

some power over other people's behavior. 33
We find similar situations when we analyze the relationship
between prestige and wealth.

Prestige does not necessarily increase

with the increase of wealth.

For example, a private locksmith in

Poland scores third place on the benefit scale, but only twelfth on the
prestige scale.

Vice versa, a high school teacher ranks third in

prestige (after university professor and physician), but he is only
fourteenth on the scale of benefits.

34

According to Sarapata, 5 factors influence the level of prestige
of an occupation in Poland: (1) the degree of interestingness, (2) the

30 Robert :&ierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," American
Sociological Review 15 (1950), p. 731.
31Adam Sarapata, "Iustum Pretium," Studia Socjologiczne 3 (1962),
p. 106.
32This is contrary to power; one must prove power continually.
33cf. Leonard Riessman, "Life Careers, Power and Professions:
The Retired Army General," American Sociological Review 21 (1956),
pp. 215-221.

34

Adam Sarapata, Iustum pretium • • • , op. cit., p. 106.
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level of education required, (3) the degree of responsibility, (4) the
job' s· security, and (5) the personal initiative permitted. 35
The following two rules regarding the prestige of an occupation in
advanced societies are regarded as valid.

First, the more skill a

manual occupation requires, the higher prestige it enjoys.

Second,

regardless of skills, manual work has less prestige than non-manual
work because of a stigma attached to physical work.
While the first rule is totally valid in the case of Poland, the
second has to be questioned.

It is true that non-manual work has an

established prestige, but actually in Poland its prestige is diminishing.

This is a direct consequence of the governmental policy.

A non-

manual job pays much less than the skilled manual job or even the unskilled manual job.

Such a policy has far reaching consequences, often

expressed in the negative attitudes of the youth toward advanced
studies: "It doesn't pay to study."

The phenomenon becomes so manifest

that Sarapata calls it "a barrier" to the upward social mobility. 36

As

far as education, both non-manual and physical skilled job, require an
equal period of time for training.3 7
Using these criteria, i.e., Party membership (political power),

35Adam Sarapata, Studia nad uwarstwieniem i ruchli~..roscia spoleczna
w Polsce (\.Jarszawa: PWN, 1965), p. 241.
36 Ibid., p. 76.
37 I am referring here to the white-collar workers on my scale and
not to the intelligentsia class.
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education, occupation (prestige), and income (wealth), I define social
class as a large aggregate of people conscious of possessing a similar
lifestyle as a consequence of homogeneity of interests based on their
similar political views, wealth, and culturally conditioned values.
On the base of this definition, we find six social classes in contemporary Polish society.

The figure number 10 on page 235 summarizes how

these four criteria account for class formation in Poland.

Thus

the

stratification system of Polish society might be diagrammed as pyramidal layers of individuals (families) who possess similar qualities
(statuses).

Every class identified in such a way, differs in some

important respect from the other classes (layers).

The pyramid on page

237 shows graphically the social classes in the Polish society and their
respective positions which they occupy.
The pyramid is composed of six layers with the political elite at
the top and unskilled physical workers at the bottom.

Next to the

unskilled workers are the farmers, followed by the white-collar
workers.

The pyramid is cut vertically into two parts by the Party

membership cleavage.

Its left side represents Party members at differ-

ent horizontal layers and its right side is constituted by non-Party
people also at the respective horizontal levels.
The assymetricality or skewness of the pyramid indicates the proportion of the Party members to non-Party people at different layers of
the social pyramid.

While the political elite is

entirely constituted

by the Party members, the proportion of Party to non-Party people in
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other levels changes visibly. 38 It is high at the level of the intelligentsia, lower at skilled physical workers and very low at the farmers
level.

The white-collar workers and unskilled physical workers have a

medium level of the party members.

But while the first are at the

bottom of that category, the latter are at its top.
The division of the socialist society along the Party membership
cleavage is an important aspect of social stratification in these
societies.

Even if Party membership alone does not assign people to

the upper class, it constitutes a necessary requirement and, more
importantly, gives to that individual (family) a privileged position in
relation to the other individuals (families) of the same class.
point needs emphasis for at least two reasons.

This

First, the forces of

production, to use Marxian terminology, in State-run societies are
stillfar behind the Western productive capacities.
is the scarcity of consumer products.

Especially visible

In the economy of scarcities,

it is very important to be first in access to non-plentiful goods such
as an apartment in the city, a car, a tractor, entrance to college,
etc., because the demand significantly exceeds supply and therefore
the last will not pe served at all.
The system of privileges is built in such a way that it grows as

38

.
In 1978, the PUWP numbered 2,930,448 members Ccand1dates
included) of which 12 per cent had a college education (there were
among them those who had Party's college diploma with very low prestige); 3.4 per cent had not completed college, 29.1 per cent had high
school diplomas, 22.1 per cent had vocational school diplomas or
uncompleted high school, 29.5 per cent had only grammar school diplomas, and 3.9 per cent had not completed grammar school. See Rocznik
Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.

237
I

PartyrMembership
Cleavage
I

'
Intelligentsia
I

Skilled Manual
"'
Workers
):::>

::0

I
'Ll

~

o

White-collar \.Jorkers
I
I

Farmers

Unskilled Manual '\.Jorkers

Figure 11
Class Pyramid in Poland

238
one moves from the bottom to the top of the pyramid.

Less significant

concessions at the lowest layers of the society are more significant at
the higher levels and most important at the top of the pyramid.
Party elite practically enjoy an immunity privilege.

The

There is nothing

the high officials cannot get: villas, cars, and even college diplomas
(\Vith little or no studies at all).39

The only thing which can deprive

them of these privileges is a necessary purge to save the Party reputation in the case of crisis which, as we saw, happens quite regularly.
As far as the prestige is concerned, the power elite in Poland does
not enjoy a high ranking for three important reasons.
elite has never been legally elected.
cians with no popular mandate.

40

Firstly, the power

They are self-nominated politi-

Secondly, the political career of the

upper class is totally tied to the Party files.

And the Party itself is

considered by a large majority of the population a Party of Russian

39 Among other disclosed abuses. there was a case of Gierek and Grudzien ~vho received their master's degrees in an unusual way. ihe second
made his college and the graduate school in fifteen months. See Gazeta
Krakowska, February 24, 1981.
40 rt was pointed out in the preceding chapter under what circumstances the election of 1947, in Poland, took place. "The result of the
Polish election had simply been invented by some office in Warsaw, or
handed down from Moscow beforehand . . . " R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of
Communism in Eastern Europe (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 139. 'The election in which the Communist Party "obtained"
majority, has open a series of pseudo-elections, or mockery-elections.
Cf. Appendix A, Interview 4, p. 391. Referring to this problem Aron says
"The elections i.n which the Communist Party would obtain a majority ~vould
be the last free election." Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and Ruling
Class," British Journal of Sociology 1 (1959), Part II, p. 129.
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puppets.41

Thirdly. the power elite is the most privilege class (9r,
42
better, caste) whose highest privilege is to be above the law.
That
easily leads to corruption.
of

During one year only in 1981, a high number

cases of corruption were disclosed at every level of the Party organ-

.
.
43
1.zat1.on.
The level of prestige of this class is, however, increased
and wealth.

by power

Power is always the desirable quality because it gives the

right of making decisions.

In societies where collective ownership is

the dominant type of ownership, political power also procures the power
over the arbitrary distribution of national income.

It is the political

elite which can, and de facto makes arbitrary decisions about the
country's division of the GNP.
Social Classes in Poland
Political Elite--Upper Class
Marx' social class theory asserts that control over the national
production of a society by one class makes it a ruling class controlling
the social and spiritual life of that society.

This is to say that con-

41 cf. history of the PUWP, Ch. II, p. 63, f. 1. Also during every
riot, the Party was denounced as a Party of "traitors."
42 A
.
3 , p. 383 •
ppend.LX A~ I nterv1.ew
43 After the strike of 1980, 3,364 people were accused of corruption.
1050 of them 1vere occupying high social positions and therefore must have
been Party members. Four :ninisters, seven vice-ministers and five former
provincial Party secretaries were convicted of corruption. See Echo
Krakowa, AtJril l8, 1981. In Gorlice, people renamed Pulaski Street "the
Seven Thieves Street," because s·even luxurious villas of high Party
dignitaries were built there. Cf. Gazeta Krakowska, May 22-24, 1981.
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trol of the economic sphere has its counterpart in ideological domination which is intended as a means of shaping the beliefs of the majoritY of .::itizens.

This netv type of ownership of the means of production

ends with exploitation and places the new society on the road to comrnunism.
The sociopolitical reality of the People's Democracies can hardly
support this doctrine.

The Communists have abolished private property

but, as Djilas says:
With the victory of the Communist revolution in a country a new class
come into power and into control. It is unwilling to surrender its
otm hard-gained privileges, even though it subordinates its interests
to a similar class
another country, solely in the cause of ideological solidarity.

tR

This new class, in that author's opinion, has its origin in

t~e

"stratum

of professio~al revolutionaries who made up its core even before it
attained power. 11 45

Djilas is also correct when he maintains that the

new class (the power elite) "uses the party as its basis"46 with the
legal control of production and distribution.
ties arise for Djilas' theory.

He unequivocally maintains that "the

Party makes that class (new class." 47

44

At this point, difficul-

One must agree with the assertion

Nilovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 175.

4 Srbid., p. 39.
4 6rbid., p. 40.
4 7Ibid., p. 40. An orthodox Xarxist Polish sociologist, Widerszpil,
attacked Djilas' theory of new class accusing the author of not perceiving or being unwilling to take notice of "a difficult process which
transformed working class into the real managers . . . " Stanislaw
Widerszpil, "Czy zmierzch klasy robotniczej," Hiesiecznik Literac.ki 3
(1968), p. 70.
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that the power elite is composed of the members of the Party.

This is

a necessary condition for every individual to reach that class (see

page 237), but not all members of the Party belong to the power elite.
This simply means that Party membership is a necessary but not sufficient condition to enter the political elite in the socialist society.
There is still another requirement one must meet in advance to that
group: a strong commitment to the Party's affairs.

Only when this

condition is met, does one have a chance to move up to the top of the
pyramid.

Some skills (not necessarily formal education) are always

required of a candidate, but they never exceed low-average capacities.
Formal education, therefore, has never been a necessary condition of
upward mobility through Party channels.

So, after 35 years of the com-

munist regime in Poland, there are still thousands of important social
positions occupied by poorly educated Party members, while at the same
time, there are many highly educated people who cannot get these
positions because they do not belong to the Party.

While there is a

growing number of college-educated Party members (in 1970, 7.9 per cent,
and in 1980, 12.0 per cent), this number is still insufficient to substitute for the poorly educated old power elite.48

The old power elite

has a very low formal education, but was trained for administrative

The 1980 events in Poland, showed, however, that Widerszpil and not
Djilas was wrong. Still in 1981, the First Congress of "Solidarity,"
the Polish Free Trade Union, proposed a national referendum on factories
workers' s.elf-management. That was an implicit denial of any workers
influence on the factories policy.
48

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979,

p~

24.
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positions because of its ideological virtues.
Having gradually adapted to the requirements of their power function
members of the old elite achieved a certain level of organizational
and administrative skill, quite sufficient in the conditions of a
stable and traditional, non-expensive local community; this amount
of skill appeared, however, quite inadequate when adaptation to the
conditions of a rapidly expending industrial community because the
immediate necessity for all who wished to keep or acquire power
positions.49
The old elite, professionally unprepared, looked at the higher
educated new elite as a threat and challenge to their careers.

The old

political elite in Poland had conspiratory experiences while working in
the underground, the newcomers lack such skill.

Instead, they have

higher formal education and differentiated important skills.

However,

one can hardly agree with the following assertion of Bauman: "They (the
new elite) are expedient, efficient industrious, full of initiative,
and rather ruthless in pushing forward what is to be done."50

The

recent events in Poland disclosed an incredible degree of corruption
and opportunism

among the members of the power elite, which unequivo-

cally suggests that the Polish power elite has already passed its
period of "terror and virtue."

They become more and more opportunists

and they serve the Party because their whole career depends upon the
Party's prosperity.

They have moved up through the Party channels and

the Party's security is a guarantee of a continuation of their future
security.

49

zygmunt Bauman, "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Formation," Class Status, and Power by R. Bendix and S.:::1. Lipset (New York:
The Free Press, 1966), p. 540.
sorbid., p. 540.
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The power elite is a sui generis "caste." It is ideology

~.,rhich

makes this group extremely exclusive, not much different from a caste.
Even apparent changes in leadership do not bring in much fresh air.
The changes remain in the "family circle."
the role of religion.

Communist ideology plays

Non-acceptance of this ideology is an unmistake-

ably sign of non-membership in the Party elite.

For that reason, even

if we distinguish between the old and new power elite (on the basis of
their education), the power elite is composed of one type of people.
"The fundamental difference between a society of the Soviet-type and one
of the Western type is that the former has a unified elite and the
latter a divided elite." 51

In Poland, like in the other People's

Democracies, all generals, Party secretaries, managers, and all higher
officials belong to the Communist Party.

If they do not belong, they

remain isolated technicians with no influence on political events.
Besides power, high wages and the system of privileges benefit this
class.

High officials' wages are supplemented by a system of bonuses.

There are two different supplements: bonuses and rewards.

Bonuses are

much higher, but are rather limited in number; rewards are more numerous, but less valuable.

Slomczynski and Szafnicki find the following

correlation: the percentage of people to whom bonuses are granted is
growing as we move from lower to higher wage groupings.

The system of

rewards is not related to the level of wages, but still the higher percentage of non-rewarded people is among those who are paid less.

51

Raymond Aron, Social Structure . . • , op. cit., Part I, p. 10.
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The average of bonuses and rewards increases with the growth of
wages, but the medium bonus increases much faster than the medium of
the rewards.

Beonuses given to people of the high class are, on the

average, eighteen time (1800%) higher than bonuses given to the
lowest class category bonuses.
The proportion of those rewarded with the bonuses grows as one
moves from the bottom to the top on the ladder of wages.

So, for the

paople who were making 4000 zlotys per month (very high salaries) the
number of bonuses was twelve times higner than among people whose wages
did not surpass 15000 zlotys.52
Such a policy of the latent rewards of the higher classes (practically all Party people) unequivocally supports the thesis that "the distribution of rewards in a society is a function of the distribution of
power, not of system needs."53

In the Soviet-type society this is mo~e

visible than in any other society.

But the social prestige of the power

elite in Poland does not correspond to the high salaries of that class.
First, a large number of people in this class is poorly educated, and in
Poland, education is the primary factor for social prestige.

Secondly,

the careers of all the people in the upper class are totally connected
with the Communist Party whose legitimacy is questioned because free

52

Kazimierz Slomczynski and Krzysztof Szafnicki, "Zroznicowanie
dochodow z pracy," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa:
Ossolineurn, 1974), pp. 154-56.
53

Gerard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1966), p. 63.
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elections do not exist in Poland.54

Additionally, the totalitarian

power elite in Poland is blamed for all the evils in Polish society:
inability to solve the fundamental problems for the country, and nominating uneducated and corrupt Party people for many higher social
positions. 55

Finally, the PUWP is considered by a large majority of

people as a Party of national traitors because of its Russian affiliation.
The Intelligentsia Class
By the class of intelligentsia I understand here an aggregate of
people who possess college diplomas and "toil with their minds instead
of their hands, that is, the technical, liberal-professional, managerial, administrative • . . personnel of the state." 56

I do not include

in that class people who occupy high social positions because they are
the members of the Communist Party, but who do not have a college education, nor people with a college education, but whose careers are
totally tied to Party channels.

Neither do I include the technicians

with a technical high school diploma.

This type of people constitutes

54It was the French magazine Paris Match which published a public
opinion poll last year, taken inside the country. In free elections
only 3 per cent of Poles would vote for the Pm~P, 34 per cent for
Christian Democrats, 27 per cent for Socialist Party, and 19 per cent
for the Conservative (Republican) Party. Cf. Time, November 24, 1980,
p. 49.
SSAccording to Time, 90 per cent of the Polish people blamed the
Communist Party for the economic disaster in Poland. Ti;ne, November 24,
1980, p. 49.
56Martin Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?," The Russian
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constitutes another class called skilled manual workers.
1-lhile it is still uncertain where the term "intelligentsia" was
coined, surely the word acquired its common usage in all modern languages. 57

It is also certain that the rise of this stratum (class) was

connected with the \.Jesternization process in Eastern Europe, especially
in Russia and partitioned Poland.

The new ideas rose in opposition to

so-called pan-slav romanticism proclaimed mainly by two Russian writers,
Herzen and Chaadaev, who believed in the great destiny of Russia.

The

ideas of the eighteenth century Enlightenment in the West, brought to
Eastern Europe, had enough time to root and begin producing the first
generation of Western-oriented people by the mid-nineteenth century.
The ideals of the French Revolution, i.e., "libert~e," "egalitee" and
"fraternitee" appealed to the Russian Imperium, where tsarist sociopolitical oppression was reaching its

cl~2ax.

There grew up a genera-

tion of intellectuals alienated from the tsarist regime.

The new intel-

lectual felt obligated not only to accept progressive ideas, but "to
place his knowledge at the service of the people, to devote his life to

Intelligentsia by R. Pipes (~ew York: Columbia University Press, 1961),
p. 3. In Poland, college usually terminates with the Master's degree.
5 7s

·
· · t h at t h e term " 1nte
·
11·1gents1a
· ' was use d
orne autnors
ma1nta1n
for the first time in Russia. See Hugh Seaton-Watson, "The Russian
Intelligentsia," The Intellectuals by G.B. de Huszar (Glencoe: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 41-62; Richard Pipes, "The Historical
Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia," ibid., pp. 47-62; Martin
Malia, op. cit., pp. 1-18.
Gella, however, argues. that it was in Poland that the term "intelligentsia" was invented as a neologism coming from Latin "intelligentsia"--"discernment." Cf. Aleksander Gella, "The Life and the Death of
the Polish Intelligentsia, 11 Slavic Review 30 (1971), pp. 1-27.
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the task of liberating masses, to lead to the social revolution." 58
Even if it is historically wrong to identify the intelligentsia with
the professional revolutionaries Lenin wanted, they were recruited from
the intelligentsia files.59

No one who supported the tsarist regime

could be a member of that stratum, because the intelligentsia was the
tsar's number one enemy, and opposing the tsarist system was intelligentsia's primary goal.

Therefore, two things distinguished Russian

intelligentsia: "a critical thinking," and an opposition to the
.
60
regLme.

The Polish intelligentsia of the nineteenth century shared the same
ideals with Russian intellectuals.

But a specific Polish milieu added

one other goal for that stratum: the struggle for Poland's independence
.
1 l'd entlty
.
.
. .
d p o 1 es. 61
.
an d preservatLon
of t h e natlona
o f tne
partltlone

So, "two main factors created the Polish intelligentsia.

The first was

socioeconomic in character and basically the same as the stimulus that
brought to life the intelligentsia and modern enlightened middle class
in other European countries in the nineteenth century.

The second was

strictly political: it appeared only in Polish territories and was

58

Hugh Seaton-Watson, op. cit., p. 44.

59

Vladimir I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?(New York: International
Publishers, 1969), pp. 48-53; p. 82
6~1artin MaLia, op. cit., p. 2.

61 During the 125 years that Poland was partitioned, all eight
insurrections, which had taken place, were organized by the intelligentsia.
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most instrumental in shaping the particular character of the Polish
intelligentsia."

62

Until the failure of the January 1863 uprising in Poland against
tsarist Russia, the Polish intelligentsia was convinced of the possibility of military success over Russia.

This misguided political

optimism was inherited from Romanticism which, in Poland, was mixed
with national Messianism.

Its founder and propagator was Towianski.

Even such personalities as Mickiewicz, Slowacki, and Krasinski could
not escape it.

The new generation of intelligentsia who happened to

live after 1863 realized that the independence of Poland could be
carried out only with significant economic development and with a
strengthening of national identity among all social classes in the
country.

Znaniecki forcefully pointed out this role of the Polish

intelligentsia after the January 1863 tragedy.63

The Polish intelli-

62

Aleksander Gella, The Life . . . , op. cit., p. 10. The Polish
intelligentsia was composed mostly of writers, historians, poets • . •
was extremely anti-pragmatic. A "technocrat" was not yet idealized at
that time and "business" ~.zas regarded as an inferior profession.
63znaniecki made an important distinction between the "national
culture society" and the "political society" or state. The first he
defines as a culture "which has a common and distinct secular, literary
culture and an independent organization functioning for the preservation, growth and expansion of this culture." Florian Znaniecki, Hodern
Nationalities (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), p. 21.
Political society instead, is one "which has a common legal system and
an organized, independent government controlling all the people who
inhabit territory." Ibid., p. 21.
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gentsia preserved and propagated national culture among five generations of the partitioned Poles.64
During the period between Wars., after regaining Polish independence, the Polish intelligentsia started to undergo a significant
change.

Primarily, it began to lose its "ghetto" character by becoming

a more open social class.

Secondly, its role of awakening and preserv-

ing the national identity had become superfluous since the establishment
of the Polish political State.

Thirdly, it started to split into three

subgroups: intellectuals, professionals, and technical intelligentsia.
But by 1939, the Polish intelligentsia was still considered a vital
class for preserving and propagating national identity.

Therefore,

after the German invasion of Poland, the Nazis' main aim was to exterminate the intelligentsia completely and thus to destroy the nation as
well. 65
The postwar period brought about the further disintegration of
that class.

A rapid industrialization of the country was responsible

for the grm-ring demand of "technical intelligentsia."

State policy

64 rn Professor Lopata's view, the role of developing and disseminating culture is universally valid for the intelligentsias of all
countries. Cf. Helena Lopata, "Hembers of the Intelligentsia as
Developers and Disseminators of Cosmopolitan Culture," Intelligentsia
and Intellectuals by A. Gella (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc.,
1976), p. 59-78.
65That was visibly reflected in the scientific output of the
Polish· intelligentsia after \olorld War II. While in 1937, there ~v-ere
7,974 scientific publications, 1,560 literary works, and 2,274 publications popularizing science in Poland~ in 1947 these publications
decreased to 426, 645 and 353 respectively. Cf. Jan J. Szczepanski,
"The Polish Intelligentsia: Past and Present," World Politics 14
(1962), p. 414.
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also pushed education in the same direction.

New recruiting norms for

college students favored the lower classes (peasants and physical
workers' children) and diversified the origin of that rapidly growing
class.

This only fostered the existing process of disintegrating the

Polish intelligentsia to such a point that some even asked if it made
sense to talk about the intelligentsia as a stratum. 66

Although many

would not go so far, two things regarding intelligentsia in postwar
Poland are undeniable: (1) the old classical intelligentsia ceased to
exist and (2) the new intelligentsia grew in number and diversified
.
- . an d spec1a
. 1.1zat1on.
.
67
accor d 1ng
to or1g1n

As far as the first variable (Party membership) is concerned, the
proportion of Party members to non-Party people is high in the intelligentsia class.

This fact is due to strong pressure by the political

elite upon the intelligentsia to join the Party.

The Party's whole

policy is aimed at increasing its membership among this class of
people.

Practically, only Party members can have a managerial

positions are highly paid.

Thus many of the members of the intelli-

gentsia join the Party to get more prestigious jobs.

An engineer

~vho

does not belong to the Party cannot become a director, even if his

66

Cf. Marcin Czerwinski, "Inteligencja polska wczoraj i dzis,"
Miesiecznik Literacki 5 (1969), pp. 114-125.
67 rhe old intelligentsia, as Gella stresses, "formed a broad
segment of society with a relatively homogeneous spiritual culture."
Aleksander Gella, "Introduction to the Sociology of Intelligentsia,"
The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals by A. Gella (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, Inc., 1976), p. 21. According to this autho~ the
new intelligentsia is more open and less homogeneous.
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qualifications meet the requirements of such a position.

A college

teacher cannot advance in his scientific career if he stays out of the
Party files. 68

All military personnel (professional soldiers) are by

principle Party members.

This type of career is even inconceivable

without Party support.
At this point one must be aware of the difference between the
power elite and that part of the intelligentsia which belongs to the
Party.

The difference is a fundamental one.

While the power elite, no

matter what its educational level, uses Party channels for its upward
mobility, the members of the intelligentsia who are Party members hold
their positions mainly because they are educated and professionally prepared.

The Party ID is a necessity but not sufficient condition for

being able to occupy prestigious posts in the society.

They treat

their Party membership as a malum necessarium of which they often are
ashamed.

These people do not intend to become power elite because they

are not interested in careers through Party channels.

If they wanted

that, they would have to change their attitudes toward the Party.69
The intelligentsia constitutes the most educated class in Polish
society.

Their minimum education is four years of college; 70 per cent

68 B
. .
.
.
ecause o f t h.LS open d.Lscr1m1nat1on
aga1nst
non- Party peop 1 e,
the most qualified people do not necessarily occupy the most prestigious positions at the Polish universities, but rather those who are able
to sacrifice even scientific objectivity to manifest enough conformity
with the Party line.
69

rt is impossible to give an exact number of the intelligentsia
people who are simultaneously Party members.
One can accept that two-
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of college graduates also have a Master's degree.

Before World War II,

a Polish high school diploma was still highly esteemed--given the fact
that secondary education was almost a privilege of higher social
classes--actually, such a diploma no longer confers much prestige.70
Instead, the college diploma is still connected with high prestige.
Prestige increases as one moves up the ladder of the scientific career:
"magister," "doctor." and finally, "docent." 71

The diplomas are

granted on the basis of a scientific contribution to the body of k.natvledge.

While at the master's level the candidate must prove his ability

to do research, the doctor's degree requires some original scientific
contribution to the body of knowledge.

Such a contribution must be

greater still as one seeks a "docent's" degree.
In 1970, there were in Poland 655,000 people with a college educa-

thirds of the Party people who have a college education belong to this
class.
70chalasinsk.i argued "because of the easy access by the lower
strata, i.e., peasants and workers, to secondary and college education,
education ceases to be a basis for distinguishing a separate stratum of
the intelligentsia." Jozef Chalasinski, "Zagadnienia nowej inteligencji," Zycie i l1ysl, 7-8 (1969), p. 25.
This can hardly be maintained. First, college education in Poland
is still highly prestigious and attracts many young people. Second,
one cannot maintain "an easy access to college" when the demand exceeds
the supply by 180 per cent.
71 rn Poland there is no bachelor's degree. The last two years of
high school correspond to freshman and sophomore college in the American educational system. There is instead a postdoctoral degree termed
"docent," '\vhich stresses a teaching role of the person. Cf. Florian
Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge (New York: Octagon
Books, 1975), pp. 131-133.
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tion.

72

The number also included those who were labeled above as the

power elite with a college diploma.

At the same time, there were

182,185 college-educated Party members.73

Even if one admits that one-

third of them could be labeled as a power elite, the intelligentsia
numbered approximately 600,000 people.
This group. homogeneous as far as education is concerned, can be
divided into three sub-categories: cultural intelligentsia, with classical education; technical intelligentsia specializing in the science,
and traditional professionals, i.e., doctors, lawyers, and economists.
In 1970, the cultural intelligentsia accounted for 16 per cent of
that class; technical intelligentsia, 39 per cent, and the established
professions, about 32 per cent. 74

The remaining 13 per cent include

militia, military intelligentsia, and power elite.

In the long term it

is the technical intelligentsia which seems to be the most probable
challenger to the Party.

There is a safeguard in the policy of "the

primacy of politics over economics and administration, thus holding in
check a technical intelligentsia eager to increase its own power."75
On the whole, the intelligentsia enjoys a rather high standard of

72 Bronislaw Golebiowski, "Rola i miej see inteligencj i w budmvie
rozwinietego spoleczenstwa socjalistycznego," Partia-panstwo-spoleczenstwo by R. Dudek and z. Siembrowicz (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 154.
73Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.
74Bronislaw Golebiowski, op. cit., 154.
75 George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals and the Road
to Class Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1979),
p. 179.
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living.

In 1965, the average salary in that class was 3321 zlotys,

while the average salary of the white-collar workers was 2558 zlotys,
and that of the unskilled workers 1717 zlotys. 76
The average intelligentsia apartments are also larger and less
crowded than the apartments of any other class.

In Lodz, Szczecin and

Koszalin, flat of a member of the intelligentsia averaged 3.29 rooms
against 2.76 of the unskilled workers.

77

Less than 20 per cent (19.7

per cent) of the intelligentsia's apartments were 1-2 room flats, while
four or more room apartments accounted for 34.3 per cent, which was
much higher than any other class.

The same research indicated that the

intelligentsia had 1.2 person per room, while the white-collar workers
scored 1.47, and the unskilled workers 1.9 person per room. 78
If one takes into consideration the possession of some "luxury"
items, the intelligentsia scores higher than other classes.

More than

12 per cent of that class possessed a car (0.8 per cent white-collar
workers,

zero per cent semi-skilled workers); 11 per cent had a tape

recorder against 0.0 per cent of unskilled workers and 2.2 per cent of
the white-collar workers; 52.7 per cent of the intelligentsia class had
a refrigerator and only 5.5 per cent of unskilled workers; 62.5 of the

76Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Zroznicowanie
spoleczne: podstawowe warunki," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. 1-Jesolowski
(Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), pp. 100-103.
77

Ibid., p. 107.

78
Ibid-, p. 110.
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intelligentsia's apartments had a telephone while only 1.1 per cent of
the unskilled workers. 79
Finally, the intelligentsia differs from the other classes with
regard to cultural consumption.

People of this class read more

odicals and more books than any other class.80

peri-

Also, the subjects of

the books read by the intelligentsia differ from those of the other
classes.

While the intelligentsia reads more specialized books, the

lower classes prefer novels and less specialized books.81
Among the three subgroups of intelligentsia, the technical intelligentsia is highly paid.

While the cultural intelligentsia earning

3000 zlotys per month, the technical intelligentsia's wages reached
3,907 zlotys.

Within the cultural intelligentsia there were two

extremes: the highly paid writers and journalists and the very low paid
teachers. 82

A college diploma is still rewarded in Poland with a high degree of
prestige, no matter whether higher education correspond to a high
salary.

In the case where salary does correpond to a high level of

education (e.g., a physician), this only adds more prestige to that
position.

~ut

a highly paid social position, if not connected with a

79 Anita Koc.us-Wojciechowska, "Warunki mieszkaniowe i wyposazenie
domow," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski (Harszawa: Ossolineum,
1974), p. 221.
80rbid., pp. 237; 260.
81

Ibid., p. 271.

82 Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Hesolowski, op. cit.,
p. 109.
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higher education, adds little to the prestige of the position.
~Jill

We

see at the end of the present chapter the inconsistencies of

status in contemporary Polish society.
Skilled Manual \lorkers
The third place in the hierarchy of social classes in Poland, is
occupied by skilled manual workers.

This class is constituted by the

people \vith a technical high school education (technicians).

In 1970,

they accounted for 28 per cent of all people with high school diplomas
(3.5 million) and constituted about 924,000 people. 83
Skilled physical workers, as understood here, ·are those who went
through technical vocational high school (Technikum) and who worked as
skilled physical workers.

This type of school involves rather exten-

sive training: five years after the compulsory eight-year elementary
school.

This is one year more than the·general education high school.

Also, the curriculum of this school differs significantly from that of
the general education high school.

It emphasizes sciences and voca-

tional subjects.
While the class of intelligentsia is highly exposed to communist
propaganda and pressured to join the Party, the manual technicians are
much less.

First, they are technicians whose skills are badly needed

in modern industry.
superfluous.

The Party's support in getting a job is for them

It surely is very helpful, but not necessary.

Thus

83stanislaw Wideszpil, "Klasa robotnicza i intelligencja we
wspolczesnym apoleczenstwie socjalistycznym," Idee Lenina a miedzynarodowy ruch robotniczy (Warszawa: KiW, 1975), p. 66.

by
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staying out of the Party, they avoid the stigma attached to Party
people: "the pushers."

Secondly, the technicians are less advanced in

the study of history and classical education than are the graduates of
a high school of general education.

Their technical skills are

extremely needed in the economy but much less in the Party's aims.
This does not mean that these people are not vulnerable to the
communist propaganda.

There is one reason why this class is exposed

to the pressure of joining the Party and this reason is in the class
itself.

The class of technicians is constituted by two groups of

people.

The first group is a group of rather intelligent people who

would have been able to get a college degree, but they had to stop
their formal education because of unfavorable circumstances (mainly
poverty).

The second group of this class is formed by people whose

intellectual capacities would not permit them to go through college.
For them there is no other T.vay of upward mobility than that of Party
channels.
"bonanza."

For both these types of people Party channels are a
Other people do not know about their Party membership. But

even if the Party "stigma" is openly attached to them, this is, at the
same time, recompensed by privileges the others do not enjoy.
In 1970, there were 376,914 Party members with vocational high
school diplomas. 84

If we subtract from that number all those who were

not physical skilled workers, but white-collar workers, that would

84

Rocznik Statvstyczny, 1979, p. 24.
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bring the number to no more than 50,000 Party members in that class.
In 1965, the salaries of skilled manual workers were at the level
of the classical intelligentsia and they were reaching, on average,
3095 zlotys per month. 85

Thirteen per cent of this class of people

possessed a car (1.8 per cent less than the intelligentsia class);
58.6 per cent had cameras (71.5 per cent intelligentsia); 75.9 per
cent had a television set (2.1 per cent less than intelligentsia), and
20.7

per cent had telephones as compared to 62.5 per cent of intelli-

gentsia.86
The apartments of the technicians are on the average composed of
the same number of rooms as the apartments of the white-collar workers
(2.91).

However, they have fewer (0.2) one-room flats and more (1.7

per cent) large apartments (four or more rooms) than the while-collar
workers.

Skilled manual workers' apartments are also slightly less

crowded (0.08) person -per room, but they are not better equipped
than are white-collar workers' apartments

as far as. the sanitary

facilities are concerned. 87
Similar patterns of differences might be observed if we consider
the use of cultural advantages.

The class of technicians reads on the

average less than does the intelligentsia class reading relatively

85 Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit.,
p. 100.
86 Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, op. cit., p. 221
87 Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit.,
p. 107.
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more popularized scientific and less sophisticated scientific books
and periodicals. 88
The rather high prestige of the skilled physical workers (technicians) has its source in the following attributes: first, their training is relatively long and requires at least average intellectual
capacities.

Secondly, the demand for those kinds of skills in Poland

is still higher than the supply and, therefore, it is easy for a
skilled worker to get a job.

Thirdly, there is also in this job a

margin of creativity which additionally fosters the prestige. Finally,
and this is probably the most important reason for the growing prestige of this class, the industriaJ. society in general, and the Soviettype socialist society in particular, enhances these skills.

It is

therefore not surprising that the old barrier between manual and nonmanual jobs is now shifted to the demarcation line between skilled and
unskilled positions.

I f this might still be questioned in the \-lestern

capitalist societies, it is evident in the Eastern European realities.
And so the Polish sociologist, Sarapata, in his comparative studies of
the occupational prestige of West Germany and Poland found similar
patterns in those two countries with one important difference.

While

in West Germany the mental workers occupy a place next to intellectu-

88

Anita Kobus-~{oj cierchowska, Zroznicowanie konsumpcj i • . • ,
op. cit., 268.
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als, in Poland, the skilled manual workers enjoy higher prestige than
the white-collar workers.89
At present, nothing indicates that the near future will change
the pattern of prestige of that clase in Poland.
White-collar Workers
The class of the white-collar workers is constituted of people
with high school diplomas other than teachnical.

(High school of

general education, vocational high schools of different types.)
People of this class work in offices, shops, banks and so on.
In the views of Lipset and Bendix, five generalizations are valid
regarding non-manual and manual position.
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

male nonmanual occupations have more prestige than most
manual occupations, even skilled ones.
Among males, white collar positions generally lead to higher
incomes than manual employment.
Non-manual positions, in general, require more education than
manual positions.
Holders of non-manual positions . • • are more likely than
manual workers to think of themselves as members of the middle
class and to act out middle-class roles in their consumption
patterns.
Low level of manual workers are more likely to have political
attitudes which resemble those of the upper middle class than
of the manual working class.90
~ost

Of these five principles, the first three can hardly be regarded
as valid in the present Polish society.

For example, office managers,

89 Adam Sarapata, "Stratification and Social Mobility," Empirical
Sociology in Poland by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: PWN, 1966), p. 43.
Once more it has to be stressed that I do not include professionals here.
90seymour 1'1. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in
Industrial Society (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960),
pp. 14-16.
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bookkeepers, high school teachers and even military officers score
lower on the scale of benefits than a private locksmith or even a
'1 or. 91

ta~

Nor are the white-collar positions in general better paid

than those of the skilled manual

workers.

Finally, the training of

the skilled physical workers is as long as is that of white-collar
workers as understood here. 92
If we take into consideration the first variable, the class of
white-collar people is rather under heavy Party propaganda and constitutes an important source for Party member recruitment.

The reason for

this is similar to that we find in the class of skilled manual workers
with one distinction that this class is still more vulnerable to the
Party pressure.

Like the class of the skilled manual workers (techni-

cians), this class is also composed of two types of people: those whose
intellectual capacities would hardly permit them to go through college
and those who would be able to get a college degree, but could not
because of unfavorable life circumstances.

However, there is a funda-

91Adam Sarapata, Studia nad uwarstwieniem . • . , op. tic., p. 223.
92 The meaning of the white-collar workers here is totally different from that introduced by Aills. Cf. C. Wright Mills, White Collar
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). One must be aware of the
differences between the American society and that of the Soviet-type
socialist system. In the latter, the private ownership of the means of
production practically does not exist. In consequence, everyone (except
richer farmers) is a State employee "as a property-less dependent."
C. t.Jright Mills, White Collar, op. cit., p. 75. Besides that, the socalled professional and other people of higher education are categorized
here as the intelligentsia class. Finally, the people whose entire
careers are tied to the Party and who occupy high administrative
positions, are labelled as a power elite.
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mental difference between this class and that of the technicians.
While technical physical workers could easily find rather high paid
jobs, many of these people, especially with a high school of general
education diploma, have difficulty in finding jobs.
jobs are among the less well paid.

Additionally, their

Therefore, practically, the only way

of upward mobility for the people of this class is through the Party
channel.
tion.

Thus they are sufficiently susceptible to Party indoctrina-

Those dedicated and committed to Party affairs could even move

as far as to the power elite.

Consequently, in 1970, this class provi-

ded 6.9 per cent of all Party members which totalled 160,667 people. 93
If we consider that in 1970, there were 594,000 people with vocational
high school diplomas, except those of technical high school, and
1,171,000 people with a high school of general education diplomas, we
must conclude that almost every ninth white-collar worker belongs to
the Party. 94
This does not mean that the class itself is as large.

This is so,

first, because some of this class moved through the Party channels to
the power elite; secondly, the State statistics include in ttat class
some people like policemen and military personnel who were here classified differently.

A white-collar worker's education consists of four

years of school after eight years of mandatory elementary school.

93
94

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24.

Cf. Ryszard Dyoniziak and others, Wapolczesne spoleczenstwo
Polskie (Warszawa: PWN, 1978), p. 23.

The
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general education high school does not prepare its students directly
for any profession.

This type of school is mainly conceived of as an

intermediate step between primary school and college.

Because of the

limited number of posts in colleges, many of the students are not
accepted.
Graduates of vocational high schools are generally in a much
better position than those with general education or high school
diploma.

These schools prepare their students for skilled trades.

Thus, even if only a small number of them try to continue their education in corresponding majors at the college level, they are not
affected by unemployment.
According to Slomczynski and Wesolowski, the average salary of this
category was 2558 zlotys with salaries of 2859 zlotys in administration
and 2100 zlots in commerce.95

This however, is misleading.

As was

pointed out above. some military personnel and the militia-men with
rather high salaries were included in that class.

This increases the

average salary.
The relatively low income of this class is reflected in the small
percentage of people who possessed some "luxury" items.

Vlhile 12.1

per cent of the intelligentsia and 10.3 per cent of the skilled workers
own cars, only 4. 3 per cent of the white-collar \vorkers own one.

A

similar pattern might be observed if we consider other objects: motorcycles are owned by 16.5 per cent of the intelligentsia, 24.1 per cent

95 Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit., p.lOO.
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of skilled physical workers, and 7.5 per cent of white-collar workers;
a tape-recorded: 11.0 per cent of the intelligentsia, 6.8 per cent of
technicians, and 2.2 per cent of the white-collar workers; a record
player: 60.4 per cent of the intelligentsia, 41.4 per cent of the technicians, and 35.3 per cent of the white-collar workers.96
In three categories the while-collar workers scored higher than
the skilled physical workers, namely in having 0.8 per cent more telephones, 1.9 per cent more refrigerators, and 2.4 per cent more washing
.
97
mac h 1nes.

The apartments of the white-collar workers are in general much
smaller than those of the intelligentsia and even smaller than those of
skilled physical workers.

According to Kobus-Wojciechowska, an average

apartment of the intelligentsia has 2.9

and of technicians 2.28 rooms,

the flats of the white-collar workers have an average of 2.17 rooms.98
Similarly, while the percentage of the intelligentsia's small apartments (1-2 rooms) accounted for 26.4 per cent, that of technicians
51.7 per cent, this type of flat of the white-collar workers represented 65.6 per cent.

The percentage of the medium sized apartments

(three rooms) of the white-collar workers reached 27.9 per cent; a
similar type of flat of the intelligentsia accounted for 53.8 per cent
and of the technicians for 41.4 per cent. 99

96Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, Warunki mieszkaniowe , . . , op. cit.,
p. 221.

97rbid., p. 221.
98rbid., p. 200.
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The difference between white-collar workers and the other class is
reflected also in cultural pursuits.

The preferences of this class is

shown in the reading of popularized scientific literature and watching
television.

People of this class read fewer scientific books (9.9 per

cent less than the intelligentsia class) and even less than technicians
(3.4 per cent). 100
Before World II, people with a high school education enjoyed high
prestige in Poland, this being almost a monopoly of the higher classes.
Practically no one from the peasant class of manual workers could reach
that level of education.

The school reform after World War II created

new possibilities for the children of peasants and workers for upward
mobility through education.

Thus the number of people with high school

diplomas grew enormously causing an increase in that type of education.
The regime's policy of favoring technical skills worked in the same
direction.

This is why the prestige of the white-collar workers, even

if still significant, has visibly declined and is still diminishing.
The Peasant Class
One of the most visible characteristics of the between-wars of
Polish society was its clear-cut division between the city and the
village.

The differences between the lifestyle in the city and village

were reflected still more deeply in the mentality of these two groups.
That psychological barrier whose source was the economic and social
degradation of the peasant class had been growing for a long time,

100Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, Zroznicowanie konsumpcji • . . , op.
Cit., p, 281.
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reaffirming the "stigma" of the interiority attached to that class.
For the peasants that meant a "ghetto" of the ·least fortunate people to
which they had become accustomed and had accepted it "as part of the
natural order."101

The well-known enormous attachment of the Polish

peasants to a scrap of land had more than an economic dimension.

Land

surely constituted a source of survival, but it was also a symbol of
one's freedom.

"The permanent unemployment of a great part of the

population in the few industrial centers offered additional arguments
. . • to (cling) . • • to • • • peasant way of life. " 102

This

undoubtedly fostered the growing number of little villages. 103
The between-wars regime had done little to emancipate the peasant
class. 104

This was true not only with regard to education, but also to

101

Paul Lewis, "The Peasantry," Social Groups in Polish Society by
D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (London: MacMillan Press, 1973), p. 30.
102 zygmunt Bauman, Economic Growth .

. .,

op. cit., p. 236.

103According to Redfield, the little village community is characterized by its (1) "distinctiveness," (2) "smallness," (3) "homogeneity," and (4) "self-sufficiency." The first characteristic stresses
apparent limits of the community, the second its capacity of experiencing the community's totality, the third points out the similarity of
minds and personalities, the fourfuthe way of gratifying the basic need
to survive. Cf. R. Redfield, The Little Community (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 60.
104Although Poland had the first I1inistry of Education in the
World, the Educational Commission, which assured free access of peasants to schools, granting them freedom if they learned to read and
write, in 1773, in practical terms did not affect the life of that
class during the entire next century. That was due mainly to the partition of Poland. Three powers (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) were more
interested in their aims than in educating peasant children. In particular, Prussia and Russia used all available methods to germanize and
russify Polish children. Only one hundred years later, a popular

267

the entire policy tvhich directly or indirectly discriminated against
villages. 105

Even if there were not legal barriers to the upward

social mobility through education, practically only a small number of
the peasants' children were able to continue their education because
their parents could not afford to pay a high tuition.

Additionally,

the system of primary schools in villages was underdeveloped.

Many

villages did not have a school at all.
The 1946 agrarian reform initiated a radical change in the lives
of the peasants in Poland.

More than six million hectars of land were

enlightenment began as a result of the failure of the January 1963
revolution. It was that failure that made clear to the Polish intelligentsia that Poland's independence was absolutely impossible
without the emancipation of the peasant class. Emancipation itself
implied a radical change in the peasants' mentality regarding education which they had inherited from elders, that "whoever learns
written stuff casts himself into hell." Cf. William I. Thomas and
Florian Znaniecki, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1337. So, "owing to the
abnormal conditions of national life which had hampered the cultural
development of Poland, popular education assumed a role which it
hardly ever possessed elsewhere; it became a universal instrument of
social reconstruction." Ibid., p. 1336.
105

The between-war Polish society was an example of an underdeveloped society with a wide gap between prices of industrial products
and those of farms. While the industrial products were extremely
expensive, the farm products were cheap. This only deepened the discrepancy between life in city and village generating an open conflict
between them. The peasants protests were often the result of despair.
In 1937, e.g., in one of the small villages in Southern Poland,
Kasinka Mala, the peasants blocked all routes to stop any delivery of
farm products to the health resort Rabka, the place of the vacationing upper class. The protest ended in tragedy when the police opened
fire on the peasants killing nine people and ~vounding many others.
On the international market, Poland found herself in an incredibly
disadvantageous position. She ~..ras forced to export agricultural products at such low prices, that England was able to buy Polish sugar to
feed it to hogs.
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used to create 1,068,000 small farms. 106

The distribution of the

large land property among the peasants and the school reform which
introduced free schools, together with the policy of favoring peasant
youth in admission to college, have radically changed the image of the
Polish villages.

"The so-called rural proletariat, the most merci-

lessly exploited section of the prewar Polish population, disappeared
entirely."l 07

Rapidly developing industry gave rise to an unprece-

dented exodus of peasants to the cities.

This almost revolutionalized

the established social structure in Poland, and visibly fostered the
change in the self-image of the Polish peasants.
At the time of the agrarian reform nothing indicated that the
farmers themselves would be the first target of the new regime's
attack as soon as the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The directives

which came from Moscow were explicit: end the private farms.lOS
Gomulka's opposition to the nationalization of the private farms
resulted with his imprisonment.

To accelerate the process of farm

nationalization, the Government discriminated against private farmers
not allowing them to buy modern equipment, fertilizers, and finally,
it imposed a levey on farmers: on milk, potatoes, grain, and meat. 1 09

106 Zygmunt Bauman, Economic Growth . • . , op. cit. p. 534.
107rbid., p. 536.
108The last chapter of this paper will bring some additional
information on this issue.
109

The levy was imposed on the farmers in 1952.
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Even if the pressure for nationalization of private farms disminished
after the regaining of power by Gomulka in 1956, discrimination
against private farms has not stopped.

In 1963, the regime undertook

radical measures to stop the process of further splitting existing
farms among the children of the farmers.

Only one child could inherit

the farm and this child could not be a State employee.
The exodus of people from villages

~o

110

the cities inverted the

proportion of residents of villages to those of the cities.

In 1938,

70.1 per cent of the Polish population lived in villages and only
29.9 per cent in the cities.

The percentages were 56.1 and 43.9 res-

pectively in 1955., 50.3 and 49.7 in 1965, and 42.4 and 57.6 in
1978.
f r0m

Mainly the period of the reconstruction fostered the exodus
'11 ages to cLtLes.
. .
111

v~

The rural population in Poland is less vulnerable to Party
propaganda than any other class.

If we consider that in 1981 there

were in Poland 3.5 million private farmers and that about 42 per cent
of the population lived in the villages,ll2 farmers constituted only
only 9.4 per cent of all Party members, that is 270,617 people. 113
This immunity from the Party propaganda of the peasant class has its

110cf. Report of the Politburo of XII Plenum KC PZPR: w sprawie
zwiekszenia inwestycji w rolnictwie i zapewnienia dalszego wzrostu
produkcji rolnej (Warszawa:P\.JN, 1963).
lllRocznik Statystyczny, 1979, pp. XXXII; XXXIII.
112The Times, April 18, 1981.
llJRocznL. k Statystyczny, 1979 , p. 24 .

Data from 1978.
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source in several factors.

(1) In the Polish nationalized economy the

farmers are the only self-employed persons and therefore, they do not
depend economically on the

tate.

This is especially important in the

event one falls from favor with the dictator.
ers

(2) The class of farm-

constitutes a traditional Catholic community

munists can expect little support from them.

and the Com-

(3) No other class in

the Societ-type of society is more oppressed by the regime than the
farmers.

The peasant class as self-employed is an oddity in the prac-

tice of the Marxian theory.

But one can hardly expect any significant

change in the position of that class in Poland in the near future.

If

any change is going to take place, this change will serve to make this
class even more independent of the regime.
The most common way of recruiting Party members from the ranks of
the peasants is by granting them privileges other farmers do not enjoy:
ease in buying tractors and other equipment, special profitable contracts with the State, the possibility of buying an unavailble variety
of seeds and so on .
In spite of the fact that the peasant class is characterized by a

.

similar lifestyle, the peasants in Poland are not equally r1ch.

114

Three categories of farmers can be distinguished: (1) small holders
(2-4 hectars); (2) moderate holders (5-15 hectars), and (3) rich

114 According to Teplicht, during the period of one decade (19551964) the real average income of the Polish peasants grew by 36 per
cent. Cf. Jerzy Teplicht, Marxisme et agriculture: Le paysant
Rolonais (Paris: Arnold Colin, 1973), p. 100.
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farmers (over 15 hectars).

The owners of small holdings up to two

hectars constitute a mixed category of farmer-workers, or more
accurately, worker-farmers.

A farm, for them, is not a unique source

of living, nor is it a main source of income.

They work full time in

the cities, and the farm constitutes for them additional work.

Owners

of farms smaller than 0.5 hectare are called the pelt-holding workers.
Almost all of them work full time outside agriculture, and farming
constitutes only a marginal part of their income.

Farm income does

not constitute the main source of revenue for the worker-peasants
(occupants of farms 0.5-2 hectares).

Sixty seven per cent of that

population occupationally active has the jobs outside agriculture. 115
Such categories of farms did not exist before World War II but
they are so visible now that one cannot underestimate them.

Still in

1970s, 1,300,000 people living inside the boundaries of the cities
were categorized as worker-farmers.

This means that every eleventh

inhabitant of Polish cities was also a farmer. 116

115
Ryszard Turski, "Przemysl a przemiany wsi," Przemysl i stoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: Osso ~neum, 1969), p. 355. Cf. Ryszard Turski, Miedzy miastem a wsia
(Warszawa: PWN, 1965), pp. 207-213.
116 zdzislaw Iwanicki, Rolnicy w strukturze spo1ecznej malych
miast (Warszawa: PWN, 1973), p. 44. Cf. Haria Kaminska, "Czy ch1opi
stanowia klase i jaka?," Nowe Drogi 9 (1955), pp. 119-125; Bogus1aw
Ga1eski, "Przemiany spoleczne wsi w Polsce Ludowej," Przemiany
spoleczne (Warszawa: PWN, 1965), pp. 276-304.
For Klos and Swietochlowska, two sources of income of the peasant
worker had weakened the traditional peasants' attachment to the land.
Cf. Czeslaw Klos and Haria Swietochlowska, Dochody i spozycie zywnosci
w rodzinach chlopskich i robotniczo-chlopskich (Warszawa: PWN, 1976),
p. 65.
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The categorY of the small peasant is rather a large category in
the peasant class.

The majority of such people has another job because

they would not be able to support their relatively large families.

For

this category of farmers, however, farming plays a significant part in
the family budget.
The second type of farmer possesses two-thirds of the arable land
and it constitutes the largest category of peasants.
farms does not, by itself, label them wealthy or poor.

The size of such
It depends

largely on the location of the farm as well as the fertility of the
land.

Proximity to a city is the most advantageous circumstance. Even

a small farm may be highly remunerative in such cases.

This small-

scale Polish agriculture still employs 26 per cent of the whole labor
force, due to low level of agricultural mechanization. 117
The third category of farmers is constituted by the owners of
large farms (over 15 hectares).

While in 1950 this category of farmers

accounted for 4 per cent of all farms, in 1960, they represented only
1 per cent of all farms (30,000 farms).ll8

117

"Polityka spoleczna partii r.;obec wsi," Biblioteka lektora i
4 (1979), p. 7.

"~"Ykladowcy

ll8cf. Stanislaw Widerszpil, Przemiany struktury klasowej w Polsce
Ludowej (Warszawa: PWN, 1971), pp. 24-25. See also Jan J. Szczepanski,
"Les paysants dans la societ~e socialiste," Cahiers internationoux de
sociologie 42 (1976); W1odzimierz Wesolowski and Jadwiga KoralewiczZabik, "Przemiany struktury klasowej i warstwowej w Polsce," Przemysl
i spoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1969), pp. 436-485.
The diminution of the number of the big farms was due to the
anti-farmer policy, and the division of the farms by the farmers themselves among their children.
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Farmers, on the average, are wealthier than other classes in
Poland, with the exception of the power elite.
houses, cattle, necessary farm equipment.

They possess farms,

Their lifestyle, however, is

much different from the lifestyle of the other classes.
hard because of poor mechanization of the farms.

They work very

They, on the average,

are poorly educated, which prevents them from being fully emancipated.
The exodus of the youth from villages to the cities during the postwar
period has had both pos.itive and negative consequences.

Generally, the

people who leave the villages are the most educated individuals and the
people of initiative.
lages.

So the less educated people remain in the vil-

As a consequence, in 1960, only 2.8 per cent of all farmers had

higher than a primary school education (seven grades), 22 per cent had
primary school diplomas, and 62.2 had not even completed a primary
education. 119

In Le~vis' view, "not only are social conditions actually

worse in the countryside, but the conviction remains that the nation as
a whole holds the peasant in low esteem." 12 0
For a long time in history and still during the between-..;.;ars
period, the land was considered in Poland a guarantee of freedom and
security.

It was landed property that gave prestige and wealth to the

Polish gentry.

Ownership of the land insured also a right to move up

119wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Przemiany struktury klasowej,"
Struktura i dynamika spoleczenstwa polskiego by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa:
PHN , 19 7 0) , p . 2 8 •
1 2 0Paul Lewis, op. cit., p. 81.
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to the nobility class.

Vice versa, the rural proletariat was, more

than any other class, exploited because of lack of organization and
poverty.
For centuries, Polish villages with their high birth rates were
considered a reservoir of biological force for the nation, a means of
preserving the nation in adverse circumstances.

It was even said about

peasants that they "feed and protect" but they have always been considered the lowest class in Polish society.

Even after World War II,

that class was carrying the heaviest burdens which were purposely
imposed on the farmers to destroy them.

For example, although the medi-

care program was in force for urban population virtually since the end
of \.Jorld War II, the peasants ~.;ere included in it only in 1972. 121
During the last two decades, the prestige of the farmer grew significantly.

Village people are no longer called "peasants" (chlopi),

but "farmers" (rolnicy).

As one can see

on the diagram (p. 285), the

peasant scores as high on the prestige scale as on the scale of benefits
(ninth place) which is higher than unskilled physical workers, shop
assistants, policemen, and even bookkeepers.
In spite of this evident advancement of the peasants on the scale
of prestige in Poland, any further move up toward the top of the pyramid
is rather unlikely until this class scores significantly in education.
Actually, in Poland, there is no ,other advantage which can procure more

121100 lat Polskiego ruchu robotniczego, op. cit., p. 362.
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prestige than that of education.
Unskilled and Semi-skilled
:!anual ~.Jorkers
The class of the unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers occupies the lowest position in the Polish social class hierarchy.

The low

social status of this class has its source in the fact that his class
scores poorly in all important variables which account for the class
hierarchy in contemporary Poland. 122

122

one must be aware of the difference between unskilled physical
workers as understood here and the popular concept of the working class
in Soviet-Marxist sociology. The difference is a fundamental one.
While by unskilled physical workers I mean here the people with no
important skills or with lesser skills, who, in consequence, can pe~
form very simple manual jobs, the "working class" as understood in the
Soviet-Marxist sociology comprises both manual and non-manual workers
who participate directly in the productive process. Excluded are the
private farmers, and those who are employed in the sector called by
~farx "superstructure."
Widerszpil sees the following characteristics of the working class:
(a) the people work with tools or means of production which are not
private; the legal basis for this job is a contract; (b) they participate directly in the productive process, commerce, services); (c) the
job itself has subordinated. and non-superordinated character, and (d)
the job constitutes to those who perform it the main source of income.
Cf. Stanislaw Hiderszpil, "Spor wokol pojecia klasy robotniczej,"
Klasa robotnicza w spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym (Warszawa: KiW, 1979),
p. 47. See also Stanislaw Kozyr-Kowalski and Janusz Ladosz, Dialektyka
(Harszawa: PWN, 1979), p. 26.
In this category are included, however, the workers who in IJesolowski's view are classified as skilled. This category is called here
semi-skilled in contrast to the technicians who might be called skilled
physical workers. The semi-skilled workers are those who meet one of
the following conditions: they completed a basic vocational school,
passed a test which permitted them to be employed as semi-skilled, or
finally, they have been working in the same factory for at least five
years, and received some training. Cf. Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Hesolowski, "Proby reprezentacyjne i kategorie spolecznozawodowe," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski ('i.Jarszawa: Ossolinerum, 1974), p. 78.
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The unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers constitute the
largest class in Poland.

In 1968, they numbered almost 5,000,000

people of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers. 12 3

Almost one-

third of the entire population economically active belonged to that
class.

The class of the unskilled manual workers has been increasing

more than any other class in Poland.

This was partly due to the growth

of industry, partly to the socio-economic policy of the Communist Party.
While in 1938, in Poland, the unskilled manual workers accounted for 18
per cent of the entire economically active population, 124 this class
increased by 700,000 in a four-year period 1950-1955. 12 5

The new

regime's polic.., stressing the industrial development of the country has
found abundant manpower which they employed to overcome the disadvantage o f scarce

.

cap~ta

1 . 126

123

That was calculated on the base of the data of the GUS (Central
Office of Statistics), 1968, reported by Widerszpil. See Stanislaw
Widerszpil, Przemiany struktury klasowej • . . , op. cit., p. 11.
124Jan J. Szczepanski, "Les classes en Pologne," Cahiers internatiaunoux de sociologie 39 (1965), pp. 198-209.
12 5George Kolankiewicz, "The Polish Industrial Manual Working
Class,'' Social Groups in Polish Society by D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz
(London: ~acMillan Press, 1973), p. 94.
126 From the economic point of vie~v such a policy in the long run
had a negative effect on the Polish economy. The economists realized
that "beyond a certain point the overemployment . • . had a retrogressive effect. It tended to disorganize work, and to demoralize both
management and workers. The swollen numbers have had a negative
marginal productivity." Alfred Zauberman, Industrial Progress in
Poland, Czechoslovakia and East· Germany 1937-1962, (London: Oxford
University Press, 1964), p. 101.
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The Marxist sociologists of the People's Democracies are tireless
in stressing that the governments of those countries are '\mrker-peasants" governments and, therefore, by principle, represent the
interests of those classes.

The workers are considered specially

important in the Party's propaganda view.
~larx'

This is totally in vein vith

teaching which opely asserted that only the workers of the indus-

trial centers could reach a high level of class consciousness.
working conditions in industry

The

and the social environment created a

favorable climate for the maturation of class consciousness.

In fact,

these people are vulnerable to Party propaganda for two reasons.

The

first is common to those of other classes of the people not highly
educated and dependent upon the Party economic and social promotion.
For unskilled manual workers there are abs.olutely no other channels of
upward mobility than through the Party.

Poorly educated and dependent

economically on the exclusive employer (the State), tney depend completely on it.

Thus the Party constitutes, for them, a unique possi-

bility of upward mobility.

Additionally, for this less educated class,

the Marxist ideology does not constitute any important barrier.

They

do not grasp the irreconcilability of the Marxian outlook on -the r.vorld
and that of the Christian.
same time believers.

So, they become Party members, being at the

And while at the higher levels, the Party could

hardly tolerate such practices in its members, it has no special objections to it on the level of the unskilled physical workers,

These

people are not prepared to fight the ideological fights on either side.
Their membership counts in order to make a good impression.

In 1978,
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there were 1,339,547 Party members who belonged to that class.

127

If

we accept that at the same time this class numbered 7,000,000 people,
we have to deduce that almost every fifth worker belonged to the Party
(19.1 per cent).
The class of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers is the
class of less well-paid people.

In 1964, the average monthly salary

of the semi-skilled manual workers was 1856 zlotys, and that of the unskilled manual workers, 1717 zlotys, which brought the medium salary of
the class to 1786 zlotys.

128

Given the fact that this class makes

less money than any other class and that the families of the unskilled
manual workers are rather large, the average income of the unskilled
workers' families was very low, almost a half of that of the intelligentsia class.
That difference in income can also be seen in the quality of the
apartments of this class.
is 2.77.

The average number of rooms of this class

The small apartments of the unskilled manual workers (1-2

rooms) accounted for 48.6 per cent of the apartments of this class
(19.7 per cent of the intelligentsia and 29.6 per cent of the whitecollar workers) and the large apartments (3-4 rooms) constituted only
10.25 per cent of all apartments of this class against 34.3 per cent

127Rocznik Statustuczny. 1979, p. 24.
128rzazimierz Slomczynski and I.J:lodzimierz Wesolowski, Zroznicowanie
• , op. cit., p. 102.
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of the intelligentsia and 21. 7 per cent of the white-collar workers. 122
As for the possession of "luxury" goods, only 1. 27 per cent of the
unskilled and semi-skilled manaual workers possessed a car (11.0 per
cent of the technicians); 8.8 per cent of this class had a refrigerator
(30.1 per cent of the white-collar workers).; 1.0 per cent of their
apartments had telephones (65.2 per cent of the intelligentsia), and
53.3 per cent possessed a television set (75. 9 per cent of the technicians). 130
As has already been mentioned, the unskilled and semi-skilled
manual workers score poorly in education.
reference to the unskilled workers.

This is valid especially in

The semi-skilled workers have some

vocational training and therefore, they constitute a subclass of this
large social class.

If it is clearly visible that the average educa-

tional level of the unskilled manual workers is increasing, the number
of the semi-skilled workers is growing at a still higher rate.

While

in 1964, there were 28.2 per cent of the unskilled physical workers who

129

Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimiera Wesolowski, Zroznicowanie
., op. cit., 107.
130According to Kalecki, the real income per worker in 1960, in
Poland, was 54 per cent higher than in 1937, when all workers were taken
into consideration, and 75 per cent higher if we exclude those employed
in the State farms. Cf. Michael Kalecki, "Porownanie dochodow robotnikow i pracownikm.r umyslowych z okresem przedwojennym, " Kultura i
Spoleczenstwo 1 (1964), p. 38. One can hardly agree with that. If, as
it was pointed out on p.129, the real income in 1955 in Poland, was at
the level of 67 per cent of the income of 1949, and that its increase
in 1956-57 did not equal the real income in 1949, in consequence, one
must come to the conclusion that the figures reported by Kalecki are
mere fantasy. Also, the data reported by Rocznik Statystyczny contradict Kalecki's findings. The real income in 1958, increased only by
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had not completed primary school (seven grades) and 55.4 per cent who
have completed only primary education, 13.8 per cent possessed a basic
vocational school diploma, in 1968, the corresponding figures were as
follows: 20.5, 56.9 and 20.4 per cent.

In only a four-year period

(1965-1968) the percent of the semi-skilled workers increased by 6.6
per cent. 131
Poorly educated semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers read
mainly local newspapers and popular magazines. 132
all or read only occasionally (63 per cent). 133
visible regarding the reading of the books.

Many do not read at
Similar patterns are

The people of this class

read little and what they do read is novels and popular books. 134
The unskilled manual workers score poorly in the scale of social
prestige.

This is a direct consequence of their low education and

their dependence on the State.

Even if there is a decreasing number of

individuals with lower than primary education, and the number of people
who completed the basic vocational schools is growing, this does not

3.3 per cent in comparison with 1957; in 1959, it grew by 5.1 per cent
as compared with that of 1958, but it decreased by 1.5 per cent in
1960. Rocznik Statystyr.zny, 1979, pp. XXXXIV-~XXV.
131 stanislaw Widerszpil, Przemiany struktury . . • op. cit., p. 11.
132Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, Zroznicowanie konsumpcji
cit., p. 248.
133

134

Ibid., p. 235.
Ibid., p. 268.

op.
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change much the social position of this class because the average education is growing for every social class.

Though the difference in

wages between white-collar workers and the unskilled and semi-skilled
manual workers is not great, the last occupy a much lower place in the
class pyramid in Poland, mainly because of their low education.
In spite of the low social status of the unskilled manual workers,
it was this class that was able to challenge the power
1970, 1976, and especially in 1980.
must be, however,

attribut~d

elit~

in 1956,

The success of the last upheaval

mainly to the leadership of the workers

who belonged to other, higher, social classes.
Status Inconsistency of the Social
Classes in Poland
The social system of the Soviety-type of society in general, and
of the Polish class system in particular, is a political system par
excellence. In these societies everything is at the service of politics
and the policies are made by one party.

There is no price so high that

the Party would hesitate to pay in order to preserve such an order.
The Party is the key to all other resources.

If some changes in class

structure take place, they "occur without deliberate efforts and simply
reflect the influence of changing social or technological conditions."l35
~arx

predicted that after the socialization of the means of pro-

duction the societies would be transformed into communities ruled by

135

Gerhard E. Lenski, op. cit., p. 81.

282
principle, "from each according to his ability, to each according to
his needs." 1 36

This was the inevitable conclusion of having ascribed

main evils of the society to the private ownership of the means of production.

The extent to which this theory is contradicted by the facts

can be seen in the case of Poland.

Social classes not only did not

disappear after the nationalization of the means of production, but a
new class, the power elite, has arisen.

Political organization has not

vanished, but again the new society is characterized by a still more
clearcut division into those who rule and those who are ruled. 137
Every society instills motivation in able individuals to occupy
higher even rather difficult social positions.

In doing so a society

rewards these people more than they do others who do not play such
important roles.

In the Polish totalitarian system, the political

elite assumes an exclusive role.

The power elite not only makes deci-

sions regarding the division of the GNP, but also decides about the
system of rewards and wages for all social classes.

Thus there has

been established in Poland a system of inconsistency in the status
of those in different social groups.

The power elite itself is an

136Karl Harx, Critique of the Gotha Program (New York: International Publishers, 1938), p. 10.

137Hosca attacked Marxism and accused it of being utopian and
unrealistic. Every society needs for its functioning a political
organization which, in turn, involves inequality of power. Cf.
Gaetane Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
139), pp. 281-286.
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example.

A minister-politician scores in the first place on the scale

of benefits, but he occupies only the fifth position in the scale of
prestige.

The graph on p. 285 indicates the inconsistency of the

statuses of the eighteen professions which might be assigned to different social classes.

The horizontal line represents the dimension of

income, while the vertical line indicates the social prestige of a
given occupation.

Only those occupations which score equally on both

scales possess consistent statuses.

In this case the joining point of

the two dimensions falls on the regression lines (AB).

The occupations

which score below the regression line are overpaid in comparison with
the prestige they have.

Conversely, the occupations which score above

the regression line are underpaid.
The same data are reported by the graph on p. 286. The coordinates
X and Y represent respectively the scale of benefit and that of prestige of the same eighteen occupations.
medium point.

The coordinates cross at the

Uccupations which score on either scale 1-9 are on the

plus side while those which score 10-18 have a negative value.

As was

shown in the preceeding graph, the occupations which score equally on
both scales have their coordinates on the regression line and their
statuses are consistent.

Contrariwise, the occupations whose coordin-

ates do not coincide with the regression line have inconsistant statuses.
The larger the distance from the regression line, the more inconsistent
the occupations' statuses.
All professions which_ score on the right side of the regression
line (AB} are overpaid in comparison with their prestige.

In other
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words, they score lower on the scale of prestige than on the scale of
benefit.

We find here two extreme cases: a private locksmith who

scores third on the scale of benefit but only twelfth on the scale of
prestige and a minister-politican who occupies first place on the
scale of benefit, but only fifth on the scale of prestige.

Visibly

inconsistent statuses are found in the case of the professional officer
and the shop-assistant.

The first scores ninth on the scale of bene-

fit, but only thirteenth on the scale of prestige.

The second occu-

pies the twelfth and fifteenth positions respectively.

Other occupa-

tions, namely qualified steel worker, priest, a factory metal worker,
policement, unskilled building worker and state farm worker score
slightly higher on the scale of benefit than they do on the scale of
prestige.
The occupations which score on the left side of the regression
line on the scale of prestige mark the discrepancy between higher
prestige and lower than expected benefit.
extreme cases: a teacher and a nurse.

Here also there are two

The first occupies. only the

fourteenth position on the scale of benefit, but scores third on the
scale of prestige.
respectively.

A nurse occupies sixteenth and eighth positions

The following occupations also show a discrepancy

between their prestige (higher) and benefit (lower): university professor, first on the scale of prestige and fourth on the scale of
benefit and engineer, fourth and seventh respectively.
The same graph also shows several clusters of occupations which
might be ascribed to social classes as analyzed earlier.

Cluster VI
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Status Inconsistancy in Poland 138
138Adapted from Adam Sarapata, "Iustum Pretium," Studia
Socjologiczne 3 (1962), p. 106.
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composed of clearner, State farm worker and unskilled building worker
represents the class of the unskilled and semi-skilled
>wrkers.

Cluster V forms a peasant clas.s.

manual

While its score on the

scale of benefit is acceptable, its place on the scale of prestige is
too high.

The prestige of the private farmer in Poland is not higher

yet than the prestige of the white-collar workers.

Cluster IV is com-

posed of the white-collar occupations as. understood above.

Their lm-.r

score on the scale of benefit is not surprising and represents the real
situation.

Their low score on the scale of prestige is probably due to

unfortunate (intentional or unintentional) selection of the occupations.

In average this class would score much higher on the scale of

prestige.

Factory metal worker and private locksmith account for

cluster III--skilled physical workers.

Cluster II; university profes-

sor, physician, engineer, qualified steel worker, priest. and teacher
represent the intelligentsia class.

All these occupations, except

teacher, form a rather easily distinguishable cluster.

The case of a

teacher was discussed above and it reflects on the one hand its established high prestige in Polish society, and on the other, a State
policy of rewarding more the skills which are needed by the grmv-ing
industry.

Cluster I, composed of minister-politician and military

officer, represents the power elite class.

But within this cluster

minister-politican ranks highest and military officer ranks lowest.
Status inconsistency is the most visible feature of the Polish
postwar reality.

While prestige has its source mainly in education,

wealth is primarily related to political power, small private enter-
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prise, and only then to education.
The insurrections of the Polish workers after World War II prove
that the postwar Polish society is a conflictual society.

But this is

not what one would expect on the basis of the Xarxist theory of class
and class conflict.

The last chapter of this paper will discuss the

problem of conflict in the socialist societies.

CHAPTER VIII
CLASS CONFLICT IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETIES
Post-Xarxian Theories of Class Conflict
Chapter I of this paper presented, quite extensively, Xarx' theory
of class and class conflict.

At this point we need only to summarize

it.

In Marx' view, class conflict is a conflict of interest between

t~vo

main classes: the owners of the means of production and those who

are deprived of that ownership (workers).

Social conflict arises

between these two classes on the basis of conflictual economic interests
which in no way can be conciliated.

The buyers of the labor force and

its sellers meet in a market regulated by the law of demand and supply.
The bargain is human labor.

The capitalists buy human labor.

Their

interest is to pay as little as possible in wages, because the less
they pay the workers, the more profit they make.
are more than economic.
interests.

Conflictual interests

There also arise conflictual political

Being a ruling class of the society, the capitalist class

is interested in maintaining the status quo in that society, while the
working class (proletariat) is a revolutionary class, whose highest
interest is to overthrow the capitalist system by seizure of political
power and by control of the economy.
The first powerful critique of the Marx' class and class conflict
theories carne from :Vlax I.Jeber.

As for Marx, also for Heber, class con-

flict was an endemic characteristic of the capitalist society.
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analyzing the decline of feudal rela.tions. between the workers and land-·
o\.mers in East Prus.sia upon the rise of .capitalism. he saw the conflicting interests of workers and

lando~.mers

in the successful harvest.

The relations between those classes were restricted to the relations
of the market.

"The old community of interest was dissolved," writes

Heber, "and the farm hands became proletarians.

The operation of

agriculture became a seasonal operation, restricted to a few months.
The lord hired migratory laborers, since the maintenance of idle hands
1
throughout the year would be too heavy a burden."
Thus the rationed
economy of capitalism (a market economy) is price-oriented.

The

prices "are determined by the conflict of interests in bargaining and
competition and the resolution of these conflicts." 2

But class con-

flict and class situation as well can "emerge only on the basis of
communalization.

The communal action that brings forth class situa-

tions, however, is not basically action between members of the identical
class; it is an action between members of different classes." 3

Because

of the specificity of the capitalistic enterprise "each kind of class
situation, and above all when it rests upon the power of property per
se, will become more clearly efficacious when all other determinants of

1Max Weber, "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany," From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 382.
2Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), p. 382.
3Max Weber, Class, Status, Party, op. cit., p. 26.

291
reciprocal relations are, as far as possible, eliminated in their
significance.

It is in this way that the utilization of the power of

· th e mar k e t o b ta1ns
·
·
·
·
t ance. u4
property 1n
1ts
most sovere1gn
1mpor
~arx'

while

Thus,

view of class was unidimensional, based on the criterion of

one's position with respect to the means of production, Weber's view of
class is multiple and comprises property or market capacity, prestige,
and authority.
class.

This is much different from what Marx understood by

Also, the class conflict acquires a new, larger perspective.

Close to Weber is Giddens who stresses the importance of the
society-value that is common to the actors of a given class and which
they bring to the market.

He distinguishes two types of class rela-

tionship: "mediate" and "proximate."

By "mediate" Giddens conceives

the "'overall' connecting links between the market on the one hand and
structured systems of class relationships on the other."S

This type

of relationship is governed by the "distribution of mobility chances
which pertain within a given society."6

As for market capacity, there

are three kinds: property, education-skills, and manual labor power.
The "proximate" class relationship refers to "'localized' factors
condition or shape class formation."

7

~•hich

Any class formation and class

conflict involve "class consciousness" which is something more than

4
Max Weber, Class, Status, Party, op. cit., p. 26.

SAnthony Giddens, op. cit., p. 107.
6Ibid.
7rbid.
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"simple" class a'-.Tareness.

The last involves only a recognition of a

common belief and lifestyle; the former includes the class awareness
and also a recognition of the fact that there are other classes which
coexist and are characterized by different attitudes and lifestyles.
Class conflict arises upon the conflictual interests.
Even if Giddens' theory refers primarily to the advanced capitalist societies, it can also fit (to some extent) the class structure of
socialist societies.

The main difficulty with this theory in reference

to socialist societies is "market."

In the totalitarian. socialist

societies everything, market included, is determined by the power
elite.

That fact must shift class structure and class conflict in new

directions.

We will see in the second part of this chapter that the

structural conflict of Soviet-type socialist societies always implies
the power elite as a party in the conflict.
More plausible, but still limited, is Dahrendorf's theory of class
and class conflict (see diagram, p. 72).

The author takes as a unit of

his theoretical analysis the "imperatively co-ordinated association."
The starting point of this analysis is the concept of a "zero-sum" of
authority meaning that one possesses as much authority as another lacks
it.

The objects of analysis are the individuals who play social roles.

In Dahrendorf's view, it is always possible to clearly distinguish
between those who possess authority and those who are subordinated.
The superordinating subjects legitimately control those who are subordinated through prohibitions and orders.

The superordinating subjects

have conflictual interest with these of the subordinated subjects.

In

293
the initial stage the conflict of interest is

"latent~"

conflictual interests give rise to "quasi-groups."

The latent

\<.Then the conflict-

ual interests become conscious goals of these "quasi-groups," conflict becomes manifest and its protagonists change into conflictual
groups.

Structural conflict by its turn accounts for social change.

Critics of this theory, regarding social classes based on the
authority relations were reported on pp.71 and

73, are also valid in

connection with the theory of structural conflict in Dahrendrof's view.
There is no need to repeat them here.

The only thing that should be

stressed again is that if we accept authority relations as a basis for
class conflicting interests, the classless society is practically
impossible because one can hardly invision any society without authority
relations.

Thus structural conflict will always be present in a

society.
Djilas'

theory of conflict between the "new class" and the vast

majority of the others is the closest to the theory of class and class
conflict presented in this paper.

It was already stressed before that

the so-called "avant-garde" of the proletariat in Djilas' view has been
transformed into a "new class."

A precondition of the rise of the "new

class'' was a seizure of the political power.

That was the first step

in creating the "Party state" which did not occur instantly but rather
during a long process.

"The totalitarian dictatorship of the Communist

Party oligarchy in the Communist system is not the result of momentary
political relations, but a long and complex social progress." 8 \.f.i.th

8Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
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time, the process is accelerated and the new class strengthens itself.
"The claim that it is a dictatorship of the proletariat becomes an
empty slogan."9
It was through the nationalization of the means of production, or
more exactly, through the rise of the new property rights and control
of the distribution of the GNP that the new class has been established.
Djilas writes:
. without their special role as administrators over society and
as distributors of property, the Communists could not transform
themselves into a new class, nor could a new class be formed and
permanently established. Gradually material goods were nationalized,
but in fact, through its right to use, enjoy, and distribute these
goods, they became the property of a discernible stratum of the
Party and the bureaucracy gathered around it.10
Thus

an exclusive control of the property distribution makes this class

a universal employer and subject of privilege. 11

"The new class felt

insecure as long as there were any other owners except itself." 12
The third important feature of the "netv class" is its attempt to
control society through the ideology.

The new class cannot tolerate

other ideologies because that might undermine its control of every
aspect of human life.

9Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 79.
lOibid., pp. 55-56.
ll"The new class
was. But it does not
bourgeoisie had. The
without aristocracy's
12

Ibid., p. 56.

is voracious and insatiable, just as the bourgeois
have the virtues of frugality and economy that the
new class is as exclusive as the aristocracy, but
refinement and proud chivalry." Ibid., p. 60.
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From birth to death a man is surrounded by the solicitude of the
ruling party, a solicitude for his consciousness and conscience.
Journalists, ideologists, paid writers, special schools, approved
ruling ideas, and tremendous material means are all enlisted and
engaged in this 'uplifting of socialism'.l3
The so-called "scientific materialism" and Marx' theory of class and
class conflict plays two different roles in chronologically different
periods.

"Before the Communists usurped power, this theory was neces-

sary in order to recruit revolutionaries and revolutionary organs; now
it justifies the totalitarian control of the new class • . • particular
revolutionary forms were transformed into reactionary ones." 14
In Djilas' view, "contemporary Communism • . . consists of three
basic factors for controlling the people.
second, ownership; the third, ideology." 15

The first is power; the
Class conflict has its roots

in conflictual political, economic and ideological interests.
flict is acute, even if it is latent.

The con-

The new class prevents any mani-

festation of it because that would undermine the "authority" of the new
class.
Becoming increasingly one-sided and exclusive, contemporary Communism
more and more creates half-truths and tries to justify them . . . its
half-truths are exaggerated and debased to the point of perversion;
the more rigid and the more inspired it is with lies, the more it
strengthens the monopolism of its leaders over society, and thus over
Communist theory itself. 16

13

u·1 ovan
.·d

n·Jl.·1 as, Th e N
·
lew c1 ass, op. c1.t.,
pp. 133 .

14Ibid., pp. 71-72.
15
16

Ibid., p. 166.
Ibid., p. 129.
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Structural Conflict and the Orthodox
Marxist Theory of Class
In the orthodox Communist sociologists' view, the conflict which
occurs in Poland is not a structural conflict because Polish society is
a "classless society." 17

The manifest conflict is explained in differ-

ent \vays t;vhich depend on the stage of the conflict and eventual future
changes in the Party forum.

At the initial stage the reason for con-

flict is found in the subversive activities of the Western (American,
British, and German) imperalists, or the domestic hooligans who have
nothing to do with the workers who love the Party because the Party
loves them.
quently

The first version of the explanation is applied most fre-

particularly in the case when an immediate change in the Party

leadership is not foreseen, or when no victims are to be sacrificed pro
Party bonum.

In this case the responsibility for the crisis is to be

located outside the Party itself.

In June 1956, the accusations were

made chiefly against the Western imperialist agents who exploited the
circumstances of the International Fair in Poznan for their own purposes, contrary to the interests of the country represented by and
embodied in the Party.

Trybuna Ludu wrote:

succeeded in provoking street disorders.

"On June 28th, enemy agents

Xatters went so far that

17 This paper has focused mainly on the worKlng class upheavals, in
large majority manual workers, but not exclusively. Their revolts
presented the most challenge to the ruling elite but they were not the
unique protagonist of the conflicts. The structural conflict, as we
will see later, also involved peasants and intelligentsia.
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several public buildings were attacked, with casualties resulting.''

18

The newspaper continued:
Let us think. I.Jho, and for what purpose, could have wanted at precisely this moment and just in Poznan, where the 25th International
Fair is taking place with many foreigners participating, to create
these sorts of incidents? • . . The enemy and well-organized nests
of agents chose precisely this. moment, disregarding the intentions
of the working people of Poznan, to incite riots for purely provocative purposes.l9
Also in 1976, the immediate change in the Party leadership was not
foreseen.

So the reason for the conflict had to be found outside the

Party files.

This time, however, the enemy was domestic, the hooligans.

These people of marginal social status had their interests in such a
conflict but they had nothing to do with the real workers.

Radio

Warsaw, while announcing the withdrawal of the price rises, said that
the disturbances in Ursus and Radom were caused by "irresponsible
elements" and "adverturers masquerading as workers." 2 0
city of Radom spoke similarly.

The mayor of the

In his view, the events were caused by

"parasitic, hooligan, criminal and anti-socialist elements."21 In consequence, the real working class is indignant at such activities which
are contrary to working class interests and to the interests of the
nation.

To prove that, hundreds of workers' resolutions were fabricated

and sent to the leaders to express full support of the leadership and

18
19
20

Trybuna Ludu, July 29, 1956.
Ibid.
BBC Monitoring, June 26, 1976.

21Trybuna Ludu, July 1, 1976.
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and to condemn the "hooligans."

Similarly, many "spontaneous" rallies

took place in support of the Party. 22
The same patterns of explanations for the crises between the power
elite and the intelligentsia (university students included) was adopted
in 1968.

The

SAil~

(Stowarzyszenie Ateistow i Wolnomyslicieli--Asso-

ciation of the Atheists and Freethinkers) bitterly condemned the intelligentsia and students.

The Poznan SAiW wrote: ''Regarding the factious

street incidents caused by reactionary forces hostile to our fatherland, we univocally support the truth which was fully presented in the
speech of comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka during the meetings with (Party)
activists in the Capitol."

23

The Warsaw SAiW was still more servile.

Its resolution said: "We decisively condemn the group of

~vriters

in the

Warsaw district, who had the audacity to raise a hand against socialism,
against Poland, and against our Party." 24

The alumni of the Party

School in Warsaw openly supported the brutality of the police: "We
morally support the actions of the workers' activists, of the ORMO, and
of the militia.

We agree with all administrative and personal decisions

undertaken by the State authorities and the Party; we totally support
them." 25

22 Especially after the June 1976 riots, the workers were forces to
participate in tne rallies. They were taken directly from the factories
to the places of the rallies. The rallies were presented on radio and
television as huge manifestations of the working class support of Party
policy.
23

"Razem z Partia," Argumenty 15 (1963).

24rbid.
25rbid.
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Only when events are under control, the official propagada admits
the real reasons for grievances which have caused the conflict.

In

July 1956, the Central Committee of the Party admitted:
It is a fact that demagogues and hostile rabble-rousing elements
succeeded in exploiting the particular dissatisfactions of the ZISPO
workers and workers of several other enterprises, caused by procrastination in dealing with their serious grievances and justified
demands, thus bringing about strikes and street demonstration&.26
The Emergency Congress of the Party in 1981 declared: "Overpowered by the
leadership Party was losing confidence of the people.

The growing dis-

crepancy between the words and the actions of the people in power was
causing chaos and an authority crisis."

27

Instead, when the change in the Politburo is on the way, the explanation of the conflict marks a new path.

In order to conciliate the

rioters the newly chosen leadership blames the former members of the
ruling body for all the evils of the past period.

One person or a

group of the former Politburo is accused of mismanagement and lack of
democracy in the Party itself.

Referring to the events of June 1956,

Gomulka said in October of the same year:
If agents and provokers were able to inspire the working class to
action, the enemies of the People's Poland, the enemies of socialism
would have a much easier task and could easily attain their goals.
But the point is that this is not so . . • The causes of the Poznan
tradegy and of the profound dissatisfaction of the entire working
class are to be found in ourselves, in the leadership of the Party,
in the Government. The inflammable materials have been accumulating for years.28

26TrybunQ Ludu, July 31, 1956.
27"Uchwala IX Nadzwyczajnego Zjazdu PZPR," Gazeta Krakowska,
July 30, 1981.
28Trvbuna Ludu, October 21, 1956.
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After the 1970 upheaval in Gdansk, Gierek stated" "Comrade Gomulka, in
112 9
. . d con f.d
. .
whom we h a d un 1 liDlte
l ence f or so 1 ong, rna d e wrong d eclslons.
Krasko, a member of the new Politburo spoke: "The brain of the
Party suffered from serious disorders."30
~1oczar

Another Politburo member,

added: "The old leadership was thinking in terms of the methods

of the nineteenth century, while there

wer~

continuing changes all

around us • . • (it) did not realize that the people did not believe
in the Party."

31

Also in 1981, the Emergency Congress of the Party

admitted that the 1980 strikes in Poland were caused by "the abuses of
the system and the deviations from universal principles of socialism

"32
These explanations of the conflict here discussed, are a necessary

consequence of the negation of the structural conflict in socialist
societies.

Wesolowski's view expresses the official doctrine.

It is

not the amount of money different social groups receive which accounts
for the rising of classes in society, but "the principle underlying this
distribution." 33

While in capitalism one can extract profit on the

basis of mere ownership (independently of labor), in socialism the dis-

29 L'Espresso (Rome), December 19, 1971.
30Nowe Drogi, February, 1971.
31Ibid.
32"Uchwala IX Nadzwyczajnego Zjazdu PZPR, Gazeta Krakmvska,
July 30, 1981.
33wlodzimierz \Jesolowski, Class, Strata and Power (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, Ltd., 1979), p. 124.
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tribution of the rewards is proportionate to the quantity and quality
of labor performed in the society according to the principle "to each
according to his work."

This does not lead to a class formation nor to

the structural conflict because: "(i) distinction 'according to work'
is recognized by the majority of the population as just; (ii) the long
term evolution of society is directed towards the transformation of this
principle into an 'even more just' one, namely distribution 'according
to need' ." 34
In other words, Wesolowski maintains that it is not inequality
itself which brings about a class formation and conflict, but the
reason for the inequality.

The existence of the inequality in the name

of socialism does not generate class conflict.
guise of something else, it does.

If it exists under the

This absurd conclusion was somewhat

corrected by the author when he added that sometimes an overpayment in
some strata and underpayment in the others can transform the "nonantagonistic" contradiction into "antagonistic" ones in the socialist
societies.

This happens when objectively noncontradictory interests

are perceived by some (socially retarded as objective). 35
The nonexistence of objective contradictory interests in the
ocialist societies are not proved by Wesolowski nor by any other
~arxist

3

sociologist.

They are taken for granted on the simple basis

~.Jlodzimierz Hesolowski, Class. Strata, . . .

op.

cit., p. 123.

35av the conflict Wesolowski means ''a perception of a certain state
of affai~s as somehow contrary to someone'~ ('mine' or 'our')
interest," ibid., p. 127.
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that with the nationalization of the means of production there has
ceased to exist the basis for conflictual

interests.

Reality, as Lane

points out, is much different.
After the initial political process by which the capitalist owners
of industry were expropriated, conflicts arise between the new
elite . . . and the majority of manual workers . . . The emoirical
facts point up a contradiction between the 'official ideology',
according to which the 'working class' is politically and socially
unitary, and the fact that income is distributed differentially
between various groups making up that class.36
In 1956, Gomulka was not a member of the outgoing Politburo.
was even imprisoned.

He

Therefore the accusations toward the former

ruling body were understandable.

But in 1970., Gomulka' s policy \vas

condemned by Gierek and others who shared Gomulka's responsibility for
the crisis.

Similarly in 1980, Gierek's leadership was sharply criti-

cized by the comrades who were his Politburo's members.

This was

openly stated by the Emergency Party Congress: "The present crisis was
caused by wrong functioning of the Party mechanism in the society and
country and by the mistakes of the concrete persons in pm.rer." 37

This

indicates the way the system functions and works to survive and the
necessary ready-made explanations the Party brings to interpret the
structural conflict and the conflict within the Party itself.
next part of this chapter,

more plausible theory

In the

of conflict in

socialist societies will be proposed.
36 navid Lane, The End of Inequality? (Middlesex: Penguin Books,
Ltd., 1971), pp. 105-106.
37

Gazeta Krakowska, July 30, 1981.

303
People's Democracies and the Structural Conflict
.Only a pure functionalism may deny the existence of conflict in
societies. 38

Other sociologists recognize the presence of one or

another type of conflict in every society.39

Even the orthodox Marx-

ists who deny the existence of structural conflict in socialist
societies which function smoothly under the guide of the respected communist parties admit some kind of tension among social groups (strata)
in socialist systems.

Similarly those who deny the existence of social

classes in the Soviet-type socialist societies because of the oneparty political system in those societies (Aron, Parkin), or because of
the power elite's role which uses terror to eliminate any formation of
other classes (Feldmesser), recognize the presence of strains in
"People's Democracies."
Obviously, the principle (the Party-state) which keeps such a regime
alive and flourishing cannot be respected for legality or for the
spirit of compromise. In all probability, a monopolistic party
regime would die if it were infected by the democratic spirit of
compromise.40

38Dahrendorf summarizes the essential elements of functionalism in
the following points: (1) "Every society is a relatively persisting configuration of elements; (2) Every society is a well integrated configuration of elements; (3) Every element in a society contributes to its
functiong; (4) Every society rests on the consensus of its members."
Ralf Dahrendorf, Toward a Theory . . . , op. cit., p. 217.
39 conflict theories presuppose a position diametrically opposite
to functionalism.
(1) " Every society is subject at every moment to
change . • . (2) Every society experiences at every moment social conflict . . • (3) Every element in the society contributes to its change,
(4) Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others."
Ibid.
40Raymond Aron, Democracy • • • , op. cit., 49.
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Elsewhere the same author indicates the contradictory character of
the State-run socialist systems which must cause social conflict.

He

says:
It (the system) has to allow the intelligentsia freedom of discussion and yet withhold the right to subject the State ideology to
critical analysis. Economists must search for the most effective
methods of planning the economy without infringing on Marxist
dogma about historical development. Sociologists must study the
workers' response to mechanization, automation, and even industrial
discipline, but neither the sociologists nor economists are
permitted to query the fundamental principles of Harxism-Leninism
or the identification of the party with the proletariat. 41
Similarly Feldmesser, admitting the "status of privilege within a
basically classless framew·ork," admits some kind of conflict. 42

Privi-

lege, by definition, excludes the meritorious basis for the distribution of scarce goods, otherwise it would be no privilege.
Conflict, as Borg points out, can be understood in a narrow or
broad sense.

The narrow concept of conflict refers to "open clashes

or struggles, either violent or non-violent." 43

Conflict in the broad

sense also includes "tensions, hostile attitudes, and antagonistic
interests between groups, even if those phenomena have not resulted in
open struggle."44
At this point we have to specify that we are dealing with a

41Rayrnond Aron, The Industrial Society (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 129-130.
42 Robert A. Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 533.
43

Marcus Borg, Conflict and Social Change (Minneapolis: Ungsburg
Publishing House, 1971), p. 69.
44 Ibid.
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structural conflict, i.e., conflict between at least two social
classes.

Thus, by definition, we exclude those authors who for any

reason deny the existence of classes in a particular society.

But the

antagonism between the classes can assume different forms, levels,
scopes, and intensities.

Referring to that issue, Miliband writes:

It (conflict) often is strictly localized and focused on immediate,
specific and 'economic' demands, and forms part of the 'normal'
pattern of relations between employer and wageearners--with strike
action as a familiar part of the pattern--fought at that level, in
so far as there occurs a permanent struggle for the communication of
alternative and contradictory ideas, values and perspectives. Or
it may be fought at the 'political' level, and bring into question
existing political arrangements, large or small.45
Even if one can hardly delineate the

boundaries between "eco-

nomic," "political," and "ideological" class conflict because the
structural conflict includes and expresses manifestations of conflict
at all these levels, the distinction is not totally sine fundamento in
re.

As we will see later on, there is at least a difference in stress-

ing the issues.

~fuile,

e.g., the conflict between peasants and power

elite, and workers and power elite in Poland was predominantly, but not
exclusively, at the economic level, the conflict between the intelligentsia and the power elite was on the ideological and political level.
This, again, is a matter of stress and not of qualitative differences
between one conflict and another at class level.
The inadequacy of the Marxian theory of class in explaining social
structure in the socialist societies has already been discussed, and an
alternative class theory presented.

Nor is the Marx' theory of conflict

4 5Ralf Miliband, Marxism and Politics, op. cit., p. 28.
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useful in explaining class conflict in these societies.
As for social conflict, one must be aware of the role which the
State, or more accurately the power elite, plays in the Soviety-type
socialist societies.46

In the capitalist societies the mechanism of

market law regulates the value of work and consequently its rewards and
the State only indirectly regulates the wages, in the "People's Democracies" an unequal distribution of goods is made by the power elite (a
political elite).

The opposite interests of the two classes in these

societies never meet directly unless the power elite is a party in the

46 Bauman sees six types of social conflict in the Soviety-type
socialist societies. (1) Conflict connected with a migration of peasants
to the cities. The peasant influx into the urban centers causes a disintegration of the urban population; (2) conflict whose main source is
a "loss of status." It takes place during the immediate period after
the revolution and its protagonists are the outgoing ruling class and
the new one. A similar conflict appears two decades later. The ruling
class composed of the professional revolutionaries finds a new generation of the ruling class more advantageous, more educated, and, therefore, they look at them as a threat; (3) a third type of conflict is a
conflict between different factions of the ruling class. This type of
conflict was manifest during all workers upheavals, but especially in
1956 and 1980. Bratkowski in his open letter to the Party saw t\vo
factions in conflict after the 1980 riot in Poland: a faction open for
reforms and the so-called "hardliners." Of these last he wrote: "They
offer no solution besides (that) of confrontation and misinformation.
They promise no hope, but drama." Stefan Bratkowski, "List Otwarty do
:1oich Wspoltowarzyszy," Solidarnosc (Gdansk) 9 (1981). (4) Conflict
between people of different occupations; (5) conflict caused by "inequality of opportunity, and (6) conflict which arises between the intelligentsia and the power elite regarding lack of freedom in the socialist
societies. Zygmunt Bauman, "Konflikty spoleczne we wschodnio-europejskim systemie politycznym," ANEKS 4 (1974) pp.37-48.
This is a mixture of different types of conflicts. Some even
(like the first) are not manifested in Poland. There was not one
workers' insurrection in Poland which showed a division between "established" and "immigrated" workers. The established workers did not
manifest more maturity than the "newcomers." Of these six conflicts
we are interested here mainly in the last two.
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conflict.

This is because, ''in the Socialist system the State (power

elite) assumes the role of direct regulator in the distribution of
goods, thus losing its guise of "nonengaged, neutral arbiter" of
controversies over pay and, more broadly, economic interests in
genera 1 . 1147

The power elite, as an intermediary, always enters

directly into a conflict with other classes.

1.-lhile the other classes

may change the power elite is always a necessary party in the conflict.
When,for example, the peasants sell a farm product, they sell it to the
State (power elite) and it is logical to assert that they enter in conflict with the power elite which establishes the prices of the product.

But they do not enter in conflict of interests with the other

classes.

They do not meet on the market.

It is again the power elite

which assumes another intermediary role; it is the power elite which
enters into a new conflict of interests (economic interests) with those
who buy products: a11 other social classes.

So the power elite is

always a necessary party in the structural conflict in the socialist
societies.

The graph on page 308 shows the possibility of conflict in

the Soviet-type aociety.
To what extent this theory is plausible can be seen in the
analyzed cases of the conflict in Poland'between workers and the power
elite.

The only people or objects attacked by the rioters were persons

and facilities of the power elite.

The looting of shops did happen but

the shops were not the direct object of attack.

47

p. 129.

Looting and vandalism

Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, Class, Strata and Power, op. cit.,
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Conflictual and Nonconflictual Class Relations in Poland
are a part of almost any kind of riot. Similarly the conflicts between
peasants and the power elite and between the intelligentsia and power
elite support this theory.

It was the intelligentsia which, after the

1976 riot in Radom and Ursus, energetically supported the workers. This
class had founded the KOR for the purpose of defending the workers and
collecting funds for their families.

Similarly, the Workers' Free

Trade Union, "Solidarity," openly supported peasants in their conflict
with the power elite in 1980.

Referring to KOR, 1-Jalesa said: "We will

never permit anyone to destroy these people.

I will support them

because I am personally indebted to them for many things."48

48

V.Thile

Gazeta Krakowska, August 31, 1981. Also Szczepanski indirectly
recognized such a conflict when he wrote: "Conflictual economic interests of the workers and intelligentsia and the peasants and intelligentsia have their roots in the division of the GNP and in the unequal
economic development of the country . . . "Jan J. Szczepanski,
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Wesolowski is almost compassionate to the power elite which has assumed
such a thankless role, the reality is very different.

It is the polit-

ical elite which has become the universal exploiter of all other
classes.

The political elite arbitrarily establishes the system of

wages and rewards and distributes the prestigious positions in society.
The political elite is not a guardian of the interests of other classes,
but it protects its own interests and privileges, of which the highest
privilege is to be above the law.

Lack of control and of any kind of

opposition brings about the personal corruption of the members of the
elite.

To cover the corruption and protect their interests, they build

a police-state.

Bribing is the most common way to influence the people.

Once one accepts a bribe, he is branded for all time, because the power
elite will blackmail him.49
cal, non-orthodox

vie~,rs,

Thus one will be punished not for politi.

but for bribing, stealing, or other crimes.

Besides the conflict between the power elite and the working class
(mainly unskilled and semi-skilled manual \·mrkers), there \vere at least

"Przewidy\vany rozwoj markostruktury spolecznej," Spoleczny rozr.wj Polski
w Pracach Pro&nostycznych by J. Danecki (Warszawa: KiW, 1974), p. 390.
Intelligentsia has to be understood here as power elite. Official class
theory does not distinguish between power elite and intelligentsia.
Even Widerszpil admits that in 1970, "conflict has manifested itself between Party leadership (on one side), and the ':·mrking class and
other classes (on the other)." Stanislaw Widerszpil, Przemiany . • . ,
op. cit., p. 19.
49

.
Xany people are conv1nced that the system purposely works in this
way. The State establishes such low wages that one is forced to steal
to survive. The State tolerates such practices until one is not
involved in political opposition. In a case of political unorthodoxy
this person is punished not for political views, but for crime. Cf.
Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384,
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two visible conflicts in the postwar Polish society: the power elite
versus peasants and the power elite versus intelligentsia.
The first type of conflict took place as early as in 1949, only
four years after the end of the War, and less than five years after the
agrarian reform was proclaimed by the PKWN in its Lublin Manifesto of
1944.

The reasons for conflict were equally economic as well as polit-

ical.

Under pressure from Moscow the government initiated an open

campaign against the rich farmers called derogatively "kulaks."50

The

official State propaganda presented them as a unique exploiting class.
Another means used by the power elite gainst the kulaks was the pressure
to join kolkhozes.
and machinery.
on farmers.

Private farmers were not allowed to buy fertilizers

At the same time the levies on products were reimposed

All this was done in the name of the Marxian principle that

the evil of the society is rooted in the private means of production.
Gomulka's opposition to the forced collectivization of privated farms
did not divert the event, and he himself was imprisoned.
The farmers' struggle was passive but very determined.

They did

not give up even though the power elite brought them to a state where
the private farm was a burden and not a means of adequate livelihood;
Polish agriculture was reaching a negative quota.

If the real income

of the private farmers in 1960 was considered as 100, the real income

50 "Kulak" means a rich farmer. The word was coined in Russia and
transplanted to Poland. It has a highly derogative meaning.
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of the Polish farmers was 78.6 in 1955.5 1
Gomulka's regaining power in 1956 brought about some relief for
private farming.

At least two things changed: (1) State propaganda

against the private farmers was stopped; (2) the pressure on the farmers
to join the Kolkhozes was lessened significantly.

For example, there

were 10,500 kolkhozes in 1956; in March 1957, there remained only 1752.
This diminution was due to the highly negative attitude of the large
majority of the population toward kolkhozes and only partly to an intentional Party policy. Jedrychowski, a planning chief at that time, said:
"Many people think that the retreat from the development of Kolkhozes
and dissolving of many of them was the result of a Party policy.

The

truth is that this retreat was brought about by the pressure of antisocialist elements at a time when the Party

~vas.

not strong enough to

resist,"5 2
At least two positive changes took place during Gomulka's leadership.

The first

~vas

more ease in receiving credits by private farmers.

In 1956, the credits for private farms reached 2,200,000 zlotys; in
1959, 5,400,000, and in 1961, 6,500,000. 53

The second positive step of

Gomulka's agricultural policy was the selling or leasing of State land

51

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. XL.

52 world Marxist Review, 2 (1959).
53 Rocznik Statystyczny, 1962; reported by Hansjakob Stehle, ''Polish
Communism," Communism in Europe by W. E. Griffith (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964), p. 159.
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to the private farmers.

In the short period of three years (1957-1960)

the government sold or leased 1,018,000,000 hectars of land to private
farmers.

54

Gomulka saw a solution of the prevalence of private farms in Poland
in the so-called agricultural circles (kolka rolnicze).

The farmers

were supposed to join others in buying machinery and were then entitled
to use it.

To support these new agricultural bodies, the Agricultural

Development Fund was established in 1959.

The main advantage of the

agricultural circles was the voluntary participation in time.

Even

withdrawal from them was only a matter of repayment of any uninvested
profit.

Their negative sides, however, were manifested very quickly.

Conflict over priority in using machinery was the most difficult problem;
Especially during an unfavorable season, when every day of good weather
was very important, the agricultural cooperative started to be a bone of
contention.

The agricultural circles were surely "a compromise solution

between practical and ideological necessities."55
not play the role they were supposed to.

They, however, did

Mainly practical difficulties

prevented them from fulfilling the task for which they were created.
The negative attitude by the power elite toward farmers was manifested also in other discriminatory policies toward peasants.

For

example, while the other social classes were included in medicare and
and social security programs since the beginning of the communist regime

54 HansJakob
.
- Stehle, Polish Communism . . . , op. cit., p. 159.
55rbid., p. 160.
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in Poland, the farmers were included only in 1971 under Gierek's leadership.
Since 1976, the strain between the power elite and the farmers was
visibly increasing.

The State bought the farm products at such low

prices that the farmers could make no profit.
critical.

The situation began to be

Farmers stopped selling their products. 56

Only after signi-

ficant increase in prices of farm products (mainly animal production)
did farmers increase agricultural production.
to be ridiculous.

But the situation started

One pound of meat or sausage (if found, because of a

chronic shortage of meat) was bought at a lower price than the price the
State was paying to the private farmers for the same amount of live
weight.

In the long run such a policy had to bring about the total

bankruptcy of the State.

Shortage of fodder and farm machinery did not

permit the increase of meat production.

Instead, it even visibly de-

creased from 194.5 in 1976 to 180.5 thousand tons in 1977.

It decreased

again by 7,000 tons in 1979, as compared with that of 1978. 57
This negative attitude of the power elite regarding the private
farmers sometimes resulted in painful actions.

In the late 1970s in the

Voivodship of Nowy Sacz, a high percentage of the crops of the farmers

56

The situation of the private farmer was not better in the 1960s.
Kuron and Modzelewski wrote in their open letter to the Party: "The
isolated peasant producer who enters into a 'voluntary' accord with the
State is helpless when faced with the State's monopoly of the market."
Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, "An Open Letter to the Party," Soviet
Communism and the Socialist Vision by J. Jacobson (New Jersey: New
Politics Publishing Company, 1972), p. 271.
56Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. XLI.
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was destroyed by the wild hogs which were purposely brought to that
region in large quantities for hun.ting.

Damages reported by the farmers

were only partly compensated for.
All these policies of the power elite regarding agriculture in the
name of the Marxian principle of nationalization of all the means of
production brought about an open conflict between the power elite and
the farmers.

Even the dramatic protests of the farmers were useless.

A

foundation of the Rural "Solidarity" somehow institutionalized the conflict.

But if politically the establishment of the Rural Free Trade

Union was surely a success, in practical terms not much change occurred.
Shortage of fuel, machinery and industrial products had a negative
effect on agricultural productivity.

Lack of goods on the market visi-

bly restricted the selling of farm products by the private farmers. Thus
a shortage of food became more acute.
The third class openly involved in the conflict with the power
elite in the postwar period in Poland was the intelligentsia class.

But

while the main issue which brought about the conflict between the working class and the power elite and the peasants and the power elite was
the economic degradation of these classes, the conflict between the
intelligentsia and the power elite has been rooted in the restriction of
freedom.

Restriction of freedom of scientific research and the obliga-

tory official ideology imposed by the regime prevented Polish humanities
from any real intellectual achievement in Communist Poland.
A turning point in the rather latent conflict between the power
elite and the intelligentsia during Stalinism was the publication of
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1-Jazyk's "Poem for Adults" in 1955.58

It was this poem which forcefully

expressed the disillusion of the Stalinist era of Communism.

The author

wrote:
They came and cried:
under socialism
a hurt finger does not hurt.
They hurt fingers.
They felt pain . . •
They drink sea-water crying 'lemonade: 59
Even if there was some opposition by the intelligentsia to the
power elite during Stalinism, Wazyk's poem marked the beginning of an
open conflict between these two classes.

Its tone, its perceptiveness,

its degree of condemnation of the present reality, its disgust and rebellion made the poem the most outspoken cry against the Polish socialist reality.

And the poem was understood in exactly this way by both

its supporters and its adversaries.

The new generation of the intelli-

gentsia perceived it as its manifesto in opposition to the regime.
Circles loyal to the Party considered it a blasphemy.

Trybuna Wolnosci,

organ of the Central Committee of the PZPR, wrote: "Wazyk weighs the
lying phraseology, the ideological emptiness and hypocrisy, the empty
declaration and old dogmas, which in reality is emptiness of heart and
mind

This poem is a bad and cruel half-truth."

60

The non-orthodox sociopolitical ideas have found a fertile soil.

58Adam Wazyk was a prewar Polish communist, a soldier in the
Eastern front against the Germans and a Party member after the war.
59Adam Wazyk, Poem for Adults, op. cit., p. 46.
60Trybuna Wolnosci, September 21-27, 1955.
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They rooted very quickly.

The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU called

them "revisionism" and their supporters "revisionists."

Revisionists

were attacking mainly dogmatism, the tyranny of politics over science
and economy.
Xatters." 61

Bienkowski published his "Hoon Economy and Earthly
J. Kott criticized the Party line regarding the cultural

policy in Poland.62

Three periodicals have become the strongholds of

the revisionist heresy: Nowa Kultura, Przeglad Kulturalny, and Po
prostu.

The young revisionists founded a social club "Krzywe Kolo"

(Crooked Circle) which served as a means of exchanging the new ideas.
The club became very popular in a short time.

Gomulka's return to

power in 1956 with his condemnation of the Stalinist past and the promises for democratization and the redefinition of the Polish-Soviet
relations on the basis of equality, received full support of the revisionists.

This group, more than anyone else, was aware of what Gomulka

publicly acknowledged: "In Poland • . • tragic events occurred when
innocent people were sent to their death.
• although innocent .

Hany others were imprisoned

Terror and demoralization were spread." 63

However, as soon as Gomulka's regime consolidated its power, it
turned against the intellectual revisionists.

W. Bienkowski was dis-

missed as Minister of Education, J. Hochfeld lost his position as
director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs. 64

Censorship was reim-

6lprzeglad Kulturalny, September 28, 1956.
62Nineteenth session of the Polist Writer and Artists, March, 1956.
63Trybuna Ludu, October 21, 1956.
64The New York Times, October 30, 1959.
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posed.

In 1957, it touched most bitterly Po prostu which had become

almost a symbol of revisionism.

By the middle of 1957, 50 per cent of

its content was censored and the weekly was closed down by the end of
the same year.

Several members of its editorial staff were expelled

from the Party.

A. Werblan, Party ideologists, said that "in the

future, neither time nor money would be wasted on the publication of
demoralizing works which do not contribute to the Socialist reconstruction of the state."

65

During the Party Plenum in 1963, Gomulka himself

proposed some guidelines for the intellectuals.

"The Party most

strongly supports the creativity of Socialist realism

Before any-

thing else we support art realistic in form and Socialist in its content
of ideas and its relationship to the world and to the fate of
men . • . " 66

Schaff in his "Communism and Humanism" elaborated somewhat

on Gomulka's idea.

He wrote:

As long as there are enemies of freedom, as long as they are capable
of effective fight, so long must various limitations of their freedome be accepted of necessity by Socialist humanism, because it is a
fighting humanism. Unlimited freedom for the enemies of freedom as
long as they are effectively capable of fighting means more than
danger of deviation and excess--it means the certainty of the defeat
of the cause of freedom.
Only against this background can one understand the Marxist theory of
the state which must go to democracy through dictatorship.67

65cited by Lewis Coser, Men of Ideas (New York: The Free Press,
1965)' p. 202.
66 N
.d J une, 1963.
iOWa Ku 1 tura, m167

Adam Schaff, "Communism and Humanism," World Communism by S.
Hook (New York: Van Nostrand Reinbolt, 1962), p. 240.
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The policy of strict censorship increased an antagonism between the
power elite and the intelligentsia.

In January 1964, during the meeting

of the members of the Union of Polish Writers, sharp criticism from the
writers was addressed to the Party authority.
~rominent

Two months later, 34

Polish \Jriters and intellectuals sent a "memorandum" to Prime

Minister J. Cyrankiewicz.

The document criticized Party policy regard-

ing freedom of publications and openly asked for a radical change in
the cultural policy.

Kuron and Modzelewski said in an open letter to

the Party:
Engaged scholars, writers and artists are discriminated against by
publishing houses and cultural policy makers. They are denied
access to mass media, i.e., the chance to practice their professions: socioliterary periodicals which exhibit even a minimum
degree of independence are replaced by publications which are then
boycotted by the most eminent creative people; the intensification
of censorship narrows down still further the already small margin
of professional freedom among the creative intelligentsia. In this
way, the ideological crisis becomes the source of a crisis in cultural creativity.68
The relationship between the power elite and the intelligentsia
has been very tense.

As in the cases of the workers' upheavals only a

spark ,.,as needed to cause an open conflict.

That happened in March

1968, when Gomulka, under pressure from Moscow, banished Hickiewicz'
play Dziady (Ancestors) because the spectators were applauding antiRussian phrases.
protests.

Thereafter students began street manifestation and

The police reacted immediately and energetically.

actions exceeded all decent limits.

68

Their

Beatings, arrests, the stopping

Jacek Kuron and Karol HodzeleHski, An Open Letter . . . , op.
cit., p. 254.
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and searching of people in the s.treets were normal events.

The Com-

munist Party kept a list of students who were later expelled from the
universities and many of whom were immediately drafted.
self was furious.

Gomulka him-

Poorly educated as he was, he publically criticized

and condemned one of the most famous Polish historians, Pawel Jasienica. 69
silence.

Jacienica' s books \vere banished and their author condemned to
A ban was also imposed on other prominent writers like Slon-

imski, Kisielewski, Andrzejewski
As during the workers' upheavals the Party fabricated hundreds of
workers' resolutions expressing the indignation of the working class at
the student-hooligans and supporting Party policy.

Gomulka was refer-

ring to those when he said: "It was not against the (real) students, but
against the reactionary instigators that the workers were aiming their
resolutions

It is absurd to maintain that our Party tries or

intends to poison workers' minds against students."70
The Fifth Congress of the Party also spent a great deal of time and
energy on dealing with revisionism.

Its final document proclaimed:

The revisionists are questioning the leading role of the workers'
class and its basis in favor of the conflicting political forces;
they maintain that the dictatorship of the proletariat in a society
without the antagonistic classes is completely antiquated . . •
They try to obliterate the differences between the bourgeois and
Socialist democracies by supplementing socialist institutions with

69 Gomulka's occupation was that of locksmith.
not go beyond the vocational high school.
70Argumenty 13 (1968).

His education did
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bourgeois ones and proclaim an ideological coexistence of socialism
capitalism. 71
The Party ideologist, Werblan, made a list of the names of the most
dangerous revisionists: L. Kolakowski, W. Brus, K. Pomian, B. Buczko,

z.

Bauman, J. Kott, P. Hertz, and others. 72

He warned against the

revisionists: "A victory of revisionism would bring about the suppressing of the leading role of the Harxist-Leninist Party and in consequence debar it from political pm.;er."
Another reason for the criticism of Gomulka's policy by the
revisionists at that time was Poland's participation in the military
invasion of Czechcslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968. 73 Gomulka
was a strong supporter of such a move.

So he considered the criticism

coming from the revisionists as a slap in his face.

He felt bitterly

touched by the criticism of the oppositionists intellectuals.

74

The revisionist intellectuals were considered by Gomulka as his
number one enemy.

He was in conflict with them during the whole period

of being in power.

Paradoxically, it was not the revisionists who

overthrew him, but the workers of Gdansk, who did it in December 1970.
Gomulka's era was closed forever.

71

His career can be characterized

Nowe Drogi 12 (1968), p. 125.

72 Andrzej Werblan, "Przyczynek do genezy konfliktu," Hiesiecznik
Ljteracki 6 (1968), p. 63.
73 rbid., p. 62.
74Gomulka had an inferiority complex because of his low education.
It manifested often in showing him to be an expert in almost everything:
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briefly in the following way: Gomulka was one of those few people who
started their political career with such greatness, but ended it so
disgracefully.
Gierek has never condemned Golumka's 1968 repressive measures
regarding the students and revisionists.

The beginning of his leader-

ship marked, however, some symptoms which were promising a change in the
cultural policy of the power elite.

A high party official, Kraska,

said: "The Party has understood that the arts cannot be forced to do
this or that and this opens possibilities for more intellectual freedome."75

In the name of the so-called dialogue between the party and

the nation, some steps of liberalization were undertaken.

Censorship

still operated full time, but several authors were again allowed to
publish.

Kisielewski, referring to that Party policy said that the

Party was more interested in finding support for its policy than in
"providing a fertil milieu for the development of genuinely superior
literature." 76
In the long run the Party did not intend to guarantee any essential
concession.

Historical and sociological researchers were watched care-

fully to keep them within the limits imposed by the regime.

The Party's

policy was clearly stated by the Politburo member, Szydlak, in 1973, who
warned that there have been observed among the writers the tendencies of

politics, industry, agriculture, husbandry, and even art and history.
75 Reuter (Warsaw), Harch 8, 1981.
76Tygodnik Powszechny (Krakow), March 8, 1973.
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socio-historical analysis "in the spirit of theories • . . ideologically alien to us." 77

So, pratically, no change in the cultural policy

of the ruling has occurred under Gierek's leadership.

Every day life

contradicted the official statement of a high official of the Party,
Tejchma, that in Poland "there is room for both firm acceptance and
critical restlessness in literature." 78
The period after 1976 marked a similar negative policy of the Party
toward the intellectuals just as it was during the worst days of
Gomulka's regime.

Professor Lipinski wrote in his open letter to

Gierek: "Censorship falsifies the historical researches

~vhen

they touch

the disgraceful policy of the tsarist Russia (regarding Poland)
:it drastically deprives the citizens of (any honest) information

He have no one newspaper in the country 11:1ich is worthy of this name,
and the raio-television information is simply shameful. " 79
During the Congress of the Polish Writers in 1978, Braun forcefully
attacked the Party's policy regarding the cultural intelligentsia.
criticized the role of censorship.

He

The speaker said:

Esixting censorship shamefully violates the moral rights of a writer
It is censorship which not only determines who is a write in
Poland, but also the subject of the writing, and its final version;
censorship decides the time and the range of a writing's diffusion
and reception, the response to it and the alleged opinion of the
readers • • . There are official lists in publishing houses, radio
and television stations of the persons deprived of the right to

77 Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1973.

78 rbid., February 23, 1975.
79Edward Lipinski, List otwarty . . . . op. cit., p. 10.
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publish and so condemned to silence because they are deprived of the
right to a professional job . • • 80
Braun also informed the participants of the search of private homes of
writers by the police, the confiscation of papers and private books,
the prohibition of contact with other people, arrests, political processes, etc.

He finished his speech saying: "this is the social status

of the Polish writer today . • • "81
A similar criticism of the Party's policy concerning cultural life
dominated the Congress of the Polish Writers in 1980.

Twenty speakers

unanimously comdemned the Party's polity regarding the rights of the
writers in Poland.82
The most acute conflict between the power elite and the intelligentsia took place in 1976, during the so-called
amendments to the Polish constitution of 1952.
discussed.

deba~e

regarding some

Two amendments were

The first regarded the constitutional recognition of the

leading role of the Communist Party in Poland and the second referred to
the introduction

of the amendment expressing the friendship between the

Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union.

Mainly the second amend-

ment raised protests and indignation among the large majority of the
Polish intelligentsia.

Professor Lipinski wrote: ''The imposition (on

80 Andrzej Braun's speech during the Congress of the Union of the
Polish Writers in 1978. See Dziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda" (Chicago),
July 28-29, 1978.
81
82

Ibid.
nziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda" , ibid., March 24, 1980.
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Poland) of the Soviet system has had many highly negative consequences
on our social and moral life, it has been a great
history of our nation. 8 3

In the same

m~sfortune

in the

author's view, the shamefulness

of such an amendment was aggravated by the circumstance that it was
taking place in a time when almost all Communist parties in the whole
world "were detaching themselves from being the supporters of the
imperialistic interests of the Soviet Union in favor of their own,
national policies." 84

Bienkowski called this amendment an absurdity

which ''imposes duties on Poland and its citizens . . . regarding a
(foreign) neighbor country." 85

He accused the Soviet Union of an

interference in the Polish affairs so deeply that the "Soviet representative to Poland plays the role of supercensor." 86

Thus the Polish

people look at those who agreed to pass such an amendment with
"repugnance and contempt."87

a

Letters similar to their content were sent

from different groups of the intelligentsia and individual persons.
The second amendment also provoked much indignation among the

83Edward Lipinski, List otwarty • • . , op. cit., p. 9.
84rbid. , p. 8.
85wladyslaw Bienkowski, "List otwarty do Wladz Polski Ludowej r.v
sprawie normalizacji stosunkow ze Zwiazkien Radzieckim." Kultura
(Paryz) 4 (1976), p. 103.
86 Ibid., p. 104.
87Ibid., p. 106.
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Polish intelligentsia.

The Club of the Intelligentsia in Wroclaw

wrote that the amendment regarding the constitutional recognition of
the leading role of the Communist Party (PZPR) intended "to confirm the
priority of the Party over the nation" and therefore, if passed, it
"would deny the little bit of democracy which still existed in the
country (Poland)." 88

Andrzejewski sent a letter signed by 101 Polish

writers expressing their concerns in connection with the proposed
amendments. 89
did likewise.90

The Catholic deputies ZNAK to Polish Parliament (Sejm)
Apropos, thirty professors and students of the Catholic

University in Lublin wrote:
Passing of the constitutional amendment recognizing the leading role
of the Communist Party in the present critical situation would
unequivocally identify the responsible force (the Party itself) for
hitherto existing negligence in different areas of our social life
and it would deepen already existing divisions.91
As one could foresee, both amendments passed in the Parliament
(Sejm), but the amendment regarding the friendship between Poland and
the Soviet Union was reworded and approved only in this mild form.
Even if the Polish intelligentsia challenged to some extent the
power elite, it was relatively an easy enemy.

The power elite could

quite easily defeat the challenger by depriving it of its weapons--

88
89
90
91

"Reakcja Katolikow Swieckich," Kultura (Paryz) 4 (1976), p. 108.
Kultura (Paryz) 3 (1976), pp. 28-30.
Ibid., pp. 30-31.
List 30 mlodszych pracownikow naukowych . . . , op. cit., p. 32.
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words and ideas--by isolating its members, imprisonment, expulsion from
the universities, drafting, etc.

The intelligentsia's challenge to the

power elite was necessary but not sufficient to bring about some essential change in the country.

It took almost 30 years for the intelli-

gentsia to realize that, only a close collaboration with the working
class could effectively challenge the powerful political elite in the
socialist country.

The workers alone did challenge the elite in 1956,

1970, and 1976, but the price the workers paid for the change was disproportionally high in comparison to the concessions they gained.
after

Only

the 1976 insurrection, when the Polish intelligentsia entered

into a close collaboration with the leaders of the workers, did they
bring about the 1980 change in the Polish society.

There is no force

which can challenge the powerful political elite in the People's
Democracies other than the working class but this class must be provided with the leadership of more enlightened people.
Structural conflict in the People's Democracies is unexplainable on
the basis of the Marxian theory of class and class conflict.

One must

necessarily choose between a recognition of the presence of class and
class conflict in the socialist societies and consequently reject
Marx' theory, or conversely, one must deny the existence of structural
conflict and provide a scapegoat theory of what is happening in these
societies.

Orthodox Marxists and the Polish Communist propaganda

chose the second alternative.

This, however, has far-reaching conse-

quences in the policy of every day life.

Negation of the structural

conflict and lack of the institutionalization of conflict through the
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appropriate channels lead to cyclical upheavals of the working class or
other social classes.

Polish workers' insurrections are the best

example of such periodical riots.
A final recapitulation of the working hypotheses from Part One,
Chapter II, pages 75-76, requires some revisions of the initial hypotheses.

The main correction is needed in regard to the hypothesis

number 2 which states that the nationalization of the means of production and large land property has eliminated extreme poverty and
extreme wealth in Poland.

As it was pointed out in several places of

the research, this is true only to a certain extent.

The ownership of

the means of production only ceases to be the first variable to account
for social structure in Poland.

Seizure of an absolute political power

by the Communist Party has changed only the form of control of the
means of production.

The power elite does not own the means of pro-

duction, but it still controls it and controls the distribution of the
GNP.

Consequently, the power elite controls the entire political,

economic, and social life.
In Poland "everything depends on
favor with the Party.

~..rhether

you are in favor or out of

Your (social) position, possibilities of scien-

tific work and any social rise depend on it.

The Party's ID is the key

to your career."92
Additionally, hypothesis number 2 must necessarily be supplemented
by other hypotheses which specify how the political power accounts for

92

Appendix A, Interview 6, p. 402.
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the inequality in Poland, and what the other important variables are
which account for class formation in the Polish society.

Thus the

stress should be laid on hypothesis number 3 which specifies the way in
which Party people are better off and how they manage their status
(hypotheses numbers 4, 5, and 6).

Hypothesis number 7 indicates the

other variables which are responsible for class structure in Poland,
namely: education, wealth, and social prestige of the occupations.

This

is supplemented by hypotheses number 8 which stresses the fact that the
nonmeritorial basis for class formation brings about the inconsistency
of social statuses in Poland.
Specificity of the conflict in the socialist system is stated in
hypothesis number 10.

The reason why the power elite is a necessary

party in every structural conflict in the Soviet-type socialist societies is the totalitarian character of the power elite.

Consequently,

the power elite imposes itself as an intermediary in the conflict.
Doing so it prevents the meeting of the conflictual interests of other
classes on the market.
Finally. hypotheses numbers 1, 11, and 12 need some additional
emphasis.

The first hypothesis needs the stress because in Poland the

so-called coexistence of different political parties is simply a
fiction created by the Communist Party for propaganda purposes.
Poland the power is not shared.

In

It belongs to the Communist Party.

There is no organized political opposition in the country.
Hypothesis 11

needs emphasis too because of the coincidence of the

division between the power elite and non-Party people, between believers
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and non-believers and between power elite (who are pro Russian) and
those for whom the national interest has the highest value.

Even if

these coincidences might not always be true at the individual level,
they are certainly true at the institutional level, i.e., State-Church.
In Poland propaganda serves as a means of social control.

Propa-

ganda is absolutely necessary for the system to survive.
As far as the future fate of the socialist societies is concerned,
the following predictions could be made on the basis of this study:
1.

Because the Soviet-type socialist societies do not know any
way to undergo even unsubstantial changes (this has been
blocked not only practically, but even constitutionally),
cyclical insurrections will be necessary to bring about social
change in those societies.

2.

At the brink of losing power, the power elite will make all
the necessary concessions (verbal and written) to prevent its
collapse. Once it overcomes the crisis, the power elite will
slowly or immediately withdraw the concessions to assure its
stay in power.

3.

In order to save its power, the political elite will not
hesitate to invite even foreign troops.

4.

Any time a crisis occurs, the political elite will need scapegoats to save the face of the system. It is almost a rule that
the first secretaries are the first to be sacrificed pro Party
bonum.

5.

The power elite will not put its officials on trial, or if it
does, this will only be a show-trial (another scapegoat),
because the trial of one Party's official would have to become
the trial of almost all high Party people.

6.

The class structure in the socialist societies can never assume
purely meritorial character. That would deprive the political
elite of the tool of rewarding the unpopular Party membership.
Similarly, the vast majority of the population must remain at
the poverty level. Procuring daily bread absorbs people and
keeps them out of politics. The Party must be an exclusive
administrator of privileges to be able to reward Party membership.
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7.

Economic, political, and social emancipation of the lower
classes would inevitably bring about the collapse of the
political elite and the system itself.

8.

A "Finlandization" of Poland would be possible, but this would
imply a substantial change in the power structure in Poland
or, at least, a political elite that would be more dedicated
to the national cause.

CONCLUSION
Marx' theory of class represents undoubtedly a dichotomous model
of social stratification.

Possession or exclusion from the ownership

of the means of production gives rise to that type of social structure.

But even the nineteenth century British society which was used

by Marx as a case study did not fit that picture.

There were three

segments of that society which were "complicating" such a model. First,
it was the middle class which neither made a part of the capitalist
class nor constituted a part of the proletariat.

The individuals of

that "class" did not belong to the capitalist class because they were
not employing the other people and therefore they were not the capitalist exploiters.

But they did not make a part of the proletariat either

because, as self-employed, they \lere not the wage-laborers.

Secondly,

:·Iarx found it difficult to categorize the "class" of the intellectuals
on the basis of the means of production criterion.

On the one hand,

they were not capitalists because they did not own the means of production or capital, and on the other hand, they could hardly be labelled
as proletarians being not involved directly in the productive process.
Thirdly, the significant differences in wages could account for different subclasses in the huge proletarian class.
Harx "solved" these difficulties in a rather simplistic way.

As

for the first difficulty, he acknowledged the existence of the "middle
class" but he predicted its disappearance with the maturation of the
capitalist system itself.

The second difficulty was "solved" by
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applying a new criterion of class, i.e., ideology, instead of the
ownership of the means of production.

Marx categorized the intel-

lectuals as a capitalist class calling them "an ideological class" supporting the capitalists.

As far as the third difficulty was concerned,

Marx was convinced that capitalist society was polarizing into two
poles: a pole of wealth and a pole of misery.

The individuals of the

misery pole could not differ significantly in regard to wealth for two
reasons: the skilled labor which was better paid would disappear with a
technical advancement of society when a machine would perform toe vast
majority of the complicated operations.

In consequence, the human

labor would be reduced to the simple repetitive actions.

Second, given

the fact of the chronic unemployment in a capitalist society, the wages
of the laborers could hardly be established at a higher level than the
value of their labor: that is what is equal to the expense necessary to
maintain workers' physical and mental capacity for work.
The predictions Marx made on the basis of this theory never came
true.

The so-called third class not only did not disappear with a

further advancement of

capit~lism,

but it had grown to such an extent

that it had become the most numerous class of the modern capitalist
society.

Similarly Marx' prediction regarding the "emiseration"

(Verelendung) of the advanced capitalist societies because of the polarization process toward the opposite poles: misery and wealth vanished.
Finally, the skilled labor in the advanced capitalist societies appeared
to be more important than ever before.
Marx predictions regarding the future society after the nationaliza-
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tion of the means of production appeared equally futile.

As it has

been shown in the case of Poland, the patterned inequality is reproducing itself in Polish society in spite of the fact that the means
of production had been nationalized in Poland.

So, unless one liter-

ally applies Marx' theory of class, one has to come to a conclusion
that the nationalization of the means of production does not necessarily
wipe out patterned inequality in a society.

This simply means that the

nationalization of the means of production can and surely does, at
least in the so-called People's Democracies, form another basis for
class formation.

In other words, as it was shown in the case of Poland,

there are other variables than the possession or exclusion from ownership of the means of production which account for class arising in the
socialist societies.
The social structure of the modern societies, either socialist or
capitalist appeared to be complicated enough so as not to fit the
simplistic class model of

~farx.

In the socialist societies everyone is

characterized by the same relations to the means of production.

Conse-

quently there are not classes in the Marxian sense in those societies.
This, however, does not mean that the social stratification is absent
in those societies.

Four main variables account for social inequality

in the socialist societies, namely, (1) access to political power with
new property relations, (2) the division of labor which is expressed
mainly in the diversity of occupations, (3) a system of differentiated
wages, and (4) the cultural values expressed mainly in a hierarchy of
social prestige in occupations.
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In Poland, as in other countries of the Peoples' Democracies, the
political elite did not grow out of the group structure.

Vice versa,

it was the political power which significantly influenced the social
structure.

This fact manifested itself primarily in the policy of the

planned economy which requested the changes in the size and numbers of
occupational groupings.

This is not the same as saying that all forms

of social inequality in Poland were determined by political power.
Secondly, the new system, while abolishing the legal right of possession
of large amounts of private property, has not abolished the right of use
this property which officially belongs to the State.

Thus those who

control the State property (those who possess political power) enjoy
special privileges in the distribution of benefits even if they cannot
be considered a capitalist class in the sense Marx understood it.
Industrial society, whether socialist or capitalist, is characterized by an advanced division of labor.
held.

But this is not what Marx

In his view, three tenets of the socioeconomic system were

inseparably linked: division of labor, private property and exploitation.

The problem is, however, that one can hardly see a necessary

connection between these three things.

The idea of being free to hunt

in the morning, to fish in the afternoon, and to raise cattle in the
evening, while the means of production are nationalized, goes far beyond
any realistic imagination.

It is not private property which makes one

necessarily a hunter, a shepherd, or a fisherman; contratiwise, being a
hunter or a shepherd or a fisherman do·es not make an owner of private
property.

Neither is exploitation necessarily related to the private
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means of production or the division of labor.

Exploitation is easily

conceivable where there is no private property.
not necessarily include exploitation.

Division of labor does

It has been pointed out how the

system of privileges operates in the socialist societies.

This appears

to be only another form of exploitation.
Division of labor, a highly developed technology, and the growing
body of knowledge imply a highly advanced training, and this enhances
the role of schooling in a modern society.

Conversely, technological

advancement brings about a further division of labor which has its
positive impact on the increase of the knowledge itself.

Because of

their training, the highly skilled people acquire almost a monopoly of
some jobs and the less skilled people can hardly compete with them.
Similarly, those who have political power control the means of manipulating symbols and slogans, and build ideologies to justify their privileged positions.
Finally, there is the strong impact of the values on the social
structure.
another.

The system of values changes visibly from one society to
I.Jhat, however, is com.rnon to the advanced societies is the

fact that knowledge and skills are highly valued.
an exception.

Polish society is not

What seems to be more particular to it is a gap between

the social prestige of different occupations and the corresponding low
wages.

This is a consequence of the incentives given the wage manipula-

tion by the power elite, combined with the impact of social values.
Thus the system of stratification in the socialist societies and
those of the capitalist societies have some convergent and some diver-
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gent points.

In both types of societies the occupational system

appears to be the backbone of the social stratification.

Both soci-

ties enhance skills as indispensable factors in the functioning of
their economic and social life.
system of the unequal wages.

This is visibly reflected in the

Additionally, the values have their

strong impact on the social prestige of the occupations.

Social groups

of the socialist societies differ from those of the capitalist societies with the legal right of control of the large amounts of private
property.
eties.

This legal right has been abolished in the socialist soci-

Instead, the political elite of these societies controls the

State property and thus takes advantage of using this property according to its own will.

This creates a situation in which the power elite

enjoys almost the same lifestyle the high capitalist class enjoys in
the capitalist society, despite the fact that they are not legally the
owners of the means of production.

The impossibility to inherit this

property is compensated for by other advantages the capitalists do not
have, such as exemptions from taxes on the use of this property and from
the expenses connected with the use of it.
The cleavage of political power is one of the most visible peculiarities of the stratification in the socialist countries.
elite is exclusively constituted by the Party people.

The power

And even if there

is a growing number of the educated people among the Party elite, education never was a necessary and sufficient condition to move up to this
class.

A conditio sine qua non ofbelonging to this class is a total

conformity with the Party line.

All other requirements are secondary
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and unecessary.

The fundamental difference between the power elite and

the Party people of the lower social classes consists in the fact that,
while the other people occupy their social positions mainly because of
their professional skills and education, and the Party channel is only
a

secondary source of their social advancement, the careers of the power

elite are totally linked to the Party.

The Party promotes them, takes

care of them, protects them and gives them privileges in exchange for
total conformity to the Party.
The second important aspect of the social structure in the socialist societies is a visible split between the professionals and the lower
white-collar workers.

It is a class of skilled manual workers which

follows the intelligentsia class and the white-collar workers occupy the
lower position.

While in the Western societies the white-collar workers

enjoy a higher status than skilled physical workers, in the socialist
societies this position is occupied by the skilled manual workers.
This is due to the system of wages and the entire policy of the power
elite in the socialist system.

The established professions, however,

retain their high statuses.
The third important cleavage in the structure of the Polish society
is a recent change in the prestige of private farmers.

For a long time

in history the peasants were considered the lowest class in the Polish
society.

Today, the unskilled manual workers occupy this position.

This change was caused by two factors.

First, there is a growing number

of the educated people who remain in the villages.

This helps to remove

the stigma attached to the peasants as the less educated people.
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Secondly, the acute food crisis in Poland in the last decade had its
positive impact and fostered the growth of the farmers' prestige in the
country.
As has been presented before, four variables, namely, political
power, education, income and the social prestige of the occupations give
rise to a six-fold class structure in the Polish postwar society.

The

classes are: political elite (power elite), intelligentsia, skilled
manual workers, white-collar workers, farmers, and unskilled manual
workers.

The cleavage of the Party membership is present at every

level of social classes but the proportion of the Party to non-Party
people varies from very low at the level of the private farmers to 100
per cent at the level of the power elite.

This means that all social

positions which imply political power are occupied exclusively by the
Party people.
As Marx' theory of class appeared to be useless in explaining the
patterned inequality in the postwar Polish society, it is equally useless in explaining the structural conflict in the socialist societies.
Having attributed the class conflict to the conflict of the economic
interests of the capitalist class and those of the proletariat, Marx
logically concluded that the abolition of the private means of production would bring about elimination of the structural conflict.

But as

it has been shown above, this is not what had happened in Poland.
After the nationalization of the means of production, a new class
(power elite) has been established.

The new class controls all aspects

of social, political and economic life in the society.

Because of that
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totalitarian power, the new class necessarily enters into conflict with
other classes.

While the other classes may change as a part in a con-

flict, the power elite is always one of the parties.

It is inconceiv-

able that a structural conflict between two classes in the Socialist
societies would occur unless the power elite is involved as one party
in that conflict.

This does not mean that the other classes have no

particular interests opposite to the interests of other classes.

This

is only to say that the conflictural interests of other classes do not
meet directly because there is arways the power elite which imposes
itself as an intermediary in the conflict.
The Communist regimes of the Peoples' Democracies deny the existence of the structural conflict in the socialist societies.

Non-recog-

nized social conflict is not institutionalized through adequate channels
and therefore in the eyes of the power elite need not be dealt with.
This has far-reaching consequences in the social life.

Denied conflict

manifests itself in cyclical riots and upheavals among the lower social
classes, which every so often are deprived of a part of what they had
already possessed.

This has to be stressed very strongly.

Polish

workers' upheavals did not hope to gain anything, but to preserve what
they had already possessed and of which the power elite intended to
deprive them.
The Polish workers.' insurrections are surely challenges to the
power elite.

They have always been understood in this way by the

political class.
class.

But they have also a positive influence on the ruling

The socialist system does not know any other way to bring about
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any, even an unsubstantial change.

The workers' insurrections force

the power elite to replace some of its personnel which would be absolutely impossible without this type of conflict.

The 1980 strikes

even brought about an institutional change with a foundation of the
Free Trade Union.

The Russian political elite is the best example of a

lack of change where only natural death brings about minimal change in
a Party personnel.
Polish postwar sociopolitical reality disproves Marx' theory of
social classes and structural conflict.
of the political elite to control the

But it also shows the inability

masses~

If it is true that the

supreme and the most insidious exercise of power is to prevent
people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they
accept their role in the existing order of things, either because
they see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as
natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely
ordained and beneficial,I
the Communist regime of the Soviet societies in general, and the Polish
Communist regime in particular, do not possess such capacities.

They

surely are unable to completely control events and to be an exclusive
force determining the future fate of these societies.

It is important

to stress,as Lane points out, that in Polish society different "groups
are able to articulate more or less opposing views which rationalize
their different interests, despite the unifying objective of the
official ideology."2

1s. Lukes, Power and Radical View (London: The McMillan Press,
1970), p. 24.
2David Lane, The End of Inequality?, op. cit., p. 106.
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INTERVIETN"S
I.

Interview with Dr. Lukasz Czuma (Economist)
(Lublin, May 30, 1980)

1.

Question: I am interested in the conflict within the Polish

which is of various dimensions.

~ociety

it in the economic dimension.

You, as an economist, can see

Could you present some data on this

subject?
Answer: Stressing that I speak only about the economic dimension
of the conflict in the Polish society

(i~

has its ideological, reli-

gious, and social dimensions as well), I would like to turn attention
to what has been published in statistical yearbooks.
Statistical Yearbook of 1979.

I have here the

Its first chapter contains data on the

socio-economic development of the country.

I would like to emphasize

t1.;o sets of indices: the first of them deals with production, particularly the industrial one; the second set refers to the standard of
living of the population.
As far as industrial production is concerned, Poland ranks tenth
in the world.

Using the 1950 index as a base of 100 (when the produc-

tion was equal to that in 1938, i.e., in the last year before World War
II), the 1970 national income t.;as seven times higher.

Steel production

increased nine times; electrical energy--ten times; production of
cement--eight times.

Morever, in 1978, coal production per head was

5.5 tons; this gave us the highest ranking in the world.

At the same

time in the USA the index was 2717 kg, and in RFN--1416 kg.

A similar

situation could be observed in the cement production per capita in
1978: in Poland--618 kg; in RFN--565 kg, and in the USA--329 kg.

Pro-

duction of electrical energy in Poland is equal to that in France.
Now, let us look at the dynamics of investment in the years 1950368
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1973. When we take the index of accumulation in 1950 for 100, by 1978
it was twelve times higher. However, and this is very important point,
while net investment in fixed capital accounted for 80% of all investment, only 20% of it was allocated to the sphere of consumption.
2.

Question: Before we come to the standard of living indices,

I wonld like to ask you one more question.

On one hand, Poland is

ranked very high in the world when the production of coal, cement, and
electrical energy is concerned.

Then, how can chronic shortages of

these goods on our domestic market be explained?
Answer: We can only speculate on this subject since no official
data is available; but the fact remains that, for instance, ha]f of t.he
population (rural population) faces serious troubles when it is necessary to huy coal which is the basic fuel.

3.

Question: And what are the standard of living indices like?

Answer: wben we take into account, for instance, the number of
hospital beds (100,000 in 1950, which had risen to 195,000 by 1973),
their number increased by about 90%, and not 200% or 300% as in many
In the years 1950-1978, real 1vages jncreased by sev-

other countries.

eral dozen per cent.

In this case the data can be easily wanipuJated,

because the increase in cost of living js calculated by the State and
not by independent institutions.

Leaving aside t.his possiblity, we can

see that while in the years 1950-1978, nowinal wages increased eight
times, real wages increased only sljghtJ.y, and in the years 1950-1955,
they even dropped.

Please note that no statistical yearbook reported

data on the increase in real wages in the years 1951-1955.
is very simple.

~he

reason

During that period real wages dror:ped by 5% annually.

Tbese data were published unintentionally in the book of Litkiewicz in

1970.

Morever, the scientific organ of the COMECON,

11

!--lirovaj a Ekonomika

i Miezdunarodnoye Ot.noszeniye 11 (World Economy and International Relation), stated in August 1972, that in the yeras 1950-1970, real wages
in Poland increased only by 19%, while national income increased five
times.
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The dynamics of the increase of reel wages after 1956, is aJso
significant.

In 1956, the increase of real wages 1,.ras strong since it

amounted to 11.6%, in 1957--8.3%, in
196o, real wages decreased.

1958--3.3%~

in 1959--5.1%, but in

If we take the index in 1950 for 100, the

level of the index in 1960, was 98.5%.

This economic situation was ac-

companjed by social and political events in the country.

The riots and

the assumption of po¥er by Gomulka in 1956, were followed by a signjficant increase in real wages; in 1957, the situation within the country
was still unstable.

In 1958, real wages 5ncreased only by 3.3%, and in

1960, the new regime felt safe enough to encourage the decrease of real
1t1ages by 1 • 5% as compared to 1959.
I W8nt to stress thaG in the above mentioned years there was no
economic stagnation, since national income increased by nearly 10% both
in 1958 and 1959, no effect of great investments or international crisis.

~1y

thesis is very sirnpJ e.

An increase in real wages depends on

to lvhat degree the regime controls the events.

When Gomulka took power

in 1956, he increased real wages, but as soon as his regime felt secure,
i t allowed only a slight increase in real wages: 1960--1.5%, 1961--2.6%,

1962--0.4%, and so on untiJ 1970.

Practically it vas no increase at

all.
Again, when Gierek and Jaroszewicz came to power, real wages
started to increase and their dJrnamics were similar to that in the late
1950s: 1971--6%, 1972--6.2%, 1973--8.7%, 1974--6.6%, 1975--8.5%.

When

society calmed down, the rate of grotJth of real wages e-ras slowed down
to such an extent that in 1978, real wages decreased by 0.7% as comparAd to the previous year.

Thus we can see that there is a

~lear

reg-

ularity 5n this respect.

4.

Question: In the context of what you have said, what is t]:le

place of Poland in the world and Europe as regards the standard of
living?
AnsHer: Before I make some comparisons of the standard of living
between Poland and other countries. I would like to stress the discrepancy between the increase of nation8l income and the standard of living
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of the population.

While the GNP was increasing 11t fair rates, the

standard of living was not improving proportionally to that growth.
Let us nmv compare some indices of standard of living in Poland
with those of other countries.
infants.

Let us begin wj_th the mortalitv rate of

In this sphere Poland (with a high mortality rate) ranks very

low, lower even than Greece, which was a country less

ind~1strialized

than Poland before the \liar (Rocznik Statystvcznv, 1979, p. 480).

Among

the socialist countries, only the Soviet TTnion has an index of higher
infant mortality.
Index of housing: The area of the apartments built in 1977 in

2

Pola.nd was 485 m per 1000 people, while in Belgium t.he index was

1200 m2 , i.e., 2.5 times that of Poland. At that time, the index in
Spain '\vB.s 755 m2 , and in the USSR 416 m2 • As far as the structure of
the apartments is concerned, in the USA only 6% of flats constituted
one and two-room apartments and five-room and larger flats accounted
for 60%. In Poland, one and two-room flats account for 40%, three and
four-room flats for 54.4%, and five-room and larger flats accounted
only for 7% of all the apartments. Even in Portugal five-room and
larger flats account for 21% of the total and one and two-room flats
only for 24% of alJ.. It is necessary to add that the standardized
2
flats in Poland are composed of 'cages' of 5-7 m •
Passenger cars: Jn 1975 there were 500 cars per 1000 people in
the USA and only 32 in Poland. This level in the USA was reached in
1916, and in the years 1950-1960 in Greece and Portugal.
Teleohones: In 1975, there were in the USA nearly 700 receivers
per 1000 people and in Poland the index was seventy five. This geve us
one of the lowest ranks in Europe.
Aircraft production: In ajrcraft production we rank sixth in the
world, but by an irony of fa_te, in air transport, '\ve are on the same
level as Nigeria. Nearly 90% of helicopters and 89% of airpJ anes :i.s
exported from Poland to the USSR.
Merchant vessels: Poland ranks tenth in the world in the production of merchant vessels, but only twentieth when the size of the fleet
is concerned, since 70% of the vessels produced in Poland is exported
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to the USSR.
Production of meat: In 1970, Poland produced 90 kg of meat per
person which was more than in RFN, Italy, Spain, France, and Japan, but
we suffered chronic shortages of meat.

5.

Question: Professor, the socialist system boasts of the intro-

duction of egaUtarian wages.

How does this vocational 'equality' look

in Poland?
Answer: A majority of people has egaljtarian incomes, i.e., the
differences between the incomes of a factory worker and those of a
university professor are not very large.
the citizens.
and wealth.

This is true for about 65% of

There are, however, two margins: the margin of poverty
It is claimed that in socialism those who work make a suf-

f:icient amount of money to live on.

Wben somebody has no resources, it

means that he either wasted money or did not work to earn it.
~roblem

of wasting money cannot be questioned.

poverty.

The

This is a committed

nowever, besides those who waste their money, the social mar-

gin comprises also about 75% of pensioners.
the social 1'1inimum.

Their pensions are below

Additionally, the fami1ies with two or more child-

ren also live on the brink of the social minimum.

In Poland, the sub-

sistence level (social minimum) is calculated at 2000 zlotys monthly
(by social minimum I mean one coat for ten years, one suit for five
years, one shirt for a year and a minimum of food).

A family with an

average income of 7000 zlotys a month (a husband--4000 zlotys, and a
wife--3000 zlotys) does not reach that quota.
children,

~or

When a family has tr..ro

example, then income per head in this family drops below

the social minimum.

In such a case, family allowance of 100 or 150

zlotys for a child is completely insignificart.

The increase of family

allowance from 95 zlotys to 100 zlotys a month for a child is nothing
more than a symbol.
In Poland, as

i:-:~

other socialj_st

countries~

there is also the

margin of wealth--people c.ri th incomes a dozen times higher than the
egalitarian incomes of blue or white-collar Horkers.

These incomes

take the form of bonuses like villas or flats for a symbolic rent,
coupons for cars, which can be sold at double price, attractive holi-
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days for a trivial fee, monetary bonuses, coupons entitljng one to very
cheap means in a restaurant or mess-room and so on.

6.

Question: It seems, from what you have said, that in the

socialist countries the system of bonuses divides the society into the
poor and the extremely rich people, and that the system is unjust.
Answer: Some time ago, I read in the Russian periodjcal Krokodil
that somebody said during the meeting of the workers' committee: "Since
we have already decided who is to be given the premium, let's now think
about the reason for which he got it."
the so-called People 1 s Democracies.

This appljes, I think, to all

The next joke, lvhich circulated

for a time, characterizes very well the system of bonuses, functionjng
in Polend: "Director," asked a reporter, "what did you buy wit.h your
last bonus?"

"A Fiat 1 25," answered tJ:J.e director.

do with the rest of the bonus?"
IsJands."

"And what did :rou

"I went with my wife to the Canary

Hhen a worker was asked the same questions, he answered to

the first.: "I bought tennis shoes for rnyself.n
rest of the money? 11 --a reporter insisted.

nAnd what about the

"Oh, my r,.rife lent me the

rest of it,l!--was the 1.;orker s answer.
1

7.
ment.

Question: The socialist system boasts of overcoming unemploy-

Has unemployment been controlled in this system?
Ans1.;er: Jn the socialist systAm, unemployment is a pretty compli-

cated problem.
ital with labor.

Its decrease is dve largely to the replacement of capMoreover, it assumes a different, disguised charac-

ter.
8.

Question: Some time ago, I rea.d about a low level of sanitary

conditions of work a.nd non-compliance with security norms in many PoJish factories.

Is it true?

Answer: 'l'he data referring t.o this field is usually not published.

That obscures the picture.

Nevertheless, the problem exists.

In my paper "Karl lvfarx on Personal Costs in the Period of Industrialization of the 19th Century England," I pointed out that in the period
of hearJ accumulation of capita] in the 19th century, the industrial-
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ization process, the consumption of many products, especialJy mea.t and
goods

satisfyi~g

basic needs, was being limited.

At that time, women

and children were being employed, and emigration was blocked •••
conditions of work and job hygiene were horrible.

The

Exactly the same

prohlems can be observed in Poland today.

9.

Question: The socialist system has had no achievements in

agriculture.

ii.'1a t is, in your opinion, the situation in Polish B.gri-

culture?
.Answer: There are two types of farms in Pola.nd: socialized and
private.

In the socialized farms, the State invests about 20,000

zlotys per hectare of arable land annually.

An average individual far-

mer invests ten times less, i.e., 2000 zlotys.
sults?

And what are there-

In the socialized farms, the production per one bectare is

lower than that in private holdings.

That proves, on one hand, the

discrimination against the private farmers, and on the other hand, that
the socialized farms have been incompetently and inefficiently run.
Usually, tractors are not sold to private farmers.

Those who have

them, bought them with foreign currencies, but not all the farmers have
their relatives in the capitalist countries.
10.

Question: Obviously, the economic structure is an important

factor in the division of society into social classes.

Could you give

me more precise data on the composition of these classes in Poland?
A.11swer: Such researches have not been carried out in our country.
I tried to do this some time ago, but I faced insurmountable difficulties.

I would like to note, hN!ever, tha.t in my opinion, it 1s incor-

rect to talk about a group of we11-prospering handicraf":smen.

It ifl

true that such peopJe exist, but they constitute only a small fraction
of the whole population.

The priviJeged group of State functionaries,

the professional military, militia functionaries, i.e., all those who
occupy more important posts in the society, iR much more numerous.
11.

Question: The wage policy jn Poland seems strange to me;

especially visible are discrepancies between social prestige of a pro-
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fession and the wages earned from it.
Answer: You are right..

Teachers are a classicaJ example,

profession still enjoys high social prestige,

This

It seems to be histor-

ically conditioned, since they have always been considered the truth
spokesmen.

Now, look at this absurd fact.

An eighteen-year-old grad-

uate from a basic vocational school can earn more than his highly educated teacher with many years of profesfdonal practice.

12.

Question: Do you think that economic differences between

various social groups are decisive for class formation and conflict in
Poland?
Answer: Yes, I do.
to everybody.

Today,

i~

Poland, these differences are known

However, structural conflict is not recognized and so

not allowed to be discussed. · This conflict, though not recognized offjcjally, reveals itself occasionally in tbe form of bloody riots and
uprisings.
Thank you. Professor!

II.

Interview with Dr. Adam Stanowski (Sociologist)
(Lublin, rfl.ay 31 , 1 980)

1.

Question: Professor, you are a sociologist.

know, you are also a social worker.

As far as I

1dhat does your social acti vi t.y

consist of?
Ans>.;er: Fj rst, I am considered a Catholic social worker, although
to tell the truth, I do not knovT what that means.

Besides, I am a mem-

ber of the Association of Learned Courses, i.e., an independent organization of an educational, academic character, and I participate occasionally in other social events.
2.

Question: Has this type of activity drawn you, Professor, to

opposition to the Party?
Answer: It seems to me that in our opposition we have to distin-
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guish three trends represented by three different groups.

The fir8t

trend represents the whole set of problems connected with the demands
of democratization, liberalization of the system, citizen rights.

The

wD.ole sphere of the activity of the Association of Learned Courses
(ALC) is connected tvi th these prohlems.

The Democratic Left stresses

the second trend which consists of the postulates of egalitarianjsm
'dhich

j

n their opinion is not sufficiently realized, and of the work-

ers-peasants' emancipation postulate.

FinaJly, the third trend bring8

into the foreground the postulates related to the internationa.l situation of Poland, that is, full independence.
this poirct.

I want to be precise at

'Nhen I talk about the three groups I take only the problem

of emphasis ircto account.

The whole opposition realize8 very well that

these three groups of postulates are inseparably linked together.

The

realization of any of them is conditio sine gua non for others.

3.

Question: Are you, Professor, so to say,

11

a born social work-

er" or did you realize later in life that this was your vocation?
Answer: I was engaged in various forms of social, religious, and,
during t.he I·Jar, military activities since my youth.

In the years 1945-

1950, I was involved in the student organizations for which I paid ·,.;tth
impri8onment.

I was sentenced to

years and

months in prison.

4.

years, out of which I spent

Question: Talking about your imprisonment, how long did your

trial last?
Answer: Only a few days.

The trial was open to the public.

There were five people judged during this trial.
the lowest.

11y sentence was among

We 'dere charged with the "attempt to overthrm.; the system

by force through impairing jts ideological foundationR ••• "

After the

thaw of 1956, I was a member of the "Znak" or rather the "Old Znak 11
movement. I am also a member of the editorial staff of the Wiez monthly.
The evolution of my '.riew8 and attitudes has put me among radical Catholic democrats.

5.

Question: I am particularly interested in the workers demon-
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strations in Poland after World War II.

To what extent, in your opin-

ion, can these demonstrations be described as a "movement"?

Or, in

other words, were they a "cry of despair" or was there an element of
organization in them?
Answer: With one exception, they were an expression of despair.
There were three or four greater demonstrations: two of them in Poznan,
in 1956, June and October, one in 1970 in the seacoast towns, and one
in 1976 in Ursus and Radom; individual and isolated strikes have become a normal phenomenon.

The demonstrations in Poznan were the only

organized demonstrations out of those mentioned above.
these were only reactions to a new situation

~orhich

In other cases,

\vas found to be an

attempt to burden the working c-lass with the results of the economic
crisis.

The "movement" developed, practically, in the course of

events.

A friend of mine, who, at the time of the riots of 1970 was a

deputy and a member of the diet commission for internal affairs and

.

jurisdiction, told me that there was the following phrase in the speech
of General SzJachcic, t.he man was responsible for this resort: "We were
surprised at the ability of t.he working class for rapid activities imrrovized :in the course of events."
the

11

I consider it characteristic that

movement'1 has quickly spread beyond the liwit.s of the environment

in which it was created.

And thus, in 1970, the workers of Lodz went

on strike in solidarity with the workers from the seacoast.

The work-

ers from Nowa Huta, who threatened to put out the fire under big blastfurnaces, are said to constitute the decisive factor for the capitulation of the authorities, the change of the ruling group and the attempt to find new solutions.

6.

Question: Can you say that today, ten years after the Decem-

ber riots and four years after the demonstrations in Ursus and Radom,
the workers can organize themselves better?
Answer: It is difficult to answer this question, or at least it
is difficult for me.
am.

Perhaps other people are better informed than I

I have no clear basis for saying that in this sphere there is an

essential change in the form of new important structures.

However, we
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may ask ivhat it looks like in the sphere of consciousness.

It seems to

me that there is an important change in this sphere.

The essence of

this change consists in the accumulated experience.

The previous ex-

periences, both negative and

positive~

domestic and those from Hungary

and Czechoslovakia, are taken into account at every future riot.

I am

fully convinced that the demonstrations of 1970, could have led to a
change in the structure of power if it were not for the fact that the
workers did not want to push their demands too far.

The latter was not

due to their identification with the power, but to their fear of the
Russian intervention.

Besides, at least in the last four years, the

workers have access to the independent publications such as Robotnik
(The Worker), and Bratniak (The Brother).

They influence the workers.

Finally, we can observe the formation of new permanent structures.
This is something new, which originated after 1976.

I think about

KOR--the Committee for the Workers' Defense, created after the events
in Ursus and Radom.
Two types of opposjtionist activities could be observed in the
years 1948-1976.

On one hand, there were underground activities, on

the other, there were the activities within the existing structures
created or, at least, accepted by the authorities.

The new element in-

troduced by the KOR is the open structure not accepted by the authorities.

In my opinion, it is not an illegal institution because it is

the norms which do not allow such an activity that are illegal.

This

is the reason why the authorities have not tried to destroy these forms
of the opposition, and have not punished people for such activities.
Repressions against the oppositionist activist were either of non-legal
character or acquired the form of punishment for petty crimes.

The au-

thorities realize that the defense would accuse the State of breaking
human rights.

So, the workers and intelligentsia do not ask for the

permission for this type of activity but lead this activity in a.n open
way.

The Independent Trade Unions, created two years ago, constitute

one of the forms of
ganization

su~h

an activity.

Repressions agaiPst such an or-

would strike the authorities themselves, because they

signed the Declarations of Human Rights, and because Polc=md is a member
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of the International Labor Organization.
7.
tural

Question: The Polish Marxists deny the existence of a struc-

confli~t

in Polish society.

May the events mentioned above, in

your opinion, Professor, be considered the symptom of this type of a
conflict?
Answer: If in the conflict there is the elite of power on one
hand and on the other, the "lvorking class, then, ex defini tione we
should consider this

confli~t

to be the structural one.

It does not

belie the fact that the structural conflict can be closely connected
with another conflict, such as a political or ideological one.

For

instance, during the December events the workers marched along the
streets of Gdynia and sang by turns the "International" and the religious Polish anthem "Boze cos Polske."

On one hand, by singing the "In-

ternational" they pojnted to the structural

confli~t

because it meant

that the present Polish situation has little to do with the promises in
the text of the "International"; on the other hand, they expressed the
ideological and politicaJ conflict because of the meaning of this religious anthem.

Besides, for many years people have been convinced

that the workers problem can be solved only in free Poland.

Thus, it

is almost impossible to separate these two conflicts.
8.

Question: Do you think that the methods employed by the au-

thorities to solve the conflic-t were similar in every case, or did they
take variow:> forms?
Answer: Before answering this question I would like to stress
that in 1956, the situation 1-1as much more complicated than in the other
events.
cases.

However, the 'day they solved the conf1ict vas similar to other
It

,.,e s

done in three stages.

At the first stage, the authorities tried to compromise the demonstrations describing them as the "hooligans' riots."

They said that

what vias goi:rg on had nothing to do with the working class which loves
the

Party~

and that the Party loves the working class.

The hooligans

and the agents of imperialjsm made use of the events and organized the
riots.

The Party reacted to this with brutal repressions.

In 1956, in
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Poznan, this reaction lasted for a shorter time than in the other insurrection.
In the second phase of solving the conflict, the authorities admitted that there actually were reasons for discontent and for demonstrations by the working class because some individuals and a part of
the ruling group had made mistakes.
people.

The whole blame is put on these

In consequence, these people or this group is removed and, it

is supposed, that the problem is solved.

Incidentally, this solution

vras applied also during the last events.

It was done, however, with a

:'our-year del9.y.

In Radom and Ursus, the caritulation of the author-

ities standing face to face with the postulates of the workers was in~tantaneous,

activists.
ferent.
and

~he

but at the same time

repression~

were directed against the

The manner in i.;hich these people were repressed was dif-

In Ursus, the actual leaders were called to account for events
falsification the authorities aimed at during the trial con-

sisted in the fact. that they tried to present those people as hooligans, 1.;hile they actually were the best workers and the leaders.
Radom, everything was the opposj te.

In

The real hooligans ·were called to

account, but they had littJe to do with the events.

Of course, there

was something they could be charged 1-ri th, but these were only marginaJ
things.

So, the second phase is the one in which the authorities with-

draw, try to soothe the political postulates by the removal of the ruling group, i.e., the people personally responsible for the errors, and,
if necessary, they make some changes.
The third phase is one of doing away with the dangerous changes.
In fact, it is the phase of turning back to the former state of affairs.

(It is necessary to note that we are still at the stage of the

events which took place in tbe West in the 19th century, i.e., the
1wrking class is fj ghting for its basic rights, and particularly for
the right of better workers' organjzatjon).

The problem in Poland is

that 'workers are still deprived of Tra.de Unions.

This is accompanied

by repressions spread over a long time and thoroughly disguised, which
consist in curtailing some people in positions in which they were or
could be dangerous, and by withdrawing granted concessions.

That could
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be easily observed in 1976, since during the following four years the
authorities managed to realize about SO% of the plans they tried to
carry out in 1976.

This withdrawal took the form of disguised price

jncreases.
Here, we should add one more thing.

All the demonstrations men-

tioned above did not aim at getting something more for the working
class.

These were only defensive reactions against the policy of de-

priving people of what they already possessed.

9.

Question: It has become almost a rule that revolution "de-

vours" its own children.

Do you think, Professor, that these patterns

will be repeated in the future?
Answer: When we talk about devouring one's own children, I would
like to stress strongly t.ha.t it is Khrushchev i-lho made a great contribution to the system in humanitarian categories.

It i-las he who intro-

duced the mechanism of changing the ruling eUte without any physical
destruction of its members.

While before Khrushchev, nobody i-lho had

been removed from the leadership stayed alive, after Khrushchev the
individuals were not done away with after their removal from the power
elite.

(Here, I think only about the Soviet Union, and not about China

or Cambodia).

So, the system actually sacrifices the people.

It hap-

pens so because the system does not know other methods of changing the
leadership.
change.

In this case, a crisis is the conditio sine qua non of any

For instance, in 1965, or 1 966, ever body knevr that Gomu lka was

unable to rule.

However, there was no method, procedure or formula for

changing the group 1-ri t.hout a crisis.

The only solution ;,-ras natural

death, which led to a situation in which the power had been in the
hands of a complete sclerotic for many years.
necessary.

Othert,;ise a shock was

That is why crises became popular.

Finally, I would like to add that I do not question the price
regulation at all.
land.

Especially, when it refers to the foodstuff in Po-

It is an inevitable process.

compensated for in some way.

But again, price increases must be

In 1976, the only compensation for the

increase of prices in articles satisfying basic needs

~.vas

a decrease of
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~rices

in some luxury items.

worker's family.

This is no compensation for an average

It gives us nothing vhen the price of a color TV set

is lowered, while the prices of butter and meat go up by 80%!
are

fa~al

errors.

These

It is the burdening of the working class and poorest

people with the effects of the crisis.

Unfortunately, that is what our

reality looks like!
Thank you, Professor, for the interview.

III.

Interview with Lech Walesa (Chairman of the strikers in

1970, and the President of the Independent Trade Union "Solidarity"
sjnce fall, 1980)
(Gdansk, June 20, 1980)
1.

Question: Before entering into a formal conversation, could

you tell me something about yourself?
AnsrN"er: My name is Lech lfilalesa.
electromechanic.

Professionally, I am

A

motorcar

At present, I am unemployed because I have lost my

job in Elelekromontaz after founding t.he workers' commissjon in this
institution.

It is the third time that I lost my joh without any rea-

son, since I had worked before in ZRE.Iv!B and in the Shipbuilding Yard.
Now, I decided not to take up another job until my present situation is
cleared up.
2.

Question: Do you get any unemployment benefit.?

Answer: I do not get any state benefit, but my organization, the
Church and my friends support me.

3.

Question: How did it happen that you found yourself in the

opposition?

Was it an unexpected vocation or did it accumulate as time

went on?
Answer: My oppositionjst activity started in 1968, when I began
to cooperate with students in their March demonstrations.

However, it

was a loose coooperation, for the workers did not join the students,
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due to a lack of organization and cooperation hetween these two groups.
I started to operate more actively in December, 1970, when the workers
elected me to their strike committee.

This committee was dissolved by

the secret police within twenty-four hours.

The secret police took us

one by one and strongly forhade any activity, threatening us and our
families 1vi th represssion:::.

And thus, two friends of mine got ter-

rified and stopped their oppositionist activity.

4.

Question: 1!lhat do you primarily contest in your opposition t.o

the State?
Ans1.rer: For me, the most irritating facet of our society j_s our
ti-Jo-class legal system.

In my opinj_ on, in Poland, most people are

bound by the legal norms and have to obey them.
there is a caste of people who are above the law.

At the same time,
I fight that the law

bind everyone equally, although the law is not perfect in many cases.
Therefore, I am always in conflict with the existing system, and I lose
even evident cases.

5.

Question: You mean that existing Polish law might be accept-

able if it. applied to all people in the same way?
Answer: Yes.

It is necessary to add, hoi,rever, that there is an

um.rritten law applied by the secret police.

The situation is such that

even the mayor of a cjty may, sometimes, issue legal norms incompatible
with the Constitution.
6.

Question: Do you think that there are wage inequalities in

Pola.nd?
Answer: There is no doubt about that.

One cannot hide it.

I am

not able to say from where some people get their money, but I know that
there are inequalities.
stolen his money.

I cannot say that somebody has inherited or

On the other hand, it is obvious that when a driver

earns 9 zlotys an hour, it is not enough for him to live, no matter how
little he spends.

It is obvious for me that such a driver must steal.

The authorities know about it, and they accept it as long as the man is
submissive.
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7.

Question: Isn't that an intentional policy so that Hhen there

is a need, the man can be blackmailed?
AnsHer: It seems to me that the system fits this scheme.
pJanned.

I say so from my experience, since up to noH they have been

trying to find out if I committed any "crime."
nothing Hrong because my wages
8.

It is

~orere

Fortunately, I did

satisfactory.

Question: Have you ever been taken into custody by the po-

lice?
ft..nswer: Since 1968, I have been arrested 78 times for 48 hours,
and in total I Has arrested 150 times.

9.

I keep a record of my arrests.

Question: What do the interrogations by the poljce look like?

Ans;.mr: LTntil 1974, the interrogations Here rather brutal.
did not reckon Hit.h us.

It terrified me.

They

So, I did not engage in any

radical demonstrations in order to avoid possible troubles.
nately, I have not made any serious mistakes.

Fortu-

HoHever, I Has deceived

by smooth-tongued interrogators, their talk about objective troubles
and unavoidable mistakes in the period of the formation of power.
task Has only not to interfere.
at that time.

My

Frankly speaking, I believed in this

Therefore, in 1970, I tried to avoid acute conflicts,

although, as a member of the Workers' Committee, I had to deal Hith
some problems brought to me by the workers.
Here tied with the phrase "We will help."

At the same time, my hands
t-Je promised this help to the

authorities during the memorable meeting Hith Gierek in 1971.
understand, hovrever, that it was a trap.
ple~

Today, I

It happened because our peo-

even if devoted to the workers' cause, had a too "soft heart."

During that meeting the workers were aggressive, until the Minister of
Internal Affa:i_rs, SzJ achcic, appeared.
'~ras

not to get out of the meeting alive.

At first, it looked as if he
When Szlachcic started to

talk, he began to play on our feelings, then he started to cry.
cried as i f he "\vere an eleven-year-old child.
knoH, I Has nominated to the post of the

Later he said:

~linister

From noi-l on a Pole will not shoot at a Pole.

He
"As you

of Internal Affajrs.

Besides, do ,,re have to
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ask someone else to rule over us?

Is anybody among you to rule?

me, who would be able to solve the conflict?
economic bankruptcy.

11

Tell

Poland is at the brink of

lfuen, as the third in turn, I was allowed to

speak, I 1vas ready for concessions.

I simp] y felt pity fo:r them.

In

my op:injon, Gierek was the strongest candidate, everything pointed to
him as the best choice.

Others underwent a similar metamorphosis.

So,

when Gierek asked us "Will you help?"--we said at once "lve will."
10.

Question: Are you still helping?

Answer: J helped, or at least did not interfere, up to 1974, that
is to the moment '\vhen I found that something was going wrong, that
everything turned back to the old methods.
engaged again in oppositionist activity,

Since that moment, I have
I must admit, hovever, that I

faced many diffjculties then, since people looked terrified and disheartened.

I started to act very cautiously.

I managed to get to the

Divisional Trade Unions, and then found that we were coming back to the
before-December methods, that we still lacked true Trade Unions, that
everything we had been told earlier was only an empty promise.
speech was received 1tli th cheering by the workers.
elected a delegate to the factory conference.

My

I was unanimmJsly

After the meeting, I was

called by the secret police A.nd they told me either not to attend the
conference, or not to rise to speak during the conference.
posed to give me a considerable sum of money fo:r this.
cept the proposal.

factory.

I did not ac-

I decided to attend the conference and I told them

I wo1lld be even more radical than before.
loss of my job.

They pro-

They threatened me with the

They proposed to send me to another section of the

I did not agree to that.

Then, on March 19, 1976, I lost my

job 1 but at that time I said there Hould be another strike.

I was

right because the strike started two months later.
11.

Question: Do you believe that you will win that battle?

Answer: Yes, I do b"elieve.

That situation cannot last much

longer.
Thank you for your interview, and good luck!
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Interview with Franciszek Grabczyk (An eng:ineer and oppo-

sitionist)
(Krakow, June 27, 1980)
Question: Before entering jnto a formal conversation, conld

1.

you tell me something about yourself?
AnsHer: Hy name is Franciszek Grabczyk.
gineer.

I worked as an engineer for many years.

the "Batory
tory.

I am a metallurgist en-

11

r!y first job was in

steelworks, since my scholarship 1,ra3 granted by that fac-

Then, I worked in the

11

Lenin Steeh10rks, 11 and three years ago I

r,.,ras laid off in consequence of the reduction in employment.
time I was unemployed.
a manual worker.

For some

At present I work in "Zaslawice" brick-yard as

The work is very hard, but I am glad because my \.rages

are rather good.
2.

Question: You mentioned that you had lost your job.

~lias

there any reason for that?
Answer: The official reason was, as I said, the reduction of employment.

In fact., I was dismissed because I did not conform to the

instruction of stopping any

11

pseudo-social" activity.

My activity in

the factory consisted in gathering those who expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing conditions.

In good part it was connected

with the so-called "cumbersome" truth about the events of 1976, in Poland.
lem.

1tJe sent a letter to the State authorities concerning this probThe letter was signed by many engineers and techniciens.

3.

Question: How many persons were dismissed at that time 1-rithin

the mentioned "reduction" of employment?
.Ans~·Jer:

I '.\/'as the only person laid off.

reduction of employment in this factory.
posts.
missed.

In fact, there was no

There were only changes of

In my case, they appliPd a "second reduction" and I

~Va;:;

dis-

I appealed against this decision t.o the District Council, the

Mediatory Cor.:mittee whose chairman is a judge of the Provincial Court.
I v!On my case there.

My factory, hOivever, appealed in turn to the Dis-
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trict Court in .Cracow where I lost.

I have a grudge against. the court

because it refused to examine the witnesses for my case.

The court

confined itself to interrogating the witnesses presented by the factory.
help.

My other appeals to higher authorities and to the Diet did not
And thus, for inst.ance, the Supreme Court replied: "The extent

to which the District Court broke the law is not great enough to qual:ify the case to be re-examined."
were dismissed.

Thus my attempts to review the case

At present, I am helpless.

people find themselves in StJCh a situation.

It seems to me that many
At present, I have recov-

ered, but there were critical moments in my life, which I covld neither
understand nor explain.

It is easier for me to bring it to mind now,

than it was to go through it..

4.

Question: Has your oppositionist activity been the passion of

your life, or 1.v-as it a sudden discovery at some stage of your life?
A..11swer: First, it was not a sudden discovery.
correct to say that I am in the opposition.
in rny life.

Second, it is not

I simply try to be myself

Obviously, it. is the process of accumulating, growing and

collecting experience, and it started in my child:bood.
5.

Question: Car. we call the events of 1956, those in the sea-

coast region in 1970, and those in Radom and Ursus in 1976, to mention
only the most important ones, the "workers' movement," if by the movement we understand something

~rhich

is better organized and not only a

"cry of despair" or the reaction of the crowd?
Answer: It is clear for me that the Poljsh society has undergone
very essential changes as far as its socio-politira} consciousness is
concerned.

This consciousness became mature both within the intelli-

gentsia and the working cla.ss: it matured among the educated people and
those who are simple, but intelligent enough.

This is the protest of

the whole society, but the most effective protest against the system is
that of the people employed in industry, i.e., the workers.
tests brought about the greatest successes.
they are isolated.
the whole society.

Their pro-

This does not mean that

The workers' movement is a part of the movement of
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6.

Question: The greatest workers' demonstrations took place at

dramatic moments (absurd price increases of thA basic goods).

ltieren 1 t

they a cry of despair?
Answer: I th5nk that both spontaneity Rnd orga.njzatjon were inr.luded in these events.

Dissfltisfaction 1-1ith the existing ::::te.te of af-

fairs, bejng a result of tightening t.he belt, had been observed in the
society for

8.

long time.

People had enough tj me to think about the

possibile solutions and this led to the beginning of organization.

The

course of events created new situations which evaded the control of the
workers' leaders.
7.

Question: What are the main weak points in the

~orkers'

de-

monstrations in your opinion?
Answer: The weak point of the opposition, and particularly of t.he
events mentioned above, is the fact that they 1-1ere reactions against
economic injustice, shortages on ·the market,. etc.

Too little attention

was paid to the falsification of the history of our nation, to the omission of our national achievements, such as the Constitution of May 3,
and other commendable facts of our history.

ThereforA, the society

gradually forgets such a crime as that of Kat.yn.

I think that economic

concessions gained during t.he riots cost the other side very lit.tJe.
Socio-poljtical concessions would cost it much more, because they arA
much more decisive for the consciousness of the nation than the economic gains.
8.

Question: Marxist class theory considers the societies of the

so-called People's Democracies to be classless societies, although it
does not deny the existence of some differences between social strata.
Can the Polish society, in your opinion, be called a classless society?
Answer:

T

.L

am sure that there are inequalities in the Polish so-

ciety with clear divisions.
socio-political situation.

These class divisions are rooted in the
I think that the effective ruling of the

society forced the Party to provoke some class hostilit.iAs within the
society, so as to divert the attention of these classes from the real
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source of the problems and tensions.

It is the old Roman principle--

Divide et imnere.

9.

Question: What is tbe most important variable which a.ccounts

\vhich accounts for class arising within the Polish society?
Answer: I think that the property of goods is the most important
factor, i.e., the differences in the level of affluence.

Among such

differentiating goods there are: houses, cars, suits and various other
facilities.

There is rather a strong competition for climb5ng up the

ladder of affluence as high as possible.

Often, this type nf competj-

tion is decisive for the political and ideological engagement of many
people.

Practically, i t happens that mar.y people join the party only

because they want to get some posts which are normally reserved for the
party members.

Nomina sunt odiosa otherwise I would give examples of

some friends of mine.

One of them, e.g. was a good Catholic--some time

ago he participated in the retreat led by the archbish0p of Cracow, the
present Pope.

When he began his professional work he admitted that he

joined the party just because he wanted to get a prestigious position.
Of course, I do not want to say that all people do that.

I want only

to signal the problem.
10.

Question:

~fuat

are the priviJeges accompanying the party

membership?
A.ns1.rer: When I worked in the "Lenin Steelworks, 11 there was an instruction that the non-party workers cannot be given even the posjtion
of foreman.

The whole professional and social career depends on the

party membership.

The party and its flecretary decide about the dis-

"':.ribution of posts, and these are given to a non-party worker only in
exceptional cases.
for a post.

Such is the case when there is no party candidate

I can give an example.

1-'lr. Kosmider, a

non-part~-

engineer,

has kept the post. of supervisor of the blast-furnaces in Nowa Huta for
many years only because his party predecessors could not control such
responsible works.
Another privilege is an access to some scarce goods.

The dis-
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tribut.ion of ap-?rtments is a typicCJl example.
~an,

I know the case of a

the father of four children, who could not get a larger flat be-

cause he was not a party member, while other famjlies with only one
child, 1·rho were party members, could get 1 arger flats.
class in our society is manifest.
"we

11

and "you,

"they."

11

and it is easy to

This aspect of

One may easily diRtjnguish between
j

dentify "rho are "we," and who are

This t"ro-class system, in 1:1y opinion, is the main source of

the tragedy of nur nation.

This is grist for the mill manned by forces

unfriendly towards our State.

For me, personally, it is the source of

very deep anx:iety about the future of our nation.
Question: The Communist Party considers itself the represen-

11.

tative of the whole nation and the legally elected authority.

w'hat is

your opinjon on that issue?
Answer: My op:injon is explicit.
i-Iar I and

~·Jorld

1,-Jar II, the most progressive thought "ras presented by

the Communist Party.
our nation.

During the perjod between World

These two parties could have reason to exist in

However, the Polish United 1:Jorkers 1 Party (PZPR) is or.ly a

"foundling." a waif.

~lie

know its history.

viet Union and brought to our country.
power to the newly created party.

It was rigged up in the So-

The same foreign State gave

The PZPR has never acted for the so-

ciety although it ha.s always tried to idePtify it.self with the :::1ation.
It deludes the society into the belief that it is its Jeading force,
but it does it in a negative "ray and harms the society.

I consider it

a party of political traitors and I think that some time in the future
it will be judged for its crimes against. the nation.
of these crimes.
excess.

Alcoholism is one

Alcohol is the only commodity which is supplied jn

Secondly, the policy of the Party led to the drastic set-back

in birth-rate.

One of the factors contributing to such a state of af-

fairs is the slow development of housing which Jeads to the far-reaching consequences in the size of a famjly.

The Party is responsible for

deceiving the society and distorting jts history.
the crime of Katyn, once again.

I "rant to point to

It has denied that it is the Soviet

Union that is responsible for it despite the fact that the bodies of
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!"!:any Polish officers lie there; that fact should be known to every PoJ ish child.

12.

Question: What do you think e.bout elections in Poland?

Answer: They are simply a farce.

Hm..rever, I arn astonished at

something else: the fact that so many people go to the polls.
knm..r what they think a bout the elections, but they vote.

I do not

It gives the

Party some reason to consider itself the legally elected authority.
think that doing so, people rnake a big mistake.

I

They lose a great op-

port.uni ty t.o protest against the existing realities.

In vindica t.ion of

thjs fact I would like t.o say that during the last elections the attendance was rather poor (about 60%, even if it was officially claimed
that the percentage reached 90).

The committees in the places where

the attendance was poor were forced to "recount" the votes.

In the

light. of this mechanism, I learned that I went to the polls, which js
absurd, since I did not.

I went to the place to look at the voting,

but I did not vote.
1 3.

Question: Isn 1 t there, in Poland, a st.rong pressure by the

Party on people to vote?
Answer: That excuses no one!
sists in terrifyjng people.
14.

The essence of dictatorship con-

That is the FolJsh reality t.oo.

Question: In the People's Democracy, it is not the false

principles of the system itself, but particular indjviduals who are
blamed for various crises.

Is the present leadership feeing the same

fate?
Answer: Of course!

It is more convenient to blame the former

group for the errors resulting in economic shortages.
expla.na tions.
system.

These are false

The roots of the error flo1,-r from the character of the

It is the system that fails.

assigned is one of these errors.

The way in 1,-rhich the posts are

Jvlore prestigious posts are conceived

as premiums, bonuses for party activists independently of their professional qualifications.

Thus we are ruled not by the most competent

people, but by the mere hustlers.

It can happen so, because there is
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no freedom of speech, press or critics.

Wnen the effects of the er-

rors accumulate, the easiest thing to do is to find a victim, An 5ndividual or group of individuals who might be blamed for that, but not
the system itself.

We observed it several times, even on the highest

level; it became almost a rule.

In my opinion, the present Government

and Party functionAries face the same fate.

15. Question: vJhat are, in your opinion, the sources of the
shortage of many commodities on the Polish market?
Answer: Well, we know how much we are in debt.

The whole tech-

nological progress has its source in foreign credits and not in the
creative activities of our cadres; not in the creation of our own licenses, but in buying Jicenses abroad.

And we must pay for them.

The

party attributed to itself all the merits of the technological progress, while the whole burden of debt, in the form of the market shortages, was laid on the workers and peasants.
vicious circle here.

In addition, we have a

We buy licenses in the West on hard currency mar-

kets, ivhile the products of these licenses we sell on the rouble market, wl:ich results in our great loss.

16.

Naturally, we must go bankrupt..

Question: Is the crisis observed in the Polish economic sys-

tem the result of 1-rrong economic pJ anning or should it rAther be localized in the heart of the system itself?
AD.swer: Some tirre ago, I wan an enthusiast of the socialist systern.

I was defeated in my hopes.

people to enthusiastic work.
tion.

I think the system should stimulate

Only such work can give to men satisfac-

The Marxist thesis stating that work ceases to be a source of

alienation when production means are socialized, is a mere fancy.

It

is only enthusiam resulting in work well done that bring satisfaction
to a man.

Since Marx' times, capitalism has undergone such changes

that I dare to say, it is more socialist than our socialism!
system, a worker is a slave!

In our

What work can you expect from a slave!

He is explojted slavishly!
17.

Question: Is there unemployment in the socialist system?
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Answer: St.a tisti cal data is very poor in this respect.

',oJe can

observe a demand for some professions, e.g. for professional drivers,
connected with the development of car transport..
there is an excessive labor force.

In other professions,

The best example js a chronic un-

employment among women, whjch is not made public.
18.

Question: I heard about horrible hygienic conditions of work

in many industrial branches.

Is it true?

A.'1swer: I do not know about all factories.
the cases where it is true.

However, I know about

A.'1d these are not isoJated cases.

The im-

provement of working conditions increases the cost of production and
this, in turn, delays plan fulfillments.
done in tbis fjeJd.

So, very oft.en, nothing is

An example of such negligence is the aluminum

smelting plant in Skawina where nothing '\.J'as done practically until a
short time a.go.
See, all the problems

~•e

have just talked about are so complex

that there would be no end if r,.re ,,ranted to discuss them further.

How-

ever, our short conversation t.hrows light. on the social situation in
PolRnd.
Thank you very much!

V.

Interview with Franciszek Zorza (A worker)
(Gdansk, .June 20, 1980)

1.

Question: Can you introduce yourself?

Ar.swer: My name is Franciszek Zorza, J work as a fitter.
2.

Question: How did it happen that you became a member of an

oppositionist group?
Answer: The beginnjng of my oppositionist activity dates from
1968, i.e., from the March strife between the students and the police.
At that time, I went out into the streets of Gdansk, as many others did,
to express my solidari t.y vi t.h the students.

It was at that time that I
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had an opportunity to hearn what the police methods were and how the
police treated oppositionist groups.

We were driven from one

another by tear-gas and police truncheons.

pla~e

to

In fRet, that was a turning

I became more a1vare of the sense of the students 1 pos-

point form me.

also understood the

T

tulates (freedom and abolishment of censorship).

J

\vorkers 1 fault, wh0 at that time did not support the students' demonstrations, although \ve were the only force •.vhich could give them such
support..

I do not understand why it happened so.

By an irony of fate,

two years later, the students in their turn, did not support our endeavors.

Unfortunately, these were the negative features of our workers-

intelligentsia movement in the sea-coast region.

The passiveness of

the students can be explained by the activities of the secret police
which dispersed their groups.
In December 1970, I was among those who were actively engagPd :in
the fight.

'dhen I had learned about the preparations for the strike

and the demonstration in other sections of the factory, I called the
Repair Shipyard workers for full support and solidarity with them.
There were seven thousand of us working there.

Along with other work-

ers, 'Je formed a group and went to the main office.
with two electric carts and entered in.

v.Je broke the gate

Then, we went into the streets

of Gdansk altogether.

3.

Question: What annoys you most in the Polish system?

Answer: An open breaking of Jaw-abidingness.
thing for me is the existing system.

The most painfvl

And thus, for instance, once the

Constitution of Poland says that the Diet is the highest legislative
authority in Poland, the law being Jaid down by the Diet should be
obeyed by all the people, also by the. secret police.

Article. 71 of the

Constitution says that a citizen may freely express his opinion :in an
oral or written form; it guarantees him free access to the radio, teJevision, and press.

However, when the secret police finds out that some-

one goes to lectures (free lectures), they take him into custody to humiliate him.

It

i~

said that Article 71 of the Constitution is

only for our descendants.
nels.

~Titten

The militia :is instructed through other chan-

That is the ivay a policeman speaks during en jnterrogat:ion of an
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oppositionist.
Isn't it

Isn't it an open infringement of the Constitution?

the situation of the state within the State?

I have the

right to stick the leaflet to a bill-post and a militia-man has no
right to beat me, strip me of my clothes, knock me about and rummage my
pockets for this, saying at the same time that I have gotten involved
with scoundrels, drunkards, students thrown out from the universities,
i.e., 1vi th the outcasts of the society.

All this happened to me. I at-

tended a lecture for intelligentsia (although I am a worker myself)
since I wanted to get in touch with them, learn their attitudes and beliPf8.

I was caught by the secret police and then humiliated by them

in various ways.

4.

Question: So, you.r are saying that there is a lack of law-

abidingpess in Poland.
Answer: Yes, of
5.

Are you?
~ou.rse!

Question: The lack of law-abidingness is one of the aspects

of injustice in Poland.

A.re there any other aspects of it?

Answer: To answer this question, I will give you the following
example,

Let us assume that I start to build a garage for myself.

The

next day, a ferret from the secret poljce comes and starts to sneak
aroung to find out if I have had permission to build it.
for such a permission, I will not get it.

If I apply

Then, they start to investi-

gate where I got a rotten board, a piece of tar paper and nails.
But if you go to Gdansk to the Kashub Lake District, you

~an

see

apartment buildings near the lakes, surrounded with three-fold fences,
watched by guards with dogs, erhere nurse -maids look after children, and
where the "nobility" amuses itself inside.
not investigate that case?

~vny

1-ihy does the secret police

do they not. check if these people are

strangers from the outer space, or from some other places?
not investigate where the;y' obtained their money?
Maybe they are the agents of Western imperialism?

Why do they

lfuom do they serve?
Does not the secret

police Potice residences which, in my opjnion, are worth three and a
half million zlotys?

They do not see the fences and several cars parked

in front of those residences?

Is it so

diffi~ult

to find nut who has
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built these houses, how much they cost and whose money was spent on
them?

Can this be called an economic egalitarianism?

tom of the classless society?

Is this a symp-

Can we call the government tolerating

such corrupt practices the governmer..t of the workers and peasants?
do they accuse the behreen-war

11

sanacj a" or the lords and nobility of

disorder and confusion in the State?

Is it not more important to in-

vestigate the lords wearing red ties to find out who they are?
do they come from?

li'lhy

~'inere

From where do they get. such big amounts of r.:oney?

wbere do they spend their holidays?

It i8 a dream of my life, for in-

stance, to spend my holidays in Leningrad, but. I cannot go there because I cannot affort it.
the USSR.

There are "friendship" trains which go to

However, it is a member of the Union of Socialist Youth, a

Part.y mewber, an activist. a member of the people's Democratic Party
that can go there, but. not me--a worker!

I am not worth the privilege

of crossing this threshold!

6.

Question:

~!hat

do you think, where do some people, those you

are talking about, get their money?
Answer: J will answer your question with the well-worn part.y slogan: "To everybody according to his needs."

Their needs have gone. very

far and that is why they are being satisf:ied!
7.

Question: To what extent could the events in Poland (especial-

ly in 1956, 1970, and 1976) be called a movement, if any organized
planned action js understood by the word "movement"?
Answer: I am not sure if I ce.n answer this question directly.
:Sowever, even if the defini +.inn of suc-h or other events as the "workers 1
movement 11 were questioned, it is necessary to stress the phenomenon of
solidarity among the workers of different branches and regions of Poland.

In solidarity with the workers of the sea-coast region, the tex-

tile workers of l·odz went on strike, the factories in Opole stopped
working$ the workers in meny fact.ories :in \l}'arsaw \vent on a si t-dowr..
strike, miPers in some mines in Silesia did not go down to work for
forty-eight hours, and ironmasters in Nowa Huta threatened to put out
blast-furnaces.

In 1970, PoJand was on the brink of a general strike,
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or even civiJ w9r.

In this sjtuation the government had to compromise.

I would like to add one more fact; this information comes from a
dependable source.

I heard it myself from the first secretary of the

Party, E. Gierek, that in December, 1970, Zenon Kliszko came to the
sea-coast region in a general's uniform, inspected different units and
used them to calm Gdansk.
obey the orders.

Nany offjcers of the Polish Army refused to

Some of them even killed themselves because they did

not want to shoot at the workers.

The commanding staff of the Navy

also refused to obey such orders.

'IJe cannot forget those people.

are true heroes.
ljes.

They

It is our society's duty to take care of their fami-

Finally, we have to excuse the soldiers.

The authorities spread

the gossip that the \-lest-German surprise raid landed in Gdansk.
such a case the soldiers could not refuse to obey the orders.
only the commander-in-chief that bears the whole blame.

In
It is

Besides, the

authorities used troops from special schools in Slupsk and Elblag.
"students" of those schools are social outcasts.
prised at the massacre in Gdansk?

The

Thus can we be sur-

I can understand those people, but

we cannot excuse the commander-in-chief.
8.

Question: Is the Polish society, in your opinion class or a

classless society?
Answer: In my opinion the Polish society has a class character.
I see it in this way: on one hand, there is the class of Government and
Party people, and on the other hand, the rest of the society.
hi~her

post is given to a Party member.

Every

Even a foreman has to be a

Party menber since the working t.eem is a social group, and such a group
should be directed only by

9.

R

Party member.

Question: now can you describe the Party members?

Answer: Excuse me, but I would like to introduce a comparjson
here.

When a farmer has a skittish horse, he halters it, so as to lim-

it its field of vision.
unlimited loyalty.

The Party needs such people, people c..ri th an

It is not necessary for them to know how to write

or read.

Others can do this for them, but they have to be loyal and

servile.

Their loyalty is rf!warded with different privileges and fa-
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cili ties.

10.

Question: Were you in the sea-coast region at the time 0f

the December events?
Answer: Yes, I was.
11.

Question: Is the officiAlJy announced number of victims,

forty-five correct?
Pms'..rer: First, this number of victims had been published before
the events ended.

Second, it is absolutely incorrect.

It is said that

the most probable number of the victlms was 600 people killed.
12.

Question: Do you believe in the rightness of the cause

th~

opposition fights for?
A'1.swer:
.
Yes, I do.

I beJ.ieve also that we 1.rill win!

Thank you for the interview,

VI.

Interview with Jan Samsonowicz and Adam Slonimski (Activists

of Young PoJand Hove:nent)
(Gdansk, June 20, 1980)
1.

Question: Before entering jnto a more formal interview, could

you say something about yourselves?
Ansvrer: My name is Jan Samsonowicz.

Professionally, I am a Po-

lish philoJogist. but I work as a provider.
My name is Adam Slonimski, and I am a physician.
profession but not in the sea-coast towns.

1Nby?

I work in my

I will explain this

later.
2.

Question: You both are engaged in the workers-intelligentsia

youth movement.

How did it happen that you became activists of this

movement?
Answer (,T .S.): The activists of the Young PoJand Movement are
united by a sped fie socio-reJ igious formation whicb they acquired from
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the university chaplains during their studies,

~'le

are united not only

by the Christian outlook on the world, but also by a spiritual formation Fhich we manifest in theory and practice of everyday life.
Friendship wd spiritual formation constitute the basis of our organization.

These are supplemented with common politicaJ views, and due to

this, our informal group took on a more formal organizational character.
It happened after the events of 1976.

3.

Question: Your views and activities have put you into opposi-

tion to the existing system.

Is this true?

Answer (,T. S.): It is said very mildly.
the system imposed on us in 1945.
create its alternative.

1:Je simply do not accept

We do not accept it and we want to

We reject the system and at the same time, we

reject the lvlarxist ideology which constitutes its basis.
communism an

experiment which failed.

the period of Stalinism.
from that.
ter.

We consider

It is enough to remind us of

The present situation is not much different

There is no compromise which we could accept in this mat-

I would like to stress also that we are not only the movement of

the yoUI1g intelligentsia, i.e., of t.hose who graduated from the uni versi ties, but. there are workers in our group as vell.

Education

j

s not a

factor which could make us a closed group.
Answer (A.S.): I would like to add that this attitude finds its
expression in close contacts between the Youpg PoJand Movement and the
Independent Trade Union, which is
Sopct.

ve~J

strong in Gdynie., Gdansk, and

This Trade Union is an authentic workers' organization, contra-

ry to the officiAl Trade Union completely controlled by the Party.

4.

Question: wnat kind of

~ontacts

do you have with the workers

at present?
Ans1ver (A.S.): The field of our common activity i3 an independent
periodical Robotnik (The Worker).

Besides, we cooperate in solving

many specific problems, such as support for those who lost their jobs
because of their social activity.

5.

We help them legalJy and financially.

Question: You mentioned before that you are not allowed to

work in the region of Gdansk.

Is it true?
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Ansi·Ter (A. S.): Yes, it is.
studies in medical school.

The roots of it reach as far as my

During the studies at the Medica] Academy

we tried to create an organization of stndents independent of the Polish Students' Associatjon.

After graduating from the school, those

who were most active in this fjed, were not allowed to practice their
profession in the Gdansk region.
sent, was one of them.

D. Kobzdej, who is imprisoned at pre-

He is a young doctor, one of the best students

at the Medical Academy, a finaJist of the All-Polish Biological Contest,
a member of the Students' Learned Society and of the Scientific Commission of the University Council. of the Socialjst Foljsh Students' Association.

(D. Kobzdej was charged with an insult to the dignjty of the

FoliPh nation, because of questionjng the alliance with the Soviet
Union, and i-li th breaking traffic regulations).

Apart from D. Kobzdej,

I and a friend of miPe, are not allowed to work in the Gdansk region.
Obviously, there is no formal ban directed agaiPst us, but everyth:i.ng
is done informally.
our employment.

It is up to the provincial doctor to decide about

And, I know, tha.t many institutions wanted to employ

us, but we could not get our jobs in this region because of the pressure from the Party ceJls on the provincial doctor who must sign the
licePses for us to practice our profession.

So, we work outside the

Gdansk region.

6.

Question: You mentioned the Independent Trade Unions.

Could

you tell me something more on this subject.?
Answer (A.S.): It
Independent Trade Union.

WRS

B. Borusewicz

~<rho

Since 1976, he has been a member of the Com-

mittee for the workers' Defense
for Social Self-Defense KOR.

which~

actually is called the Committee

He deserves the credit, to a great ex-

tent, for the existence of this Trade Union.
for organizing people.
deserves the credit.

started to organize the

He has a great abilit.y

This does not mean that he is the only one who
This is our common achievement.

At the initial

stage, the KOR 1 s task ivas to support the families of the workers who
vrere imprisoned after the events of 1976.

Later on, KOR changed jtself

into the Committee for Self-Defense, and thus it assumed much broader
goals and range of act.ivit.ies,

I want to be precise at this point.
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There is no division among us into workers and intelligentsia.

We are

an oppositionist group and education or affiJiBtion to a social stratum
are of minor importance.
groups are united.
one common opponent.

We all helped the workers and in that our

The difference is only a functional one.
That keeps us united.

We have

The fact that there were

solidarity strikes in the sections of the factory whose workers had
been arrested, can serve as an example of thjs solidarity,

The evi-

dence for the successfulness of strikes may be the fact that, when the
authority tried to dismiss A. Walentynovricz from the shipbuilding yard,
a four-hour strike in the section of thP shipyi'lrd she worked, was proclaimed. That scared the authorities and they revoked the decision.
On another occasion, the secret police separated the leaders from
the workers by force in order to defeat the strike.

Although, at that

time, there was not a strike, the Workers' Committee was formed which
successfully serves the 1..rorkers 1 cause.
7.

Question: vihat injustice do you observe in the socialist

system?
Answer (A.S.): The answer to this question is not an easy one.
The system in which we live, is not a socialist system at all.
nothing to do with socialism.

It has

It is a typical totalitarian system in

which the State is an absolute lord of everything.

It is the most

modern form of serfdom, which, however, tries to keep up the appearances of legality and equality.

And thus the working class is said to

rule in Poland, although the workers have been deprived of their basjc
rights to strike, to form unions, to exercise free speech; they have
been deprived of access to the radio, television and the press.
8.

Question: The socialist system boasts of having created a

classless society.

Do you think that our society is genuinely class-

less?
Answer (A.S.): I see two classes. or rather castes, in the contemporary Polish society.

One class is the ruling eli que to r...rhich be-

long alJ those 'N'ho serve the system.
other people.

The second class comprises all

The differences between the workers and the intelligent-
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sia do not account for significant differences as far as class division
is concerned.
Answer (J.S.): I would distinguish also the class of swindJers in
the Poljsh society.
of themselves.

These are the people who know how to take "care"

But those people should be, in some way, classified

hand in hand with the ruling caste.

They gravitate towards this caste,

although they do not form the core of it.
9.

Question: What is the demarcation line between the privileeed

caste and the rest of thA society?
Answer (A.S.): It is rather difficult to answer this question.
It is kno'Nn that the privileges at the low level of the Party membership are not equal to those at the higher levels.

On the other band,

it would be difficult to distinguish t.he level at which priviJee;es are
so great that those who enjoy t.hem belong to the priviJeged caste.
my opinion, the demarcation line is tbe Party membership.

In

J also would

include in this those peonle who. although not formal Part.y members,
serve the system in a servile v.ray and are paid for t.his.
10.

Question: vfuat

profits~

beside the financial ones, does the

caste of the privileged people in Poland get?
A.'1.swer (A.S.): Today, in Poland, everythjng depends on whether
you are in favour or out of favour with t.he Party.

Your position, pos-

sibiJities of scientific work and any social rise depend on it.
Party's ID is tbe key to your career.

The

Those who do not have it formal-

ly. bwe to make up for j ts lack with double servili t.y and with support
for the official Jine.
11.

Question: 1:Jere you :in Gdansk during the events of 1970?

Answer (J.S.): Yes, I was there.

I worked in the port at that

AnsHer (A.S.): I was there too.

I was a student in hjgh school.

time.
I learned the meaning of socialj sm in those days.
We were told to go to school, so I did.

It vras Wednesday.

iTnfortunately, some time be-

fore, I had hurt my hand and I got. it bandaged.

Even today, I remember
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that there were many tanks in the city.

I 1vas about 100 meters from

the school, whP.n the police car barred my way.
of it,

dre~.,r

Some policemen came out

me to the car and beat me 1.dth their truncheons.

They kept

beating me almost all the time on their Hay to the police station.

The

only break in beating was Hhen they caught tHo other people and started
to beat them.
12.

Question: tfuat is, acC'ording to you, the number of vict:ims

of the December events in the sea-coast citiAs?
..:ffiswer (A.S.): I cannot give you precise data.

It is certain

that the number of victims 1-1as much higher than officially a.dmi tted

(45 killed).

Similarly, the number of wounded persons was higher tha11

that given officially.

My conclusion follows from the fact that in the

Gdansk region they ran short of first.-aid supplies for t-rounded people
in emergency rooms.
13.

Question: Do you believe in the rightness and the victory of

your cause?
Answer (J.S.): Of course, we do!

In my op:inion, it is only a

ma.tter of time.
Thank you verJ· muC'h for the conversation.

FOLAND'S CONSTITUTION OF 1952
(An

E.xtract)

Article 1-(I) The Polish People's Republic is a State of People's
Democracy.
Article 2-(I) The working people wield State power through their
representatives elected to the Seym (Parliament) of the Polish People's
Republic and to the People's Councils on the basis of universal, equal
and direct suffrage by secret ballot.
Article 4-(I) The laws of the Polish People's Republic express
the interests and the will of the working people.
Article 6 The armed forces of the Polish People's Republic safeguard the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation and its security and peace.
Article 7-(I) The Polish People's Republic, on the basis of

so~

cialised means of production, trade, communications and credit, develops the economic and cultural life cf the country in accordance with
the National Economic Plan, and, in particular, through the

e;~pansion

of Socialist State industry, which is the decisive factor in the transformation of social and economic relations.
Article 9-(I) The Polish People's Republic strengthens in a planned way the economic union between town and country, founded on brotherly cooperation between workers and peasants.
Article !0-(I) The Polish People's Republic protects the individual farms of working peasants and assists them in order to protect
them against capitalist exploitation, to increase production, raise the
technical level of

agri~ulture,

and improve their welfare.

(II) The Polish People's Republic gives special support
and all-round aid to co-operative farms set up, on the principle of
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voluntary l!lembership, as forms of collective economy.

By apply:ing

methods of efficient collective cultivation and mechanised work, collective farming enables the working peasants to reach a turning point
in production and contributes to the complete elimination of exploitation in the countryside and to a rapid and considerable rise in its
welfare and culture.
Article 11 The Polish People's Republic promotes the development
of different forms of the co-operative movement in town and country and
gives it every help in the fulfillment of its tasks.

It also extends

special care and protection to co-operative property as constituting
social property.
Article 12 The Polish People's Republic recognises and protects,
on the basis of existing legislation, individual property and the right
to inherit land, buildings and other means of production belonging to
peasants, craftsmen and persons engaged in domestic hl'l.ndicra.fts,
Article 13 The Polish People's Republic guarantees to citi7ens
full protection of personal propert.y and the right to inherit it.
Article 15-(I) The highest organ of State authority :is the Seym
of the Polish People's Republic.
Article 24-(I) At its first sitting, the Seym elects a Council of
State composed of the President of the Council of State, four Deputy
Presidents, the Secretary of the Council of State, and nine Hembers.
Article 25-(I) The following functions are vested in the Council
of State:
(i) the ordering of elections to the Seym;
(ii) the convocation of sessions of the Seym;
(iii) the establishment of universally binding interpretation of
laws;
(iv) the issuing of decrees with the force of law;
(v) the appointment and recall of plenipotentiary representatives
of the Polish People's Republic in other States;
(vi) the acceptance of letters of credence and of recall of dip-
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lomatic representatives of other States accredited to the
Council of State;
(vii) the ra tifi ce. ti on and denouncing of international treaties;
(viii) the appointment to civilian and military posts specjfied by
law;
(ix) the awarding of orders, decorations and titles of honour:
(x) the exercise of the right to grant pardon:
(xi) the exercise of other functions vested in the Council of
State by the Constitution or assigned to it by special laws.
Article 29-(I) The Seym appoints and recalls the Government of
the Polish People's Republic--the Council of Ministers or its jndividual members.
Article 34-(I) The organs of State authority jn rural districts,
urban districts, to-vms, boroughs of larger towns, sub-county areas, and
voivodships, are the People's Councils.
Article 46-(I) The administration of justice in the Polish People's Republic is carried out by the Supreme Court, Voivodship Courts,
District Courts, and Special Courts.
Article 52 Judges are independent and subject only to the law.
Article 53
(II) The accused is guaranteed the right to a defence
counsel, either of his own choice or appointed by the Court.
Article 65 The Polish People's Republic extePds special protection to the creative intelligentsia--to those working in the fieJds of
science, education, literature and art, as well as to pioneers of technical progress, to rationalisers and inventors.
Article 70-(I) The Polish People's Republic guarantees freedom of
conscience and religion to its citizens.

The Church and other reli-

gious bodies may freely exercise their religious functions.

It is for-

bidden to prevent citizens from taking part in religious activities or
rites,

It is also forbidden to coerce anybody to participate in reli-

gious activities or rites.
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(II) The Church is separated from the State.

The

principles of the relationship between Church and State as well as the
legal and patrimonial position of religious bodies are determined by
laws.
Article 71-(I) The Polish People's Republic guarantees its citizens freedom of speech, of the press, of meetings and assemblies, of
processions and demonstrations.
(II) The granting to working reople and their organisations of the use of printing shops, stocks of paper, public buildings
and halls, means of communication, the radio, and other indispensable
material means, serves to put this freedom into effect.
Article 72-(I) In order to promote the political, social, economic and cultural acti vi t.y of the working people of tmm and country, the
Polish People's Republic guarantees to its citizens the right to unite
in public organisations.
(III) The setting up of and participation in associations whose aims or acti vit.ies are directed against the political and
social structure or against the legal order of the Polish People's
RepubJic are forbidden.
Article 80 Elections to the Seym and People's Councils are universal, equal, direct, and carried out by secret ballot.

THE LUBLIN MANIFESTO
The K.R.N. (Krajowa Rada Narodowa--National Council of the Homeland), called forth by the fighting nation, is thw sole legal source of
authority in Poland.

The 'emigre' Government in London and its agency

in Pole.nd is an illegal and self -stJrled authority, based on the illegal
Fascist Constitution of April, 1935.

That Government has hampered the

struggle against the Hitlerite invaders by its policy of political opportunism and is driving Poland to a new disaster.
The K.R.N. and the P.K.W.N. (Polski Komitet \'iyzwolenia Narodowego--Polish Committee of National Liberation) are acting on the basis of
the Constitution of March 17th, 1921, the sole Constitution, which is
legally binding and which has been legally voted.

The basic provisions

of that Constitution shall remain valid until the meeting of the Constituent Diet (Sejm) elected by a general equal, indirect, secret, and proportional vote, which, as representative of the nation's will, will
vote a new Constitution.
The P.K.VJ.N. calls upon the Polish population and upon all authorities subordinated to its power to collaborate most closely with
the Red Army.

Stand up and fight for the liberation of Poland, for the

return to the Motherland of the ancient Polish territory of Pomerania
and Silesia, for East Prussia, for a broad access to the sea, for Polish boundary marks on the Oder!

History and the present 1v-ar prove

that Poland can be saved from the German menace only by the extablishment of a great defensive alliance of Slav nations based on an agreement between Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia.
The Polish frontiers should be settled by mutual agreement.

Po-

land's eastern frontier should be a frontier of neighbourly friendship,
not a barrier between ourselves and our friends.

It should be settled

in accordance with the principle of Polish terri tory for Poland, vlhi te
Russian. Ukrainian, and Lithuanian territory for Soviet Hhite Russia,
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Ukraine and Lithuania.
The P.K.1.1J.N. will make a systematic inventory of t.he damage inflicted on the Polish nation by the Germans and will take steps to secure for Poland the reparations ciue to her.
None but a Polish administration can act, even for a single moment, on Polish territory liberated from German invasion.

It will be

the task of independent Polish courts to ensure the swift dispensation
of

ju~tice.

No German war criminaJ or traitor shall escape punishment.

In order to secure the reconstruction of our country and to satisfy the peasants' traditional longing for the soil, the P.K.W.N. will at
once proceed with a. broad agrarian reform in liberated Polj sh terri tory.

Towards that end a land fund will be set up under the Department

of Agriculture and Agricultural Reforms.

This fund will jnclude the

lifestock and equipment of estates hitherto held by Germans or by traitors to the nation, and also the estates of big landowners of more than
50 hectares, and in territories incorporated in tbe Reich, in principle,
of more than 100 ha.

The estates of Germans and of traitors to the na-

tion "rill be confiscated.

Large holdings of the above type will be ta-

ken over without any compensation, dependent on size, but a personal
allowance will be increased in the case of landowners who have won merit in fighting against the Germans.

With the exception of land set

aside for collective farms, the soil taken over by the land fund will
be distributed among small-holders, medium-sized farmers with large
families to support, and farm labourers.
The P.K.W.N. 's aim will be the quickest possible return home of
all emigres and it will take steps to organize this return.

The gates

of the Republic will be barred only to Hitlerite agents and those who
betrayed their country in September 1939.

We excommunicate the loutish

agents of the reactionary movement r,.;ho, by splittjng internal unity and
by their attempts to embroil Poles against. each other, have been playing into the hands of Hitlerism.
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